U.S. Licensing Associates, Inc. v. The Rob Nelson Corporation
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER re: 4 MOTION to Dismiss U.S. Licensing Associates, Inc.'s Complaint. filed by The Rob Nelson Corporation. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion is DENIED as to the Amended Complaint's First Cause of A ction and is GRANTED as to the Amended Complaint's Second and Third Causes of Action, Leave to Amend within 20 days is granted as to the Second Cause of Action only, The Clerk of the Court is instructed to close this motion and to change Defendant's name to The Rob Nelson Company in the case caption. (Signed by Judge Harold Baer on 11/28/2011) (jfe)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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U.S. LICENSING ASSOCIATES, INC.,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
- against :
:
THE ROB NELSON COMPANY,
:
:
Defendant.
:
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Hon. Harold Baer, Jr., District Judge:
11 CV 4517 (HB)
OPINION &
ORDER
Before the Court is a motion to dismiss brought by defendant The Rob Nelson Company
(“RNC”). The Notice of Motion also seeks leave to change the Defendant’s name in the case
caption to “The Rob Nelson Company” rather than the “The Rob Nelson Corporation.” In the
amended complaint, plaintiff U.S. Licensing Associates, Inc. (“USLA”) alleges two counts of
breach of contract and one count of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
connection with a contract between RNC and USLA entered into in 1992 (“1992 Contract”). For
the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. BACKGROUND
On January 1, 1992, The Jim Bouton Corporation (“JBC”), Defendant RNC’s predecessor in
interest, entered into a written license agreement (“1992 License Agreement”) with Amurol
Products Company (“Amurol”) through which JBC licensed the use of trademarks for a shredded
gum called Big League Chew. Complaint ¶ 12. In return, Amurol agreed to manufacture and sell
Big League Chew products and agreed to pay JBC 6 percent of net sales of Big League Chew
products, with a Guaranteed Minimum Royalty of $500,000.00 each year. Id. at ¶ 21.
On January 1, 1992, USLA also entered into the 1992 Contract with JBC, through which
JBC agreed to pay USLA a percentage of royalties received from Big League Chew products in
consideration for USLA’s “labor and services in connection with” prior license agreements between
JBC and Amurol. Id. at ¶ 14. USLA was entitled to receive 1.5 percent of Amurol’s net sales of Big
League Chew products, or if Amurol did not achieve the Guaranteed Minimum Royalty, USLA was
entitled to 23 percent of the difference between the Guaranteed Minimum Royalty and the actual
royalties earned. Id. at ¶ 23.
JBC subsequently assigned all of its rights, obligations and liabilities under the 1992
Contract and 1992 License Agreement to RNC, id. at ¶¶ 15, 16, and Wrigley subsequently
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purchased Amurol, assuming all of Amurol’s rights and obligations under the 1992 License
Agreement. Id. at ¶ 17.
The 1992 Contract was scheduled to expire on December 31, 2011. Id. at ¶ 26. In January
2010, Wrigley notified RNC that it did not intend to renew the 1992 License Agreement and wanted
to terminate the 1992 License Agreement at the end of 2010 in exchange for payment of the 2011
Guaranteed Minimum Royalty. Id. at ¶ 28. Instead, RNC waived its right to the 2011 Minimum
Guaranteed Royalty and Wrigley agreed to sell the equipment it had used to manufacture Big
League Chew Products to RNC pursuant to a termination agreement (“Termination Agreement”)
entered into on July 28, 2010. Id. at ¶¶ 30-32.
The 1992 Contract, 1992 License Agreement and the Termination Agreement explicitly
state that the agreements should be construed under the laws of the state of New York. Feureisen
Decl., Ex. B 1992 Contract ¶ 7; Feureisen Decl., Ex. A 1992 License Agreement ¶ 31; Feureisen
Decl., Ex. G Termination Agreement ¶ 10(c).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
According to the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncements, “[t]o survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The
requirement that the court accept all factual allegations as true does not apply to “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. The
court’s determination of whether a complaint states a “plausible claim for relief” is a “contextspecific task” that requires application of “judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950.
At the motion to dismiss stage, “the complaint is deemed to include any written instrument
attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference.”
Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc. 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted) (affirming district court’s consideration of contracts referenced in the complaint on
a motion to dismiss).
New York rules govern choice-of-law questions in diversity actions in this Court. Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 498 (1941). Under New York law, “a contractual
choice-of-law provision is generally binding on a party claiming rights under a contract.” CIH
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Intern. Holdings, LLC v. BT United States, LLC, No. 10 Civ. 7790, 2011 WL 4483983, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2011) (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Orient Overseas Containers Lines (UK)
Ltd., 230 F.3d 549, 556 (2d Cir. 2000) (relying on New York Contract law to resolve the issues
raised in the case).
While the court must “draw all reasonable inferences” in the non-movant’s favor Roth v.
Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 503 (2d Cir. 2007), it need not accord “[l]egal conclusions, deductions or
opinions couched as factual allegations . . . a presumption of truthfulness.” In re NYSE Specialists
Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Motion to Dismiss is Denied as to the First Cause of Action
USLA’s first cause of action alleges that RNC breached the 1992 Contract with USLA by
waiving the 2011 Minimum Guaranteed Royalty and by failing to pay USLA the greater of 23
percent of the 2011 Minimum Guaranteed Royalty or 23 percent of the valuable consideration that
Wrigley gave RNC for RNC’s promise to waive the 2011 Minimum Guaranteed Royalty.
Paragraph 11 of the 1992 Contract reads:
11. Notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, in the event of any
amendment, modification, extension, renewal and/or an agreement between JBC and
LICENSEE and/or their respective successors and assigns, entered into in
substitution of the License Agreement between JBC and LICENSEE, and regardless
of the prior termination or expiration of the term of said License Agreement, USLA
shall nonetheless continue to be entitled to receive a percentage of advances,
royalties and Guaranteed Minimum Royalties or other consideration received by JBC
and/or its successors and assigns from LICENSEE and/or its successors and assigns
with respect to each such amendment, modification, renewal and/or substitution of
said License Agreement . . .
Feureisen Decl. Ex. B, 1992 Contract ¶ 11.
USLA concedes that the Termination Agreement between Wrigley and RNC was not
a modification, but argues instead that it was “an agreement ‘entered into in substitution’ of
the License Agreement.” Pl.’s Opp. 6. RNC first argues that “the 1992 Contract does not
entitle USLA to share in the consideration for any generic substitution of the 1992 License
Agreement, but only for certain types of substitution agreements . . . to the 1992 License
Agreement.” Def.’s Reply 3-4. The text of Paragraph 11, however, indicates the parties’
clear intention that any substitute agreement would suffice: the paragraph quoted by RNC
lists certain types of substitution agreements for which USLA would be entitled to
consideration payments, including any “amendment,” “modification,” “extension,” or
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“renewal” but also provides that USLA would be entitled to consideration payments for a
generic “agreement” entered into in substitution of the 1992 License Agreement. Further,
the paragraph states that USLA shall continue to be entitled to the Guaranteed Minimum
Royalties or other consideration “with respect to each such amendment, modification,
renewal and/or substitution of said License Agreement,” Feureisen Decl. Ex. B, 1992
Contract ¶ 11, again indicating that a generic substitution would suffice.
RNC’s second argument is that that the Termination Agreement was not a
substitution to the 1992 Agreement. Def.’s Reply 4. This argument rests on the distinction
between the common law contract terms of a “substitution agreement,” and an “executory
accord” or “accord and satisfaction.” A substitution agreement discharges the original
agreement and replaces it with a new one that is executory, but “will immediately discharge
the existing obligation.” Denburg v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Kimpl, 82 N.Y.2d 375, 384
(1993). In contrast, an “accord and satisfaction” or an “executory accord” is one in which
the “obligee does not intend to discharge the existing claim merely upon the making of the
accord.” Id. at 383. The presumption in determining whether a contract is a substitution
agreement or an executory accord is that “one does not surrender an existing obligation for a
promise to perform in the future. . . .” EFCO Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 897 N.Y.S.2d
669 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (quoting Albee Truck Inc. v. Halpin Fire Equipment Inc., 615 N.Y.S.2d
118, 120 (App. Div. 1994)). RNC is correct that the language of the Termination
Agreement indicates a clear intent that the agreement is an executory accord: the
Termination Agreement states that the 1992 License Agreement is terminated “[u]pon
satisfaction of the conditions herein,” not at execution. Feureisen Decl. Ex. G, Termination
Agreement ¶ 1(a).
Nonetheless, the language of the 1992 Agreement does not foreclose the possibility
that an executory accord, such as the termination agreement, falls into the general category
of an agreement entered into “in substitution of” the Licensing Agreement under Paragraph
11 of the 1992 Contract. Courts often speak of executory accords as agreements that
“substitute” for prior contracts, making clear that there is a legal meaning of the term
“substitution agreement” and a different, more general meaning of the word “substitute.”
See, e.g., Gibbs v. Moore, 848 N.Y.S.2d 266, 267 (App. Div. 2007) (“The documents
submitted by the defendant in support of his motion established the existence of an accord
and satisfaction by way of a substituted agreement.”); see also Shipsview Corp. v. Beeche
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Systems Corp., 125 F.3d 844, 844 (2d Cir. 1997) (“In an accord and satisfaction, an obligor
agrees to provide a performance different from that required, or allegedly required, of him
by the contract, and the obligee agrees to accept the substituted performance in satisfaction
of the obligor's existing duty.”); U.S. ex rel. Veltz v. Allegany Rehabilitation Associates,
Inc., No. 01 Civ. 190S, 2011 WL 1042194, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. March 18, 2011) (“ ‘An accord
and satisfaction is a method of discharging a contract or settling a cause of action arising
from a contract or a tort, by substituting for such contract or cause of action an agreement
for the satisfaction thereof and an execution of such substituted agreement.’ ”) (quoting City
of Amsterdam v. Daniel Goldreyer, Ltd., 882 F. Supp. 1273, 1279-80 (E.D.N.Y.1995)).
There is no clear intention in the 1992 Contract to curtail USLA’s right to receive
consideration for an executory accord that was “substituted” for the Licensing Agreement,
but not for a substitution agreement. It is plausible to read Paragraph 11 of the 1992
Contract as permitting USLA to receive consideration for an executory agreement entered
into “in substitution of” the licensing agreement. If this is the correct reading, USLA would
be entitled to its 23 percent share of “other consideration” received by RNC. Because this
reading is plausible, it would be inappropriate to resolve the ambiguity in the contract at the
motion to dismiss stage. See Zuckerwise v. Sorceron Inc., 735 N.Y.S.2d 100, 114-15 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2001) (“[A]t the very least, the contract is ambiguous and cannot be construed as
a matter of law on the instant motion to dismiss.”); see also TufAmerica, Inc. v. Orchard
Enterprises, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 181620, 2011 WL 4946663, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2011)
(“[A] motion to dismiss should not be granted where the contract leaves doubt as to the
parties' intent.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Defendant’s motion to
dismiss as to Count 1 is denied.1
B. The Motion to Dismiss is Granted as to the Second Cause of Action
USLA’s second cause of action alleges that RNC underpaid plaintiff under the terms of the
1992 Contract for USLA’s share of royalties through 2011 and that this constitutes a breach of the
1992 Contract. In a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the standard is that the complaint must allege a “short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
1
RNC also relies on Paragraph 13 of the contract to argue that USLA is not entitled to any of the consideration received
from Wrigley; however, that provision is clearly inapplicable to the situation here. That paragraph states: “In the event
of a termination or expiration of the License Agreement and in the further event JBC grants a license under the
TRADEMARK to a third party that is not in privity with LICENSEE, USLA acknowledges that it will have no rights to
share in any royalties, compensation or monies received by JBC from such third party.” Feureisen Decl., Ex. B 1992
Contract ¶ 13. USLA does not claim that it is entitled to royalties from the contract that JBC has entered with a new,
third party manufacturer and so this argument fails.
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555 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). However, “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
RNC is correct that the complaint provides no facts to indicate that there was any
underpayment. Def.’s Reply 8. The only facts that USLA was ever underpaid come from an exhibit
and statements submitted in connection with USLA’s opposition to the motion to dismiss, where
USLA states that “RNC informed USLA that RNC had underpaid USLA $13,300.00 in royalties for
2010 under the 1992 contract. . .” Pl.’s Opp. 12; Feureisen Decl., Ex. I Letter from Pokotilow to
Feureisen. As a result, USLA argues, “It is more than reasonable to infer that RNC has underpaid
USLA under the terms of the 1992 Contract for the years prior to 2010.” Pl.’s Opp. 12-13.
Exhibit I to the Feureisen Declaration and the facts first raised in USLA’s Opposition to the
motion to dismiss are not properly considered in deciding this motion to dismiss. In Chambers, the
Second Circuit explained that “a plaintiff’s reliance on the terms and effect of a document in
drafting the complaint is a necessary prerequisite to the court’s consideration of the document on a
dismissal motion; mere notice or possession is not enough.” 282 F.3d at 154 (holding that the
district court erred by reviewing matters outside the pleadings that were not relied on by the
complaint). Exhibit I to the Feureisen Declaration is not referenced in the complaint nor does the
complaint indicate that USLA “relied on” this document in drafting the complaint.
The allegations in the complaint on this cause of action are “mere conclusory statements.”
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. The complaint states: “RNC has underpaid USLA under the terms of the
1992 Contract for plaintiff USLA’s share of royalties through 2011, despite defendant RNC’s false
assurances to the contrary.” Complaint ¶ 48.2 These allegations do not “raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. USLA’s Second Cause of Action is dismissed.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that leave to amend should be “granted freely
. . . when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Courts should deny leave to amend when a
claim is “clearly frivolous or legally insufficient on its face.” Ruiz v. Suffolk County Sheriff's Dep't,
No. 03 Civ. 3545, 2008 WL 4516222, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2008) (citing Blaskiewicz v. County
of Suffolk, 29 F. Supp. 2d 134, 138 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)). USLA’s complaint is not clearly frivolous or
legally insufficient because were USLA to provide facts indicating that they had been underpaid,
2
In any event, even were I to consider these documents, these factual allegations would not “raise a right to relief above
the speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and USLA cannot save this cause of action by arguing that after
discovery, it will be able to plausibly state a claim. See Hill v. Philip Morris USA, No. 03 Civ. 6922, 2004 WL 1065548,
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2004) (“[I]t is not sufficient to say that appropriate allegations to plead a sufficient cause of
action will be made after pre-trial discovery.”). The only facts apparent in Exhibit I to the Feureisen Declaration are
that RNC acknowledged that it had made an accounting error, underpaying USLA in 2010, and was correcting it. This
fact alone does not suggest that RNC underpaid USLA prior to 2010.
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USLA would sufficiently plead a second breach of contract claim. Therefore, this Court grants
USLA leave to file a second amended complaint with respect to this claim only.
C. The Motion to Dismiss is Granted as to the Third Cause of Action
USLA's third cause of action alleges that RNC breached the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in the 1992 Contract by waiving the 2011 Guaranteed Minimum Royalty in order to
negotiate the purchase of the Big League Chew equipment, materials and other valuable assistance
from Wrigley. RNC argues that "[e]ven if there is no express contractual provision on point, the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing prevents RNC's scheme to avoid paying USLA its
share of the 2011 Guaranteed Minimum Royalties." PI. 's Opp. 11.
Courts dismiss claims ofbreach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing where they
are duplicative of breach of contract claims. See Amcan Holdings, Inc. v, Canadian Imperial Bank
a/Commerce, 894 N.Y.S, 2d47, 49-50 (N.Y, App. Div. 2010) (upholding dismissal of claim of
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as "duplicative of the breach-of-contract
claim" because "both claims arise from the same facts and seek the identical damages for each
alleged breach") (internal citations omitted); see also Serdarevic v, Centex Homes, LLC, 760 F.
Supp. 2d 322, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("A claim for breach of the implied covenant [of good faith and
fair dealing] will be dismissed as redundant where the conduct allegedly violating the implied
covenant is also the predicate for breach of a covenant of an express provision of the underlying
contract.") (quoting Harris v, Provident Life & Accident Ins, Co, 310 F.3d 73,80 (2d Cir, 2002)).
Because USLA's Third Cause of Action relies on the exact same facts and seeks the exact same
damages as the First Cause of Action for breach of contract, the Third Cause of Action is dismissed
as duplicative and leave to amend as to this cause of action is denied,
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion is DENIED as to the Amended Complaint's
First Cause of Action and is GRANTED as to the Amended Complaint's Second and Third Causes
of Action, Leave to Amend within 20 days is granted as to the Second Cause of Action only, The
Clerk of the Court is instructed to close this motion and to change Defendant's
Nelson Company in the case caption.
SOORDE)1.
November
,2011
New York, New York
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