Reeves et al v. Detective Richard Anderson et al
Filing
32
OPINION AND ORDER re: 18 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by The Village of Bronxville Police Department, Chief Christopher Satriale, Detective Richard Anderson, The Village of Bronxville. For the reasons set forth above, defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is ordered to close the motion [Docket No. 18] and this case. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Shira A. Scheindlin on 12/24/2014) (ajs)
station for additional questioning and searches. Based on this police activity and a
subsequent publication of a police bulletin concerning Mr. Reeves, plaintiffs assert
a litany of federal and state law claims, seeking relief for the alleged resulting
impact to Mr. Reeves’s reputation and ability to seek employment.1 Defendants
now move for summary judgment on all claims asserted against them on the
grounds that Mr. Reeves consented to the searches and questioning, and that
information published about him was true and did not violate Mr. Reeves’s due
process rights.2 For the reasons set forth below, defendants’ motion is GRANTED.
II.
BACKGROUND3
A.
The Events Leading to the Search
Mr. Reeves was formerly employed as a contract administrator for KG
& D Architect, a company performing construction work for the village of
1
See Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.) at 11-25. When referring to
allegations in the Amended Complaint, this Opinion cites page numbers, not
paragraph numbers, because the paragraph numbering in the Amended Complaint
is defective.
2
See generally Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Its
[sic] Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def. Mem.”).
3
The facts recited below are drawn from the pleadings, the parties’
Local Civil Rule 56.1 Statements, the declarations submitted in connection with
this motion, and the exhibits attached thereto. These facts are undisputed unless
otherwise noted. Where disputed, the facts are viewed in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. See Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 529-30 (2006).
2
Bronxville.4 On the morning of May 4, 2010, Mr. Reeves drove to Bronxville
High School, where he had a work-related appointment scheduled for later in the
day.5 Having arrived very early for his appointment, Mr. Reeves remained in his
car, which he parked approximately two hundred feet away from the school.6
As Mr. Reeves sat in his car, a telephone company worker parked
behind Mr. Reeves started to observe over the course of forty-five minutes what he
considered to be suspicious behavior. According to the telephone company
worker, whenever a group of girls walked by, Mr. Reeves would raise up his cell
phone and take a picture.7 Eventually, the telephone company worker called 911 to
report Mr. Reeves’s conduct.8 In response to the complaint, Officer Nicholas
DeYoung arrived on the scene, followed soon after by Detective Anderson, both of
4
See Am. Compl. at 3.
5
See id.
6
See Plaintiffs’ Local Rule 56.1(b) Statement (“Pl. 56.1”) ¶ 1. Like
their Amended Complaint, plaintiffs’ Rule 56.1 Statement also contains defective
paragraph numbering. For the portion of the document under the header “Local
Rule 56.1(b) Statement,” I cite the relevant paragraph numbers, which correspond
to those contained in defendants’ 56.1 Statement. When citing to paragraphs in the
portion of the document under the header “Disputed Issues of Material Fact,” I
refer to the ECF page number.
7
Defendants’ 56.1 Statement of Undisputed Facts (“Def. 56.1”) ¶ 5.
8
See id. ¶ 4; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 4.
3
the Bronxville Police Department.9
B.
The Search Outside of the High School
Detective Anderson approached Mr. Reeves, informed him of the
complaint, and asked him if he had been taking photographs.10 Mr. Reeves
responded in the negative.11 Detective Anderson then asked Mr. Reeves if he had
any cameras with him; Mr. Reeves voluntarily gave Detective Anderson a camera
that he had in his vehicle.12 Detective Anderson inspected that camera and did not
find any pictures on it.13
Detective Anderson also observed that Mr. Reeves possessed a
camera-equipped smartphone.14 Detective Anderson asked Mr. Reeves for
permission to “take a look at [the camera phone].”15 Mr. Reeves obliged and
9
See Def. 56.1 ¶ 3.
10
See id. ¶ 6.
11
See id. ¶ 7. No pun intended.
12
See id. ¶ 8.
13
See id. ¶ 9.
14
See 8/28/12 Deposition of Richard Anderson, Ex. D to 11/4/13
Declaration of Philip Russell, counsel for plaintiffs, in Opposition to Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment (“Russell Decl.”) (“Anderson Dep.”), at 43:2-43:5.
15
Id.
4
handed Detective Anderson the phone.16 Upon receiving the phone, Detective
Anderson reviewed the photographs stored on it from that morning.17
Although Mr. Reeves claims that he was shooting pictures of a “bay
brick building,”18 it is undisputed that included in several of these photographs
were girls who appeared to be school-aged.19 These photographs displayed young
girls’ backsides, primarily focusing on girls wearing short skirts and short shorts.20
16
See id. at 43:8-43:9. Detective Anderson did not take the phone from
inside the car; instead, Mr. Reeves handed it to him while Detective Anderson
remained outside the car. See id. at 43:10-12.
17
See 12/7/10 David Reeves’s 50-H Hearing, Ex. B to 9/13/13
Declaration of Matthew Weir, counsel for defendants, Submitted in Support of
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Weir Decl”) (“ Reeves’s 50-H
Hr’g”), at 33:7-34:17.
18
Pl. 56.1 ¶ 1.
19
See 5/4/10 Photographs Taken by Mr. Reeves, Ex. A to Weir Decl.
(“May 4 Photographs”); Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 1, 19.
20
See Def. 56.1 ¶ 19. Plaintiffs deny that Mr. Reeves “zoomed in” on
the short skirts and shorts. See Pl. 56.1 ¶ 19. Instead, plaintiffs maintain that the
“the subject” of the photographs was the bay brick building, not the “females
depicted . . . [who] varied in age.” Id. at 8. Plaintiffs’ general characterizations of
the photographs are disingenuous, at best, and are plainly contradicted by the
photographic evidence and testimony in the record. While the Court must view the
facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs and “cannot make credibility
determinations in deciding a motion for summary judgment, [the Court] need not
credit assertions that are wholly contradicted by photographic evidence in the
record.” Matteo v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 7830, 2012 WL 760317,
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2012) aff’d, 533 Fed. App’x 1 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Scott
v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)).
5
Specifically, Detective Anderson reviewed five pictures.21 One of those
photographs contains no brick building or building of any sort; it is actually a
close-up image of the backsides of two girls wearing a short skirt and short pair of
shorts, respectively.22 Girls’ backsides are also displayed in the remaining four
photographs, which are taken from a more distant perspective.23
After reviewing these photographs, Detective Anderson asked Mr.
Reeves for permission to search Mr. Reeves’s vehicle.24 Mr. Reeves again, in his
words, “agreed” to Detective Anderson’s request.25 In the vehicle, Detective
Anderson discovered a laptop and another camera device.26
C.
Continued Questioning at the Police Station
At this point, Detective Anderson asked Mr. Reeves if he would come
to the police station to discuss the matter further “outside of the public eye.”27 Mr.
21
See May 4 Photographs.
22
See id.; Def. 56.1 ¶ 19.
23
See May 4 Photographs; Def. 56.1 ¶ 19.
24
See Def. 56.1 ¶ 10.
25
Reeves’s 50-H Hr’g at 33:17.
26
See Def. 56.1 ¶ 11.
27
Anderson Dep. at 54:3. See also Def. 56.1 ¶ 12; Reeves’s 50-H Hr’g
at 34:16-34:24.
6
Reeves agreed and handed over his car keys to another officer, who drove Mr.
Reeves’s car to the station while Mr. Reeves was driven there by Officer
DeYoung.28
When they arrived at the police station, Mr. Reeves signed a “Consent
to Search Form,” which stated that the police could search Mr. Reeves’s vehicle
and all electronic storage devices Mr. Reeves had on his person or inside his
vehicle.29 Detective Anderson conducted a search of Mr. Reeves’s belongings,
including the additional camera device found in his car, which contained videos
28
See Anderson Dep. at 54:16-54:23; Reeves’s 50-H Hr’g at 34:16-
34:24.
29
See Def. 56.1 ¶ 13; 5/4/10 Consent to Search Form, Ex. F to Weir
Decl. In an affidavit opposing defendants’ summary judgment motion, Mr. Reeves
contends that the form was blank when he signed it. See 11/4/13 Affidavit of
David Reeves, Ex. H to Russell Decl. (“Reeves Aff.”) ¶ 22. However, during his
50-H hearing, Mr. Reeves made no such allegation; instead, he stated: “Detective
Anderson comes in, puts a piece of paper [sic] and asked me to sign off on the
search of my vehicle. I sign it, [and] he leaves.” Reeves’s 50-H Hr’g at 35:2-32:5.
Because Mr. Reeves’s affidavit contradicts his sworn prior testimony, I need not
credit it. See Hayes v. New York City Dep’t of Corrs., 84 F. 3d 614, 619 (2d Cir.
1996) (“[A] party may not create an issue of fact by submitting an affidavit in
opposition to a summary judgment motion that, by omission or addition,
contradicts the affiant’s previous deposition testimony.”). In any event, this
manufactured factual dispute is immaterial, as Mr. Reeves does not deny that he
explicitly consented to a search of his vehicle and electronic devices before
reaching the police station.
7
and images of children outside of other schools in nearby towns.30 Detective
Anderson then questioned Mr. Reeves further concerning his activities that
morning.31 After he finished questioning Mr. Reeves, Detective Anderson returned
the property to Mr. Reeves and asked him to stand by a wall so that Detective
Anderson could take a photograph of him.32 According to Mr. Reeves, upon
leaving the station, he extended his hand to Detective Anderson for a handshake,
and Detective Anderson squeezed Mr. Reeves’s hand, pulled it towards his belt
buckle, and admonished Mr. Reeves to “get help for [Mr. Reeves’s] problem.”33
Mr. Reeves then left the police station on his own.34 He was not charged with any
crime; the pictures he took that morning were not illegal.35
At no point during these events did anyone explicitly instruct Mr.
Reeves that he could refuse police requests to search Mr. Reeves’s property near
30
See Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 14, 18. Specifically, the police officers found
pictures and videos of school-aged children in Mahopac, Carmel, and Kent, though
Mr. Reeves insists that he took the photographs and video clips for purposes
related to his construction work. See Pl. 56.1 ¶ 18.
31
See id. ¶ 14.
32
See id. ¶ 15. Mr. Reeves testified at his 50-H hearing that he agreed to
this request. See Reeves’s 50-H Hr’g at 37:8-37:12.
33
Reeves’s 50-H Hr’g at 38:2-38:10.
34
See id.
35
See Def. 56.1 ¶ 19.
8
the high school or at the police station, or that he was free to leave, nor did anyone
ever instruct Mr. Reeves that his compliance with these requests was mandatory.36
Mr. Reeves now testifies that he believed his cooperation was mandatory, though
he admits that he never communicated to any officer a desire to leave or decline to
supply requested information, and that no one told him he could not leave.37
D.
The Police Information Bulletin
Detective Anderson ultimately prepared a police information bulletin
regarding Mr. Reeves’s activities, intending to disseminate it to the District
Attorney’s office in Putnam County so that the office could pass it on to the police
departments in that county as an investigatory tool.38 The bulletin contained an
account of Mr. Reeves’s activities outside of Bronxville High School, stating that
Mr. Reeves was found in possession of a camera phone containing five pictures of
twelve to fourteen year old girls in miniskirts outside of the school, as well as
another camera consisting of thirty videos of young girls outside of a Mahopac
school and near the Carmel and Kent school areas.39 The bulletin also includes
36
See Pl. 56.1 at 8.
37
See id.; Def. 56.1 ¶ 17.
38
See Def. 56.1 ¶ 22.
39
See Police Information Bulletin, Ex. G to Weir Decl. (“Police
Bulletin”).
9
pictures of Mr. Reeves and his vehicle.40
After drafting the bulletin, Detective Anderson spoke about it over the
telephone with Henry Lopez, an investigator in the Putnam County District
Attorney’s office.41 Detective Anderson then sent the bulletin to Investigator
Lopez so that it could be distributed to area law enforcement agencies.42
Investigator Lopez, upon receiving the bulletin, understood that it was intended
only for law enforcement purposes, not for public dissemination.43 To that end, he
subsequently distributed the bulletin to an e-mail list of law enforcement personnel
within Putnam County.44 At some later point, Investigator Lopez learned that the
bulletin was forwarded to personal e-mail (non-governmental) addresses by at least
two law enforcement personnel – one Westchester Probation employee and one
Assistant District Attorney in Investigator Lopez’s office.45 The Assistant District
Attorney then apparently forwarded the bulletin to her husband, who subsequently
40
See id.
41
See Def. 56.1 ¶ 23.
42
See id. ¶ 24.
43
See id. ¶ 25.
44
See id. ¶ 26.
45
See id. ¶¶ 28-29.
10
forwarded the bulletin to other members of the public.46
As a result of the public dissemination of the police bulletin, Mr.
Reeves claims that he lost his job at the construction company and has been unable
to regain steady employment, and that he and his wife have suffered severe
emotional distress.47
III.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “only where, construing all the
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and drawing all reasonable
inferences in that party’s favor, there is ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact
and . . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”48 “A fact is
material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and an
issue of fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.”49
“[T]he moving party has the burden of showing that no genuine issue
46
See id.
47
See Pl. 56.1 at 9.
48
Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Reg’l Transp. Auth., 743 F.3d 11, 19 (2d
Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)) (some quotation marks omitted).
49
Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 192 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133
S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (quotations and alterations omitted).
11
of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts entitle [it] to judgment as a
matter of law.”50 To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party
must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts,”51 and “may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated
speculation.”52
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he role of the court is
not to resolve disputed issues of fact but to assess whether there are any factual
issues to be tried.”53 “‘Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence,
and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those
of a judge.’”54
IV.
APPLICABLE LAW
A.
Section 1983
50
Coollick v. Hughes, 699 F.3d 211, 219 (2d Cir. 2012) (citations
omitted).
51
Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 2011) (quotation
marks and citations omitted).
52
Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).
53
Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 677 F.3d 109, 119 (2d Cir.
2012).
54
Barrows v. Seneca Foods Corp., 512 Fed. App’x 115, 117 (2d Cir.
2013) (quoting Redd v. New York Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 174 (2d Cir.
2012)).
12
Section 1983 states, in relevant part, that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .
Section 1983 “does not create a federal right or benefit; it simply provides a
mechanism for enforcing a right or benefit established elsewhere.”55 “The purpose
of [section] 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to
deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to
victims if such deterrence fails.”56 In order to have recourse against a municipality
under section 1983, a plaintiff “must prove that ‘action pursuant to official
municipal policy’ caused the alleged constitutional injury.”57 Any form of liability
under section 1983 requires direct involvement by the defendant in causing the
55
Morris–Hayes v. Board of Educ. of Chester Union Free Sch. Dist.,
423 F.3d 153, 158-59 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808,
816 (1985)). Accord Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002) (“‘[O]ne
cannot go into court and claim a violation of § 1983-for § 1983 by itself does not
protect anyone against anything.’”) (quoting Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights
Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979)).
56
Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992).
57
Cash v. County of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting
Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011)).
13
plaintiff’s damages.58 “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . [section]
1983 suits, a plaintiff must [prove] that each Government-official defendant,
through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”59
B.
The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”60 Section 1983 claims for false arrest and illegal search and seizure arise
under the Fourth Amendment and are identical to claims for false arrest and illegal
search and seizure under New York law.61
To establish claims for false arrest (or unlawful detention), a plaintiff
must show, among other factors, that “the plaintiff did not consent to the
confinement” and that “‘the confinement was not otherwise privileged.’”62 Under
58
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).
59
Id. (citations omitted).
60
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
61
See Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 151 (2d Cir. 2006); see also
Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 84–85 (2d Cir. 2007).
62
Ackerson v. City of White Plains, 702 F.3d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 2012)
(quoting Broughton v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 456 (1975)). See also
Edwards v. Pretsch, 180 F. Supp. 2d 489, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (noting that for
Section 1983 purposes, false arrest is synonymous with unlawful detention).
14
the Fourth Amendment, warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable.63
However, “[i]t is well settled that a warrantless search does not violate the Fourth
Amendment if ‘the authorities have obtained the voluntary consent of a person
authorized to grant such consent.’”64 Ultimately, the Government must show that
consent was voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence.65
1.
Consent
“The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under
the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness – what would the
typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and
the suspect?”66 “Whether authorities obtained voluntary consent . . . “‘is a question
of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.’”67 “Factors that
courts consider in assessing the voluntariness of a consent include the individual’s
age, intelligence and educational background, the length and nature of the
63
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
64
United States v. Hernandez, 85 F.3d 1023, 1028 (2d Cir. 1996)
(quoting United States v. Elliot, 50 F.3d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1995)).
65
United States v. Calvente, 722 F.2d 1019, 1023 (2d Cir. 1983).
66
United States v. Kelly, 553 Fed. App’x 91, 94 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)).
67
United States v. Rico Beltran, 409 Fed. App’x 441, 442-43 (2d Cir.
2011) (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227).
15
questioning and whether the law enforcement officials engaged in coercive
behavior.”68 “[N]either the fact that a person is in custody nor that she has been
subjected to a display of force rules out a finding of voluntariness.”69
The concept of a “knowing and intelligent waiver, which is strictly
applied to rights involving a fair criminal trial, does not govern in the Fourth
Amendment context.”70 Therefore, “[w]hile knowledge of the right to refuse
consent is one factor to be taken into account,” “the government need not establish
such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent.”71
C.
Stigma-Plus Claim
A “stigma-plus” claim is a subset of procedural due process. It is
“brought for injury to one’s reputation (the stigma) coupled with the deprivation of
some ‘tangible interest’ or property right (the plus), without adequate process.”72
68
United States v. Jones, 154 F. Supp. 2d 617, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
69
United States v. Moreno, 701 F.3d 64, 77 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 2797 (2013) (citing United States v. Ansaldi, 372 F.3d 118, 129 (2d Cir.
2004)).
70
United States v. Garcia, 56 F.3d 418, 422 (2d Cir. 1995).
71
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206-07 (2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
72
DiBlasio v. Novello, 344 F.3d 292, 302 (2d Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted). Accord S & D Maintenance Co. v. Goldin, 844 F.2d 962, 970 (2d Cir.
1988) (“A government employee’s liberty interest is implicated where the
government dismisses him based on charges that might seriously damage his
16
A stigma-plus claim has three elements: statements (1) by the government that call
into question plaintiff’s “good name, reputation, honor, or integrity” or “denigrate
[his] competence as a professional and impugn [his] professional reputation in such
a fashion as to effectively put a significant roadblock on [his] continued ability to
practice [his] profession;” (2) that were public; and (3) that “were made
concurrently in time to [his] dismissal from government employment.”73 The
Second Circuit has urged that “defamation is not by itself a deprivation of a liberty
interest unless coupled with the termination of government employment ‘or
deprivation of some other legal right or status.’”74
V.
DISCUSSION75
standing and associations in his community or that might impose on him a stigma
or other disability that forecloses his freedom to take advantage of other
employment opportunities.”) (quotation marks and alterations omitted).
73
Patterson v. City of Utica, 370 F.3d 322, 330 (2d Cir. 2004)
(quotation marks omitted). With regard to the publication requirement, “[t]he
defamatory statement must be sufficiently public to create or threaten a stigma;
hence, a statement made only to the plaintiff, and only in private, ordinarily does
not implicate a liberty interest.” Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 87 (2d Cir. 2005).
74
Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1000 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Neu v.
Corcoran, 869 F.2d 662, 667 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,
709 (1976))).
75
Although Mr. Reeves’s wife is a named plaintiff in this action, there is
virtually no evidence in the record related to her, nor any allegation in the amended
complaint explaining in any detail how she has been harmed, other than that she
suffered emotional distress. To the extent that Ms. Reeves is also bringing federal
17
A.
Fourth Amendment Claims
Defendants move for summary judgment on Mr. Reeves’s Fourth
Amendment claims primarily on the ground that Mr. Reeves consented to the
police searches of his property and his vehicle and agreed to answer all of the
officers’ questions. To the extent that they did violate Mr. Reeves’s Fourth
Amendment rights, Detective Anderson and Chief Satriale argue in the alternative
that they are entitled to summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity.
Because I agree with defendants that Mr. Reeves’s Fourth Amendment rights were
not violated, I need not address the qualified immunity ground.76
1.
Reeves Consented to the Searches and Police Questioning
Mr. Reeves’s Fourth Amendment claims, which relate to the search of
his camera phone, vehicle, and personal property found within it, as well as his
questioning outside of the high school and at the police station, must be dismissed
because he voluntarily consented to all of the police conduct of which he now
complains. To overcome the clear manifestations in the record of his consent to
claims against defendants, those claims are dismissed.
76
Even if Detective Anderson and Chief Satriale had violated Mr.
Reeves’s Fourth Amendment rights, which they did not, a qualified immunity
analysis would likely favor the officers because, at minimum, reasonable officers
could disagree over whether the alleged search and seizure of Mr. Reeves was
unlawful given his expressions of consent. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194
(2001).
18
the searches and questioning, Mr. Reeves attempts to argue that his consent was
not freely given.77 In support of this contention, Mr. Reeves relies heavily on the
fact that the officers never told him he was free to leave, and that the questioning at
the police station occurred in a room behind closed doors for roughly two hours.78
Having never been arrested, he also insists that he did not believe that he could
leave or refuse any of the searches.79
These arguments fail as a matter of law. Where a suspect has
consented to conduct implicating his Fourth Amendment rights, courts require
much more police coercion than what Mr. Reeves faced to render that consent
involuntary. For instance, the Second Circuit has noted that “[t]he fact that
[defendant] [is] in custody for five hours [does] not compel a finding that his
consent was involuntary.”80 Even “handcuffing and display of guns by five or six
officers to effectuate [an] arrest did not render consent to [a] search involuntary.”81
The facts in the record here are not nearly as damning. It is undisputed that Mr.
Reeves was never handcuffed or exposed to any real show of force, and that he was
77
See Pl. 56.1 at 8.
78
See id.
79
See id.
80
United States v. Arango Correa, 851 F.2d 54, 57-58 (2d Cir. 1988).
81
Moreno, 701 F.3d at 77 (citing Ansaldi, 372 F.3d at 129).
19
questioned for approximately two hours. Throughout this process, it is undisputed
that Mr. Reeves repeatedly agreed to answer the officers’ questions and voluntarily
turned over his property to be searched. The officers never communicated to him
that he could not leave or needed to turn over his property – their failure to inform
him about his freedom to refuse to consent cannot save his claims.82 Because the
undisputed evidence shows that Mr. Reeves freely and voluntarily consented to the
searches of his property and police questioning, summary judgment is granted to
Detective Anderson and Chief Satriale on Mr. Reeves’s Fourth Amendment claims
against them.83
B.
Mr. Reeves Was Not Deprived of a Constitutionally Protected
Interest
Mr. Reeves also alleges that the dissemination of the police bulletin
deprived him of his due process rights because the defamatory publication of
82
See Drayton, 536 U.S. at 206-07.
83
The amended complaint could conceivably be read to assert claims for
excessive force and malicious prosecution. Unfortunately for Mr. Reeves, there is
no evidence in the record that force, much less excessive force, was used against
him, nor was he ever prosecuted. It is unfathomable that Mr. Reeves insists that a
factual dispute exists over either of these claims. Summary judgment on both of
them is granted to defendants as well. See, e.g., Faruki v. City of N.Y., 517 Fed.
App’x 1, 2 (2d Cir. 2013) (stating the obvious: to prevail on a claim for excessive
force, there must be some evidence of use of force, and to prevail on a claim for
malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must show as a threshold matter that judicial
proceedings were initiated against him).
20
conduct for which he was never arrested or afforded a hearing ruined his reputation
and employment prospects. As established in Valmonte v. Bane, however,
“defamation is not by itself a deprivation of a liberty interest unless coupled with
the termination of government employment ‘or deprivation of some other legal
right or status.’”84 Mr. Reeves argues that the “plus” aspect of the “stigma-plus”
test is satisfied because publication of the allegations against him has cost him his
job and prevented him from finding steady full-time employment.85 In Valmonte,
however, the Second Circuit emphasized that the
deleterious effects which flow directly from a sullied reputation
would normally also be insufficient [to satisfy the plus]. These
would normally include the impact that defamation might have on
job prospects, or, for that matter, romantic aspirations, friendships,
self-esteem, or any other typical consequence of a bad reputation.86
Mr. Reeves was not terminated from government employment, nor has he been
deprived of “‘some other legal right or status.’”87 Therefore, Mr. Reeves has not
been deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his reputation.
Accordingly, summary judgment is granted to defendants on Mr. Reeves’s stigma
84
Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 1000 (quoting Neu, 869 F.2d at 667).
85
See Reeves Aff. ¶ 42.
86
Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 1001.
87
Id. at 1000 (quoting Neu, 869 F.2d at 667). For this reason, I need not
address whether the police bulletin was in fact defamatory.
21
plus claim.
C.
There Is No Evidence to Support Claims for Municipal Liability
Plaintiffs’ claims imputing liability on the Village of Bronxville for
the alleged violation of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights fail for two simple reasons.
First, plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were not violated. Second, even if their
constitutional rights were violated, plaintiffs have not alleged a single fact
concerning a municipal policy or custom causing a rights violation, nor is there any
such evidence in the record. It is axiomatic that there cannot be a material dispute
of fact over a claim when no facts or allegations are asserted in support of that
claim. Therefore, neither the Village of Bronxville nor the Village of Bronxville
Police Department, to the extent the latter is even capable of being sued, can be
held liable, and the claims against them are dismissed.88
D.
State Law Claims
Because there are no remaining federal claims, I decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims against
defendants.89
88
See Cash, 654 F.3d at 333.
89
See Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 549 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that “it
is axiomatic that a court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over state-law
claims when it dismisses the federal claims prior to trial”).
22
-AppearancesFor Plaintiffs:
Philip Russell, Esq.
Philip Russell, LLC
66 Field Point Road
P.O. Box 1437
Greenwich, CT 06836
(203) 661-4200
For Defendants:
Matthew Weir, Esq.
Morris Duffy Alonso & Faley
2 Rector Street
New York, NY 10006
(212) 766-1888
24
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