Ironshore Insurance Ltd. v. Western Asset Management Company

Filing 43

ORDER denying 32 Motion. Defendant Western Asset Management ("Western") has moved for certification for an interlocutory appeal of the Court's May 30, 2012, Memorandum Order, which held that an investment manager is not a "profe ssional" for the purposes of Rule 214(6) of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules (the "CPLR"). For the following reasons, the motion is denied. As Western has not demonstrated a substantial ground for difference of opinion, the motion for certification of the May 30 Memorandum Order for an interlocutory appeal is hereby denied. (Signed by Judge Laura Taylor Swain on 7/31/2012) (ja)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-------------------------------------------------------x

IRONSHORE INSURANCE LTD.,
Plaintiff,
No. 11 Civ. 05954 (LTS) (JCF)

-vWESTERN ASSET MANAGEMENT
COMPANY,
Defendant.

-------------------------------------------------------x
ORDER

Defendant Western Asset Management ("Western") has moved for certification
for an interlocutory appeal of the Court's May 30,2012, Memorandum Order, which held that an
investment manager is not a "professional" for the purposes of Rule 214(6) of New York's Civil
Practice Law and Rules (the "CPLR"). For the following reasons, the motion is denied.
CPLR 214(6) provides that a three-year statute of limitations period applies to
non-medical malpractice claims. CPLR 214(6). In Chase Scientific Research, Inc. v. NIA
Group, Inc., the New York Court of Appeals explained that CPLR 214(6) applies only to
professionals and that a "professional" is one whose work is characterized by, among other
things, "extensive formal learning and training" as is required of lawyers, doctors, engineers and
architects. Chase Scientific Research, Inc. v. NIA Group, Inc., 96 N.Y.2d 20, 29 (N.Y. 2001).
This Court, in its May 30,2012, Memorandum Order, found that, although some of Western's
employees may have had advanced education, their work managing plaintiffs portfolio did not
require the same degree of advanced training required of lawyers, doctors, engineers and
IRONSHORE.CERT DENIAL.WPD

VERSION 7/31112

architects and, therefore, plaintiffs claims against Western are not governed by the three-year
limitations period. (May 30,2012, Memorandum Order, docket entry no. 30.) Instead a six-year
period governs. (Id.) Western seeks certification of that decision for an interlocutory appeaL
The general rule in federal courts is that appeals lie only from final decisions of
district courts, and only "exceptional circumstances [will] justify a departure from the basic
policy of postponing appellate review until after the entry of a final judgment." Coopers &
~~~.:..:.....!.~=:,,!..,

437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978). Title 28 of the United States Code permits

certification of an order for an interlocutory appeal:
[w]hen a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not
otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that
such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there
is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation ....
28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) (West 2006).
Here, the Court finds, and Plaintiff concedes, that the May 30, 2012,
Memorandum Order involved a controlling question of law and that an immediate appeal may
materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation, as a reversal of the May 30
Memorandum Order would almost certainly require the dismissal of the complaint. The key
dispute for the purposes of the instant motion is, therefore, whether a "substantial ground for
difference of opinion" exists regarding the Court's decision.
"A mere claim that the district court's ruling was incorrect does not demonstrate a
substantial ground for difference of opinion." Quinn v. Altria Group, Inc., 07 Civ. 8783,2008
WL 3518462, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1,2008) (citation omitted). Western has not proffered, and this
Court has been unable to find, any decision by a court in this circuit that is directly on point and

IRO:-JSHORE.CERT DE:-JIAl..WPD

VERSIO~

7/3 III 2

2

reaches a conclusion different from the Court's conclusion in its May 30 Memorandum Order.
Although Western has cited a few cases with analogous issues and presented a colorable
argument based on those cases, a colorable argument does not constitute "substantial grounds for
difference of opinion." As Western has not demonstrate a substantial ground for difference of
opinion, the motion for certification of the May 30 Memorandum Order for an interlocutory
appeal is hereby denied.
This Order resolves docket entry number 32.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: New York, New York
July 31,2012

~RSWAIN

United States District Judge

(RONSHORE.CERT DENIAL.WPD

VERSION 7131112