Eastman Kodak Company v. Asia Optical Company, Inc.
Filing
179
OPINION & ORDER....The plaintiff's March 24, 2015 motion for an anti-suit injunction is granted. A scheduling order accompanies this opinion. (Signed by Judge Denise L. Cote on 7/23/2015) (gr)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------------X
:
EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
-v:
:
ASIA OPTICAL CO., INC.,
:
:
Defendant.
:
:
----------------------------------------X
11cv6036 (DLC)
OPINION & ORDER
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff:
Robert J. Gunther
Michael J. Summersgill
Jordan L. Hirsch
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP
399 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022
For Defendant:
Christopher Kao
Perkins Coie LLP
3150 Porter Drive
Palo Alto, CA 94304
DENISE COTE, District Judge:
The plaintiff Eastman Kodak Company (“Kodak”) won a
judgment in this Court against the defendant Asia Optical Co.,
Inc. (“AO”) in 2012.
In 2014, AO brought suit against Kodak in
China to obtain reimbursement of money it paid to Kodak pursuant
to that judgment.
Kodak now seeks an anti-suit injunction
against AO to halt the Chinese lawsuit.
reasons, Kodak’s motion is granted.
For the following
BACKGROUND
The factual background of this case is laid out in several
Opinions of this Court, including in the March 16, 2012 Opinion
granting partial summary judgment in Kodak’s favor, Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Asia Optical Co., Inc., 11cv6036 (DLC), 2012 WL
917393 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2012) (“March 2012 Opinion”), and the
June 13, 2012 Opinion dismissing the third-party complaint
against Fujifilm (“Fuji”).
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Asia Optical
Co., Inc., 11cv6036 (DLC), 2012 WL 2148198 (S.D.N.Y. June 13,
2012) (“June 2012 Opinion”).
Familiarity with the March and
June 2012 Opinions is assumed.
Kodak owns many patents associated with digital camera
technology.
It licenses its patents to digital camera
manufacturers, including companies like AO that assemble cameras
for sale under other companies’ brand names.
In April 2009,
Kodak and AO entered into a patent licensing agreement (“PLA”)
whereby Kodak licensed its full set of digital camera patents to
AO in exchange for royalty payments.
A written modification
(“Side Letter”) executed contemporaneously with the PLA
described the circumstances under which AO may not be required
to pay royalties.
AO sold some of cameras it manufactured to Fuji and
contends that Fuji and not AO is responsible for paying Kodak
the patent licensing fees associated with those cameras.
2
This
dispute has spawned litigation in New York State court, this
Court, Japan, and now China.
A description of this litigation
follows.
1. Asia Optical’s New York State Lawsuits Against Fuji
AO sued Fuji twice in New York State court, alleging that
Fuji owed a duty to indemnify AO for any royalties it owed
Kodak.
On October 2, 2009, AO brought suit against Fuji and
three of Fuji’s American subsidiaries in New York State Supreme
Court, Westchester County, but discontinued the action on March
1, 2010.
On February 10, 2010, AO filed a second lawsuit
against Fuji in New York State Supreme Court, this time in New
York County.
Fuji’s motion to dismiss the second New York State action
for lack of personal jurisdiction was granted at a hearing held
on June 3, 2011, and by written order on June 7, 2011.
Following the dismissal, AO made an application for
jurisdictional discovery.
8, 2011.
This application was denied on July
AO did not appeal the decisions to dismiss the action
or to deny jurisdictional discovery.
2. Kodak’s Federal Litigation Against Asia Optical
Kodak commenced this federal action against AO on August
26, 2011, seeking royalty payments pursuant to the PLA.
In the
March 2012 Opinion, this Court granted partial summary judgment
for Kodak and held inter alia that the Side Letter only exempts
3
AO from royalty payments it owes to Kodak when its contract
assembly work is performed for a Kodak “licensee,” and that Fuji
was not a Kodak licensee. 1
AO was therefore responsible for
paying royalties for the digital cameras it manufactured for
Fuji.
In determining that AO was responsible for paying
royalties to Kodak, this Court rejected several AO arguments,
including that all “pure contract assembly” work is exempt from
the PLA’s royalty requirements even if it is not done for a
Kodak licensee.
The primary issue addressed in the March 2012 Opinion is
whether AO was obligated, under Section 5.6 of the PLA and Side
Letter, to pay Kodak royalties for cameras AO manufactured on
Fuji’s behalf. Section 5.6 of the PLA provides:
1
In the case where Digital Cameras are sold by Asia
Optical to an existing Kodak licensee under the
Digital Camera Portfolio, and sold under that
licensee’s Trademark or Tradename, then it shall be
presumed that Asia Optical shall be responsible for
the royalty payment to Kodak for those Digital Cameras
under this Agreement. However, if the existing
licensee elects to pay Kodak, and pays Kodak in full,
for Digital Cameras made and provided by Asia
Optical[,] those Digital Cameras shall not be included
in calculating Net Sales under this Agreement so long
as that licensee pays in full Kodak royalties under
its Agreement with Kodak. Asia Optical shall indicate
on its royalty report the model Digital Cameras
excluded from royalties due under this clause and the
name of the existing Kodak Licensee responsible for
payment of the royalty.
(Emphasis added.) The Side Letter states, inter alia, that
“[p]ure contract assembly without design responsibility, or
simple provision of parts does not obligate [AO] to pay a
royalty.”
4
AO filed a third-party complaint in this lawsuit against
Fuji on December 7, 2011, asserting that Fuji had agreed to
indemnify AO for the royalties owed to Kodak under the PLA.
The
third-party complaint was virtually identical to AO’s New York
State complaints.
Fuji’s motion to dismiss the third-party
complaint was granted in the June 2012 Opinion.
That Opinion
held that AO was collaterally estopped from relitigating the
existence of personal jurisdiction over Fuji.
Eastman Kodak,
2012 WL 2148198, at *3-6.
With these decisions, all that remained to be litigated was
the amount of damages.
A damages trial was scheduled to begin
on July 23, 2012, but the parties stipulated to a damages amount
on July 12.
Accordingly, on July 18, 2012, judgment was entered
in favor of Kodak against AO in the amount of $33,726,531
(“Final Judgment”).
AO appealed from the Final Judgment on the
ground that the PLA and Side Letter are ambiguous, and extrinsic
evidence would show that this Court’s interpretation of PLA §
5.6 was contrary to the parties’ intentions.
On May 23, 2013,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the Final
Judgment.
AO delayed paying the Final Judgment.
AO contended it was
unable to pay the Final Judgment but resisted post-judgment
requests aimed at discovering its financial status.
Following
motion practice and conferences with the Court, and facing
5
imposition of contempt sanctions, AO agreed to pay the Final
Judgment with interest in four equal installments.
A November
12, 2013 Order memorialized the payment schedule and revised the
amount owed to account for interest and royalties that had
accrued following the entry of the Final Judgment (“November
2013 Order”).
The November 2013 Order set the total amount to
be paid as $37,472,411.
It required AO to pay Kodak by December
31, 2013, March 31, 2014, June 30, 2014, and September 30, 2014.
On December 22, 2014, the parties informed the Court by
letter than all payments had been made pursuant to the November
2013 Order, and requested that the matter be closed.
This case
was closed on January 12, 2015.
3. Asia Optical’s Japanese Arbitration Against Fuji
After entry of the Final Judgment, AO brought an
arbitration action against Fuji in Japan, seeking
indemnification for the amount AO owed to Kodak in the Final
Judgment.
The Japanese arbitration panel denied AO’s claims on
February 28, 2014.
denied AO’s appeal.
On March 11, 2015, the Tokyo District Court
An appeal before the Tokyo High Court is
pending.
AO asserts in its memorandum of law in the instant motion
that Fuji took the position in the Japanese arbitration
proceeding that it had no duty to indemnify AO because a 2013
patent licensing agreement it entered with Kodak, and the fees
6
paid to Kodak pursuant to that agreement, “covered” the digital
cameras made by AO for Fuji.
AO explains that it has not
presented any documents from Fuji or its arbitration with Fuji
to support this assertion because the arbitration documents have
been designated as confidential.
It is undisputed that on February 1, 2013, Kodak and Fuji
entered into a patent licensing agreement.
Kodak submitted a
copy of that agreement in support of its current motion for an
injunction.
It is filed under seal, although a complete copy
has been provided to AO’s outside counsel, and certain language
critical to the current dispute between Kodak and AO has been
provided to AO’s in-house counsel. 2
AO acknowledges that Kodak’s
interpretation of the terms of the agreement between Kodak and
Fuji is inconsistent with what AO describes as Fuji’s position
in the Japanese arbitration.
4. Asia Optical’s Chinese Lawsuit Against Kodak
On July 28, 2014, AO and Sintai Optical (Shenzhen) Co.,
Ltd. (“Sintai”) began a lawsuit against Kodak in China, but did
not immediately serve Kodak. 3
2
The complaint’s single claim
The passage disclosed to AO’s inside counsel reads: [REDACTED]
Sintai is apparently a Chinese subsidiary of AO.
other connection to this dispute.
3
7
It has no
against Kodak is premised on Kodak’s alleged breach of the PLA,
specifically Section 5.6 of the PLA, 4 and it seeks reimbursement
from Kodak in the amount of $12,368,103. 5
It contends that AO
learned that Fuji and Kodak had entered into a patent licensing
agreement, which paid royalties to Kodak for the same digital
cameras that were the subject of the federal litigation, and
that it would be unjust for Kodak to receive royalty payments
from both AO and Fuji for the manufacture and sale of the same
cameras. 6
The complaint names Fuji as a “third-party,” but seeks
no damages from Fuji.
AO served the Chinese complaint on Kodak on January 16,
2015, which was four days after this federal action was closed
pursuant to a joint request from the parties.
On March 3, 2015,
Kodak requested that the instant action be reopened.
The case
was reopened on March 6.
Section 5.6 of the PLA was at the heart of the parties’ dispute
before this Court. It is quoted above.
4
The complaint asserts that AO paid this amount to Kodak
pursuant to the Final Judgment. But, the Final Judgment was
entered for $33,726,531, and the November 2013 Order is in the
amount of $37,472,411.
5
The Chinese complaint asserts that the four installment
payments were made to Kodak between December 18, 2013 and March
26, 2014, which would predate the filing of the Chinese
complaint. This is an error. The installment payments to Kodak
extended to September 2014.
6
8
Kodak filed its motion seeking an anti-suit injunction on
March 24.
In support of its motion, it has provided copies of
its agreement with Fuji, AO’s Chinese complaint, and an email
exchange between Kodak and AO in May and June 2014. 7
AO did not
submit any exhibits with its opposition to this motion.
The
motion was fully submitted on April 17.
DISCUSSION
A district court has the power to enjoin a party before it
from pursuing litigation in a foreign jurisdiction.
Paramedics
Electromedicina Comercial, Ltda. v. GE Med. Sys. Info.
Techs., Inc., 369 F.3d 645, 652 (2d Cir. 2004).
While
concurrent actions are ordinarily permitted, an anti-suit
injunction may be appropriate when used to protect the
jurisdiction and judgment of the enjoining court.
Id. at 654-
55.
But, “principles of comity counsel that injunctions
restraining foreign litigation be used sparingly and granted
only with care and great restraint.”
omitted).
Id. at 652 (citation
Applying a test identified in China Trade & Dev.
Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1987), this
Circuit has consistently held that an anti-suit injunction may
only be granted where two threshold requirements are met: first,
The email correspondence was submitted as part of Kodak’s
application to reopen the case, and is referenced in Kodak’s
briefing.
7
9
the parties must be the same in both proceedings, and second,
resolution of the case before the enjoining court must be
dispositive of the action to be enjoined.
See,
e.g., Paramedics, 369 F.3d at 652.
If the threshold requirements are met, courts weigh five
additional factors: (1) the threat to the enjoining court’s
jurisdiction posed by the foreign action; (2) the potential
frustration of strong public policies in the enjoining forum;
(3) the vexatiousness of the foreign litigation; (4) the
possibility of delay, inconvenience, expense, inconsistency, or
a race to judgment; and (5) other equitable considerations.
Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
Negara, 500 F.3d 111, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2007).
While all of the
discretionary factors must be considered, the first two factors
-- whether the foreign action threatens the enjoining forum’s
jurisdiction or its strong public policies -- are given greater
weight.
Id. at 119.
The discretionary factors will tend to
weigh in favor of an anti-foreign-suit injunction “that is
sought to protect a federal judgment.”
Id. at 120.
“There is
less justification for permitting a second action . . . after a
prior court has reached a judgment on the same issues.”
(citation omitted).
10
Id.
I. The Parties in the Federal and Chinese Litigation
The first threshold requirement is that the parties are the
same in both matters.
need not be identical.
To satisfy this requirement, the parties
See Paramedics, 369 F.3d at 652-53.
This requirement is met if the parties are “sufficiently
similar.”
See id. at 652; see also In re Millenium Seacarriers,
Inc., 458 F.3d 92, 97 n.5 (2d Cir. 2006)
The first requirement is satisfied.
The presence of Sintai
as an additional plaintiff does not alter this conclusion.
AO
has failed to explain what role Sintai has in this dispute or
why it is a co-plaintiff in the Chinese action. 8
The Chinese
complaint only requests that Kodak be ordered to pay damages to
AO.
Similarly, the presence of Fuji as a “third-party” does not
preclude a finding that the parties are the same in both the
U.S. and Chinese litigation.
Kodak is the only defendant named
in the Chinese action, and it is the only party from whom AO
seeks damages.
To support its claim against Kodak, AO asserts
The Chinese complaint lists the additional plaintiff as Sintai
Optical (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd. The text of the complaint
describes a company Dongguan Sintai Optical Co., Ltd. as a
company that concluded “Commissioned Development Agreements”
with Fuji. The complaint explains that AO also concluded seven
Commissioned Development Agreements with Fuji. There is no
allegation linking either Sintai entity to a transaction between
AO and Kodak or to a transaction between AO and Fuji. Unlike
the other parties, the plaintiff Sintai is a Chinese company.
It is apparently a Chinese subsidiary of AO.
8
11
that Kodak violated the PLA, which was entered between AO and
Kodak.
Fuji is not a party to the PLA.
Fuji is named in the Chinese action as a “third-party.” 9
While AO has not explained what role a named “third-party” plays
in Chinese litigation, it would appear to be a party that
possesses relevant evidence.
According to the translation of
the complaint provided to the Court, Fuji assured AO in
approximately 2005 that Fuji would be responsible for any
royalties owed to Kodak on the cameras that AO assembled for
Fuji and that Fuji itself told Kodak to contact Fuji directly
about such royalties. 10
The Chinese complaint also asserts that
when Fuji and Kodak executed a patent rights agreement in 2013,
they agreed that Fuji “may not pay the royalty repeatedly.”
The
complaint adds that the principle prohibiting “dual unjust
enrichments” should allow AO to recover damages from Kodak.
In
sum, AO has not sued Fuji in the Chinese action and does not
seek to recover damages from it.
Fuji’s role in the Chinese litigation is similar to the role it
played in the Federal litigation. In this Court, AO sought to
implead Fuji, asserting that it was Fuji and not AO that owed
money to Kodak, and that AO should not be required to pay Kodak
anything. In the Chinese litigation, AO asserts that Fuji was
responsible for paying Kodak, that it has paid Kodak, and that
Kodak should repay AO the money it obtained from AO through the
Final Judgment.
9
This is similar to assertions that AO made during its Federal
litigation with Kodak.
10
12
AO contends that the parties in the Federal and Chinese
litigation differ because Fuji is an “indispensable” party in
the Chinese litigation.
This argument fails.
Fuji is no more
indispensable to the Chinese litigation that AO has brought
against Kodak than it was to the Federal litigation Kodak
brought against AO.
The gravamen of AO’s complaint in the
Chinese litigation is that Kodak breached the PLA by accepting
double royalties and should repay AO.
The key factual question
-- whether Kodak received double royalties -- may be resolved
without Fuji’s presence in the litigation, and the key legal
question -- whether the receipt of double royalties violates the
PLA –- involves an agreement to which Fuji is not a party.
AO also argues that, Fuji having been dismissed from the
Federal litigation, it would be “grossly unfair” to enjoin AO.
AO does not explain in what way the entry of the requested
injunction would be unfair.
AO has not brought any suit against
Fuji in China to recover damages from Fuji.
To the extent that
AO wishes to sue Fuji, it may do so in another jurisdiction, as
it did when it brought an arbitration proceeding against AO in
Japan.
There is no unfairness in enjoining litigation against
Kodak in China simply because AO did not succeed in joining Fuji
as a defendant in a lawsuit in America.
13
II. The Federal Litigation Is Dispositive of the Chinese
Litigation.
The second threshold factor requires the resolution of the
case before this Court to be dispositive of the action to be
enjoined.
In determining whether a previous action is
dispositive of a subsequent one, a court “must determine the
substance of the case before the enjoining court.”
Bodas, 500 F.3d at 121 (citation omitted).
Karaha
A court must also
examine whether the judgment sought to be protected was
“dispositive” of the subsequent action.
Id.
requirement that the two actions be identical.
There is no
See id. at 121-
22; Paramedics, 369 F.3d at 653; see also Sanofi-Aventis
Deutschland GmbH v. Genentech, Inc., 716 F.3d 586, 591 (Fed.
Cir. 2013); Applied Med. Distribution Corp. v. Surgical Co. BV,
587 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2009).
The judgment entered in the instant action is dispositive
of the claim that AO is pursuing in the Chinese litigation.
Both actions are premised on patent royalty payments due to
Kodak for the same set of cameras that AO sold to Fuji.
In both
actions, AO relies on the PLA, and its contention that Kodak
breached the PLA, in particular PLA § 5.6, by seeking royalty
payments from AO for cameras that AO provided to Fuji.
Through
the Chinese litigation, AO seeks to unwind the judgment entered
14
against it in the Federal litigation and to recover money it
paid to Kodak pursuant to the Final Judgment.
To the extent that AO believes that Kodak’s agreement with
Fuji entitles it to vacate the judgment entered against it in
this Court, it could have pursued that relief in this Court.
It
bears noting that, while Kodak’s agreement with Fuji post-dates
the Final Judgment, activity in the Federal litigation did not
cease with the entry of the Final Judgment.
Rather, Kodak had
to move to compel payment from AO after the Final Judgment was
entered.
AO’s final payment to Kodak was not made until
September 2014, months after AO filed its complaint in China,
and this case was not closed until January 2015.
AO argues that the Federal litigation is not dispositive of
the Chinese litigation because AO’s Chinese lawsuit relies on
the existence of the 2013 agreement between Kodak and Fuji,
which purportedly paid Kodak royalties for the same digital
cameras that were the subject of the Federal litigation, and on
AO’s contention that Kodak should not be paid twice for the same
use of its patents.
As AO emphasizes, the 2013 licensing
agreement did not exist at the time the Final Judgment was
entered.
AO is correct that it is relying in part in its Chinese
action on events that had not occurred when the Final Judgment
was entered.
But, those new facts are offered by AO to assert
15
once again that it had no obligation to pay Kodak licensing fees
under the PLA.
In both lawsuits, AO relies on its reading of
the PLA and its contention that Fuji is the party that owes
royalty payments to Kodak.
AO may have a right to reimbursement
from Fuji for the money it paid to Kodak, but the extent of its
separate obligations to Kodak, as they arise under the PLA, has
already been litigated and cannot be collaterally attacked by
filing a lawsuit in another jurisdiction.
III. Additional China Trade Factors
As the threshold factors are met, this Opinion turns to the
discretionary China Trade factors.
Each of these factors
supports entry of the requested injunction.
The Chinese litigation seeks reimbursement of money that
this Court ordered paid as part of the Final Judgment.
threatens to undermine the judgment of this Court.
This
Moreover,
because the Chinese litigation will require a Chinese court to
interpret PLA § 5.6, the same contractual provision addressed in
the March 2012 Opinion, permitting the Chinese litigation to go
forward threatens to create inconsistent judicial readings of
the same contract language.
The Chinese lawsuit also implicates important policies of
this jurisdiction favoring finality and disfavoring forum
shopping.
See Ibeto Petrochemical Indus. Ltd. v. M/T Beffen,
475 F.3d 56, 64 (2d Cir. 2007) (forum shopping); Mendes Junior
16
Int’l Co. v. Banco do Brasil, S.A., 215 F.3d 306, 314 (2d Cir.
2000) (finality); Personis v. Oiler, 889 F.2d 424, 426 (2d Cir.
1989) (forum shopping).
Kodak is entitled to freedom from
further litigation with respect to the issues resolved in the
Federal litigation.
Kodak received a judgment that was upheld
on appeal, and pursued enforcement proceedings to obtain
payment.
In the course of the Federal litigation, AO was given
a full and fair opportunity to be heard and has not argued that
it has any grounds to vacate the Final Judgment.
Nor has AO
explained why its lawsuit in China is anything other than
improper forum shopping in an effort to nullify the Final
Judgment.
China has no connection whatsoever to this dispute.
The PLA was entered between AO and Kodak, which are Taiwanese
and American companies.
Payments under the PLA were received in
New York, and the PLA selected New York law to resolve disputes
arising under it.
AO sold the cameras to Fuji, a Japanese
company.
Moreover, unbeknownst to Kodak, AO filed the Chinese
lawsuit in the midst of paying Kodak pursuant to the Final
Judgment.
Rather than seek relief in this Court, AO sought to
pursue a lawsuit in a foreign jurisdiction with no connection
with the underlying facts.
This is the sort of conduct that may
properly be described as “vexatious.”
126.
17
Karaha Bodas, 500 F.3d at
The Chinese lawsuit will also inconvenience Kodak and
impose additional litigation expense on it.
Kodak’s principal
place of business is in New York, and legal issues concerning
the PLA, which underlie both the Federal and Chinese litigation,
have already been resolved in this Court and require application
of New York law.
AO does not advance any meaningful argument that the
consideration of these discretionary factors weighs in its
favor.
While AO contends that it is not challenging the Final
Judgment or this Court’s prior rulings, that is precisely what
it seeks to do in the Chinese lawsuit.
It seeks to negate the
Final Judgment and retrieve payments that it already made to
Kodak under that Judgment.
AO also argues that the Chinese
lawsuit is not vexatious because it has a legitimate dispute
with Kodak and Fuji.
The legitimacy of its dispute, however,
does not render the litigation proper.
That legitimate dispute
was litigated to a final judgment in this Court.
Kodak is
entitled to the continued enforcement of that judgment.
Because the threshold China Trade requirements are met, and
the discretionary factors weigh in favor of an injunction, an
anti-suit injunction is appropriate here.
such an injunction is granted.
18
Kodak’s motion for
IV. Ancillary Jurisdiction
AO makes one additional argument against entry of an antisuit injunction.
It asserts that the Court cannot enter an
injunction because it lacks “ancillary jurisdiction” over this
matter.
AO is wrong.
A federal court retains the authority to enforce its
judgment and the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction will not
divest a court of that authority.
As the Second Circuit has
noted,
While the boundaries of ancillary jurisdiction are
not easily defined and the cases addressing it are
hardly a model of clarity, . . . federal courts have
continuing jurisdiction, grounded in the concepts of
res judicata and collateral estoppel, to enjoin a
party properly before them from relitigating issues
in a non-federal forum that were already decided in
federal court. This source of jurisdiction remains
even after a judgment has been satisfied -regardless of whether . . . the font of jurisdiction
for such an injunction is characterized as ancillary
or otherwise.
Karaha Bodas, 500 F.3d at 129 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
In Karaha Bodas, the Court of Appeals applied the China
Trade test to determine that an anti-suit injunction was
appropriate rather than looking to case law describing ancillary
jurisdiction.
Id. at 120-28.
AO has not cited, and the Court
has not found, any Court of Appeals decision in this Circuit
post-dating China Trade that has evaluated the issue of
19
ancillary jurisdiction separately from the China Trade factors
in considering whether an anti-suit injunction should issue.
See, e.g., Karaha Bodas, 500 F.3d at 120-28; Ibeto, 475 F.3d at
62-65; LAIF X SPRL v. Axtel, S.A. de C.V., 390 F.3d 194, 199-200
(2d Cir. 2004); Paramedics, 359 F.3d at 652-55.
There is no
basis in the case law cited by AO to conclude that the doctrine
of ancillary jurisdiction imposes any additional limits on this
Court’s ability to issue an anti-suit injunction.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff’s March 24, 2015 motion for an anti-suit
injunction is granted.
A scheduling order accompanies this
Opinion.
Dated:
New York, New York
July 23, 2015
__________________________________
DENISE COTE
United States District Judge
20
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?