Shepherd v. Powers et al
Filing
218
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER re: 182 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Kevin Johnson, Westchester County Health Care Corporation, Karim Haspil, Kevin Cheverko, James Powers, Robert O'Dell, Jose Pena, Westchester County, Merv in Enders, Anthony Amicucci, 164 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Kevin Johnson, Westchester County Health Care Corporation, Karim Haspil, Kevin Cheverko, Robert O'Dell, James Powers, Jose Pena, Westchester County, Mervin Enders, Anthony Amicucci. As set worth within, Defendants' motion for summary judgment denied. This Memorandum Order resolves docket entry number 164 and 182. The parties are directed to meet promptly with Judge Ellis to discuss outstanding pretrial matters and settlement. SO ORDERED. (See Order.) (Signed by Judge Laura Taylor Swain on 9/26/2014) (ajs)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------------x
EUGENE C. SHEPHERD,
Plaintiff,
-v-
No. 11-CV-6860-LTS-RLE
C.O. JAMES POWERS et al.,
Defendants.
-------------------------------------------------------x
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Eugene Shepherd (“Shepherd” or “Plaintiff”), who was at all relevant times an
inmate or detainee at the Westchester County Jail, brings this civil rights action against
Correction Officer James Powers (“Powers”), Correction Officer Mervin Enders (“Enders”), and
Westchester County (“the County”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Shepherd asserts (1) a claim of
excessive force against Powers pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) a claim of excessive force
against Enders pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) a claim of liability against the County based on
Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), for the exercise of excessive force by
Powers and Enders; (4) a claim against Powers for malicious prosecution pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and state law; and (5) a claim against the County for denying or interfering with
Plaintiff’s religious rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 2000cc-1. 1
Defendants move for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56. The Court has considered carefully all of the parties’ submissions in connection
with the motion.
1
The claims listed herein are the sole claims Plaintiff indicates that he “continues to
pursue.” (Compare Pl.’s Response to Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Statement and Counterstatement
at 16, ¶ 111, docket entry no. 199, with Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Statement at 21, ¶ 111, docket
entry no. 181.) All other claims are deemed withdrawn and are hereby dismissed.
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The Court has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.
For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is denied in its entirety.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed except insofar as they are characterized here as
allegations. On April 18, 2009, Shepherd was arrested and charged with, among other things,
burglary in the third degree. (Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶ 11. 2) Shepherd attended a court
appearance in connection with those charges on March 9, 2010. (Id. at ¶ 13.) After attending the
appearance, Shepherd was taken back to the Westchester County Jail. (Id. at ¶ 14.) According
to the Westchester County Department of Correction Policy and Procedure, inmates returning
from court appearances must be strip-searched. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Powers was the on-duty correction
officer assigned to search inmates returning from court appearances on March 9, 2010. (Id. at
¶ 17.) During a routine strip search, an inmate must remove all of his clothing, show the bottoms
of his feet, squat, and cough “to show that he is not hiding any contraband within his buttocks or
anus.” (Id. at ¶ 21.)
Defendants allege that Powers instructed Plaintiff to remove all of his clothing.
(Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶ 26.) They allege that Plaintiff began to remove his clothing, but
refused to remove his underwear and socks. (Id. ¶ 27.) Defendants allege that, when Powers
ordered Plaintiff to take off his underwear, Plaintiff accused Powers of being a “fagot [sic].” (Id.
at ¶ 29.) Plaintiff then allegedly removed his underwear and threw it at Powers and attempted to
throw a sock toward Powers. (Id. at ¶ 29.) Defendants allege that Powers attempted to stop
Plaintiff from throwing the other sock at him and that Powers responded by pinning Powers’
2
Citations to S.D.N.Y. Local Civil Rule 56.1 Statements incorporate by reference the
evidence cited therein.
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head to the metal search table in the cubicle. (Id. at ¶ 30.) Defendants allege that Powers
ordered Plaintiff to stop, but that Plaintiff continued to struggle. (Id. at ¶¶ 30–31.) Defendants
allege that nearby officers and the Emergency Response Team (“ERT”) responded to the
disturbance, which was classified as a Code 13 (officer needs assistance) matter. (Id. at ¶¶ 34–
42.) One of the ERT officers, Enders, placed Plaintiff in handcuffs and leg irons. (Id. at ¶ 45.)
Defendants allege that Plaintiff did not cooperate with instructions to comply with a search. (Id.
at ¶ 48.)
Plaintiff presents a different version of the events. Plaintiff alleges that he
removed all of his clothing except his socks and underwear of his own initiative after entering
the search cubicle. (Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶ 23.) Powers, Plaintiff alleges, gave no verbal
instructions for a few minutes. Plaintiff alleges that he said to Powers, “What, are you new, you
don’t know what to do? Let me go ahead and initiate this for you, and I dropped [my underwear]
and I squat.” (Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶ 28.) After Plaintiff dropped his underwear and
squatted once, Powers asked him to “do it again.” Plaintiff then responded by asking Powers
whether he was gay. (Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶ 29; Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶ 29.)
Plaintiff alleges that, after Powers instructed Plaintiff to pull down his underwear again, Plaintiff
drew down his underwear and squatted. (Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶ 30.)
Plaintiff alleges that Powers screamed at him to take the rest of his clothing off
and that Plaintiff responded by placing his underwear on the table and throwing his socks on the
table. (Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶ 30.) Plaintiff alleges that Powers then reached across the
table and tried to choke him. (Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶ 32.) According to Plaintiff, he then
retreated to a corner of the search cubicle. (Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶ 33.) Plaintiff alleges
that Powers then grabbed his left leg. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Powers also grabbed and
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squeezed Plaintiff’s testicles. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he responded by “screaming and
hollering, ‘what’s the matter with you’” and “help” as he tried to push Powers away. (Id.)
One other correction officer and officers from the ERT, including Officer Enders,
responded to the disturbance. (Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 36.) Plaintiff alleges that Powers
was still squeezing his testicles when the ERT entered the room and that Powers did not release
him until the ERT team members pulled Powers off the table. (Pl.’s 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 33–34.)
The ERT placed Plaintiff in handcuffs and leg irons. (Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 45–46.)
The ERT then proceeded to search Plaintiff. (Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 47.) Plaintiff alleges
that, after the search, one of the officers tossed him orange prison clothing and Plaintiff tossed it
back because the clothing was too small. (Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 50.) Plaintiff alleges
that Enders responded by “grabb[ing]/yok[ing]” Plaintiff and throwing Plaintiff “into the crowd
of emergency responders who jumped on him and forcibly restrained him.” (Pl.’s Rule 56.1
Statement ¶ 51.) Then, “another officer . . . stepped on his back; [and] another mushed his head
into the ground while a fourth tried to break his fingers.” (Id.)
According to Defendants, when Plaintiff was given orange prison clothing to
wear, he threw the clothing to the ground and flailed his arms toward Enders. (Id. at ¶ 50.)
Defendants allege that Enders responded by “t[aking] [P]laintiff to the ground in a controlled
fashion.” (Id. at ¶ 51.)
Plaintiff was then dressed in a restraint garment referred to as a “green gown” and
brought to the medical unit, where he was examined by the nurse. (Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Statement
¶ 52–53.) Plaintiff alleges that he told the nurse that he was hurt “all over.” (Pl.’s Rule 56.1
Statement ¶ 54.) The next day, Plaintiff submitted a sick call request, which indicated he had
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pain in his right shoulder, hand, back, left thigh and right knee, and that he had itchy skin.
(Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 58; Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 58.)
Powers submitted a disciplinary report on March 9, 2010, charging Plaintiff with
violations of the Westchester County Jail Code based on allegations of misconduct that Plaintiff
disputes. (Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 67–68; Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 68.) The report
states that Plaintiff refused to remove all of his clothing as part of the strip search, that Plaintiff
threw his underwear and socks at Powers, and that Plaintiff pushed Powers’s head onto the metal
search table during the incident. (Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 67–68.) Enders also prepared a
disciplinary report detailing his version of the March 9, 2010, incident charging Plaintiff with
violations of the Westchester County Jail code based on allegations of misconduct that Plaintiff
disputes. (Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 69–70.) Plaintiff was found guilty of four separate
infractions based on the disciplinary charges in the reports and was sentenced to punitive
segregation for sixty days. (Id. ¶ 71–72.)
While he was in punitive segregation, Plaintiff was unable to attend church or
Bible study sessions, but was given a Bible upon his request. (Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 75;
Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 75.)
DISCUSSION
A court “shall grant” summary judgment to a movant where the movant “shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is considered material “if it ‘might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law,’” and an issue of fact is a genuine one where “the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Holtz v.
Rockefeller & Co., Inc., 258 F.3d 62, 69 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted). In
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evaluating the record to determine whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact, a
court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all factual inferences in favor of the party against
whom summary judgment is sought. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
Excessive Force Claims
An Eighth Amendment claim of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” must
meet objective and subjective requirements. Sims v. Artuz, 230 F.3d 14, 20–21 (2d Cir. 2000).
For excessive force claims, “the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a goodfaith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). To satisfy the objective requirement, the alleged
conduct must be serious enough to rise to the level of a constitutional injury. Sims, 230 F.3d at
20–21. While de minimis uses of force are “necessarily excluded from constitutional
recognition, when prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm,
contemporary standards of decency always are violated . . . . whether or not significant injury is
evident.” Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 515 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotations
omitted). To satisfy the subjective prong, the defendant must have acted with a sufficiently
culpable state of mind. Id.
“[S]evere or repetitive sexual abuse of an inmate by a prison officer can be
‘objectively, sufficiently serious’ enough to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.”
Boddie, 105 F.3d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). It has “no legitimate penological
purpose, and is ‘simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses
against society.’” Id. (citation omitted). “The subjective element of the Eighth Amendment test
may also be met by claims of sexual abuse. Where no legitimate law enforcement or penological
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purpose can be inferred from the defendant’s alleged conduct, the abuse itself may, in some
circumstances, be sufficient evidence of a culpable state of mind.” Id.
Excessive Force Claim Against Powers
Plaintiff alleges that, during a routine strip search, Powers reached across the
metal search table, attempted to choke Plaintiff, and then grabbed and squeezed Plaintiff’s
testicles. Plaintiff alleges that Powers continued to hold and squeeze his testicles even after
Plaintiff screamed, called for help, and tried to get away from Powers, and that Powers did not
let go until other officers entered the room and pushed Plaintiff off the search table. Powers
denies the alleged conduct, and alleges that Plaintiff assaulted him.
Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and construing the facts in his favor, as the
Court must at this summary judgment phase, Plaintiff’s claim that his bare testicles were grabbed
and squeezed for a significant period of time, even as he yelled for help, is sufficient to frame a
genuine issue of fact as to whether Powers violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. There
is no apparent legitimate penological purpose for the alleged behavior, a circumstance which
puts in issue both the objective and subjective components of the Eighth Amendment standard.
See Boddie, supra. Even if Plaintiff’s distress arose more from shock and humiliation than pain,
the circumstances would still be “repugnant to the conscience of mankind and therefore violate[]
the Eighth Amendment.” Hogan, 738 F.3d at 516 (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted); see Washington v. Hively, 695 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2012) (“An unwanted touching
of an inmate’s private parts, intended to humiliate the victim . . . can violate a prisoner’s
constitutional rights whether or not the force exerted by the assailant is significant.”); cf. Boddie,
105 F.3d 857 (small number of incidents in which inmate alleged he was verbally harassed,
touched, and pressed against were not severe enough to state a constitutional harm).
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Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that
genuine issues of material of fact exist and accordingly denies Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment with respect to the merits of the excessive force claim against Powers.
Excessive Force Claim Against Enders
Plaintiff alleges that Enders grabbed him from behind, while he was not resisting
the ERT officers’ instructions, and threw him roughly to the floor so that he could be stepped on
and beaten by other ERT officers, one of whom who also allegedly tried to break Plaintiff’s
fingers. (Pl. Dep. Tr. at 187–190.) The videotape of the encounter shows Plaintiff being thrown
or pulled backward; the view of Plaintiff is thereafter generally obscured by a number of riotsuited officers on and around his unclothed prone body. At one point, an officer can be seen
pressing Plaintiff’s face against the floor. (Mastellone Affirm., Ex. C.) Plaintiff alleges that he
thereafter suffered pain all over his body. Plaintiff further alleges that Enders subjected him to
unnecessary physical restraints. Taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, this evidence is
sufficient to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Enders’ conduct was
objectively malicious and sadistic, as well as a genuine dispute as to Enders’ subjective
motivation in throwing or pulling Plaintiff to the floor. Defendants’ summary judgment motion
is therefore denied to the extent it seeks a determination in Defendants’ favor on the merits of
Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Enders.
Qualified Immunity
Powers and Enders each assert a defense of qualified immunity. “In resolving
questions of qualified immunity at summary judgment, courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry.”
Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1865, __ U.S. __ (2014) (per curiam) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). “The first asks whether the facts, [t]aken in the light most favorable to
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the party asserting the injury, . . . show the officer’s conduct violated a [federal] right.” Id.
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “The second prong of the qualified-immunity
analysis asks whether the right in question was clearly established at the time of the violation.”
Id. at 1866 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Individual government actors “are
shielded from liability for civil damages if their actions did not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Id. (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). “Courts have discretion to decide the order in which to
engage these two prongs. But under either prong, courts may not resolve genuine disputes of
fact in favor of the party seeking summary judgment.” Id. (internal citations and quotations
marks omitted).
Here, summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity as to Defendants
Powers and Enders would be inappropriate because, if Plaintiff’s allegations are true, neither
Powers nor Enders would be entitled to qualified immunity, as their conduct would have been so
malicious and sadistic as to violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known.” Id. Thus, genuine disputes of material fact preclude
summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s excessive force claims
against Defendants Powers and Enders.
Monell Claim
Plaintiff asserts a claim against the County in connection with the correction
officers’ alleged excessive use of force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that the County
had a custom and practice of using excessive force and failed to adequately train or supervise
correction officers in the use of force. In order to prevail on a Section 1983 claim against a
municipality, a plaintiff must establish that his injuries were directly caused by a municipal
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policy, custom or practice. Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692–
94 (1978); see Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1983).
Plaintiff has cited to extensive portions of a letter issued by the Department of
Justice (“DOJ”) on November 19, 2009, describing the findings of an investigation of the
Westchester County Jail pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997. (“Findings Letter,” Mastellone Affirm., Ex. BB.) The Findings Letter describes many
improper uses of force by the ERT in the Westchester County Jail, including the use of chemical
crowd control contaminants and the application of “needlessly painful escort techniques (bent
wrist locks while apparently applying intense pressure),” the application of force and the
disregard of some inmates’ mental impairments (Mastellone Affirm., Ex. BB at 8), and the use of
force against apparently compliant inmates that resulted in serious injury evidenced by bleeding
and laceration (id. at 10).
Defendants, who had previously produced in discovery a copy, labeled as a draft,
of policy revisions responsive to the DOJ report, tendered a “final” copy of the same revisions in
their reply papers in support of the instant motion, and assert that they had already promulgated
new policies adopting the recommendations of the DOJ prior to the March 9, 2010, incident
involving Plaintiff, Powers, Enders, and the ERT. Defendants argue that that the existence of
these policies is sufficient to eliminate any factual issue as to whether, even if Plaintiff’s
allegations are true, the beating was the product of the County’s custom or policy of using
excessive force against inmates. Plaintiff requests that Defendants be precluded from using the
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“final” memorandum, in light of Defendants’ failure to produce it before the close of discovery.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). 3
Even taking the proffered “final” policy into account, summary judgment in
Defendants’ favor is not warranted. The existence of a “final” policy document that was
allegedly released approximately one month before the March 9, 2010, incident is not sufficient
to eliminate the issues of fact raised by Plaintiff as to whether the alleged incident was the
product of the longstanding policies and practices documented in the extensive findings of the
DOJ, which describe conduct involving officers pressing the faces of inmates against inanimate
objects and the use of excessive restraints. (“Findings Letter,” Mastellone Affirm., Ex. BB at 9–
10.) There remain triable issues of fact including, but not limited to, whether any new policy
was communicated or effectively implemented before the March 9, 2010, incident. The Court
accordingly rejects Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Monell claim, and denies Plaintiff’s
preclusion request without prejudice to renewal as a motion in limine prior to trial. See supra
note 3.
3
Rule 37(c)(1) provides that a party who fails to provide information as required by Rule
26(a) or (e) (disclosure provisions requiring, inter alia, automatic disclosure of “all
documents . . . that the disclosing person has in its possession, custody or control and
may use to support its claims or defenses”) “is not allowed to use that information . . . to
supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially
justified or is harmless.” The Court is empowered to impose additional or alternative
sanctions “on motion and after giving an opportunity to be heard.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(1), 37(c)(1). Defendants have proffered no justification whatsoever for their failure
to produce the “final” version in a timely fashion. That failure is not harmless,
furthermore, in light of their use of the document in a reply submission to bolster their
remediation argument. However, because the document is not dispositive of the issues
before the Court on this motion and neither party has briefed the propriety of preclusion
and/or additional or different sanctions in connection with any trial of this matter, the
Court denies Plaintiff’s request for preclusion without prejudice to renewal as a motion in
limine.
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Malicious Prosecution Claims
Plaintiff asserts a malicious prosecution claim against Powers under state law and
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (i.e., Fourth Amendment violation). A malicious prosecution claim
under state law or pursuant to Section 1983 consists of four elements. An individual asserting a
malicious prosecution claim must show that (1) the defendant commenced or continued a
criminal proceeding against plaintiff; (2) the proceeding was terminated in favor of the plaintiff;
(3) there was no probable cause for the proceeding; and (4) the proceeding was instituted with
malice. Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 2003). A plaintiff asserting a claim for
malicious prosecution under Section 1983 must also demonstrate that he suffered a “sufficient
post-arraignment liberty restraint to implicate [his] Fourth Amendment rights.” Rohman v. New
York City Transit Authority, 215 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 2000).
Here, Plaintiff was charged with assaulting Powers, brought to trial in state court,
and acquitted by a jury. Thus, the first two elements of a malicious prosecution claim are
satisfied.
Powers argues that Plaintiff is precluded from seeking to prove a lack of probable
cause for the prosecution because the state trial judge denied Plaintiff’s motion for a trial order of
dismissal after the government had concluded its case, but before the defense had presented its
case. (See Mastellone Affirm., Ex. Y.) In denying the motion, the trial judge found that “[t]here
[was] sufficient evidence that the elements of the crime [had] been introduced,” acknowledging
that “the legal requirement for the People on a prima facie case is minimum.” (Id. at 75.) The
trial court’s rejection of Plaintiff’s motion is not determinative of the question of probable cause
because, on such motion practice, the trial court merely determines whether “the trial evidence, if
accepted as true without considering questions as to the quality or weight of the evidence, is
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legally insufficient to establish every element of the offense charged.” People v. Sala, 258 A.D.
2d 182, 188 (2d Dep’t 1999) (citations omitted; emphasis supplied), aff’d, 95 N.Y. 2d 254
(2000). The trial court was not empowered to consider any contention that the statements of
Powers were untrue, which is the issue at the heart of Plaintiff’s contention that probable cause
for the prosecution was lacking. Therefore, the trial judge’s determination that there was
“sufficient evidence that the elements of the crime [had] been introduced,” is not preclusive of
the issue of whether there was probable cause for the criminal proceeding.
Drawing all factual inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, as this Court must upon
summary judgment motion practice, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegation that Powers
version of the March 9, 2010, incident is false creates a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether there was probable cause for the criminal proceeding. This satisfies the third element of
a malicious prosecution claim. Plaintiff’s allegations are also sufficient, at the summary
judgment stage, to satisfy the fourth element. The Court, accordingly, denies Powers’ motion to
dismiss the malicious prosecution claim asserted under New York law.
The Court notes that, as explained above, malicious prosecution claims brought
under Section 1983 require evidence of a “sufficient post-arraignment liberty restraint,” see
Rohman, 215 F.3d at 215. An already incarcerated individual bringing a claim of malicious
prosecution must produce evidence of a distinct restraint on his liberty, see Holmes v. Grant, No.
03-CV-3426, 2006 WL 851753, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2006) (dismissing malicious
prosecution claim brought under Section 1983 because incarcerated plaintiff suffered no new
seizure “as a result of being charged with new criminal offenses and being forced to appear in
court to defend himself”). The parties have not briefed this issue, and it is unclear on this record
whether Plaintiff suffered a distinct restraint as a result of the prosecution based on Powers’
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account of the March 9, 2010, incident. Cf. Allen v. City of New York, 480 F. Supp. 2d 689,
717–18 (concluding that plaintiff alleged a sufficient deprivation of liberty where he spent time
in state custody as a result of state charges brought against him while he was serving his federal
sentence). Defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s malicious
prosecution claim brought under Section 1983 is also denied.
Free Exercise of Religion Claim
Plaintiff asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) for denial or interference with the exercise of his
religion while he was placed in punitive segregation as a result of being found guilty of
disciplinary violation charges. (Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 71.) The RLUIPA provides that
governments may not impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of inmates, unless the
burden is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc-1(a); see United States v. Salahuddin, 467 F.3d 263, 273 (2d Cir. 2006).
To prevail on a First Amendment religious exercise claim asserted under Section
1983, a plaintiff must prove “purposeful discrimination.” See Giano v. Senkowski, 54 F.3d
1050, 1057 (2d Cir. 1995). Courts analyze religious exercise claims asserted by prisoners under
a “reasonableness” test to determine whether the conduct that “burdens a protected right . . . is
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 274 (internal
citations and quotations omitted). The reasonableness of such a restrictive prison regulation or
practice is assessed by applying a four-factor test: (1) whether the challenged regulation or
official action has a valid, rational connection to a legitimate governmental objective; (2)
whether prisoners have alternative means of exercising the burdened right; (3) the impact on
guards, inmates, and prison resources of accommodating the right; and (4) the existence of
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alternative means of facilitating exercise of the right that have only a de minimis adverse effect
on valid penological interests. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90–91 (1987). A prisoner must
show at the threshold that the disputed conduct substantially burdens his sincerely held religious
beliefs. Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 274–75. The defendant then must identify “the legitimate
penological interests that justify the impinging conduct, though the burden remains with the
prisoner to show that these concerns were irrational.” Id. at 275.
Here, Plaintiff was placed in punitive segregation as a result of being found guilty
of certain disciplinary violations, as charged in Enders’ and Powers’ reports of the March 9,
2010, incident. Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of being placed in punitive segregation, he was
unable to attend church or Bible study classes. He also alleges that he only a received a Bible
three days after he requested one. At the summary judgment stage, these allegations are
sufficient to meet Plaintiff’s burden of showing that the conduct in question substantially
burdened his religious beliefs.
Defendants identify no legitimate penological interest that justifies the substantial
burdens. Their submissions include the Westchester County Department of Correction Policy
and Procedure (“Policy”), which provides that the purpose of disciplinary segregation is to
“provide a safe, secure, and humane environment for those inmates that are violent towards staff
or other inmates and pose a serious threat.” (Mastellone Affirm., Ex. W at 1.) The Policy also
provides that, “[o]n a case by case basis, limited access to Programs may be granted to all
inmates on Disciplinary Segregation.” Defendants have proffered no explanation or
substantiation of any reason for denying Plaintiff access to church and Bible study programs
under this exception, and thus have not met their burden of demonstrating that the restrictions
imposed on Plaintiff were reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. The Court
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therefore denies Defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s religious
exercise claim brought under Section 1983. A fortiori, Defendants have failed to identify a
compelling government interest warranting the infringement of Plaintiff’s rights under the
RLUIPA, and the Court, accordingly, denies Defendants’ motion to the extent it seeks summary
judgment dismissing the religious exercise claim brought under the RLUIPA.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment denied.
This Memorandum Order resolves docket entry numbers 164 and 182.
The parties are directed to meet promptly with Judge Ellis to discuss outstanding
pretrial matters and settlement.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: New York, New York
September 26, 2014
/s/ Laura Taylor Swain
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN
United States District Judge
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