KSW Mechanical Services, Inc. et al v. Mechanical Contractors Association of New York, Inc. et al

Filing 35

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. For the foregoing reasons, the Association's motion for reconsideration is denied. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate the motion pending at ECF No. 26. Denying 26 Motion for Reconsideration. (Signed by Judge William H. Pauley, III on 5/4/2012) (rjm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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11 Civ. 5100 (WHP)

KSW MECHANICAL SERVICES, INC.,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Plaintiff,
-against-

USDCSDNY-~

MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS
ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, INC.,

DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC#:

et al.,
Defendants.

----..

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FILED:

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WILLIAM H. PAULEY III, District Judge:

The Mechanical Contractors Association of New York, Inc. (the "Association")
moves for reconsideration of this Court's Memorandum & Order granting in part and denying in
part its motion for summary judgment. See KSW Mech. Servs., Inc. v. Mech. Contractors Ass'n
of N.Y., No. 11 Civ. 5100 (WHP), 2012 WL 1027354, at *1 (Mar. 27, 2012). For the following
reasons, the Association's motion for reconsideration is denied.

DISCUSSION

1.

Legal Standard
Local Civil Rule 6.3 allows a party to move for reconsideration of an order in

light of "matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the Court has overlooked."
Reconsideration of an order is an "extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly in the
interests of finaJity and [to conserve] scarce judicial resources." Parrish v. Sollecito, 253

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F.Supp.2d 713, 715 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (citing In re Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 113
F.Supp.2d 613,614 (S.D.N.Y.2000)). Accordingly, the standard for granting a motion for
reconsideration is strict, and the motion "will generally be denied unless the moving party can
point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked ... that might reasonably be
expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc ., 70 F.3d
255,257 (2d Cir.1995). "Reconsideration is not an invitation for parties to treat the court's
initial decision as the opening of a dialogue in which that party may then use such a motion to
advance new theories or adduce new evidence in response to the court's rulings." Tradition
Chile Agentes de Valores Ltda. v. ICAP Sec. USA LLC, No. 09 Civ. 10343 (WHP), 2011 WL
181735, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11,2011) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted).
II.

Sufficiency of the Complaint
The Association argues that PlaintiffKSW Mechanical Services, Inc. ("KSW")

fails to allege damages in its Complaint, and thus does not plead facts supporting its Sherman
Act and New York law claims. The Association contends that-in denying in part its motion for
summary judgment-this Court overlooked the pleading standards announced in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78
(2009). In those cases, the Supreme Court held that "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to reliefthat is
plausible on its face. '" Jgbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The Court
further explained that "[ a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

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But the Association both misinterprets Twombly and Iqbal and misreads the
Complaint. First, Twombly and Igbal did not disturb the well-settled rule that courts "must
accept as true the reasonable inferences that [can] be drawn from [a plaintiffs] allegations."
Anderson News, L.L.c. v. Am. Media, Inc., --- F.3d m_, 2012 WL 1085948, at *23 (2d Cir.
2012). Second, KSW does, in fact, plead damages. Specifically, KSW alleges that "[t]he Work
Rule XVII applicable to members of the [Association] provides said members with a competitive
advantage over non-members when bidding on construction projects, because it increased non­
members labor costs compared to MCA members' costs." (Complaint dated July 25,2011
("Compl.")' 21.) KSW further alleges that "Defendants' actions ... have an anti-competitive
effect on the mechanical construction market by increasing the non-members [sic] costs, which
impairs the ability of non-member signatories to compete with [Association] member
signatories." (CompI., 30.)
Taken together, KSW's allegations support the reasonable inference that the
Association's conduct increased KSW's labor costs and impaired its ability to bid competitively.
These allegations suffice to state a claim under the Sherman Act and New York law. See KSW,
2012 WL 1027354, at *5-*6.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Association's motion for reconsideration is denied.
The Clerk ofthe Court is directed to terminate the motion pending at ECF No. 26.

Dated: May 4,2012
New York, New York
SO ORDERED:

'~~~~~~
WILLIAM H. PAULEYIII'-'"
U.S.DJ.

Counsel ofRecord:

James F. Oliviero, Esq.
37-16 23rd Street
Long Island City, NY 11101
Counsel for Plaintiff
Peter D. Stergios, Esq.
Christina M. Schmid, Esq.
McCarter & English, LLP
245 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10167
Counsel for Defendants

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