Peoples v. Fischer et al
Filing
37
OPINION AND ORDER re: 21 MOTION to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) filed by Peter A. Crusco, Richard A. Brown, Eric C. Rosenbaum. For the foregoing reasons, the Prosecutor Defendants' motion is granted as to all claims and they are hereby dismissed from this lawsuit. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this motion (Docket No. 21). (Signed by Judge Shira A. Scheindlin on 12/1/2011) (lmb)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------------------------- )(
LEROY PEOPLES,
Plaintiff,
OPINION AND ORDER
- against
11 Civ. 2694 (SAS)
BRIAN FISCHER, LUCIEN LECLAIRE,:
JR., DOCS OFFICE OF COUNSEL,
WILLIAM LEE, PETER A. CRUSCO,
ERIC C. ROSENBAUM, RICHARD A.
BROWN, LT. L. JARD, SGT.
O'CONNOR, C.O. MALARE,
C.O. DROWN, NORMAN BEZIO,
D. ROCK, LT. WARD, and KAREN
BELLAMY,
Defendants.
----------------------------------------------------- )(
SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN, U.S.D.J.:
I.
INTRODUCTION
LeRoy Peoples, a pro se inmate, brings this action pursuant to section
1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code ("section 1983") against, inter alia,
Peter A. Crusco, Executive Assistant District Attorney, Queens County, Eric C.
Rosenbaum, Assistant District Attorney, Queens County, and Richard A. Brown,
District Attorney, Queens County, alleging violations of his constitutional rights.
Crusco, Rosenbaum, and Brown (collectively the "Prosecutor Defendants") now
move to dismiss Peoples’s Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure on the following grounds: (1) lack of personal involvement; (2)
failure to state a conspiracy claim; and (3) absolute and qualified immunity. For
the reasons that follow, the motion is granted and these defendants are dismissed
from the lawsuit.
II.
BACKGROUND
LeRoy Peoples is an inmate formerly incarcerated at the Green Haven
Correctional Facility (“Green Haven”).1 On October 5, 2009, Sergeant O’Connor
ordered Corrections Officer Malare to frisk Peoples and to search his work station.2
Officer Malare then led Peoples to his cell, which Malare searched, seizing certain
items3 including U.C.C. forms prohibited by Rule 113.30 of the Standards of
Inmate Behavior.4 As punishment for possession of these prohibited materials,
corrections officers moved Peoples to the Special Housing Unit, where he lost a
1
See Complaint (“Compl.”), Ex. A to Defendants’ Notice of Motion to
Dismiss, at 3.
2
See id. ¶ 2.
3
See id.
4
See id. ¶ 1. Rule 113.30 states that “[a]n inmate shall not possess any
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 9 form . . . .” (codified at 7 N.Y. Comp.
Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 270.2 (2011)).
2
tooth in a fist fight with another inmate5 and sustained mental and emotional
injuries.6
On October 13, 2009, Department of Correctional Services (“DOCS”)
personnel held a hearing in connection with Peoples’s misbehavior report
stemming from this incident.7 Peoples alleges that Corrections Officer Drown
“verbally attacked” him off the record.8 At the close of this hearing, Peoples
received a punishment of three years in the Special Housing Unit, a three-year loss
of packages, phone and commissary privileges, and seventy-two months of
recommended loss of good-time credit.9 In “November/December 2009,” Peoples
appealed the hearing disposition to defendant Norman Bezio.10 This appeal was
denied.11
Peoples alleges that the Prosecutor Defendants caused the search of
his cell by forwarding a package of letters they received from Peoples to William
5
See Compl. ¶ 1.
6
See id. ¶ 7.
7
See id. ¶ 3.
8
Id.
9
See id.
10
See id. ¶ 4.
11
See id.
3
Lee, the Superintendent of Green Haven.12 According to the Inmate Misbehavior
Report, the letters forwarded by the Prosecutor Defendants included evidence that
Peoples possessed prohibited U.C.C. materials and other financial forms that “are
bogus and without legal basis.”13
Peoples alleges that the Prosecutor Defendants violated his
constitutional rights by acting in concert with officials at Green Haven to suppress
his speech by confiscating his U.C.C. materials.14 The Prosecutor Defendants
move to dismiss the Complaint on the following grounds: (1) Peoples has failed to
state a plausible claim and (2) the defendants are shielded by absolute and qualified
immunity.
III.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A.
Motion to Dismiss
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must “accept as true all of the factual allegations
contained in the complaint”15 and “draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s
12
See id. ¶ 1.
13
See Inmate Misbehavior Report, Ex. A to Compl. at 1.
14
See Compl. ¶ 11.
15
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 572 (2007). Accord
Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 2009).
4
favor.”16 However, the court need not accord “[l]egal conclusions, deductions, or
opinions couched as factual allegations . . . a presumption of truthfulness.”17 To
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint must
meet a standard of “plausibility.”18 A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”19 Plausibility “is not akin to a
probability requirement,” rather plausibility requires “more than a sheer possibility
that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”20
When determining the sufficiency of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a
court is generally required to consider only the allegations in the complaint.21
However, a court is allowed to consider documents outside the pleading if the
16
Faber v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011).
17
In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2007)
(quotation marks omitted).
18
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564.
19
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quotation marks
omitted).
20
Id. (quotation marks omitted).
21
See Halebian v. Berv, 644 F.3d 122, 130 (2d Cir. 2011).
5
documents are integral to the pleading or if they are subject to judicial notice.22 A
pro se plaintiff is entitled to have his pleadings held to “less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”23 Accordingly, a pro se plaintiff’s papers
should be interpreted “to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.”24
B.
Section 1983
Section 1983 states, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .25
Section 1983 “does not create a federal right or benefit; it simply provides a
mechanism for enforcing a right or benefit established elsewhere.”26 “The purpose
22
See Global Network Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 458 F.3d 150, 156
(2d Cir. 2006) (vacating district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint where the
court relied on materials outside of the complaint).
23
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
24
Fulton v. Goord, 591 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 2009).
25
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
26
Morris-Hayes v. Board of Educ. of Chester Union Free Sch. Dist., 423
F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816
(1985)). Accord Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002) (“‘[O]ne cannot
6
of [section] 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to
deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to
victims if such deterrence fails.”27
1.
Direct Involvement
Imposition of liability under section 1983 requires a defendant’s direct
involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.28 “Thus, [a] supervisory official
cannot be liable solely on account of the acts or omissions of his or her
subordinates.”29 In 1995, the Second Circuit held that the personal involvement of a
supervisory defendant may be shown by evidence that: (1) the defendant
participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation, (2) the defendant, after
being informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the
wrong, (3) the defendant created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional
go into court and claim ‘a violation of § 1983’ - for § 1983 by itself does not
protect anyone against anything.’”) (quoting Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights
Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979)).
27
Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992).
28
See Farid v. Ellen, 593 F.3d 233, 249 (2d Cir. 2010) (“‘It is well
settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in alleged
constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under §
1983.’”) (quoting Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994)).
29
Bellamy v. Mount Vernon Hosp., No. 07 Civ. 1801, 2009 WL
1835939, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2009).
7
practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom, (4) the
defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the
wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of
inmates by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional practices
were occurring.30 However, in 2009, the Supreme Court held that “[b]ecause
vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . [section] 1983 suits, a plaintiff must [prove]
that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual
actions, has violated the Constitution.”31 “Accordingly, only the first and third
Colon factors have survived the Supreme Court’s decision in Iqbal.”32
2.
Conspiracy Under Section 1983
In order to survive a motion to dismiss a section 1983 conspiracy
claim, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) an agreement between [two or more state actors
or] a state actor and a private party; (2) to act in concert to inflict an
unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing
30
See Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995).
31
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948-49 (citations omitted) (explicitly rejecting
the argument that “a supervisor’s mere knowledge of his subordinate’s
discriminatory purpose amounts to the supervisor’s violating the Constitution”).
32
Spear v. Hughes, No. 08 Civ. 4026, 2009 WL 2176725, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2009).
8
damages.”33 “Thus, a plaintiff must show that defendants acted in a willful manner,
culminating in an agreement, understanding, or meeting of the minds, that violated
[his] rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or federal
courts.”34 “In addition, ‘complaints containing only conclusory, vague, or general
allegations that the defendants have engaged in a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff
of his constitutional rights are properly dismissed.’”35 While conclusory allegations
may be insufficient, “‘conspiracies are by their very nature secretive operations,’
and may have to be proven by circumstantial, rather than direct, evidence.”36
Finally, “[a] violated constitutional right is a natural prerequisite to a claim of
conspiracy to violate such right.”37 “Without deprivation of a federal constitutional
33
Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324-25 (2d Cir. 2010)
(citing Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1999)).
34
Bussey v. Phillips, 419 F. Supp. 2d 569, 586-87 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(quotation marks and citations omitted, alteration in original).
35
Ciambriello, 292 F.3d at 325 (quoting Dwares v. City of N.Y., 985
F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 1993) (quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted)).
36
Pangburn, 200 F.3d at 65 (quoting Rounseville v. Zahl, 13 F.3d 625,
632 (2d Cir. 1994)).
37
Romer v. Morgenthau, 119 F. Supp. 2d 346, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(“Thus, if a plaintiff cannot sufficiently allege a violation of his rights, it follows
that he cannot sustain a claim of conspiracy to violate those rights.”).
9
right, ‘there can be no civil rights conspiracy to deprive that right.’”38 Thus, to
survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege a constitutional deprivation.
C.
Absolute and Qualified Immunity
Government officials performing discretionary functions are generally
granted qualified immunity from suit provided that “‘their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.’”39 The Second Circuit has held that “[a] right is clearly
established if (1) the law is defined with reasonable clarity, (2) the Supreme Court
or Second Circuit has recognized the right, and (3) a reasonable defendant [would]
have understood from the existing law that [his] conduct was unlawful.”40
In addition, prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for “prosecutorial
actions that are ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
38
Bussey, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 587 (quoting Young v. County of Fulton,
160 F.3d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1998)). Accord Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63
F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that a section 1983 conspiracy claim “will
stand only insofar as the plaintiff can prove the sine qua non of a § 1983 action:
the violation of a federal right”) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,
150 (1970)).
39
Luna v. Pico, 356 F.3d 481, 490 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Wilson v.
Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999)).
40
Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).
10
process.’”41 “[A]bsolute immunity may not apply when a prosecutor is not acting as
‘an officer of the court,’ but is instead engaged in other tasks, say, investigative or
administrative tasks.”42
The doctrines of absolute and qualified immunity do not apply when a
plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive relief only.43 Prosecutorial immunity does not
bar a claim for prospective injunctive relief,44 so long as a court finds that “‘the
complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly
characterized as prospective.’”45
IV.
DISCUSSION
A.
Personal Involvement of the Prosecutor Defendants
The Prosecutor Defendants argue that because they had no personal
involvement in the constitutional violations allegedly suffered by Peoples, they
41
Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 343 (2009) (quoting Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)).
42
Id. (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)).
43
See Supreme Ct. of Va. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 446 U.S.
719, 736-37 (1980).
44
See Lewis v. City of N. Y., No. 07 Civ. 7258, 2008 WL 4307985, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2008) (citing Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. Cahill, 217
F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir. 2000)).
45
Ford v. Reynolds, 316 F.3d 351, 355 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Verizon
Md., Inc. v. Public Service Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)).
11
cannot be held liable for his alleged injuries.46 Peoples argues that the Prosecutor
Defendants were personally involved to the extent that (1) it is their job to “uphold
the Constitutions of N.Y.S. and the U.S.,” and (2) that the injuries Peoples suffered
flowed from his attempted communications with the Prosecutor Defendants.47
However, the injuries alleged by Peoples all stemmed from actions
taken by officials at Green Haven that did not involve the Prosecutor Defendants.48
The seizure of Peoples’s legal materials was ordered and performed by corrections
officers.49 Likewise, corrections officers moved Peoples to the Special Housing
Unit because of People’s possession of materials prohibited by the Standards of
Inmate Behavior promulgated by the Commissioner of DOCS.50 Peoples has not
46
See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss (“Def. Mem.”) at 6.
47
Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss (“Opp. Mem.”) at 3. I will consider the factual allegations
contained in plaintiff’s opposition papers to the extent they are consistent with the
allegations in the Complaint. “In general, a court may not look outside the
pleadings when reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. However, the mandate to
read the papers of pro se litigants generously makes it appropriate to consider
plaintiff’s additional materials, such as his opposition memorandum.” Burgess v.
Goord, No. 98 Civ. 2077, 1999 WL 33458, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 1999)
(quotations marks and citations omitted). Accord Cusamano v. Sobek, 604 F.
Supp. 2d 416, 461 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (same).
48
See Compl. ¶ 1.
49
See id.
50
See id.
12
shown that the Prosecutor Defendants had any direct involvement in these
incidents.
To the extent that Peoples is arguing that the Prosecutor Defendants
created an unconstitutional policy or that they were deliberately indifferent to a
constitutional violation, Peoples has not alleged sufficient facts to support this
claim. The Prosecutor Defendants work for an agency entirely separate from
DOCS and have no authority over DOCS policy or DOCS officials. For these
reasons, Peoples has failed to show that the Prosecutor Defendants were directly
involved in any of the alleged constitutional violations. Accordingly, the
Prosecutor Defendants are dismissed from this lawsuit based on their lack of
personal involvement.
B.
Conspiracy
Peoples alleges that the Prosecutor Defendants conspired with DOCS
officials to suppress his speech and restrict his access to legal materials.51 He
alleges that when the Prosecutor Defendants mailed the correspondence they had
received from Peoples to Green Haven officials, they included a cover letter that
indicated that DOCS officials should unlawfully suppress Peoples’s speech.52
51
See id. ¶ 11.
52
See Opp. Mem. at 3-4.
13
While Peoples claims that a conspiracy existed, he has not alleged any
facts to support this claim. Peoples’s conclusory allegations of conspiracy do not
raise a reasonable inference of a meeting of the minds to achieve an unlawful result.
Even if a cover letter existed explaining why the Prosecutor Defendants were
forwarding the materials, Peoples has failed to set forth any facts showing that this
cover letter would contain evidence of a plan to inflict an unconstitutional injury.
Thus, Peoples has failed to raise a plausible claim of conspiracy.
C.
Qualified Immunity
Peoples argues that the Prosecutor Defendants are not entitled to
immunity because their actions “were ‘not within the scope of their duty’ as
prosecutor, as they attempted to get a [sic] ‘gage order’ so to speak on plaintiff . . .
.”53 Peoples argues that neither absolute nor qualified immunity applies because he
is seeking injunctive relief against the Prosecutor Defendants.54
The Prosecutor Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity here.
Peoples has failed to show that the Prosecutor Defendants violated any clearly
established constitutional or statutory rights when they mailed Peoples’s
communication, which revealed his possession of prohibited materials, to DOCS
53
See Compl. ¶ 11.
54
See Opp. Mem. at 2.
14
officials. Regardless of whether the actions taken by the Prosecutor Defendants are
administrative, prosecutorial, or investigative, and therefore whether absolute
immunity applies, the Prosecutor Defendants are shielded by qualified immunity.
Although Peoples argues that he is entitled to injunctive relief and therefore no form
of immunity should apply, nothing in the Complaint reveals an ongoing violation of
federal law committed by the Prosecutor Defendants. Peoples does not seek any
relief that can be considered prospective. Thus, the Prosecutor Defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity, which shields them from the instant action.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Prosecutor Defendants' motion is
granted as to all claims and they are hereby dismissed from this lawsuit. The Clerk
of the Court is directed to close this motion (Docket No. 21).
SO ORDERED:
Dated:
New York, New York
December 1, 2011
15
-AppearancesPlaintiff (Pro Se):
Leroy Peoples
ID # 05-A-2620
Upstate Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 2001
309 Bare Hill Road
Malone, New York 12953
For Defendants:
Ryan G. Shaffer
Assistant Corporation Counsel
Special Federal Litigation Division
The New York City Law Department
100 Church Street
New York, New York 10007
(212) 788-1041
16
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