Synrik v. Polones Construction Corporation
Filing
65
OPINION AND ORDER re: 55 MOTION for Attorney Fees , Costs, and Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest filed by Yurek Syrnik. For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's motion for attorneys fees, costs, and interest is granted in part and denied i n part. It is hereby ORDERED that defendant shall pay plaintiff: (1) $142,250.00 in attorneys' fees, (2) $9,535.49 in costs, (3) pre-judgment interest on plaintiff's award of back pay, and (4) post-judgment interest on all money judgments awarded in this action. (Signed by Judge Katherine B. Forrest on 9/19/2012) (lmb)
USDCSDNY
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------------x
DOC#:~
DATE
FILEg:EP 1 9 201~
YUREK SYRNIK,
11 Civ. 7754 (KBF)
Plaintiff,
OPINION
-v-
AND ORDER
POLONES CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION,
Defendant.
---------------------------------x
KATHERINE B. FORREST, District Judge:
Now before the Court is plaintiff Yurek Syrnik's
("plaintiff" or "Syrnik") application for attorneys' fees,
costs, and interest.
For the following reasons, the Court
grants plaintiff's application in part, and awards him:
(1)
$142,250.00 in attorneys' fees,
(3) pre
(2) $9,535.49 in costs,
judgment interest for his back-pay award, and (4) post-judgment
interest.
I. BACKGROUND
In October 2011, plaintiff brought this action against
defendant Polones Construction Corp.
("defendant" or "Polones")
alleging unlawful employment practices under Section 1981 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 ("Section 1981"), Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), the New York State Human
Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law.
After a
trial on July 16 and 17, 2012, the jury rendered a verdict for
1
plaintiff, and on August 3, 2012, a judgment was entered against
defendant for approximately $606,000.
Syrnik timely moved for attorneys' fees and costs on August
15, 2012.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6 and Rule
6.1(b) of the Local Rules of the United States District Courts
for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, defendant's
response was due Tuesday, September 4, 2012.
On September 4,
2012, defendant timely filed a notice of appeal in this action,
but did not then file (and still has not filed) a response to
plaintiff's motion for attorneys fees and costs.
On September
5, 2012, plaintiff e-mailed the Court, copying defendant,
requesting that the Court grant plaintiff's motion as unopposed.
Defendant has not subsequently contacted the Court to oppose
plaintiff's motion.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction
The Court has a duty to ensure that it has subject matter
jurisdiction before acting, even if "no party has called the
matter to the court's attention."
Durant, Nichols, Houston,
Hodgson & Cortese-Costa, P.C. v. Dupont, 565 F.3d 56, 62 (2d
Cir. 2009)
(citing Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211
U.S. 149, 152 (1908)).
Such an inquiry is appropriate here, as the filing of a
notice of appeal "confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals
2
and divests the district court of its control over those aspects
of the case involved in the appeal."
Griggs v. Provident
Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982).
Nevertheless, the
filing of notice of appeal does not strip the district court of
its jurisdiction completely.
In particular, district courts
retain "residual jurisdiction over collateral matters, including
claims for attorneys' fees."
Tancredi v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
378 F.3d 220, 225 (2d Cir. 2004) i see also Valley Disposal, Inc.
v. Cent. Vt. Solid Waste Mgmt. Dist., 71 F.3d 1053, 1055-56 (2d
Cir. 1995)
(affirming district court's jurisdiction over costs
as a collateral matter, despite voluntary dismissal) .
Because the Court addresses only the collateral matters of
fees, costs, and interest, the Court has jurisdiction to resolve
this motion, despite defendant's notice of appeal.
B. Attorneys' Fees
The Court may, in its discretion, award costs and a
reasonable attorney's fee to the "prevailing party" in an action
under Title VII, Section 1981, and the New York City Human
Rights Law.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); id. § 1988; N.Y.C. Admin.
Code § 8-502(f).
Although the Court's discretion is broad, that
discretion is constrained by "a presumption that successful
civil rights litigants should ordinarily recover attorneys' fees
unless special circumstances would render an award unjust."
Raishevich v. Foster, 247 F.3d 337, 344 (2d Cir. 2001)
3
(citing
Kerr v. Quinn, 692 F.2d 875, 877 (2d Cir. 1982)).
This fee
shifting policy has the salutary effect of encouraging civil
rights litigants to act as private attorneys general, enforcing
important federal policies even when the financial stakes are
low.
See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402
(1968).
Where this incentive is unnecessary
such as when the
plaintiff's claims are strong on the merits and likely to result
in a substantial judgment -- then the Court may deny fees if "an
award of such fees might work an injustice."
Raishevich, 247
F.3d at 345 (quoting Kerr, 692 F.2d at 877) .
An award of attorneys' fees is appropriate here.
Plaintiff
unquestionably prevailed on claims that permit him to recover
attorneys' fees.
(See Jury Verdict Form, ECF No. 40.)
While
plaintiff's claims were strong on the merits, the size of his
eventual recovery was not obvious given the short amount of time
that he worked for defendant.
(See Compl. ~~ 10-21, ECF No.1.)
Moreover, the parties have pointed to no evidence that an award
of attorneys' fees would work an undue hardship on defendant,
and the Court knows of none.
Accordingly the Court will not
exercise its discretion to withhold attorneys' fees from Syrnik.
When approving attorneys' fees, the Court must not only
decide whether fee shifting is appropriate; it must also decide
the size of the fee to which the prevailing party is entitled.
This "presumptively reasonable fee" is determined "by
4
multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number of reasonably
expended hours."
Bergerson v. N.Y. State Office of Mental
Health/ 652 F.3d 277/ 289 (2d Cir. 2011).
The determination is
to be grounded in what a "reasonable, paying client would be
willing to pay.ff
Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood
Ass'n v. Cnty. of Albany/ 522 F.3d 182, 184 (2d Cir. 2007).1
Here/ plaintiff requests an award of attorneys' fees based
on the following rates:
•
$450.00 for three senior attorneys working a total of
218.99 hoursi
•
$325.00 for one junior attorney working 80.29 hoursi
•
$250.00 for two senior paralegals working a total of
224.32 hoursj and
•
$175.00 for five junior paralegals working a total of
83.65 hours.
In total, plaintiff requests an award of attorneys' fees of
$196,258.50.
In light of the prevailing rates in Manhattan for civil
rights attorneys of comparable skill, the Court finds these
hourly rates to be reasonable.
See, e.g., Marchisotto v. City
of New York, No. 05 civ. 2699, 2009 WL 2229695, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
1 This Court approaches such an inquiry with some hesitation,
given that it is
not a paying client, that it will not pay the fees awarded, that the attorney
and client have already arranged their (presumably reasonable) fee agreement,
and that the Court must award a fee based on an hourly rate for work that is
generally taken on a contingent-fee basis.
5
July 27, 2009)
(approving a fee of $400.00/hour for similar work
in this jurisdiction and noting the approval of higher rates by
courts in this district).
The reasonableness of these rates is
further supported by the representation of plaintiff's counsel
that their firm charges nnumerous clients in this District
hourly billable rates in excess of those requested here."
(Pl.'s Br. for Attorneys' Fees & Costs, ECF No. 55.)
Nevertheless, the Court finds that, given the
straightforward nature of this action and the relatively small
amount of evidence needed to prove plaintiff's claims, the
number of hours worked is more than reasonably necessary.
Instead, the Court finds that a reasonable, paying client would
be willing to pay for 190 hours of time from senior attorneys,
forty hours of time from junior attorneys, and 175 hours of time
total from (senior) paralegals.
On that basis, the Court finds
that the presumptively reasonable fee to which plaintiff is
entitled is $142,250.00.
C. Costs
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) (1), a
prevailing party is entitled to the costs of the suit.
costs include: "(1) fees of the clerk and marshalj
These
(2) fees for
printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily
obtained for use in the casej
printing and witnessesj
(3) fees and disbursements for
(4) fees for exemplification and the
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costs of making copies of any material where the copies are
necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(5) docket fees under
[28 U.S.C. § 1923]; and (6) compensation of court-appointed
experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees,
expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under [28
U.S.C. § 1828]."
28 U.S.C. § 1920; see also Arlington Cent.
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 298 (2006).2
Plaintiff has submitted to the court a bill of costs along
with supporting documentation, requesting a total of $9,959.03.
Because plaintiff is a prevailing party and because most of the
costs plaintiff submitted fall within those recoverable by a
prevailing party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 (and
Local Rule 54.1), the Court awards plaintiff $9,535.49 in costs. 3
D. Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest
Courts have the discretion to award pre-judgment interest
absent statutory language to the contrary.
Whether to award
pre-judgment interest "should be a function of (i) the need to
fully compensate the wronged party for actual damages suffered,
(ii) considerations of fairness and the relative equities of the
award,
(iii) the remedial purpose of the statute involved,
2 In this District,
certain costs associated with transcripts, depositions,
witness fees, copying, docket fees, and other miscellaneous fees are also
explicitly taxable for the prevailing party. See Local Rule 54.1.
3 Plaintiff's bill of costs included three entries with insufficient detail
for the Court to determine whether they should be taxable to defendant.
(See
Graff Declo, Ex. C, at 1-2, ECF No. 57 ("Other / Jon Myers: Manta Expense,-"
"Other / Jon Myers: AYG Expenses," "Other / Jon Myers: MSH Expense").}
Those
items come to a total of $423.54. Accordingly, the Court disallows $423.54
of plaintiff's requested costs.
7
and/or (iv) such other general principles as are deemed relevant
by the court."
Wickham Contracting Co. v. Local Union No.3,
955 F.2d 831, 833-34 (2d Cir. 1992).
In considering these
factors, courts have allowed pre-judgment interest for back pay
awards for civil rights plaintiffs.
Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 558 (1988)
See, e.g., Loeffler v.
Miner v. City of Glenn Falls,
i
999 F.2d 655, 662 (2d Cir. 1993).
Here, an award of pre-judgment interest is particularly
appropriate.
Such an award comports both with the goal of the
back pay remedy -- to compensate the plaintiff fully for her
injury -- and with the remedial purposes of Title VII.
Indeed,
in the Title VII context, the Second Circuit "has held that it
is ordinarily an abuse of discretion not to include pre-judgment
interest in a back-pay award."
1154 (2d Cir. 1992)
(quoting Donovan v. Sovereign Sec., Ltd.,
726 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1984})
omitted).
Clark v. Frank, 960 F.2d 1146,
(internal quotation mark
Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to pre-judgment
interest for that portion of his judgment constituting an award
of back pay.4
Finally, plaintiff is also entitled to post-judgment
interest.
Post-judgment interest is awarded as a matter of
The Court does not read Plaintiff's motion for fees, costs, and interest to
seek pre-judgment interest on his award of punitive damages.
(See pI.'s Br.
for Attorneys' Fees & Costs 17-18, ECF No. 55.) That decision was sensible,
as it is "well-settled . . . that penalties do not carry prejudgment
interest." Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Pharaon, 169 F.3d
110, 114 (2d Cir. 1999).
4
8
course for any money judgment, included the judgment awarded in
this action.
See 28 U.S.C.
§
1961(a)
(Ulnterest shall be
allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a
district court.") i see also Greenway v. Buffalo Hilton Hotel,
143 F.3d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1998).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's motion for attorneys
fees, costs, and interest is granted in part and denied in part.
It is hereby
ORDERED that defendant shall pay plaintiff:
in attorneys' fees,
(2) $9,535.49 in costs,
(1) $142,250.00
(3) pre-judgment
interest on plaintiff's award of back pay, and (4) post-judgment
interest on all money judgments awarded in this action.
SO ORDERED:
Dated:
New York, New York
September ~, 2012
KATHERINE B. FORREST
United States District Judge
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