Mahmood v. Research in Motion Ltd.
Filing
71
OPINION & ORDER: For the reasons set forth above, this Court finds that laches presents an entire defense to plaintiff's inventorship claim. Plaintiff's action is therefore DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate this action. (Signed by Judge Katherine B. Forrest on 5/16/2012) (pl) Modified on 5/16/2012 (pl).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------- X
USDCSDNY
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC II:
DATE F=I::-LE~I"j-l'fl-~.-::~-
TAHIR MAHMOOD,
Plaintiff,
11 Civ. 5345 (KBF)
OPINION & ORDER
-v-
RESEARCH IN MOTION LTD.,
Defendant.
------ ------------------------------- X
KATHERINE B. FORREST, District Judge:
This dispute arises from the inventorship of a patent
integral to defendant Research in Motion Limited's ("RIM")
BlackBerry products. A bench trial on the applicability of the
laches doctrine to plaintiff Tahir Mahmood's ("plaintiff")
correction-of-inventorship claim was held on April 19, 2012. The
issue at the bench trial was, specifically, whether RIM suffered
economic prejudice as a result of plaintiff's delay in bringing
suit. Based on the findings of facts and conclusions of law
below, this Court finds that the laches doctrine bars this
action and accordingly dismisses it with prejudice.
BACKGROUND
On August 1, 2011, Tahir Mahmood brought an action against
RIM asserting a claim for correction of inventorship on one of
RIM's core patents relating to its BlackBerry products. 1 In the
same action, plaintiff asserted state law claims for conversion,
unfair competition and unjust enrichment. Defendant moved to
dismiss plaintiff's claims on the basis of, inter alia, statute
of limitations and lachesi this Court converted that motion to
one for summary judgment (see Notice, Dec. 1, 2011).
On January 23, 2012, this Court granted summary judgment in
favor of defendant RIM as to all of plaintiff's state law
claims, found that defendant had established a presumption of
laches with respect to the correction-of-inventorship claim, but
that plaintiff had rebutted that presumption by showing a lack
of evidentiary or economic prejudice resulting from the
unreasonable delay in bringing suit. Mahmood v. Research in
Motion Ltd., No. 11 Civ. 5345, 2012 WL 242836, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 24, 2012). Familiarity with the facts of this case, as set
out in the Court's January 23, 2012 summary judgment opinion, is
assumed.
On February 3, 2012, plaintiff filed a related suit,
captioned Mahmood v. Research in Motion Ltd., 12 Civ. 0899 1
alleging a need for correction of inventorship and asserting
various state law claims relating to five additional
patents/patent applications that are part of the same family as
1 The patent at issue is U.S.
Patent No. 6,219,694 (the \\\694 patent H ) . That
patent was the first in what has become a large family of related patents now
numbering over 120 worldwide with over 4,000 claims. (Tr. at 70:3-6, April
19, 2012.)
2
the '694 patent: U.S. Patent No. 7,386,588 B2, U.S. Patent No.
6,463,464 B1, U.S. Patent No. 6,389,457 B2, U.S. Patent
Application Publication No. 2008/0052365 A1, and U.S. Patent
Application Publication No. 2008/0052409 A1. Each of these
patents/applications was obtained/filed after the '694 patent
issued. On the basis that this new lawsuit demonstrated that RIM
was subject to economic prejudice as a result of plaintiff's
delay in filing suit, defendant asked this Court to reconsider
its decision on laches. This Court declined to entertain the
motion as one for reconsideration but stated that, if defendant
chose, it could make a second motion for summary judgment.
See
Order, Feb. 7, 2012.) Defendant chose to make a second motion
that motion was fully briefed on March 9, 2012.
At a conference on March 16, 2012, this Court orally denied
defendant's renewed motion for summary judgment.
(Tr. at 2:13
20, Mar. 16, 2012.) Based on the submissions of the parties, the
Court found that there were disputed issues of fact regarding
whether RIM had suffered any economic prejudice resulting from
plaintiff's delay in bringing suit, and determined that limited
discovery as to that issue was warranted before the Court could
make the factual determinations necessary to deciding the merits
of the laches defense.
(Id. at 3:14-5:8.) Based on the fact that
laches is an equitable issue to be tried to the Court and not
jury, this Court also determined that it would be most efficient
3
to reach a prompt final determination as to the issue of laches.
(Id. at 2:11-13.) The Court then set a schedule for discovery
limited to the laches issue and set April 19, 2012 as the date
for a bench trial solely on the issue of whether RIM suffered
any economic prejudice as a result of plaintiff's unreasonable
delay in commencing suit.
(Id. at 2:5-8:22.) The Court stated
that after a final determination on laches, this case would
either proceed to the merits on the inventorship claim, or would
be disposed of entirely.
Id. at 19:16-17.)
On April 19, 2012, this Court held a one day bench trial on
the issue of whether RIM suffered any economic prejudice as a
result of plaintiff's unreasonable delay in bringing suit. Each
side made opening statements, presented evidence and submitted
post-trial memoranda. This Court has now made findings of fact
and conclusions of law on laches as set forth herein.
Based on the evidence presented at trial, this Court finds
that RIM has and will suffer economic prejudice directly related
to plaintiff's unreasonable delay in filing this lawsuit.
Accordingly, since laches presents an entire defense to
plaintiff's sole remaining claim in this action (correction of
inventorship), this case is now dismissed with prejudice.
FINDINGS OF FACT
In connection with defendant RIM's initial motion for
summary judgment, this Court determined that plaintiff had
4
unreasonably and inexcusably delayed in commencing this lawsuit.
Mahmood, 2012 WL 242836, at *7. As discussed above, however,
this Court also found that there was an open question as to
whether that delay resulted in economic prejudice to RIM
that
is, economic prejudice that it would not have suffered had
plaintiff commenced the lawsuit sooner.
(Id. at 20.)
Based upon the evidence presented at trial, this Court has
determined that at the time that plaintiff knew or should have
been on inquiry notice of his claims, the only patent that had
issued arguably relating to plaintiff's PageMail invention
i.e., the software solution that plaintiff had developed and
alleges is the basis for BlackBerry's email technology - was the
'694 patent. Krishna Pathiyal ("Pathiyal H )
testified credibly as
to RIM's intellectual property strategy, how the passage of time
has impacted that strategy with regard to the '694 patent and
RIM's internal investigation of plaintiff's claims in 2004.
I.
Pathiyal Testimony
Pathiyal was hired by RIM in 1999 to develop a patent
portfolio and strategy.
(Tr. at 63:7-22, April 19, 2012.) He was
personally involved in the '694 patent and mining that patent
for other possible assets.
(Id. at 69:10-19.) He and others at
RIM identified a dozen or more major categories of invention
relating to the '694 patent.
(Id. at 71:16-23.) This resulted in
a host of other, related patent applications submitted allover
5
the world.
(Id. at 73:1-13.) Pathiyal testified credibly at
trial that when plaintiff raised questions regarding whether he
was an inventor of the invention reflected in the '694 patent,
in whole or in part, that RIM undertook an internal
investigation.
(See~,
id. at 105:3-108:22.)2
RIM's investigation included analysis of a variety of
materials including, inter alia, lab notebooks of individuals
associated with the '694 patent, interviews with relevant people
within RIM and review of the source code associated with the
'694 patent.
(See~,
id. at 189:21-24.) In a series of
correspondence exchanged between RIM and plaintiff, RIM
repeatedly requested that plaintiff provide it with any
information that he had with regard to the merits of his claim
of inventorship.
(See~,
id. at 101:24-102:15.) On more than
one occasion, plaintiff stated that such information would be
forthcoming but it never was.
(See~,
id. at 111:10-13.) In a
single fax, plaintiff outlined several general areas that he
believed demonstrated that he was an inventor of the '694
patent.
Id. at 101:14-104:10.) Pathiyal testified credibly that
this fax did not provide RIM with any factual basis upon which
to make a determination that plaintiff had any role in the
invention of the '694 patent.
(Id.) While plaintiff had
repeatedly told RIM that he had additional information, none was
2
The Court found Pathiyal credible as to all topics upon which he testified.
6
forthcoming and RIM had to proceed based on the information
available to it at the time.
(Id. at 102:10-15, 107:17-108:22,
122:15-23, 120:4-5, 227:12-228:1, 226:12-19, 227:19-21; Def.'s
Ex. 8, Def.'s Ex. 10.)
Relatedly, plaintiff has asserted that he discovered
certain "corroborating evidence" in a box in his brother's
garage in 2009.
(Mahmood Decl.
~
67, Dec. 16, 2011.) In
connection with his opposition to RIM's original motion for
summary judgment, plaintiff argued that laches does not bar his
correction-of-inventorship claim because he could not have
brought his claim prior to making this discovery.
(See Pl.'s
Mem. of Law in Opp. to RIM's Mot. to Dismiss the CompI. at 5,
Oct. 6, 2011.)
In the January 23, 2012 decision on that motion,
this Court noted that that box apparently contained floppy disks
and other "materials supportive of his claim." Mahmood, 2012 WL
242836, at *2. The Court also determined that it was fairly easy
for plaintiff to locate this box and it was inexcusable that he
had not done so earlier. Id. at *6. In reliance, in part, on
plaintiff's declaration reciting the contents of the box, this
Court determined that there appeared to be sufficient existing
evidence that defendant could not support a claim for
"evidentiary prejudice" resulting from the unreasonable delay.
Id. at *8.
7
pathiyal testified that had RIM received additional,
specific information regarding plaintiff's claims, RIM certainly
would have taken that information into consideration in coming
to its determination as to an appropriate course of action.
~,
(See
Tr. at 137:9-16, April 19, 2012.) In the absence of such
information, however, RIM had to base its actions on what it had
available from its own records. Pathiyal testified that when RIM
conducted its investigation in 2004 it did not have access to
any source code for plaintiff's PageMail invention.
Id.at
132:5-16.) According to plaintiff's affidavit, that source code
was contained in the box he located in 2009.
(Mahmood Decl. ,
67, Dec. 16, 2011.)
Pathiyal testified that RIM is very serious and careful
regarding intellectual property rights. It does not take
unnecessary risks with respect to its patent portfolio.
~,
See
Tr. at 92:14-19, April 19, 2012.) From time to time, RIM
has been approached by individuals claiming rights in a RIM
invention or patent.
(See~,
id. at 89:17-90:3.) RIM has
handled those issues in a variety of ways: it has obtained a
license
id. at 91:8-5), it has included the individual as an
inventor (id. at 95:4-10), it has attempted to invent around the
invention (id. at 86:4-15), and it has investigated and
determined that the individual's assertions are sometimes
without basis (id. at 219:15-25). Pathiyal testified to two
8
specific instances (regarding NTP, Inc. and InPro) in which
third parties claimed that they had rights to certain technology
and RIM designed around that technology.
Id. at 86:4-15.)
If RIM had information available to it that indicated that
plaintiff's claims were substantiated, pathiyal explained the
several options RIM would have had in 2001 or even 2004: it
could have provided a financial settlement, it could have
designed around the patent, it could have obtained a license to
the patent, it could have entered into some sort of business
relationship with plaintiff, and/or it could have considered
whether plaintiff should have been included as an inventor on
the '694 patent.
(Id. at 90:13-91:2i 135:15-138:22.)
Pathiyal provided support for these alternatives. For
instance, in terms of design around, Pathiyal testified that
this was a realistic option in 2001 or 2004.
(Id. at 98:22
99:8.) There was, in fact, more than one way to achieve certain
of the features of the '694 patent. Pathiyal explained that the
'694 patent has claims relating to a single mailbox and
Microsoft has itself invented a technology that has a single
mailbox that is not on the same "technological path" as the '694
patent.
Id. at 175:9-12.) Moreover, Pathiyal presented a number
of patents that listed non-RIM employees as inventors with RIM
employees to support his assertion that RIM would have
9
considered, as one option, listing plaintiff as a co-inventor if
merited.
(Def.'s Ex. 27.)
Pathiyal testified that after RIM had conducted its 2004
investigation, based on the information available to it at that
time, it committed itself to the '694 patent strategy. The delay
in commencing this lawsuit, as Pathiyal testified, meant that
RIM did not understand that there were real risks associated
with this strategy. In reliance on its belief that it was the
sole owner of the patent, RIM proceeded to develop a family of
now more than 120 patents worldwide relating to the '694 patent,
and that there were now 4,000 claims encompassed within those
patents.
(Tr. at 139:23-140:14, April 19, 2012.) This was in
contrast to the fact that in 2001, the only patent that had
issued was the '694 patent, which had a total of 36 claims.
Id.
at 135:19-25.) According to Pathiyal, RIM was now committed to a
very significant technology path to which it would not have
committed itself to had plaintiff brought his claims earlier and
RIM had an opportunity to investigate them. Pathiyal explained
that the options available to RIM in 2001 and 2004 to deal with
a claim of co-inventorship no longer existed, or were much more
difficult to achieve, when plaintiff finally brought his suit in
2011.
Id. at 135:12-138:22.)
Pathiyal also testified that by proceeding to develop the
'694 patent family, RIM had spent the time, resources and
10
creative energies of a host of engineers whose talents could
have been directed towards developing alternative technologies.
(Id. at 137:17-138:9.)
II.
Adler Testimony
Plaintiff presented live testimony from Mark Adler
("Adler"). It was unclear what Alder was being offered as an
expert in. His experience in patent "strategies" was derived
almost exclusively from his job as Chief Intellectual Property
Counsel at Rohm and Haas for over two decades.
Id. at 236:24
237:1.) In addition to that position, he has sat on various
committees and boards with individuals from a number of
different industries.
rd. at 240:12-241:12.) He readily
conceded that he had never: prosecuted patents on mobile
telecommunications devices, conducted research as to the
prosecution strategies of mobile telecommunications device
manufacturers, worked for a mobile telecommunications company or
handled a situation, while working at Rohm and Haas, where a
third party brought a patent infringement suit against his
employer.
Id. at 244:2-245:17.) Adler also confirmed that he
did not have expertise in determining economic prejudice.
(Id.)
The testimony from Adler was based on his ipse dixit. When
the Court posed questions, he appeared to agree that the facts
facing RIM could indeed have resulted in prejudice, and then
when questioned by plaintiff's counsel, he would take contrary
11
t:
positions.
(See~,
id. at 282:7-12; 283:17-19; 283:21-284:5;
296:17-20; 300:3-9.) This Court finds that Adler's testimony was
unreliable and unhelpful to this Court. It does not pass muster
under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993), and the Court
excludes it for that reason.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I.
Standard of Review
For the purposes of this proceeding, in order to prevail on
its laches defense, defendant must demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that it suffered economic
prejudice causally related to plaintiff's unreasonable delay in
bringing suit. See A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr.
Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
II.
Laches and Economic Prejudice
As this Court set forth in its opinion dated January 23,
2012, familiarity with which is assumed herein, "laches is
unacceptable neglect or delay in bringing suit which causes
prejudice to the other party" and, if shown, bars an action.
Mahmood, 2012 WL 242836, at *7. Laches consists of two elements:
"(1) the plaintiff delayed filing suit for an unreasonable and
inexcusable length of time from the time the plaintiff knew or
reasonably should have known of its claim against the defendant,
and (2) the delay operated to the prejudice or injury of the
12
,
I
defendant." Mahmood, 2012 WL 242836, at *7 (citing A.C.
Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1032). The doctrine is an equitable
defense and should, accordingly, not be applied mechanically.
Mahmood, 2012 WL 242836, at *7 (citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht,
327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946)). Instead, a determination as to
whether a lawsuit is barred by laches depends on a weighing of
the facts and circumstances surrounding the reasons for delay in
bringing suit as well as whether the defendant to a suit when
finally commenced has suffered any evidentiary or economic
prejudice. Id.
(citing A.C. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1032) .
Here, as this court found in the January 23, 2012 summary
judgment opinion, plaintiff did unreasonably and inexcusably
delay in commencing this lawsuit against RIM for more than six
years after he knew, should have known or was on inquiry notice
of his claim against RIM. Mahmood, 2012 WL 242836, at *7. This
raised a rebuttable presumption of laches. Id. Plaintiff was
able to show, however, that there was sufficient evidentiary
material available to raise a triable issue of fact as to
whether RIM had in fact experienced any evidentiary prejudice.
Id. at *8. Moreover, the only evidence of economic prejudice
presented by defendant at the time related to "mere investments
and costs," which this Court found insufficient to establish
economic prejudice on the motion for summary judgment. Id.
13
For the reasons stated in the Background section of this
decision l the sole issue at the bench trial on April 19 1 2012
was the economic prejudice l if any
I
of plaintiffls delay in filing suit.
suffered by RIM as a result
(Tr. at 8:8-13 1 Mar. 16 1
2012.) Economic prejudice "may arise where a defendant will
suffer the loss of monetary investments or incur damages which
likely would have been prevented by earlier suit." Serdarevic v.
Advanced Med. Optics
i
Inc'
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25
at 1033)
1
l
No. 06 Civ. 7107 1 2007 WL 27741771
2007)
(quoting A . . Aukerman
960 F.2d
(internal quotation marks omitted)). "This concept
addresses something more than the damages that may be awarded
for a finding of infringementi it is seeking evidence that there
has been a change in the economic position of the alleged
infringer during the period of delay." Id.
(internal quotation
marks omitted). See also Lake Caryonah Improvement Assoc. v.
Pulte Home Corp.
I
903 F.2d 505 1 510 (7th Cir. 1990)
(economic
prejudice found where defendant expended substantial resources
developing and maintaining property for eleven years)
Robotics
I
Inc. v. GMFanuc Robotics Corp.
(Fed. Cir. 1995)
I
i
ABB
52 F.3d 1062 1 1065
(increasing sales expenditures and procuring
additional patents in the same field may constitute economic
prejudice) i Radio Sys. Corp. v. Lalor l No. C10-828RSL
254026 1 at *9
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 26 1 2012)
I
2012 WL
(a partyls loss of the
"opportunity to structure their business plans as they might
14
have had they known of the threat of litigation . . . is a
recognized example of prejudice") .
There must be a nexus between a plaintiff's unexcused delay
in bringing suit and the change in economic position. A.C.
Aukerman, 960 F.2d. at 1033 ("The courts must look for a change
in the economic position of the alleged infringer during the
period of delay."
(emphasis in original)). See also Hemstreet v.
Computer Entry Sys. Corp., 972 F.2d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
("The change must be because of and as a result of the delay.").
Economic prejudice cannot result from a "business decision or
gamble that the patent owner would not sue." Gasser Chair Co.,
Inc. v. Infanti Chair Mfg. Corp., 60 F.3d 770, 775 (Fed. Cir.
1995). A nexus has not been found, for instance, where plaintiff
continued to pursue his rights and "left the attentive observer
with little doubt of his
in~entions"
-
i.e., there can be no
nexus where a defendant suffers economic prejudice in the face
of a plaintiff that has made it clear he will be pursuing
litigation. Hemstreet, 972 F.2d at 1294.
Irrelevant to the nexus inquiry is whether or not a
defendant has been profitable. Financial success alone does not
evidence a lack of economic prejudice. For example, in ABB
Robotics, Inc. v. GMFanuc Robotics Corp., plaintiff failed to
rebut a presumption of economic prejudice with a showing that
defendant's sales had tripled during the period of delay. 828 F.
15
Supp. 1386, 1396 (E.D. Wisc. 1993), aff'd, 52 F.3d 1062 (Fed.
Cir. 1995). In another case, Coleman v. Corning Glass Works, the
court found economic prejudice despite the fact that defendant
had earned $10 million in profits during the period of delay.
619 F. Supp. 950, 954-55 (W.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd 818 F.2d 874
(Fed. Cir. 1987). As Judge Learned Hand has stated in the
copyright context:
It must be obvious to everyone familiar with equitable
principles that it is inequitable for the owner of a
copyright,
with
full
notice
of
an
intended
infringement, to stand inactive while the proposed
infringer
spends
large
sums
of
money
in
its
exploitation,
and
to
intervene
only
when
his
speculation has proved a success. Delay under such
circumstances allows the owner to speculate without
risk with another's money i he cannot possibly lose,
and he may win.
Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 F. lOS, 108 (D.C.N.Y. 1916). Thus,
while there must be a nexus between a plaintiff's delay and a
defendant's economic prejudice, whether or not the defendant has
been economically successful on the whole is not an issue.
III.
RIM Has Demonstrated Economic Prejudice
Plaintiff's primary arguments against a showing of economic
prejudice boil down to one simple concept: that after RIM
conducted its 2004 investigation, the die was cast. Put another
way, plaintiff's claim that no lawsuit by plaintiff, no further
evidence provided by plaintiff, would have caused RIM to have
altered its coursej therefore, there is no support for a nexus
16
between plaintiff's delay and any of the things defendant says
it did in reliance on plaintiff's inaction, or what it would
have done alternatively had plaintiff in fact acted.
(See Pl.'s
Post-Hr'g Br. at 3-8.)
Plaintiff's position finds no support in the record. While
it is true, as this Court has found above, that RIM did conduct
an internal investigation of plaintiff's claims in 2004, that
investigation was based solely on the information to which RIM
then had access. Plaintiff claimed to have more but his alleged
evidence never materialized. It would be incredible for a
business to have made a major strategic decision not to pursue a
patent family because unsubstantiated assertions had been made.
Equally, there is no evidence in the record, and there is
evidence to the contrary, that had plaintiff in fact come
forward with credible evidence of ownership, RIM would have
seriously reviewed it and, if merited, undertaken an appropriate
alteration in course.
In support of his position, plaintiff points to testimony
from Pathiyal that after RIM was contacted by plaintiff in 2004
with his inventorship claims, it did not change its strategy.
See Pl.'s Post-Hr'g Br. at 1-2.) However, that does not answer
the critical question: had plaintiff presented RIM with a
lawsuit in which he made the sort of detailed factual
allegations made in the instant lawsuit, or had plaintiff
17
provided the information that he repeatedly suggested he would
provide, would that have altered RIM's strategy? That is a
different question. Pathiyal testified at length that had RIM
had sufficient information with which to judge the merits of
plaintiff's claims, it could have pursued other options that
would have lessened or eliminated the economic prejudice which
RIM would now face.
(Tr. at 90:13-92:19, 95:4-97:21, 132:17
133:6, April 19, 2012.) A negotiated resolution could have
included a licensing arrangement, RIM could have changed its
patent prosecution and enforcement strategy, designing around
plaintiff's alleged contribution.
Id. at 85:18-23, 132:17
133:6.) Pathiyal corroborated that RIM would have undertaken
such efforts by reference to specific other instances in which,
when faced with other intellectual property disputes, it had
done so.
(See~,
id. at 86:2-10, 92:24-93:5.) That none of
these paths was undertaken is due to the lack of diligent
pursuit by plaintiff - he frankly just disappeared for several
years.
Plaintiff argues that his delay is of no consequence
because the BlackBerry products that utilized the '694 patent
family have been profitable for RIM.
See PI.'s Post-Hr'g Br. at
9.) Plaintiff misunderstands economic prejudice. As explained
above, the fact that RIM has made a profit on the technology
does not speak to what RIM would have done differently had
18
plaintiff brought his suit earlier - i.e., RIM could both make a
profit off of its BlackBerry products and suffer economic
prejudice as a result of plaintiff's inexcusable delay in filing
suit.
For example, if it now turned out that plaintiff should be
listed as a co-inventor, that would mean that in the absence of
another arrangement, plaintiff would have the right to license
the '694 patent. See Ethicon v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d
1456, 1466 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(holding that an omitted co-inventor
could grant a license under the patent to a third party). This
could run directly counter to RIM's own developed licensing and
marketing strategies - and could have been avoided, at least in
large part, had plaintiff not waited over six years to bring his
lawsuit. such economic prejudice and turning a profit are not
mutually exclusive.
Based on the extensive evidentiary record and the credible
testimony from Pathiyal, RIM certainly suffered economic
prejudice directly related to plaintiff's delay in bringing
suit. Equity does not condone, and this Court will not allow, a
plaintiff to make unsupported allegations of ownership,
disappear for years while a company builds a successful business
strategy around the very invention in which he asserts an
interest, and then allow him to bring an untimely lawsuit.
19
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Court finds that
laches presents an entire defense to plaintiff's inventorship
claim. Plaintiff's action is therefore DISMISSED with prejudice.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate this
action.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:
New York, New York
May 16, 2012
KATHERINE B. FORREST
United States District Judge
20
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