Lindsey v. Butler et al

Filing 59

OPINION AND ORDER: re: 51 MOTION for Reconsideration re; 50 Memorandum & Opinion (Notice of Motion of Detective Butler's Motion, Pursuant to Local Rule 6.3, for Partial Reconsideration) filed by Sean Butler. For the reasons set forth above, Defendant's motion for partial reconsideration is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion, Doc. 51, and to mail a copy of this Opinion and Order to Plaintiff. Furthermore, the Court cert ifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this Opinion and Order would not be taken in good faith; therefore, in forma pauperis status is denied for purposes of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). SO ORDERED (Signed by Judge Edgardo Ramos on 11/05/2014) The Clerks Office Has Mailed Copies. (ama)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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ANTHONY LINDSEY,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
- against :
:
DETECTIVE SEAN BUTLER, DETECTIVE RICHARD :
WERNER, RAYMOND KELLY, Commissioner of the
:
N.Y.P.D., and CITY OF NEW YORK,
:
:
Defendants.
:
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OPINION AND ORDER
11 Civ. 9102 (ER)

Ramos, D.J.:
Pro se plaintiff Anthony Lindsey (“Plaintiff” or “Lindsey”) brings this action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated when New York City
Police Department (“NYPD”) officers forcibly shaved his facial hair during a custodial
interrogation on December 16, 2008. On August 29, 2014, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment claim, as well as all claims against former NYPD Commissioner Raymond Kelly
and the City of New York. Doc. 50. The Court further held that the Amended Complaint stated
a claim under the First Amendment and the Fourth Amendment, and denied Detective Sean
Butler’s (“Defendant”) motion to dismiss the Fourth Amendment claim on the basis of qualified
immunity. Defendant now moves, pursuant to Local Civil Rule 6.3, for partial reconsideration of
this Court’s August 29, 2014 Order (the “Order”). 1 Doc. 51. Defendant argues that the Court
should have granted his motion to dismiss the First Amendment claim on the basis of qualified
immunity. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED.

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The facts and procedural history of this case are discussed in the Order, familiarity with which is presumed.

I.

Legal Standard
Rule 6.3 of the Local Civil Rules for this District provides for reconsideration or

reargument of a court’s order on a motion only where the court has overlooked controlling
decisions or factual matters that were “put before it on the underlying motion . . . and which, had
they been considered, might have reasonably altered the result before the court.” Mikol v.
Barnhart, 554 F. Supp. 2d 498, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Greenwald v. Orb Commc’ns &
Mktg., Inc., No. 00 Civ. 1939 (LTS) (HBP), 2003 WL 660844, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2003));
see also Local R. 6.3. “Reconsideration of a court’s previous order is an ‘extraordinary remedy
to be employed sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial
resources.’” Parrish v. Sollecito, 253 F. Supp. 2d 713, 715 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting In re
Health Mgmt. Sys. Inc. Sec. Litig., 113 F. Supp. 2d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)). Local Rule 6.3 is
“narrowly construed and strictly applied so as to avoid repetitive arguments on issues that have
been considered fully by the Court.” Mikol, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 500 (quoting Dellefave v. Access
Temps., Inc., No. 99 Civ. 6098 (RWS), 2001 WL 286771, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2001))
(internal quotation marks omitted). “Where the movant fails to show that any controlling
authority or facts have actually been overlooked, and merely offers substantially the same
arguments he offered on the original motion or attempts to advance new facts, the motion for
reconsideration must be denied.” Id. (citing Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d
Cir. 1995)).
A motion for reconsideration under Local Rule 6.3 is not a substitute for appeal, Boart
Longyear Ltd. v. Alliance Indus., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 407, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), nor is it a
vehicle for a party dissatisfied with the Court’s ruling to voice its disagreement with the decision.
R.F.M.A.S., Inc. v. Mimi So, 640 F. Supp. 2d 506, 512-13 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). “Courts have
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repeatedly been forced to warn litigants that such motions should not be made reflexively to
reargue those issues already considered when a party does not like the way the original motion
was resolved.” Boart Longyear Ltd., 869 F. Supp. 2d at 418 (quoting Makas v. Orlando, No. 06
Civ. 14305 (DAB), 2008 WL 2139131, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2008)) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see, e.g., Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 884 F. Supp. 2d 92, 96 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (“The provision for reargument is not designed to allow wasteful repetition of arguments
already briefed, considered and decided.”); see also Assoc. Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 395 F.
Supp. 2d 17, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (motion for reconsideration is not “an occasion for repeating
old arguments previously rejected”).
Whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is within the sound discretion of
the district court. Premium Sports Inc. v. Connell, No. 10 Civ. 3752 (KBP), 2012 WL 2878085,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2012) (citing Aczel v. Labonia, 584 F.3d 52, 61 (2d Cir. 2009)).
II.

Defendant’s Motion
Detective Butler contends that the Court should have granted his motion to dismiss the

First Amendment claim on the basis of qualified immunity. Def. Mem. L. 3. In particular,
Defendant claims both that his alleged conduct did not violate any clearly established right and
that it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that his alleged conduct was lawful. Id. at 34. Plaintiff, however, argues that it is clearly established that “a Muslim is to be respected in the
aspect of his religion not to shave his facial hair.” Pl. Opp. Mem. L. 2.
A government official sued in his individual capacity is entitled to qualified immunity (1)
if the conduct attributed to him was not prohibited by federal law; or (2) where the conduct was
so prohibited, if the plaintiff’s right not to be subjected to such conduct by the defendant was not
clearly established at the time it occurred; or (3) if the defendant’s action was objectively legally
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reasonable in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken.
Manganiello v. City of New York, 612 F.3d 149, 164 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted).
As the Second Circuit explained in DiStiso v. Cook, 691 F.3d 226, 240 (2d Cir. 2012), qualified
immunity “affords government officials breathing room to make reasonable—even if sometimes
mistaken—decisions, and protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law from liability for damages.” Therefore, “[w]hether qualified immunity applies in
a particular case generally turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the challenged action,
assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Under a qualified immunity analysis, a court must first decide whether the facts that a
plaintiff has alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right, and then whether the right at
issue was clearly established at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct. Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). Because the Court has already concluded that the Amended
Complaint states a claim against Defendant under the First Amendment, see Order at 10, the
Court need only consider whether Plaintiff, based on his religious beliefs, had a clearly
established right to be protected from being forcibly shaved in the custodial interrogation setting.
Defendant contends that at the time of the forced shaving in December 2008, neither the
Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit had recognized such a right under the First Amendment.
Def. Mem. L. 5. Indeed, the Court recognized in the Order that the parties had not cited to, and
the Court had not found, any federal precedent analyzing the constitutionality of forced
grooming in the custodial interrogation context, or specifically to facilitate a police lineup.
Order at 8 n.9. In opposition to the instant motion, Plaintiff does not cite any such authority, and
instead relies on rulings from Islamic law concerning the custom of growing a beard in the
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