Knife Rights, Inc. et al v. Vance et al

Filing 58

OPINION AND ORDER re: 47 MOTION for Leave to File Amended Complaint filed by John Copeland, Pedro Perez, Knife Rights, Inc. Based on the foregoing, Knife Rights's motion for leave to me an Amended Complaint is GRANTED. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Ronald L. Ellis on 9/7/2012) (mro)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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KNIFE RIGHTS, INC. et ai.,
Plaintiffs,

OPINION AND ORDER
- against11 Civ. 3918 (BSJ) (RLE)
CYRUS VANCE, JR., in his official capacity as the
New York Country District Attorney, et al.,
Defendants.
RONALD L. ELLIS, United States Magistrate Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION

PlaintitTs Knife Rights, Inc., John Copeland, and Pedro Perez (collectively "Knife
Rights") brought this action against Defendants Cyrus Vance, .Ir. and The City of New York
("Vance") pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, arguing that a
New York State statute outlawing certain gravity knives violates the United States Constitution
for vagueness. On May 23,2011, Knife Rights filed a motion for leave to file an amended
complaint to include two additional parties-the Knife Rights Foundation and Native Leatherand to dismiss Attorney General Eric Schneiderman pursuant to Rule] 5 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The City filed a memorandum in opposition on June 15,2012, which District
Attorney Vance adopted. For the reasons which follow, Knife Rights's motion to amend is

GRANTED.
II.

DISCUSSION

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may amend its pleading once as a
matter of right before a responsive pleading is served, or within twenty days after the pleading
is served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). A party may also amend its pleading with \vritten consent from

the opposing party or by filing a motion for leave to amend with the Court. ld. Rule 1S(a)

snecifies that leave to amend shaH be freely eiven when justice so requires. Since this rule is
interpreted liberally, an amendment is normally permitted, and the refusal to grant leave without

justification is "inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules." Rachman Bag Co. v. Liberty
lv/ut. Ins. Co.. 46 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir. 1995); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). It

remains, however, within the discretion of the court whether to allow amendment. Id.,' John
Hancock

MUf.

Life Ins. Co. v. Amerfhrd Int'l Corp .. 22 F.3d 458, 462 (2d Cir. 1994). Reasons

for a proper denial of leave to amend inc] ude undue delay, undue prej udice, bad faith, and
futility of the amendment. Stale Teachers Retirement Board v. Fluor Corp .. 654 F.2d 843, 856
(2d Cir. 1981); Dluhos v. Floating and Abandoned Vessel. Knoti'n as NeH' York, 162 F.3d 63, 69
(2d Cir. 1998).
A.

Futility

In its opposition to Knife Rights' proposal, the City contends that the amendment to the
complaint is futile. See Def. Opp'n 5. Relying on the Supreme Court's two-pronged test, it
maintains that Knife Rights failed to prove that the state law is vague. Grayned v. City of
Rock/hrd, 408 U.S. 104, 111-113 (1972). The opposition, however, does not claim that Knife

Rights failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted, but contends that the facts as
alleged by Knife Rights will fail on the merits. The futility of an amendment is determined by
whether the amendment could survive a motion to dismiss, construing the amendment in the
light most favorable to the plaintifr. See AEP EnerJ:.,ry Services Gas Holding Co. v. Bank of
America. N.A .. 626 F.3d 699, 726 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting futility is found when "the proposed

amendment fails to state a legally cognizable claim or fails to raise triable issues of fact."):Beth
Cline v. 1-888-Plumbing Group, 1nc., 2000 WL 342689, *2 (S.D.N.Y. March 30, 2000). "The

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issue is not whether a plaintiff is likely to prevail ultimately, but whether the claimant is entitled

to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed. it may appear on the face of the pleading that a
recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test." Gant v. Wallingfi)rd Bd.

(~f Educ.

69 FJd 669,673 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted); Branham v. Meachum. 77 FJd
626,628 (2d Cir. 1996). The City'S bald asseliion alone that Knife Rights's claims will
ultimately fail does not prevent Knife Rights from amending its pleading to raise triable issues
of fact that support its claim.

B.

Undue Delay and Undue Prejudice
A mere delay is not a basis for denying a motion to amend, absent a showing of bad

faith or undue prejudice to the nonmoving party. See Block v. First Blood Associates, 988 F.2d
344,350 (2d Cir. 1993); Richardson Greenshields Securities. Inc. v. Lau, 825 F.2d 647, 653 n.
6 (2d Cir. 1987); Hazeldine v. Beverage Media. Ltd., 954 F.Supp. 697, 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
"Although an amendment to the Complaint will more than likely subject a defendant to some
additional burden, courts have held that such a burden does not constitute impennissible
prejudice." See. Morse/Diesel. Inc. v. Fidelity and Deposit Co.

(~f Md.,

715 F.Supp. 578, 581

(S.D.N.Y. 1989); International Bankv. Price Waterhouse and Co., 85 F.R.D. 140,142 (1980);

Tomlinson v. St. Paul Reinsurance Management Corp., 1998 WL 65996, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
February 17, 1998). In detennining what constitutes prejUdice, the Court considers whether the
assertion of the new claim would (I) require the opponent to expend significant additional
resources to conduct discovery and prepare for trial; (2) significantly delay the resolution of the
dispute; or (3) prevent the plaintiff from bringing a timely action in another jurisdiction.

Duncan v. College

~j'New

Rochelle, 174 F.R.D. 48, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).

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The City makes no claim of bad faith, and nothing in the record suggests bad faith. The

City does. however. assert prejudice. The City asserts that it will be prejudiced because the
proximity of the amendment to the closing of discovery will not give it suftlcient time to assert
discovery demands and prepare for trial. These arguments have little merit. The City has
already deposed Knife Rights Foundation. Further, although they have not deposed Native
Leather's owner, Carol Walsh, Knife Rights informed the City of its intent to include Native
Leather as a plaintiff one month prior to the end of discovery, giving Defendants ample time to
prepare. In any case, the court may grant additional time if needed, The City will thus suffer no
undue prejudice or undue delay by the amendment of the complaint.

Ill. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Knife Rights's motion for leave to me an Amended Complaint
is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED this 7th day of September 2012
New York, New York

r;~~/
The Honorable Ronald L. Ellis
United States Magistrate Judge

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