Robinson v. Gucci America et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: #101349 for the aforementioned reasons denying re: 11 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Matteo Mascazzini. The Clerk of Court is Directed to term motion (doc. #11). (Signed by Judge J. Paul Oetken on 1/26/2012) (cd) Modified on 1/30/2012 (jab).
VSDCSDNY
DOCUMENT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ELECTRCl~iCALLY
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DOC#:
DATE FILED:
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FILED
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I '7 "'VI 17
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JOSEPHINE ROBINSON,
Plaintiff~
ll-CV-3742 (JPO)
-v-
MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER
GUCCI AMERICA, STAN SHERWOOD,
MATTEO MASCAZZINI, and CHRISTY
LELECK,
Defendants.
------------------------------------------------------------- )(
J. PAUL OETKEN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Josephine Robinson ("Robinson") brings this action against Defendant Gucci
America ("Gucci") for discrimination based on sex, race, national origin, and disability, and for
retaliation for her opposition to those practices, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2008, et seq. ("Title VII"); the Americans with Disabilities Act; New York
State Executive Law, Human Rights Law ("NYHRL") § 296; and the New York City Human
Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code Title 8. Robinson also brings claims against Stan Sherwood
("Sherwood"), Matteo Mascazzini ("Mascazzini"), and Christy Leleck ("Leleck") for aiding,
abetting, inciting, compelling, and/or coercing the aforementioned unlawful conduct in violation
ofNYHRL § 296(6). Mascazzini moves to dismiss the claims against him under Rule 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the "Federal Rules"), for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. For the reasons that follow, the Court denies Mascazzini's motion
to dismiss.
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I.
Background
A. Factual Background
The following facts are drawn from the allegations in the Complaint, which are presumed
true for the purpose of this motion. The Complaint details an extensive history of allegedly
discriminatory behavior on the part of various employees of Gucci. This summary focuses on
the facts pertinent to the motion before the Court.
Plaintiff Robinson was, from March 2008 to November 2010, employed as a tax attorney
by Gucci. She is a dark-skinned, Latin female of West Indian national origin. Sherwood was, at
all times relevant to this case, Executive International Tax Counsel, and was Robinson's
supervisor at Gucci. Leleck was, at all times relevant to this case, the Director of Human
Resources ("HR") at Gucci. Mascazzini was, at all times relevant to this case, Associate
President of Gucci, and was also Robinson's supervisor.
Almost from the time that she started at Gucci, Robinson was subjected to a series of
racially and sexually harassing comments from Sherwood. It is not necessary to detail this
conduct at this stage, given that the Complaint does not allege that Mascazzini was involved in
this behavior, but for the sake of illustration, the Complaint describes one such incident as
follows:
On April 9, 2009, Sherwood called Robinson a loose woman. Robinson told
Sherwood she was offended and did not appreciate his comment. Sherwood
replied that she was a typical black girl from Bronx. Sherwood also said that
Latin women have a reputation for being loose and Robinson proved that to be
true.
(Complaint ("Compl.")
~
17.)
Starting in May 2010, Robinson began raising her concerns about these comments with
her colleagues and with representatives from Gucci's HR department. In response, Sherwood
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allegedly joked about Robinson's complaints, and continued making similar comments to
Robinson. In June 2010, Robinson again raised her concerns with the HR department.
On July 17,2010, Robinson received a letter from HR "reprimanding her for behaving
inappropriately" at a work function she had attended during the prior year, "even though she was
not advised of the nature of the alleged inappropriate conduct." (CompI.
~
35.) Robinson
responded to the letter by email to Leleck and Hilarie Nenner, Manager of Oucci HR, in which
Robinson again raised her concerns about Sherwood's comments. Immediately thereafter,
Robinson requested a meeting with Nenner. Robinson did not receive a response.
On July 26,2010, Robinson was placed on administrative leave and was escorted out of
the building by security.
On September 13, 2010, Robinson was instructed to return to work the following day,
and was given the option to work in the office in Seacaucus, New Jersey or return to work in the
New York office. Robinson elected to work in the New York office. When she reported to work
the next day, Mascazzini and Leleck ordered her to report to work in the New Jersey office.
Robinson "objected and explained that the commute was too burdensome and she cannot
lawfully practice law in New Jersey because she is not licensed to do so. Nonetheless, Leleck
and Mascazzini ordered Robisnon to report to work in New Jersey." (CompI.
~
42.) Robinson
stated that she was being subjected to retaliation, but in response Leleck repeatedly stated, "You
are to be at the New Jersey office September 15th at 8:30 in the morning." (Compi.
~
43.)
The office to which Robinson was assigned in New Jersey was "hot and dirty," and she
was not given a computer or any work assignments. (CompI.
~
44.) Robinson noticed that she
was experiencing symptoms of depression and sought medical treatment. On September 26,
2010, she was hospitalized "for anxiety and severe depression." (Compi.
Leleck of her situation and was placed on medical leave.
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~
46.) She notified
Upon her return to work on October 20, 2010, Robinson had several conflicts with Gucci
HR personnel regarding accommodations for her medical appointments. On October 25, 2010,
she received an email from HR "reprimanding her for being unprofessional" in her
correspondence with HR regarding scheduling days off for her medical appointments. On
October 27, 2010, she was called to a meeting with Nenner, who reprimanded her for "being
unprofessional and rude in the email to Leleck wherein Robinson expressed her belief that Gucci
violated her right to [Family Medical Leave Act] leave." (CompI.
~56.)
That same day, Nenner
and a member of Gucci's legal counsel placed Robinson on administrative leave "pending an
investigation and until further notice." (CompI.
~
57.)
On November 2, 2010, Robinson received a letter from Leleck terminating her
employment effective November 1,2010.
B. Procedural History
Robinson filed the Complaint in this case on June 1, 2011. At that time, the case was
assigned to the Honorable William H. Pauley, III. On October 3, 2011, the case was reassigned
to the undersigned pursuant to this District's Rules for the Division of Business Among District
Judges governing the reassignment of cases to new District Judges.
On October 7, 2011 Mascazzini filed the instant motion.
II.
Discussion
A. Motion to Dismiss Standard
In order to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must
plead sufficient factual allegations "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible "when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937,
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1949 (2009). The Court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint,
and "draw [ ] all inferences in the plaintiffs favor." Allaire Corp. v. Okumus, 433 FJd 248,
249-50 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). On the other hand, "the tenet that a court
must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555 (noting that a court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation" (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986»).
In a recent summary of the plausibility standard, the Second Circuit explained that
the Twombly Court stated that a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, but mere labels and conclusions
or formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action will not do; rather, the
complaint'sfactual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level, i.e., enough to make the claim plausible.
Arista Records, LLCv. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555, 570) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The court further explained that this
"does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegality." Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) (quotation marks omitted).
The Second Circuit has held that "the pleading requirements in discrimination cases are
very lenient, even de minimis," Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195,200 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting
Brown v. Coach Stores, Inc., 163 F.3d 706,710 (2d Cir. 1998». Prior to its decision in
Twombly, the Supreme Court held that, in a discrimination case, a plaintiff is not required to
plead in its complaint the specific elements of a prima facie case under the burden-shifting
framework outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 492 (1973). Swierkiewicz
v. Sorema NA., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002) (explaining that the burden-shifting framework "is an
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evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement"). The Court expressly reaffirmed this holding
in the Twombly decision. See 550 U.S. at 569-70 (citing Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508). The
Second Circuit has also affirmed the continued force of the Swierkiewicz rule even after
Twombly and Iqbal. See Arista, 604 F.3d at 120; Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 213-14 (2d
Cir. 2008) (holding post-Twombly, but pre-Iqbal, that Swierkiewicz "applies with equal force to
any claim ... that the McDonnell Douglas framework covers" and retains its "vitality" post-
Twombly). "Reconciling Swierkiewicz, Twombly, and Iqbal, a complaint need not establish a
prima facie case of employment discrimination to survive a motion to dismiss; however, 'the
claim must be facially plausible and must give fair notice to the defendants of the basis for the
claim.'" Barbosa v. Continuum Health Partners, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 2d 210, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(quoting Fowler v. Scores Holding Co., 677 F.Supp.2d 673, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)).
B. Applicable Law
Robinson brings claims against her former employer under Title VII, as well as the
NYHRL and the New York City Human Rights Law. However, against Mascazzini and the
other individual defendants, Plaintiff brings claims only under the NYHRL. 1
Section 296(1) ofthe New York State Human Rights Law provides that "[i]t shall be an
unlawful discriminatory practice ... [f]or an employer ... because of an individual's ... race, ...
color, national origin, . .. sex, [or] disability, ... to ... bar or to discharge from employment
such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions
or privileges of employment." N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). The same statute also provides that
it shall be unlawful to retaliate against an employee because she has "opposed" any such
discriminatory practice. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(e).
Courts in this circuit "typically treat Title VII and NYHRL discrimination claims as
analytically identical, applying the same standard of proof to both claims." Salamon v. Our Lady
o/Victory Hosp. 514 F.3d 217,226 n.9 (2d Cir. 2008)
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To state a claim for retaliation under the NYHRL, a plaintiff must allege that "(1) she has
engaged in protected activity, (2) her employer was aware that she participated in such activity,
(3) she suffered an adverse employment action based upon her activity, and (4) there is a causal
connection between the protected activity and the adverse action." Harper v. New York City
Housing Authority, 673 F. Supp. 2d 174, 181-82 (S.D.N. V. 2009) (quoting Forrest v. Jewish
Guild/or the Blind, 3 N.V.3d 295,312-13,786 N.Y.S.2d 382, 395-96,819 N.E.2d 998, 1011-12
(2004».
Generally, only the employer itself, and not individual employees, may be liable for
discrimination under Title VII or the NYHRL. Mandell v. County o/Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 377
(2d Cir. 2003). However, section 296(6) of the NYHRL provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful
discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of
the acts forbidden under this article, or to attempt to do so." N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). The
Second Circuit has held that this provision imposes personal liability on an individual "who
actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim." Tomka v. Seiler Corp.,
66 F.3d 1295,1317 (2d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). See also Feingoldv. New York, 366 F.3d 138,158-59 (2d Cir.
2004). Courts in the circuit have emphasized that
Aiding and abetting liability requires that the aider and abettor share the intent or
purpose of the principal actor, and there can be no partnership in an act where
there is no community of purpose. Consequently, to find that a defendant actually
participated in the discriminatory conduct requires a showing of direct, purposeful
participation.
Fried v. LVI Services, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 9308,2011 WL 2119748, at *7 (S.D.N. V. May 23,
2011) (quoting Brice v. Sec. Operations Sys., Inc., No. 00 Civ. 2438, 2001 WL 185136, at *4
(S.D.N.V. Feb. 26,2001» (quotation marks omitted); see also Robles v. Goddard Riverside
Community Ctr., No. 08 Civ. 4856,2009 WL 1704627, at *3 (S.D.N.V. June 17,2009).
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C. Application of Law to Facts
The Complaint discusses Mascazzini's actions only once: After Robinson returned from
her first administrative leave, she was offered the choice to work in either the New York or New
Jersey office, and elected to work in the New York office. The references to Mascazzini appear
in paragraphs 42 and 43 of the Complaint:
42. When Robinson reported to work on September 14, Mascazzini and Leleck
ordered Robinson to report to work in the New Jersey office. Robinson objected
and explained that the commute was too burdensome and she cannot lawfully
practice law in New Jersey because she is not licensed to do so. Nonetheless,
Leleck and Mascazzini ordered Robinson to report to work in New Jersey.
43. Robinson complained to Mascazzini and Leleck that she was being subjected
to retaliation. Despite this, Le1eck repeated multiple times, "You are to be at the
New Jersey office September 15th at 8:30 in the morning."
(Compi.
~~
42-43.)
Mascazzini concedes, for the purposes of this motion, that the move to New Jersey
constituted an adverse employment action and does not dispute that Robinson engaged in
protected activity. (Defendant Mascazzini's Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of
Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 19) at 3 n.l.) Nevertheless, he argues that Robinson has not alleged
sufficient facts to support a claim against him because there are no allegations that Mascazzini
"actually participate[d]" in any alleged discriminatory or retaliatory conduct, nor any facts to
show that Mascazzini "share[d] the intent or purpose" of his co-defendants. Fried, 2011 WL
2119748, at *7.
Mascazzini is correct that there are no allegations that Mascazzini participated in the
discrimination that gave rise to Robinson's initial complaints regarding a hostile work
environment. However, keeping in mind the Second Circuit's admonition that the "the pleading
requirements in discrimination cases are very lenient, even de minimis," Deravin, 335 F.3d at
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200, Robinson has adequately pleaded a claim against Mascazzini for aiding and abetting
retaliation against her.
Mascazzini argues that there is no allegation that he had knowledge of Robinson's
alleged prior protected conduct when he participated in the decision to assign her to the New
Jersey office. However, at the same meeting in which Mascazzini allegedly participated in
ordering Robinson to report to the New Jersey office, Robinson stated that this move would be
burdensome for her, and that she was being subjected to retaliation. She also explained that she
was not licensed to practice law in New Jersey. Mascazzini nevertheless apparently assented to
the instruction for Robinson to work in the New Jersey office.
As the Second Circuit has explained (in the context of reviewing a jury verdict),
"[aJctions taken by an employer that disadvantage an employee for no logical reason constitute
strong evidence of an intent to discriminate." Stratton v. Dep 'f for the Agingfor the City ofNew
York, 132 F.3d 869, 880 n.6 (2d Cir. 1997). Here, taking the allegations of the complaint as true,
and given that Robinson was not licensed to practice law in New Jersey, there does not appear to
have been a logical reason for her to be assigned to work there. Moreover, to whatever extent
Mascazzini may have been ignorant of Robinson's past protected conduct, Robinson stated at the
meeting that she believed she was being subjected to retaliation. Despite this, Mascazzini
allegedly persisted in assigning her to the New Jersey office.
Based on the facts pleaded, the Court can draw the reasonable inference that Macazzini
aided and abetted retaliation against Robinson for her past complaints about discrimination at
Gucci. As the Supreme Court emphasized in Iqbal, "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." 129 S.Ct. at 1950. It is, of course, possible that
the evidence will demonstrate that Mascazzini had legitimate non-discriminatory and non
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retaliatory reasons for his actions, but that is an issue to be decided on summary judgment, not at
the motion to dismiss stage.
III.
Conclusion
For the aforementioned reasons, Mascazzini's motion to dismiss the complaint against
him is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: New York, New York
January 26,2012
United States District Judge
The Clerk ofCourt is Directed to:
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Tenn motion (doc. #JLJ
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