Mazier v. USA

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: For the reasons stated above, petitioner's habeas petitionis denied. Because petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C . § 2253 (c). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a)(3), it is hereby certified that any appeal from this Memorandum and Order would not be taken ingood faith. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). (Signed by Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald on 8/8/2013) Copies Mailed By Chambers. (mt)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------X
RONNIE MAZIER,
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
- against 11 Civ. 3469 (NRB)
06 Crim. 80 (NRB)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
----------------------------------X
NAOMI REICE BUCHWALD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I. Introduction

Ronnie Mazier (“petitioner” or “Mazier”) brings this pro se
petition to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Petitioner challenges a sentence imposed

by this Court on July 17, 2008, after a jury found him guilty of
conspiracy to distribute 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana in
violation

of

21

U.S.C.

§§

841

and

846.

The

jury

found

petitioner not guilty of possession of a firearm in furtherance
of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924.
This Court sentenced petitioner to a prison term of ten years,
the mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)
and 846.
Petitioner

asserts

what

we

generously

interpret

as

five

grounds for habeas relief: (1) Petitioner was denied his Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because his

trial counsel failed to object to the total amount of marijuana
allocated to him; (2) petitioner was denied his Sixth Amendment
right

to

effective

assistance

of

counsel

because

his

trial

counsel failed to request a trial severance and petitioner was
prejudiced
(3) the

by

having

sentence

(a) wrongly

a

joint

imposed

considered

trial

was

with

improper

sentence

his

co-defendants;

because

enhancement

this

factors

for

Court
the

charge on which petitioner was acquitted and (b) failed to apply
necessary reduction factors; (4) petitioner was denied his Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because his
trial counsel failed to request and secure a more desirable
prison facility for petitioner; and (5) the evidence presented
against petitioner is insufficient to uphold his conviction.
For the reasons stated below, the petition is denied.
II. Background
A. Petitioner’s Underlying Criminal Conduct
A group of persons involved in the large-scale distribution
of marijuana, known as the “John Shop Crew,” operated out of the
Bronx.

Pet’r’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Vacate, Set

Aside or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, at 4
[hereinafter Pet’r’s Mot.].

From in or about 1997 until in or

about 2004, the John Shop Crew transported large quantities of
marijuana from California to New York, where the shipments were
repackaged and stored in numerous stash houses around New York

2

in preparation for retail.

Gov’t’s Response to Pet’r’s Mot. to

Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2255, at 1-2 [hereinafter Gov’t’s Opp’n].

The stash houses,

including the 2748 Cruger Avenue residence that served as the
John Shop Crew headquarters, were secured by firearms kept on
the premises.

Pet’r’s Mot. 4-5.

The Cruger Avenue building also housed a music-recording
studio, John Shop Records, which petitioner alleges was separate
from the marijuana business.

Id. at 5.

Petitioner asserts

that, although “[t]here is no doubt that [he] spent time around
the house and studio no Cruger Avenue,” he was not involved in
the

marijuana

distribution

conspiracy,

but

rather

was

merely

“participat[ing] in Cruger Avenue’s vibrant and active music and
partying scene.”

Id. at 5-6.

According to cooperating witness testimony, petitioner was
seen

in

the

vicinity

of

the

Cruger

Avenue

house

marijuana to and receiving payment from customers.
12,

1209:21-1210:20,

1569:25-1570:12.1

delivering

Tr. 1013:11-

Petitioner

further

participated in the conspiracy by delivering purchase money to
California.

Tr.

314:3-7.

There

was

also

testimony

that

petitioner stored and had access to firearms kept at 2748 Cruger
Avenue.

1

Tr. 762:14-19.

Citations to “Tr.” refer to the transcript of petitioner’s trial.

3

B. Petitioner’s Conviction and Sentencing
On

February

13,

2008,

petitioner,

along

with

five

defendants, proceeded to a jury trial before this Court.
8:16-18.

Prior

to

trial,

petitioner

had

coTr.

expressed

dissatisfaction with his first attorney, Mr. Jerry Tritz, who
had been appointed pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act.
from Pet’r to the Court (Nov. 16, 2006).

Mr. Tritz subsequently

withdrew as counsel for unrelated reasons.
Tritz to the Court (Jan. 18, 2007).

Letter

Letter from Jerry

Petitioner was represented

at trial by his second attorney, Mr. Howard Jacobs.
On March 4, 2008, petitioner was convicted by the jury of
conspiring

to

distribute

and

to

possess

with

intent

to

distribute 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana.

Tr. 2677:19-

24.

firearms

Petitioner

was

acquitted

furtherance of the conspiracy.

of

possessing

in

Tr. at 2679: 7-9.

On July 17, 2008, the Court sentenced petitioner to ten
years in custody -- the statutory mandatory minimum and a term
of imprisonment significantly below the Guidelines range of 324
to 425 months.

Sent’g Tr. 6:1-4.

On petitioner’s request, the

Court recommended that he be housed at the prison facility at
Fort

Dix,

child.

New

Jersey,

to

facilitate

visits

by

his

wife

and

Sent’g Tr. 7:6-9; see also Judgment in a Criminal Case

at 2.

4

C. Post-Conviction Proceedings
Petitioner appealed his conviction, on two grounds.

First,

petitioner argued that insufficient evidence was presented at
trial

to

sustain

cooperating

his

witness

unreliable.”

conviction.
testimony

was

He

asserted

“vague,

that

general,

the
and

Br. of Appellant Mazier at 11, United States v.

Barris, 377 F. App’x 93 (2d Cir. 2010) (Nos. 08-4247-cr(L), 084251-cr(CON),
7166859.

08-4252-cr(CON),

08-5954-cr(CON)),

2009

WL

Additionally, he argued that a reasonable jury could

not have found him guilty on the conspiracy charge but not on
the firearm possession charge.
petitioner,

because

the

same

Id. at 10-11.
witness

testimony

According to
was

used

to

support each of the two charges, the testimony could not have
justified a conviction on one charge but not the other.

Id.

Second, petitioner argued that he was entitled to a retrial
because of possible jury tainting and this Court’s failure to
grant a hearing on the issue.

Id. at 16.

The Second Circuit rejected both of petitioner’s claims.
As

to

petitioner’s

insufficient

evidence

claim,

the

Circuit

found that there was “ample evidence to support [petitioner’s]
conviction[].”

Barris, 377 F. App’x at 95.

As to petitioner’s

jury misconduct claim, the Circuit found that this Court did not

5

abuse its discretion in declining to hold a hearing on the issue
and that a mistrial was not warranted.
Petitioner

now

challenges

See id. at 96.

his

conviction

and

sentence

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
III. Discussion
A district court must liberally construe the claims put
forth in a pro se habeas petition.

See Parisi v. United States,

529 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[Petitioner] was acting pro
se

both

before

accordingly
determine

we

the

district

must

whether

read

they

court

his

raise

and

on

this

broadly

submissions
any

appeal,
so

colorable

legal

and

as

to

claims.”);

Cortez v. United States, Nos. 09 Civ. 7220 (DAB), 05 CR 55
(DAB),

2011

[p]etitioner

WL
is

liberally.”).

666245,

at

*3

(S.D.N.Y.

pro

se,

his

“[A]

pro

se

Feb.

petition

10,

will

complaint,

2011)

be

however

(“As

construed
inartfully

pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976))
(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).

Pro

se

motions

are

therefore “interpret[ed] . . . to raise the strongest arguments
that they suggest.”
1995)

(quoting

Soto v. Walker, 44 F.3d 169, 173 (2d Cir.

Burgos

v.

Hopkins, 14

F.3d

1994)) (internal quotation mark omitted).

787,

790 (2d

Cir.

However, a habeas

petitioner still “bears the burden to prove his allegations by a

6

preponderance of the evidence.”

Gotti v. United States, 622 F.

Supp. 2d 87, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Whitaker v. Meachum, 123
F.3d 714, 716 (2d Cir. 1997)).
A. Timeliness
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, establishes a
one-year period of limitation for motions filed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255.
to

run

from

28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).
“the

becomes final.”

date

on

which

Id. § 2255(f)(1).

The one-year period begins
the

judgment

of

conviction

If a conviction is appealed,

it becomes final when “the Supreme Court ‘affirms a conviction
on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ
of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition
expires.’”

Moshier v. United States, 402 F.3d 116, 118 (2d Cir.

2005) (quoting Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527 (2003)).
This Court entered judgment on petitioner’s conviction on August
25, 2008.

The Second Circuit affirmed petitioner’s conviction

and sentence by summary order on May 17, 2010.

Petitioner had

See S. Ct. R. 13.1.

ninety days to seek certiorari.

He did not

do so, thus the judgment became final on August 16, 2010.
S. Ct. R. 13.1, 30.1.
petitioner

on

May

See

The present habeas petition was filed by

10,

conviction became final.

2011,

less

than

one

year

Thus, the petition is timely.

7

after

his

B. Analysis
A prisoner in federal custody may file a motion for a writ
of habeas corpus on any the following grounds: “[1] that the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the

United

States,

or

[2]

that

the

court

was

without

jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or [3] that the sentence
was

in

excess

of

the

maximum

authorized

by

otherwise subject to collateral attack.”
Collateral

attack

is

generally

law,

or

[4]

is

28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).

available

“only

for

a

constitutional error, a lack of jurisdiction in the sentencing
court,

or

fundamental

an

error

defect

of

which

miscarriage of justice.’”

law

or

fact

inherently

that

constitutes

results

in

a

‘a

complete

Cuoco v. United States, 208 F.3d 27,

30 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Bokun, 73 F.3d 8, 12
(2d Cir. 1995)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
Here, petitioner bases his motion for a writ of habeas
corpus
claims.

on

several

grounds

that

overlap

in

their

underlying

Therefore, these claims are grouped for the purpose of

the following analysis.
1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
A claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is analyzed
under

the

two-part

standard

set

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

forth

in

Strickland

v.

Under Strickland, petitioner

must demonstrate (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient in

8

that it “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,”
id. at 687-88, and (2) that the deficient performance resulted
in prejudice to petitioner such that he was denied a fair trial,
id. at 691-92.
First,
must

to

demonstrate

“identif[y]

acts

or

deficient
omissions

performance,
[by

counsel

petitioner
that]

were

outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.”
Id. at 690.

When a court evaluates an ineffective assistance

claim, its “scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly
deferential,” and it “must indulge a strong presumption that
counsel’s

conduct

falls

professional assistance.”
make

every

hindsight,

effort
to

“to

within

the

wide

Id. at 689.
eliminate

reconstruct

the

the

range

of

reasonable

Further, the court must
distorting

circumstances

of

effects

of

counsel’s

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s
perspective at the time.”

Id.

Where an ineffective assistance claim is based on counsel’s
failure to raise a specific argument, the claim must be rejected
if that argument would have been meritless.

See United States

v. Arena, 180 F.3d 380, 396 (2d Cir. 1999), abrogated in part on
other grounds by Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 537
U.S. 393 (2003).

Counsel is not required to make every argument

9

regardless
judgment.

of

its

merit

and

may

rely

on

his

professional

See id.

Second, to demonstrate prejudice, petitioner must show “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

“A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
Id.

Therefore, “[e]ven serious errors by counsel do not warrant

granting

habeas

relief

where

the

overwhelming evidence of guilt.”

conviction

is

supported

by

Lindstadt v. Keane, 239 F.3d

191, 204 (2d Cir. 2001).
Petitioner’s first, second, and fourth claims each assert
ineffective

assistance

of

counsel.

In

his

first

claim,

petitioner asserts that counsel was ineffective by failing to
object to or properly argue the amount of drugs attributed to
him.

In his second claim, petitioner argues that counsel was

ineffective in that counsel failed to sever petitioner’s trial
from that of his co-defendants. In his fourth claim, finally,
petitioner states that his counsel was ineffective by failing to
secure his placement in a more desirable prison facility.
analyze each of these arguments in turn.

10

We

a. Counsel’s Failure to Object to the Amount of
Drugs Attributed to Petitioner
Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective
because he “failed to object or properly argue or challenge the
amount of drugs attributed to [petitioner].”

Pet’r’s Mot. 15.

Petitioner asserts that he should have been held responsible for
only the quantity of drugs that he personally handled and not
the total amount attributed to all conspirators.
Petitioner’s
Strickland
deficient.

argument

test.

fails

First,

“Failure

to

on

counsel’s

make

a

both

prongs

performance

meritless

amount to ineffective assistance.”

Id. at 13-16.

argument

of

the

was

not

does

not

Arena, 180 F.3d at 396.

Here, any objection by petitioner’s counsel to the amount of
drugs attributed to petitioner would have been meritless.

In

the context of a drug conspiracy, a participant is responsible
for all reasonably foreseeable quantities of drugs within the
conspiracy, regardless of the amount the participant personally
handled.

See United States v. Jackson, 335 F.3d 170, 183 (2d

Cir. 2003) (“Under fundamental conspiracy law [the defendant] is
responsible for any amount of [drugs] that his co-conspirators
agreed to import so long as these amounts were within the scope
of the conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable by him.”).
there

was

ample

evidence

for

the

jury

to

conclude

Here,
that

petitioner knowingly participated in the conspiracy, that the

11

conspiracy distributed 1000 kilograms or more of marijuana, and
that this amount was reasonably foreseeable to petitioner.2
Second, and relatedly, even if counsel somehow performed
deficiently,

petitioner

Petitioner

has

not

responsible

for

less

could

shown
than

not

that

have

he

1000

suffered

should

kilograms

prejudice.

have

of

been

held

marijuana,

and,

indeed, the evidence presented at trial established that he was
properly held accountable for at least this quantity.
petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on appeal.

Moreover,

As discussed

above, a quantity of 1000 kilograms of marijuana was sufficient
to trigger the mandatory minimum sentence of ten years that
petitioner received.

See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).

b. Counsel’s Failure to Move to Sever
Petitioner’s Trial from that of His Co-Defendants
Petitioner

asserts

that

his

trial

counsel

rendered

ineffective assistance by failing to move to sever his trial
from that of his co-defendants.
to

petitioner,

his

defense

Pet’r’s Mot. 17-20.

was

compromised

by

According
prejudicial

spillover of evidence and testimony admitted at trial that was
not relevant to his involvement.

2

To the extent that petitioner argues that his counsel performed deficiently
by failing to object to quantities of marijuana attributed to him in excess
of 1000 kilograms, we need not consider whether counsel performed deficiently
because, as discussed below, such a failure by counsel could not have
affected the sentence petitioner received and thus petitioner could not have
suffered prejudice.

12

Petitioner’s argument is not convincing.
to

demonstrate

defendants

in

defendants’

deficient
a

single

criminal

performance.
indictment

acts

are

First, he fails

Joinder

is

of

appropriate

“unified

by

some

multiple
when

the

substantial

identity of facts or participants, or arise out of a common plan
or scheme.”

United States v. Mason, No. S1 06 CR 80 (NRB), 2007

WL 541653, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2007) (quoting United States
v.

Cervone,

907

F.2d

332,

quotation marks omitted).

341

(2d

Cir.

1990))

(internal

A motion to sever should be granted

only when there is a “serious risk that the joint trial would
compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or
prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or
innocence.”
U.S.

534,

Id. at *7 (quoting Zafiro v. United States, 506
539

culpability

(1993)).

and

proof

are

Moreover,
inevitable

“differing
in

any

levels

of

multi-defendant

trial and, standing alone, are insufficient grounds for separate
trials.”

Id. (quoting United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993,

1015 (2d Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also

id.

marginally

(“[J]oint
involved

constitutionally

trials

involving

alongside

permissible.”

those

defendants
heavily

(quoting

United

who

are

only

involved

are

States

v.

Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 947 (2d Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation
mark omitted)).

13

Applying these standards here, it is clear that a motion to
sever by petitioner’s counsel would have been meritless.

As in

all conspiracy cases, evidence of the activities of petitioner’s
co-defendants
conspiracy

was

for

relevant

which

to

establish

petitioner

was

the

scope

the

Indeed,

charged.

of

had

petitioner been tried separately, much of the evidence involving
his
have

co-conspirators
been

but

admitted.

not

him

Moreover,

personally
the

would

nonetheless

that

certain

fact

of

petitioner’s co-defendants might have been more culpable than he
does not justify severance.

Finally, we note that, although

petitioner’s counsel did not move for severance, one of his codefendants did, and we denied that motion.

See id.

Therefore,

a motion for severance would have been futile, and counsel did
not perform deficiently by failing to make such a motion.
Second,

petitioner

fails

to

demonstrate

prejudice.

As

discussed above, had petitioner’s counsel made a motion to sever
petitioner’s trial, the Court would probably have denied it.
Moreover,

even

if

the

Court

would

have

granted

a

severance

motion, much of the same evidence would have been admissible in
a trial against petitioner alone.

As such, even if counsel

performed deficiently, petitioner’s defense was not prejudiced.

14

c. Counsel’s Failure to Request Better Prison
Facilities
Petitioner

claims

that

his

counsel

was

ineffective

for

failing to secure his placement in a more desirable prison.
Pet’r’s Mot. 22-24.

Again, however, petitioner has demonstrated

neither deficient performance nor prejudice.
First, petitioner fails to show that counsel’s performance
was deficient.
the

Court

Petitioner’s counsel did, in fact, request that

recommend

request was granted.

a

preferred

prison

facility,

and

that

Sent’g Tr. 7:6-9; Judgment in a Criminal

Case at 2 (“The court makes the following recommendations to the
Bureau of Prisons: The defendant should be housed at the federal
correctional

facility

in

Fort

Dix,

New

Jersey.”)).

Because

counsel did exactly what petitioner is now claiming he should
have done, petitioner cannot demonstrate deficient performance.3
Second,
decision

petitioner

regarding

cannot

inmate

demonstrate

placement

lies

prejudice.

with

the

See 18 U.S.C. § 3621.

Prisons, not with the Court.

Bureau

The
of

Although

the Court may recommend a specific placement to the Bureau of
Prisons,

the

discretion.

actual
See id.

placement

is

committed

to

the

Bureau’s

“The Court’s recommendation is just that,

3

To the extent that petitioner objects to conditions of his imprisonment that
are based on his lack of United States citizenship, see Pet’r’s Mot. 23-24,
there was obviously no argument his counsel could have advanced, nor Order
this Court was authorized to issue, that would have improved petitioner’s
position.

15

a recommendation.”

Bowker v. United States, Nos. 4:01CR441,

4:12CV612, 2012 WL 1552516, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 30, 2012); see
also United States v. Alcantar, Nos. CV 10–7765 CAS, CV 10–8073
CAS, (CR 09–306 CAS), 2011 WL 2448247, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 17,
2011).

As this Court did not have the authority to designate

the facility in which petitioner would be housed, his assertion
that

his

counsel

failed

to

request

his

preferred

prison

facility, even if true, cannot sustain a claim for ineffective
assistance.
2. Improper Application of the Sentencing
Guidelines
Petitioner

objects

Guidelines range.

to

the

Court’s

Pet’r’s Mot. 12, 19-20.

calculation

of

his

As discussed above,

however, the Court sentenced petitioner to the mandatory minimum
term of imprisonment, and the Guidelines played no role in the
sentence petitioner received.
Petitioner

further

argues

that

he

qualified

for

the

statutory safety-valve, which would have allowed the Court to
sentence him “without regard to any statutory minimum sentence.”
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); see also Pet’r’s Mot. 19-20.

However, in

order to qualify for the safety-valve, a defendant must satisfy
a number of criteria, one of which is that he has no more than
one criminal history point.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1).

16

Petitioner

had two criminal history points.

Therefore, he was ineligible

for the safety-valve.
3. Insufficiency of the Evidence
Petitioner

asserts

that

there

was

insufficient

presented at trial to support his conviction.
10-11.

evidence

Pet’r’s Mot. 6,

However, “section 2255 may not be employed to relitigate

questions which were raised and considered on direct appeal.”
Cabrera

v.

United

States,

972

F.2d

23,

25

(2d

Cir.

1992)

(quoting Barton v. United States, 791 F.2d 265, 267 (2d Cir.
1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, this claim was

previously raised on direct appeal, and the Second Circuit noted
that

there

was

conviction[].”
Cir. 2010).

“ample

evidence

to

support

[petitioner’s]

United States v. Barris, 377 F. App’x 93, 95 (2d

Petitioner’s claim is therefore barred.
4. Request for Hearing

Petitioner requests a hearing on the issues raised in his
habeas petition.
unnecessary.

Pet’r’s Mot. 3, 20-21.

However, a hearing is

Section 2255 “requires the district court to hold

a hearing ‘[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the
case

conclusively

relief.’”

show

that

the

prisoner

is

entitled

to

no

Chang v. United States, 250 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir.

2001) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b)).

The district court must

exercise its discretion to determine whether, in light of the

17

record, a hearing would "offer any reasonable chance of altering
its view of the facts."
Here,
entitled
hearing

Id. at 86.

the record conclusively shows that petitioner is not
to

There

relief.

would

alter

our

is

no

view

reasonable

of

the

chance

facts.

that

a

Therefore,

petitioner's request for a hearing is denied.
IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above,
is

denied.

Because

petitioner's habeas petition

petitioner

has

not

made

showing of the denial of a constitutional right,
of

appealability

will

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

not
§

issue.

See

1915 (a) (3),

28

a

substantial

a certificate

U.S.C.

§

2253 (c) .

it is hereby certified that

any appeal from this Memorandum and Order would not be taken in
good faith.

See

United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45

(1962).

Dated:

New York
August 8

l

New York

1

2013

L(e~~4
NAOMI REICE BUCHWALD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Cop
of
mailed on this

foregoing Memorandum and Order have been
to the following:

Petitioner:

Ronnie Mazier

No. 52097 054

MVCC Unit A-5

555 I Geo Drive

Philipsburg, PA 16866

Att
for the Government:

Julian J. Moore,

John T. Zach, Esq.

U.S. Attorney's Off
One Saint Andrew's Plaza
New York, NY 10007

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