Poindexter v. Davis et al

Filing 61

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re: 43 MOTION for Summary Judgment, filed by Milton, Davis, Faltine, McCain Hall, DiGiovanni, 57 MOTION That the defendant's motion for summary judgment be denied based on the undisputed documented facts provided by the plaintiff and allow my complaint to be decided on its merits, filed by Glenn Poindexter. For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 43) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's "motion" in opposition (Docket No . 57) is DENIED. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for defendants. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and in forma pauperis status is denied. (Signed by Judge P. Kevin Castel on 11/8/2012) (ja)

USDS Sni'~Y
DOCUMENT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ELECTRONICALLY BLED

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GLENN POINDEXTER,
Plaintiff,

11 Civ. 2928 (PKC)
MEMORANDUM

-againstC.O. DAVIS; C.O. FALTINE; C.O. MILTON;
CAPT AIN DIGIOV ANNT;
CLINICAL
STAFF AT M.D.C.; DR. MCCAIN HALL,
Defendants.

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P. KEVIN CASTEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff Glenn Poindexter, proceeding pro se. brings this action pursuant to 28
U.S.c. § 1983 against defendants, each associated with a state or municipal facility where
plaintiff has been a prisoner, alleging that while he was incarcerated at the Manhattan Detention
Complex ("M.D.C.") defendants failed adequately to attend to his medical needs.! Read
liberally, the complaint alleges deliberate indifference to plaintiffs serious medical needs in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which, in the context of a
claim brought by a pretrial detainee such as plaintiff, provides the same protections as the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 2
1 In plaintiffs papers, his name is alternatively spelled as Pondexter or Poindexter, and the Court will assume the
latter is correct. The complaint's caption identifies defendants as corrections or "C.O.s" Davis, Faltine, and "\·iilton,
as well as Captain DiGiovanni and "The Clinical Staff at M.D.C." (CompI. I.) Under the heading "parties in this
complaint;' however, plaintiff lists Dr. McCain Hall instead of the clinical staff generally. (Id. at 2.) Additionally,
defendants note in their statement of undisputed facts that C.O. Milton's name is actually spelled "Melton." (Dcf.

56.1. 1.) These inconsistencies have no bearing on the outcome of this motion.
2 Plaintiffs injury and subsequent treatment occurred when he was a pretrial detainee. As such, his claims would
arise under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63,69 (2d Cif.
2009). Deliberate indifference claims are, however, "analyzed under the same standard irrespective of whether they
are brought under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment."
at 72.

Defendants move for summary judgment under Rule 56, Fed. R. Civ. P. Because
there is no genuine issue of fact regarding the severity of plaintiff s medical condition or the
quality and promptness of the medical care he received, and because the roughly six-hour delay
in treatment here is insufficiently serious to allow plaintiff to prevail on his deliberate
indifference claim, defendants' motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are either not in dispute or, where there is a dispute, the
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. All times are approximate.

3

On March 9, 2011, at 11 :35 a.m., plaintiff slipped and fell in the common area of
a housing unit at the M.D.e., injuring his hand. (PI. 56.1

~

3; Def. 56.1 Counterstatement,r 3.)

Plaintiff immediately reported his injury to e.0. Davis, who refused to send plaintiff for medical
treatment. (PI. Dep. 33.) Seven minutes later, a different officer escorted plaintiff to his job
washing dishes in the M.D.C. kitchen, where he arrived at 12:00 p.m. (Id. at 33, 37.) Upon
arriving at the kitchen, plaintiff informed e.0. Faltine, who was supervising the inmates, that
plaintiff had hurt his hand before arriving and needed medical treatment. (Id. at 38.) e.0.
Faltine responded that she would send plaintiff back to e.0. Davis for an injury report. (Id. at
40.) While he waited, plaintiff abstained from working and instead placed ice from an ice
machine on his injured hand and sat on a box in the kitchen. (Id. at 40, 41.)
3 In response to defendants' motion for summary judgment, which was accompanied by defendants' statement of
undisputed facts pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, plaintiff submitted what has been styled a "motion," asking that the
defendants' motion for summary judgment be denied. Plaintiffs "motion" is accompanied by his own 56.1
statement (which is not responsive to defendant's statement of undisputed facts), a declaration, and exhibits to that
declaration. (Docket No. 57.) In response, defendants have submitted a 56.1 counterstatement and ask that the facts
in their original 56.1 statement be accepted as true, given that plaintiff has failed to respond. As the plaintiff is
proceeding pro se, however, the Court instead sets forth the facts from plaintiffs deposition transcript and other
documents submitted by the parties, accepting plaintiffs version of the facts as true for the purpose of deciding this
motion.

2

Eventually, C.O. Faltine generated an injury report, and a different officer came
and escorted plaintiff to the M.D.C. clinic to receive treatment. (rd. at 50; Richards Decl. Ex. 8.)
Plaintiff arrived at the clinic at 5:11 p.m. and was seen by Allen Walker, a physician assistant.
(PI. Dep. 50l After examining plaintiffs hand and stating that it appeared broken, Walker
wrapped plaintiffs hand in an Ace bandage, put his arm in a sling, and gave him Ibuprofen as
pain medication. (Id. at 53.) Walker recorded in plaintiffs medical records that plaintiffs right
hand had "swelling & point tenderness wi [palpation] wi limited [r]ange of motion." (Richards
Deci. Ex. G at NYC 98.) After plaintiff explained that his family was coming to visit him that
evening at 6:00 p.m. and that he preferred to delay further treatment until after their visit, Walker
issued plaintiff a referral to return the following day for x-rays. (PI. Dep. 54; Richards Decl. Ex.
G at NYC 98.)
At 8:00 a.m. the following morning, plaintiff returned to the clinic where he was
informed that he would be going to a Rikers Island facility for x-rays. (PI. Dep. 55.) Plaintiff
arrived at the facility at 11 :30 a.m. and later that day was diagnosed as having a closed fracture
in his right hand. (Id. at 58; Richards Decl. Ex. G at NYC 92.) The attending doctor rewrapped
plaintiffs hand and gave him instructions for caring for his injury. (Pl. Dep. 58-60.) The
physician also gave plaintiff a referral to see a hand specialist. (Id. at 61.) Plaintiff did not
request or receive pain medication while at the Rikers Island facility that day. (Id. at 58,60.)
Plaintiff arrived back at the M.D.C. at 1:30 p.m., at which time he informed C.O.
Milton that he was in need of pain medication. (Id. at 61,62.) Milton stated that he would
arrange for plaintiff to visit the clinic for medication but instead, and unbeknownst to Milton,

4 Plaintiff described Walker as a doctor, but plaintiffs medical records indicate that Walker is a physician assistant.
(Richards Ded Ex. Gat l\'YC 98,)

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plaintiffwas taken to his cell at 4:15 p.m. (Id. at 62, 64, 66.) At 5:00 p.m. plaintiff received
Tylenol with Codeine during one of the three daily medication calls. (rd. at 65, 66.) When asked
to recall the pain he experienced on March 9 and 10, plaintiff assigned a consistent pain rating of
roughly seven to eight out often. (PI. Dep. 39,43,54,59,66.)
On March 13, 2011, plaintiff met with Captain DiGiovanni, to whom plaintiff
recounted the events that transpired on March 9, including the refusal of C.O. Davis to complete
an injury report. (Id. at 84.) Because plaintiff could not write with his injured hand, Captain
DiGiovanni completed an Inmate Voluntary Statement Form on plaintiffs behalf. (Richards
Decl. Ex. D.) Plaintiff refused to sign the form because Captain DiGiovanni failed to record
plaintiffs words verbatim, omitting that e.O. Davis refused to send plaintiff for medical
treatment, and also because Captain DiGiovanni stated in the form that the accident occurred
while plaintiff was "rushing" to work-a detail that plaintiff believed was untrue. (PI. Dep. 84­
87.)
Following the accident, plaintiff received regular treatment for his injury
(including physical therapy and treatment by hand specialists) on dozens of occasions between
March 24,2011 and September 28, 2011. (PI. Dep. 79; Richards DecI. Ex. G at NYC 9-11.)
During this time, plaintiffs medication was renewed or adjusted repeatedly. (Richards Decl. Ex.
G at NYC 9-11.) In particular, plaintiffrecalls that he met with Dr. McCain Hall on March 15,
2011 to adjust his pain medication, which he felt was not adequate. (PI. Dep. 76; Richards Decl.
Ex. G at NYC 84.)

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DISCUSSION

L Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment "shall" be granted "if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." Rule 56(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. "The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between
the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A dispute about a fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law."

at 248. A dispute about a material fact is genuine "if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. The
moving party bears the burden of identifying matters that it believes demonstrate the absence of
a genuine issue of material fact, see -=-=-=-=-::::.:.::--=::...:::~--'-'--=...::=-=, 477 U.S. 317,323 (1986), and all
reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, see Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
372,378 (2007); ~=====-c.==~:""':-=-==-"-==~'-l;::.!.' 475 U.S. 574,587-88
(1986).
A pro se party's submissions are read liberally, a requirement that is especially
strong in the summary judgment context where claims are subject to a final dismissal. See
Graham v. Lewinski, 848 F.2d 342, 344 (2d Cir.1988) ("[S]pecial solicitude should be afforded
pro se litigants generally, when confronted with motions for summary judgment."). "However,
at some point in a lawsuit even pro se litigants must make clear to the court their claims and the
facts that they believe entitle them to specific relief. The summary judgment stage is an
appropriate juncture to identify the real issues in a case," even where the plaintiff proceeds
se. Salahuddin v. Coughlin, 781 F.2d 24,29 (2d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
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II. Deliberate Indifference To Seriolls Medical Needs
The Eighth Amendment prohibits infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments,"
including punishments that "involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976). A prison official's "deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain'" in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,104 (1976) (citation
omitted). To state a "cognizable" Eighth Amendment claim in this context, "a prisoner must
allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs." Id. at 106.
The deliberate indifference standard has two prongs. Farmer v. Brennan, 511
US. 825,834 (1994). The first prong is objective: the alleged deprivation of medical care must
be "sufficiently serious." Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 279 (2d Cif. 2006) (quoting
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 US. 294, 298 (1991 )). The second prong is sUbjective: the charged official
must have acted with a "sufficiently culpable state of mind." Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d
550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996).
The objective prong is divided into two subparts. "The first inquiry is whether the
prisoner was actually deprived of adequate medical care," keeping in mind that only "reasonable
care" is required. Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 279 (citing Farmer, 511 US. at 844-47). "Second, the
objective test asks whether the inadequacy in medical care is sufficiently serious" by examining
"how the offending conduct is inadequate and what harm, if any, the inadequacy has caused or
will likely cause the prisoner."

at 280 (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 US. 25, 32-33

(1993)). In cases where no care is provided, this means assessing the seriousness of the
underlying medical condition, whereas in cases of delayed or otherwise inadequate care, both the
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underlying condition and the seriousness of any deficiency in care are assessed.

id. In the

latter case, "it's the particular risk of harm faced by a prisoner due to the challenged deprivation
of care, rather than the severity of the prisoner's underlying medical condition, considered in the
abstract, that is relevant for Eighth Amendment purposes." Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178,
186 (2d CiL 2003).
While "[t]here is no settled, precise metric" as to how serious the condition must
be, Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 162 (2d CiL 2003), the degree of seriousness required has
been described as "a condition of urgency ... that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme
pain." Johnson v. Wright, 412 F.3d 398, 403 (2d CiL 2005) (citation and quotation marks
omitted). Relevant factors include whether "a reasonable doctor or patient would find [the
ailment] important and worthy oftreatment;" whether the ailment "significantly affects the
individual's daily activities;" and whether the pain is "chronic and substantial." Chance v.
Armstrong, 143 F .3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation and quotation marks omitted). "[I]n most
cases, the actual medical consequences that flow from the alleged denial of care will be highly
relevant to ... whether the denial of treatment subjected the prisoner to a significant risk of
serious harm." Smith, 316 F.3d at 187.
The SUbjective prong requires the prisoner to establish that the defendant acted
with a "sufficiently culpable state of mind." Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298. The standard is deliberate
indifference to the prisoner's health, "a mental state equivalent to subjective recklessness as the
term is used in criminal law." Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 280 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839-40).
"[A] prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless that official 'knows
of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and
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he must also draw the inference. '" Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994)
(quoting "'-==.!c' 511 U.S. at 837). A prisoner must show "more than negligence, but less than
conduct undertaken for the very purpose of causing harm." rd. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836).
III. Plaintiff Did Not Experienge A Sufficiently Serious Deprivation Of Medical Care
By his own admission, plaintiffs initial injury occurred, through no fault of
defendants, when plaintiff slipped and fell. Plaintiff has not alleged (and there is no evidence to
suggest) that his initial injury was caused by any action or omission by defendants. Thus, the
only harm to plaintiffthat could conceivably be attributed to defendants would arise from the
delay in treating plaintiffs injury, or from the inadequacy of the treatment plaintiff received.
Drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor, the time between his injury
and when he first received medical treatment did not exceed six hours. Plaintiff states that he fell
"[a]tsomepointbetween 11:35 a.m. and 12 p.m." (PI. 56.1 '13.) Plaintiff arrived at the clinic
for treatment at 5:11 p.m. (PI. Dep. 50.) He spent the intervening hours sitting down, applying
ice to his hand. (Id. at 40, 41.) Although plaintiffs hand was not x-rayed until the following
morning, that delay was due to plaintiffs desire to defer the x-ray until after a visit with his
family. (Id. at 54.) Following his x-ray, plaintiff received regular medical treatment and pain
medication. (Id. at 79.)
Plaintiffs underlying injury may have caused discomfort and some degree of
pain, but it did not constitute "a condition of urgency ... that may produce death, degeneration,
or extreme pain." Johnson, 412 F.3d at 403 (citation and quotation marks omitted). In cases
where the Second Circuit has held that a delay in medical treatment was sufficient to survive a
motion for summary judgment, the delay has persisted for months or years.

Salahuddin, 467

F.3d at 281 (five-month delay in liver biopsy needed for Hepatitis C treatment); Hathawav v.
8

Coughlin, 841 F.2d 48, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1988) (two-year delay in surgery to correct broken pins in
hip); see also Chance, 143 F.3d at 702-703 (allegation of inadequate dental treatment spanning
several months that resulted in extreme pain, tooth deterioration, and inability to eat properly
held sufficiently serious to survive motion to dismiss). Simply put, a six-hour period during
which plaintiff sat with an ice pack on his injured hand does not approach the threshold
requirement of seriousness for a deliberate indifference claim to survive. Following the six-hour
period, plaintiff was given pain medication and consistent medical treatment. The same is true
of the brief period on March 10 during which plaintiff went without pain medication until the
regular medication call at 5:00 p.m. There is nothing in the record to suggest that these modest
delays in treatment in any way exacerbated plaintiff s injury or caused him any harm except for
the discomfort and some degree of pain he experienced while waiting to receive treatment.
That plaintiffs injury was not sufficiently serious is perhaps best demonstrated by
the fact that plaintiff himself chose to defer medical care. Plaintiff admitted in his deposition
(and the fact is corroborated by his medical records) that he declined x-rays on March 9 in order
to visit with his family, electing to put off further treatment until the following morning. (PI.
Dep. 54; Richards Decl. Ex. G at NYC 98.) Thus, the most significant delay in plaintiffs
treatment occurred not through any act or omission by defendants, but by plaintiff s own choice.
Plaintiffs actions were inconsistent with any present claim that his underlying injury or any
delay in treatment was serious or urgent.

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket
No. 43) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs "motion" in opposition (Docket No. 57) is DENIED. The
Clerk is directed to enter judgment for defendants. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.c. §
1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and in forma
pauperis status is denied.

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./:;

SO ORDERED.

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P. Kevin Castel
United States District Judge

Dated: New York, New York
November 8, 2012

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