Sokolwski v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority et al
Filing
25
OPINION & ORDER re: 5 MOTION to Dismiss filed by MTA Metro-North Commuter Railroad. For the reasons explained above, the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's federal claims for lack of jurisdiction is granted. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims and those claims are dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment dismissing the Complaint and closing this case. The Clerk is also directed to close any open motions. (Signed by Judge John G. Koeltl on 3/28/2012) (cd)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
────────────────────────────────────
EUGENE SOKOLOWSKI,
Plaintiff,
- against -
11 Civ. 2623 (JGK)
OPINION AND ORDER
METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORITY, MTA METRO-NORTH RAILROAD,
and MTA METRO-NORTH COMMUTER
RAILROAD,
Defendants.
────────────────────────────────────
JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge:
The plaintiff, Eugene Sokolowski, brought this action
against the Metropolitan Transit Authority (the “MTA”), MTA
Metro-North Railroad, and MTA Metro-North Commuter Railroad
(collectively, the “defendants”), pursuant to the Railway Labor
Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., the New York State Human Rights
Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq., and the New York
City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-101 et
seq.
The plaintiff was terminated by the defendants and his
termination was upheld by the Special Board of Adjustment No.
1001 (the “Board”).
In various claims, the plaintiff seeks to
reverse the Board’s decision and to obtain an order that the
plaintiff be reinstated.
Jurisdiction for these claims is
alleged pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question
jurisdiction) and 45 U.S.C. § 153 (creation of National Railroad
Adjustment Board and special adjustment boards, including
jurisdiction to review orders of those boards).
The plaintiff
also claims that he was discriminated against on the basis of
his age in violation of the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL.
Jurisdiction
over these claims is asserted under supplemental jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
The defendants move to dismiss the claims under the Railway
Labor Act pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
They
move to dismiss the claims under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state
a claim.
I.
When presented with motions under both Rule 12(b)(1) to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and Rule
12(b)(6) to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, the Court must first analyze the Rule
12(b)(1) motion to determine whether the Court has the subject
matter jurisdiction necessary to consider the merits of the
action.
See Rhulen Agency, Inc., v. Alabama Ins. Guar. Ass’n,
896 F.2d 674, 678 (2d Cir. 2000); McKevitt v. Mueller, 689 F.
Supp. 2d 661, 664 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
In defending a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the
2
Court’s jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.
Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000).
In
considering such a motion, the Court generally must accept the
See J.S.
material factual allegations in the complaint as true.
ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Sch., 386 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir.
2004).
The Court does not, however, draw all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.
Id.; Graubart v. Jazz
Images, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4645, 2006 WL 1140724, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 27, 2006).
Indeed, where jurisdictional facts are
disputed, the Court has the power and the obligation to consider
matters outside the pleadings, such as affidavits, documents,
and testimony, to determine whether jurisdiction exists.
See
APWU v. Potter, 343 F.3d 619, 627 (2d Cir. 2003); Filetech S.A.
v. France Telecom S.A., 157 F.3d 922, 932 (2d Cir. 1998); Kamen
v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1011 (2d Cir. 1986).
In
conducting this analysis, “the Court is guided by that body of
decisional law that has developed under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56.”
McKevitt, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 665 (citing Kamen,
791 F.2d at 1011).
II.
The following assertions of fact are assumed to be true for
the purpose of this motion to dismiss, unless otherwise noted.
3
The plaintiff worked for the MTA for approximately twenty
two years and maintained an unblemished record during his tenure
as an MTA employee, until his termination.
(Compl. ¶¶ 7-8.)
On
September 2, 2010, when the plaintiff was terminated, he was 45
years of age and held the position of Mechanical Foreman
responsible for the maintenance and repair of MTA elevators.
(Compl. ¶ 7.)
While employed by the MTA, the plaintiff was a
member of the American Railway and Airway Supervisors’
Association Maintenance of Equipment Union (“ARASA”).
12.)
(Compl. ¶
A collective bargaining agreement entered into by ARASA
and the MTA governed the terms of the plaintiff’s employment.
Prior to July 16, 2010, the MTA issued Operating Procedure
No. 21-012 and General Safety Instruction 200.8, both of which
prohibit employees from appearing at work under the influence of
alcohol or drugs and from possessing alcohol or drugs in the
workplace.
(Compl. ¶¶ 10-11.)
Despite these prohibitions, ARASA negotiated an agreement
with the MTA known as the “SAVE Agreement” that allows employees
charged with the violation of a substance abuse rule to avoid
termination when certain conditions are met.
(Compl. ¶ 13.)
To
qualify under the SAVE Agreement, the alleged substance abuse
rule violation must be the employee’s first offense and the
offense must not involve any other apparent rule violation.
(Compl. ¶ 14.)
Employees who qualify submit to the Metro-North
4
Employee Assistance Program (“EAP”) and accept counseling; they
return to work only upon a favorable recommendation, also known
as a waiver, from an EAP counselor.
(Compl. ¶ 13; Decl. of
Brian Gardner (“Gardner Decl.”) Ex. B.)
The SAVE Agreement is mandatory on the MTA.
Accordingly,
any employee who qualifies under the SAVE Agreement must be
mailed a waiver letter within 24 hours of removal from service.
(Compl. ¶¶ 15-16.)
After receiving a waiver letter, an employee
must meet the conditions in the SAVE Agreement to be reinstated
to employment.
(Compl. ¶ 15.)
On July 16, 2010, based on an anonymous tip, an officer
from the MTA Police Department, along with New York City police
officers and personnel from the MTA Inspector General’s office,
entered an office in Grand Central Terminal that was occupied by
the plaintiff and two other MTA employees.
(Compl. ¶ 21; Decl.
of Frank Rinaldi (“Rinaldi Decl.”) Ex. B., at 4.)
Inside the
office, the plaintiff and two others were sitting at a desk upon
which were a bottle of whiskey, a metal pipe, a disc used to
grind marijuana, and two small bags of marijuana. (Compl. ¶ 21;
Rinaldi Decl. Ex. B, at 4.)
When questioned by the officers,
the plaintiff admitted that he had smoked marijuana the weekend
before but denied smoking marijuana while on duty.
21.)
(Compl. ¶
The plaintiff voluntarily turned over a bag of marijuana
when he was asked if he possessed any contraband.
5
(Compl. ¶ 21;
Rinaldi Decl. Ex. B, at 4.)
The officers issued the plaintiff a
criminal summons for the unlawful possession of marijuana.
(Rinaldi Decl. Ex. B., at 2.)
Later that night, the MTA
directed the plaintiff to submit a urine sample, which tested
positive for the presence of marijuana.
(Compl. ¶ 22.)
As a result of the positive drug test and the July 16
incident, on July 22, 2010, the MTA instituted three charges
against the plaintiff.
The charges alleged that the plaintiff
(1) violated Substance Abuse Policy No. 21-012 and General
Safety Instruction 200.8 by submitting a positive urine sample,
(2) engaged in conduct unbecoming a Metro-North employee by
possessing a controlled substance, drug paraphernalia, and
alcohol on Metro-North property, and (3) failed to perform
duties by possessing a controlled substance, drug paraphernalia,
and alcohol on Metro-North property during his tour of duty.
(Compl. ¶ 19.)
The plaintiff was removed from service on July
16, as a result of the incident, but did not receive a SAVE
Agreement waiver letter.
(Compl. ¶¶ 23, 25.)
On August 25, 2010, a disciplinary hearing was held to
investigate the charges against the plaintiff.
(Compl. ¶ 20.)
At the hearing, Rita Seaton, the MTA’s Superintendent of
Operation Support at Grand Central Terminal, testified that she
was directed not to offer the plaintiff a SAVE waiver because
6
the incident had been reported on by the media.
(Compl. ¶¶ 29,
32.)
On September 2, 2010, the MTA sent the plaintiff a Notice
of Discipline that terminated his employment. (Compl. ¶ 35.)
The plaintiff appealed the termination, but his appeal was
denied by letter on September 21.
(Compl. ¶ 36.)
The letter
explained that the denial was based on the MTA’s conclusion that
guilt had been proven on all three charges and that the
plaintiff was not eligible for a SAVE waiver.
(Compl. ¶ 36.)
The plaintiff appealed the denial to the Board.
42.)
(Compl. ¶
The Board affirmed the MTA’s decision to terminate the
plaintiff and held that the plaintiff was not eligible for a
SAVE waiver.
(Compl. ¶ 42.)
The plaintiff instituted this action pursuant to the
Railway Labor Act based on his argument that the Board’s
decision exceeded its proper jurisdiction.
First (q).
See 45 U.S.C. § 153
The plaintiff also brought claims for age
discrimination under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL based on his
argument that the MTA terminated his employment and refused to
extend him a SAVE waiver based on his age.
III.
In general, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction
to review the decision of an adjustment board.
7
See Andrews v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 406 U.S. 320, 324-25 (1972);
CSX Transp., Inc. v. United Transp. Union, 950 F.2d 872, 877 (2d
Cir. 1991); DeClara v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 748 F. Supp. 92, 94
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
The Railway Labor Act commands that a decision
of an adjustment board shall be “final and binding on the
parties.”
45 U.S.C. § 153 Second.
Judicial review of a
decision of an adjustment board is limited to three specific
grounds: (1) the board failed to comply with the requirements of
the Railway Labor Act; (2) the board failed to confine its
decision to matters within its jurisdiction; and (3) fraud or
corruption of a member of the board.
See 45 U.S.C. §§ 153 First
(q), 145 Second; Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 93
(1978). 1
Judicial review of a decision of an adjustment board is
“among the narrowest known to the law.”
United Transp. Union v.
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 588 F.3d 805, 810 (2d Cir. 2009)
1
The Railway Labor Act establishes a National Railroad
Adjustment Board, and limits judicial review of the decision of
any divisions of that Adjustment Board. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First
(q). The Act also authorizes the creation of special adjustment
boards, and provides that the decisions of those boards “shall
be final and binding upon both parties to the dispute,” and
“[c]ompliance with such awards shall be enforcible [sic] by
proceedings in the United States district courts in the same
manner and subject to the same provisions that apply to
proceedings for enforcement of compliance with awards of the
Adjustment Board.” Id. § 153 Second; see also United Transp.
Union v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 588 F.3d 805, 810 (2d Cir.
2009). The parties do not dispute that the Board at issue in
this case is a special adjustment board.
8
(quoting Sheehan, 439 U.S. at 91).
The plaintiff alleges that
the Board in this case exceeded its jurisdiction.
For a court to find that an adjustment board exceeded its
jurisdiction, the award must be “wholly baseless and completely
without reason.”
Gunther v. San Diego & Ariz. E. Ry. Co., 382
U.S. 257, 261 (1965); Giraud v. MTA Metro-N. R.R. Co., No. 09
Civ. 2187, 2010 WL 931886, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2010).
Moreover, “[w]here fraud is not at issue, the court’s inquiry is
limited to the sole issue of ‘whether the arbitrators did the
job they were told to do—not whether they did it well, or
correctly, or reasonably, but simply whether they did it.’”
Segal v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 373, 380
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting CSX Transp., 950 F.2d at 877). 2
2
At oral argument, the plaintiff argued that the Board lacked
jurisdiction to decide whether the plaintiff was entitled to the
benefit of a SAVE waiver because there is a provision of the
SAVE Agreement that provides that: “If and when disagreements
arise as a result of interpretations of the [SAVE] Agreement, a
committee of three . . . will meet as expeditiously as possible
to resolve any matters in dispute.” (Gardner Decl. Ex. B, at
¶ 8.) This provision is an administrative remedy that does not
divest the Board of jurisdiction to review disciplinary actions.
The Agreement establishing the Board provides: “Such Board
shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all final appeals in
. . . discipline proceedings . . . .” Agreement Between ARASA
and Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., at 1 (June 30, 1987), attached
to Letter from Sofia C. Hubscher, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Metro-N.
R.R (Mar. 22, 2012). Moreover, when the plaintiff appealed the
discipline assessed against him, he claimed that the failure to
afford him the SAVE waiver was error and not that there was no
jurisdiction to review the discipline. See Letter from William
Mills, Gen. Chairman, ARASA, to Andrew J. Paul, Dir. of Labor
Relations, Metro-N. R.R. (Sept. 16, 2010), attached as Ex. E to
9
The plaintiff argues that the Board exceeded its
jurisdiction by finding that he was not eligible for a SAVE
waiver. 3
The plaintiff alleges that the Board based its finding
of ineligibility on the “egregious nature” of the charges
against the plaintiff, despite the lack of an exception in the
SAVE Agreement for “egregious” charges.
The plaintiff also
argues that the Board found that the plaintiff had violated only
one rule (Substance Abuse Policy No. 21-012), which makes the
SAVE Agreement applicable to him.
Thus, according to the
plaintiff’s argument, the Board’s decision lacked a foundation
Rinaldi Decl. Similarly, when the plaintiff appealed to the
Board, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants’ decision to
discipline the plaintiff was erroneous, not that the Board
lacked the jurisdiction to decide the dispute because of the
existence of the three-member panel provided by the SAVE
Agreement. (Gardner Decl. Ex. D (“Board Decision”).) Any
argument that the existence of the three-member SAVE committee
is without merit and was, in any event, waived.
3
The plaintiff points to the defendants’ preliminary pretrial
statement from another case by a different plaintiff arising
from the incident that led to that plaintiff’s termination,
which contains an allegation that an MTA employee testified in a
disciplinary hearing that the other employee should have been
granted a SAVE waiver. (Supplemental Decl. of Brian Gardner
(“Gardner Suppl. Decl.”) Ex. A, at 4.) The plaintiff suggests
that this testimony supports his argument that he should have
been granted a waiver by the MTA’s own admission. However,
these statements do not differ materially from the plaintiff’s
allegations of that witness’s testimony at his disciplinary
hearing. (Compl. ¶¶ 29-33.) The issue in this case is whether
the decision of the Board was wholly baseless and completely
without reason, not whether there were contrary arguments.
10
in reason or fact because the SAVE Agreement applied to him and
does not contain an exception for “egregious” charges.
In this case, the Board did not exceed its jurisdiction by
finding that the plaintiff was not eligible for the SAVE
program.
The SAVE Agreement is limited to employees who are
charged with only a single substance abuse violation.
Here the
plaintiff was charged with three violations of the MTA’s rules.
The Board upheld each of the violations and held that the MTA
proved each of the charges.
(Board Decision at 6-7.)
Contrary
to the plaintiff’s allegation in the Complaint, the Board found
that each violation was a separate violation and the Board’s
decision on this point is supported by the record.
The
plaintiff admitted to the first charge against him, namely the
violation of Substance Abuse Policy No. 21-012.
The MTA proved
the second charge based on the plaintiff’s admissions and the
evidence collected during the incident because the evidence
showed that the plaintiff possessed marijuana, alcohol, and drug
paraphernalia at the workplace.
The third charge of failure to
perform duties also was proved because the evidence showed that
the plaintiff was in an office with two other employees in
possession of marijuana, alcohol, and drug paraphernalia, when
he was supposed to be performing his job.
7.)
(Board Decision at 6-
Although the Board noted that the latter two charges “could
be construed as somewhat overblown piling on,” it went on to
11
“find no fatal error in the redundancies.”
7.)
(Board Decision at
Because the Board found that the plaintiff committed three
violations instead of one violation based on the record
evidence, its decision that the plaintiff was ineligible for a
SAVE waiver was not wholly baseless or completely without
reason.
Thus the Board did not exceed its jurisdiction by
finding that the plaintiff was ineligible for a SAVE waiver.
The plaintiff’s argument that the Board improperly read an
exception into the SAVE Agreement based on the “egregious”
nature of charges takes the Board’s statement out of context.
The Board found that the MTA had proved three violations
committed by the plaintiff, which rendered the plaintiff
ineligible for a waiver.
The Board emphasized its ineligibility
conclusion by stating that “the egregious nature of the
[plaintiff’s] violations” deprived the plaintiff of the right to
a waiver.
(Board Decision at 8.)
Clearly the Board viewed the
plaintiff’s multiple violations as egregious and based on those
multiple violations found that he lacked a right to a SAVE
waiver.
This reading of the Board’s decision is confirmed by
its finding that the MTA had not violated the language of the
SAVE Agreement by denying the plaintiff’s leniency request.
(Board Decision at 8.)
The Board based its decision on the
plaintiff’s multiple violations that were supported by the
12
record and thus it acted within its jurisdiction when it held
that the plaintiff was ineligible for a SAVE waiver.
The plaintiff also argues that the Board exceeded its
jurisdiction by misapprehending its authority as to the standard
of review to apply.
The Board mentioned that the MTA’s decision
to terminate the plaintiff was not “arbitrary, capricious or
unreasonable.”
(Board Decision at 8.)
However, the Board did
not purport to use that standard in assessing the evidence.
It
is clear that the Board concluded that the MTA’s decision was
not a violation of the SAVE Agreement because the MTA proved
that the plaintiff committed three violations.
In reaching that
conclusion, the Board correctly stated that it could not impose
its “personalized notions of industrial justice.”
Decision at 7.)
(Board
The Board acted properly by judging the MTA’s
actions against the SAVE Agreement and the factual record.
The
Board’s decision that the plaintiff was ineligible for a SAVE
waiver was supported by the record and thus the Board did not
exceed its jurisdiction.
The defendants’ motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) is
granted because the Board did not exceed its jurisdiction.
It is unnecessary to reach the other grounds asserted by
the defendants for dismissal.
Because the plaintiff’s federal
claims are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
13
the plaintiff's NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims and dismisses them
without reaching the merits.
See 28 U.S.C.
§
1367(c) (3);
Valencia ex reI. Franco v. Lee, 316 F.3d 299, 305 (2d Cir.
2003); Merrill Lynch Ltd. P'ships Litig. v. Merrill Lynch & Co.,
154 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1998).
CONCLUSION
The Court has considered all of the arguments of the
parties.
To the extent not specifically addressed above, they
are either moot or without merit.
For the reasons explained
above, the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's federal
claims for lack of jurisdiction is granted.
The Court declines
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's
NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims and those claims are dismissed without
prejudice.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment
dismissing the Complaint and closing this case.
The Clerk is
also directed to close any open motions.
Dated:
New York, New York
March;l
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