Israel v. NYC Department of Corrections et al
Filing
50
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: re: 42 MOTION for Summary Judgment. filed by The City of New York, Cook, Quintano, Jackson. For the reasons set forth above, Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 42) is GRANTED and Plaintiffs complaint is dismissed in its entirety. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case. (Signed by Judge Jesse M. Furman on 10/5/2012) (jfe)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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MICHAEL L. ISRAEL,
USDCSD'NY
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILEDDOC #:__.._ _--r---r-'--. DATE FILED: to/'i /1~
Plaintiff,
II Civ. 7726 (JMF)
-v-
MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER
CITY OF NEW YORK, ET AL.,
Defendants.
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JESSE M. FURMAN, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Michael L. Israel, a New York State prisoner proceeding prose, brings this
action against the City of New York and three corrections officers pursuant to Title 42, United
States Code, Section I983, alleging that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when he
was strip searched while incarcerated in two New York City Department of Correction ("DOC")
facilities. On May 3I, 20I2, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule
56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing principally that, in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Florence v. Board ofChosen Freeholders, I32 S. Ct. I5IO (2012), Israel's
claim fails as a matter of law. (Docket No. 42). For the reasons discussed below, Defendants'
motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
The Defendants' motion is unopposed. Accordingly, the Court considers the following
facts, proffered by the Defendants and supported by documentary evidence, to be undisputed for
purposes of this motion. See Vt. Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 3 73 F .3d 241, 246 (2d
Cir. 2004).
On July 18, 2011, Plaintiff was arrested for misdemeanor assault and entered into DOC
custody. (Speight Decl. Ex. B). Israel was initially transported to the Manhattan Detention
Center (the "MDC"), where he remained until August 2011. (Speight Decl. Ex. Cat 7). On
several occasions during his incarceration at the MDC, Plaintiff was transported to court for
appearances related to criminal charges pending against him. (!d. at 39). Plaintiff alleges that on
July 27, 2011, and again on July 28, 2011 -the date of one such court appearance- he was
subjected to strip searches in the receiving room of the MDC. (Am. Compl. at II B, II D; Speight
Decl. Ex. Cat 28-33). Plaintiff alleges that, during these two searches, he was required to strip
naked, face the correction officer, lift his genitals, squat, bend over, and wiggle his toes.
(Speight Decl. Ex. Cat 29-33). Plaintiff does not allege that the correction officers directing
these searches physically touched him. (!d.).
In August 2011, Plaintiff was transferred to the George R. Vierno Center (the "GRVC")
at Riker's Island. (Speight DecI. Ex. C at 7). On September 27, 2011, correction officers at the
GRVC conducted a search of the cells within the housing area in which Israel was located.
(Speight Decl. Ex. C at 34; Am. Compl. at II D). According to Plaintiff, the corrections officer
assigned to conduct the search of his cell directed him to remove his clothing, lift his genitals,
and spread his buttocks while nude. (Speight Decl. Ex. Cat 35-36, 67, 71). After Israel
complied, correction officers searched Plaintiffs cell. (!d. at 34-35, 70-71).
Plaintiff commenced this action on October 28, 2011, alleging that his constitutional
rights were violated when he was strip searched. (Docket No. 2). He seeks $1 million in
damages for cruel and unusual punishment, unfair treatment, and emotional distress. He also
seeks injunctive relief- to wit, that "any inmate, prisoner, detainee, etc. who is being held on
misdemeanor charges not be stripped 'buck-naked' searched." (Am. Compl. at V). On May 31,
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2012, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. (Docket No. 42). Plaintiff was informed ofthe Defendants' intention to file
this motion during a telephone conference in front of Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck on April
11,2012 (Docket No. 48 at 10, 13), and the certificate of service accompanying the motion
reflects that Plaintiff was properly served with the motion papers (Docket No. 42), but Plaintiff
did not file any opposition to the motion.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record demonstrates that there are no genuine
issues of material fact in dispute and that one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See FED. R. CIV. P 56( c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine issue of
material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
non moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,248 (1986). The moving
party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying
those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56( c);
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, all evidence must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Overton v. NY State Div. of
Military & Naval Affairs, 373 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 2004), and the court must "resolve all
ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom
summary judgment is sought," Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 391
F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2004).
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When, as here, a summary judgment motion is unopposed, "[t]he fact that there has been
no [such] response ... does not ... [by itself] mean that the motion is to be granted
automatically." Champion v. Artuz, 76 F.3d 483, 486 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Vt. Teddy Bear,
373 F .3d at 244. Instead, a court must (1) determine what material facts, if any, are disputed in
the record presented on the motion, and (2) assure itself that, based on those undisputed material
facts, the law indeed warrants judgment for the moving party. See Champion, 76 F .3d at 486;
Allen v. Comprehensive Analytical Grp., Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 229,232 (N.D.N.Y. 2001). The
motion may fail if the movant's submission fails to establish that no material issue of fact
remains for trial, Amaker v. Foley, 274 F.3d 677, 681 (2d Cir. 2001), or if the "undisputed facts
fail to show that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law," Vt. Teddy Bear,
373 F.3d at 244 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
B. Discussion
Plaintiff claims he was strip searched, without suspicion, three times- on July 27, 2011,
and July 28,2011, in the receiving room of MDC; and on September 27, 2011, in a GRVC
housing area. (Am. Compl. at II D). He argues that such searches violate the Fourth
Amendment when performed upon a non-felony detainee, such as himself. (!d. at V).
This claim fails in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Florence, which
"confirmed the importance of deference to correctional officials and explained that a regulation
impinging on an inmate's constitutional rights must be upheld 'if it is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests."' 132 S. Ct. at 1515 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89
(1987)). In particular, the Supreme Court held that a suspicionless strip search of a detainee
arrested for a non-serious crime conducted prior to his introduction into the general jail
population was reasonable and thus consistent with the Fourth Amendment. The Court noted
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that "a responsible Fourth Amendment balance is not well served by standards requiring
sensitive, case-by-case determinations of government need, lest every discretionary judgment in
the field be converted into an occasion for constitutional review." I d. at 1517-18 (quoting
Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318,347 (2001)). The Court further noted that "correctional
officials must be permitted to devise reasonable search policies to detect and deter the possession
of contraband in their facilities," id. at 1512, and that "[t]he task of determining whether a policy
is reasonably related to legitimate security interests is 'peculiarly within the province and
professional expertise of corrections officials,"' id. at 1517 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 548 (1979)). As a result, "in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate
that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations courts should ordinarily
defer to their expert judgment in such matters." I d. (quotations and citations omitted).
Applying these standards here, the searches to which Israel was subjected were
"reasonably related to legitimate security interests," including preventing the smuggling of
contraband into or out of the correctional facilities, and therefore do not constitute Fourth
Amendment violations. I d. at 1516-17. Plaintiff alleges that he was strip searched in the intake
area of MDC on July 27,2011, in front of"several inmates and officers females and males."
(Am. Compl. at II D). He further alleges that on July 28,2011, he was searched in the same
location. (Am. Compl. at II B, D). Prison records indicate that Plaintiff appeared at the Bronx
Supreme Court on July 28, 2012; as such, the searches occurred prior to his exit and entrance to
the MDC. (Speight Decl. Ex. Cat 28-32). These searches were not unreasonable, as they were
in line with DOC policy to strip search prisoners "upon entering and leaving the confines of the
facility" (Speight Decl. D at V(a)(i)), which serves the legitimate interest of preventing the
smuggling of contraband. See Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1516-17. The presence of other inmates
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and officers, males and females, does not alter this determination. See Carr. Officers Benev.
Ass'n ofRocklandCnty. v. Kralik, No. 04 Civ. 2199 (PGG), 2011 WL 1236135, at *11
(S.D.N. Y. Mar. 30, 2011) (noting that "recent cases in this Circuit and elsewhere addressing
inmates' right to privacy suggest that occasional, indirect, or brief viewing of a naked prisoner
by a guard of the opposite sex may be permissible, but that 'regular and close viewing' is
prohibited") (footnotes omitted); Baker v. Welch, No. 03 Civ. 2267 (JSR) (AJP), 2003 WL
22901051, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2003) (same and collecting cases); Miller v. Bailey, No.
05-CV-5493 (CBA) (LB), 2008 WL 1787692, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2008) ("[S]everal Courts
have held that strip searches of prisoners in the presence of other inmates and staff is not
constitutionally defective, especially in light of legitimate security concerns.").
Plaintiff's claim with respect to the GRVC search fares no better, even though it took
place in connection with a random search of his cell rather than the intake process. The Supreme
Court has held that "random searches are essential to the effective security of penal institutions."
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,529 (1984); see also Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1516 (recognizing
that "deterring the possession of contraband depends in part on the ability to conduct searches
without predictable exceptions"). And the strip search here was consistent with DOC policy,
which expressly permits correction officers to conduct strip searches of inmates "prior to the
search of an inmate's living quarters to ensure that the inmate is not concealing contraband on
his/her person." (Speight Decl. Ex. D at V(b)(i)). Under Florence and Bell, this Court is
required to defer to the judgment of DOC officials that this policy "is reasonably related to
legitimate security interests" because such a judgment is "'peculiarly within the province and
professional expertise of corrections officials."' Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1517 (quoting Bell, 441
U.S. at 548).
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In light of the foregoing -
and the absence of any evidence, let alone "substantial
evidence," indicating that Defendants "exaggerated their response" to the need to limit the
presence of contraband in DOC facilities, id. -Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claim fails as a
matter oflaw. Accordingly, Israel's unconstitutional strip search claims must be dismissed and
his request for injunctive relief denied. See Myers v. City of NY, No. 11 Civ. 8525 (PAE), 2012
WL 3776707, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2012). 1
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket No.
42) is GRANTED and Plaintiffs complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 5, 2012
New York, New York
Although Plaintiffs claims plainly sound in the Fourth Amendment, his amended
complaint also seeks damages "for cruel and unusual punishment, unfair treatment, [and]
emotional distress." (Am. Compl. at V). These conclusory assertions are insufficient to state a
claim, and certainly insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Auguste v.
NY Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 593 F. Supp. 2d 659,663 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that a prose
party "may not rely simply on conclusory allegations or speculation to avoid summary judgment,
but instead must offer evidence to show that its version of the events is not wholly fanciful")
(quoting Morris v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 1999)). Further, as the Second Circuit
recently explained, "[i]n the case of a person being held prior to trial ... 'the cruel and unusual
punishment proscription of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution does not apply,' because
'as a pre-trial detainee [the plaintiff is] not being punished.'" Caiazzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63,
69 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2000)).
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