Peoples v. Fischer et al
Filing
551
OPINION AND ORDER re: 538 MOTION Motion for Relief from Settlement Order . filed by Dewayne Richardson, Tonja Fenton, Leroy Peoples. Accordingly, the motion for relief from the order of settlement is granted. The Court extends the Settlement Agreement for a period of one year, to begin at the date of this Order. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion at ECF No. 538. (Signed by Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr on 9/30/2022) (ate)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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LEROY PEOPLES, ET AL.,
:
:
Plaintiffs,
:
:
-against:
:
ANTHONY ANNUCCI, ET AL.,
:
:
Defendants.
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--------------------------------------------------------------------ANDREW L. CARTER, JR., United States District Judge:
9/30/22
11-CV-2694 (ALC)
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Leroy Peoples, Tonja Fenton, and Dewayne Richardson, on behalf of themselves
and the class, bring this motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rules 60(b)(5) and (b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking a one-year extension of the settlement agreement,
ECF No. 331 (“Settlement Agreement” or “Agreement”). For the reasons below, the Court
GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion.
This class action challenged solitary confinement practices in New York State Department
of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) facilities. In 2016, the parties entered into
the Settlement Agreement, which provided that Plaintiffs would monitor DOCCS’ compliance
with the settlement through various measures, including four-day facility tours held twice each
calendar year, attended by Plaintiffs’ expert, as well as an annual meeting. The tours and meetings
proceeded as planned until the COVID-19 pandemic. The first tour to be held since the onset of
the COVID-19 occurred in September 2021.
Plaintiffs first approached DOCCS in March 2021 with the proposal to extend the
Agreement by one year. On April 21, 2021, DOCCS wrote that it did “not
believe an extension is warranted.” ECF No. 539-4 at 4. DOCCS offered to schedule additional
tours during the current year instead. Plaintiffs renewed their request on July 26, 2021, and
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Defendants’ counsel agreed to propose the extension to Defendants. Plaintiffs’ counsel followed
up on August 16, 2021, August 27, 2021, and September 8, 2021. On September 10, 2021,
Defendants responded that the matter of extension could be addressed at the September 28, 2021
and September 30, 2021 tours. Plaintiffs requested that Defendants instead respond by September
20, 2021 because “further delay would prevent us from bringing this issue to the Court’s attention
should the parties fail to reach consensus on an appropriate extension.” ECF No. 544-1 ¶ 8. Having
received no response, Plaintiffs filed their pre-motion conference letter regarding the instant
motion on September 29, 2021. ECF No. 525.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), “the court may relieve a party or its legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” if “applying [the judgment]
prospectively is no longer equitable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). 1 “Rule 60(b) strikes a balance
between serving the ends of justice and preserving the finality of judgments.” Nemaizer v. Baker,
793 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986). Rule 60(b)(5) codified courts’ power to “modify their decrees or
injunctions in light of changed circumstances.” Tapper v. Hearn, 833 F.3d 166, 170 (2d Cir. 2016).
A motion for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) “must be made within a reasonable time.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c). Reasonableness is “determined based on the particular circumstances of the
case, taking into account the reason for any delay, the possible prejudice to the non-moving party,
and the interests of finality.” Thai-Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co. v. Gov’t of Lao People’s Democratic
Republic, 864 F.3d 172, 182 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
While the Court acknowledges that Plaintiff’s pre-motion letter regarding this motion was
filed shortly before the Agreement was to expire, the Court finds that the motion was timely given
the circumstances. For approximately six months prior to their pre-motion letter, Plaintiffs made
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As the Court grants the motion on Rule 60(b)(5) grounds, Rule 60(b)(6) is not addressed.
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multiple good faith efforts to resolve the issue of extension consensually before bringing it to the
Court. Defendants did not respond to Plaintiffs’ various attempts despite knowing that the
Agreement was soon terminating. The interests of finality do not pose a barrier here—Plaintiffs
brought this motion before—albeit close in time to—the termination of the settlement’s monitoring
period and have made clear that they are requesting a limited one-year extension to account for the
time lost due to COVID-19. Thus, there is no significant encroachment of the “tangible interest in
avoiding the costs, uncertainty, and even disrespect reflected by repeated and otherwise unfounded
challenges to [the court’s] judgments.” Thai-Lao Lignite, 864 F.3d at 188. Similarly, the Court
declines to hold that Defendants will be prejudiced such that any prejudice should outweigh the
reasons for granting the motion. Based on the clear terms of the Agreement and the alreadyestablished practice of facility visits and annual meetings, Defendants anticipated a certain number
of visits, occurring in a certain format (in-person), at certain times of the calendar year. COVID19 necessarily changed that expectation temporarily. Requiring Defendants to partake in the same
process to which they had previously agreed for the commensurate period of time that was missed
(one year) does not significantly prejudice Defendants.
Rule 60(b)(5) may be invoked when there are “changes in circumstances that were beyond
the defendants’ control and were not contemplated by the court or the parties when the decree was
entered.” Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 380–81 (1992). The Second Circuit
has not spoken directly on this issue but has implied that a party can only prevail under Rule
60(b)(5) if it points to a “material, relevant change in fact or law.” Fendi Adele S.R.L. v. Burlington
Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., 222 F. App’x 25, 26 (2d Cir. 2007).
Here, COVID-19 was, of course, not contemplated at the time of the Settlement
Agreement, and the change in fact and circumstances resulting in the cancelled visits were beyond
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the parties’ control. Further, COVID-19 materially affected Plaintiffs’ ability to monitor
Defendants’ compliance with the Settlement Agreement as Plaintiffs could not partake in the
crucial in-person visits and meetings, without which Plaintiffs could not carry out their duties
under the Agreement.
Defendants’ remaining arguments are without merit. Accordingly, the motion for relief
from the order of settlement is granted.
The Court extends the Settlement Agreement for a period of one year, to begin at the date
of this Order. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion at ECF No. 538.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 30, 2022
New York, New York
____________________________________
ANDREW L. CARTER, JR.
United States District Judge
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