Howard v. City of New York et al
Filing
40
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 21 Motion to Quash. For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Ruiz's motion to quash is DENIED. Further, Plaintiff's counsel is hereby ordered to this serve this Memorandum Opinion and Order on Mr. Ruiz by email at empanadasba@gmail.com and by certified mail, return receipt, and to file proof of such service promptly thereafter. In addition, unless Mr. Ruiz confirms by e-mail that he received the Memorandum Opinion and Order, Plaintiffs counsel must cal l Mr. Ruiz to confirm he received it. Defense counsel is hereby ordered to send a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to Assistant District Attorney Sarah Hines. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate Mr. Ruiz's motion (Docket No. 21). SO ORDERED.(Signed by Judge Jesse M. Furman on 1/16/2013) (ama)
l
~DC
SIJ\ 1
DO< l \H \ I
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------------------------------------------)(
I
FI.FCTJ{(l'fC.-\1 L\ Fll L!J'
ll\
H
.: .
-----,;--1-..,.....,---i-;'""""'-
DOUGLAS HOWARD,
Plaintiff,
-v-
12 Civ. 933 (JMF)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,
Defendants.
----------------------------------------------------------------------)(
JESSE M. FURMAN, United States District Judge:
On January 2, 2013, non-party Carlos Ruiz, proceeding prose, filed a motion to quash (1) a
subpoena that Plaintiff served on him for deposition testimony and various materials; and (2) a
subpoena duces tecum that Plaintiff served on the Manhattan District Attorney's Office seeking
records concerning Mr. Ruiz's May 13,2009 arrest and non-prosecution. (Docket No. 21). On
January 7, 2013, the parties made submissions in response to Mr. Ruiz's motion: Plaintiff, naturally,
opposes the motion (Docket No. 27); Defendants support it (Docket No. 28). (By letter dated
January 10,2013, the District Attorney's Office advised the Court that it takes no position on the
motion, except to state that unsealing arrest records "could constitute an unwarranted invasion" of
privacy and that "unsealing the file in a case like this ... could have a chilling effect upon citizens'
willingness to make complaints to the police." (Docket No. 37)).
Under Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may obtain discovery
"that is relevant to any party's claim or defense" and that "[r]elevant information need not be
admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence." Pursuant to Rule 45, a party may serve a subpoena on a non-party, although
a non-party to whom a subpoena is addressed may object to the subpoena. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
45(c)(2). Under Rule 45(c)(3), the Court "must quash or modify a subpoena that ... requires
disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies; or ... subjects
a person to undue burden." Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3). "Motions to compel and motions to quash a
subpoena are both entrusted to the sound discretion of the court." Fitch, Inc. v. UBS Painewebber,
Inc., 330 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Applying these provisions and standards here, the Court concludes that there is no basis to
grant Mr. Ruiz's motion to quash the subpoena seeking his deposition testimony and materials.
Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that Parks Department officials discriminated against him on the
basis of race in the performance and enforcement of his contract with the City to provide tennis
lessons in East River Park. (Compl.
~~
1, 25 (Docket No. 1)). A central aspect of his claim is that
Defendants granted preferential treatment to Mr. Ruiz, "a Hispanic individual," on the basis of his
race- specifically, that Defendant Garnes and her staff allowed and enabled Mr. Ruiz to give
lessons in East River Park in violation of applicable rules and regulations; failed to act on Plaintiff's
complaints about Mr. Ruiz; and gave false information to the police about an altercation between
Plaintiff and Mr. Ruiz that resulted in Plaintiff's arrest. (Compl.
~~
27 -49). In light of these
allegations, the Court finds that Mr. Ruiz's testimony and the materials sought in the subpoena
served upon him are plainly "relevant" to Plaintiff's claims and that the subpoena does not impose
an "undue burden" on Mr. Ruiz. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l), 45(c)(3).
Mr. Ruiz's claim- adamantly denied by Plaintiff (Docket No. 26)- that the subpoena is
"a continuation of [Plaintiff's] relentless four year campaign to discredit [him], malign [him] and
harass [him]" does not call for a different result. (Mot. to Quash 2). Nevertheless, out of an
abundance of caution, the Court orders that the deposition of Mr. Ruiz shall take place at the United
States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007, under the supervision of Magistrate
Judge James C. Francis IV. (By separate order, the Court is referring this matter to Magistrate
2
Judge Francis for that purpose.) Plaintiffs counsel shall promptly make the necessary
arrangements with the Chambers of Magistrate Judge Francis, defense counsel, and Mr. Ruiz.
Notwithstanding defense counsel's request (Docket No. 28, ~ 8), the Court declines to limit the
scope of Mr. Ruiz's deposition to any particular topic; in the event there is a dispute regarding the
scope of the deposition, or any particular questions posed to Mr. Ruiz, such dispute can be raised
with Magistrate Judge Francis or the Court during the deposition.
Mr. Ruiz's motion to quash the subpoena to the District Attorney's Office presents a closer
question because the arrest records Plaintiff seeks are sealed pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L. Section
160.50, but it too must be denied. It is well established "that New York State law does not govern
discoverability and confidentiality in federal civil rights actions." Cruz v. Kennedy, No. 97 Civ.
4001 (KMW), 1997 WL 839483, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1997) (citing King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D.
180, 187 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)); accord MacNamara v. City ofNY, No. 04 Civ. 9612 (KMK) (JCF),
2006 WL 3298911, at *2-4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2006) (Francis, M.J.); Woodardv. City ofNY, No.
99 Civ. 1123 (ILG), 2000 WL 516890, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2000); Daniels v. City ofNY, No.
99 Civ. 1695 (SAS), 2001 WL 228091, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2001). More specifically, this
Court has held that the privilege created by Section 160.50 "must be construed narrowly, 'and must
yield when outweighed by a federal interest in presenting relevant information to a trier of fact."'
Daniels, 2001 WL 228091, at* 1 (quoting United States v. One Parcel of Property at 31-33 York
Street, 930 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1991)). In particular, the Court's task is to "balance the
deference to be accorded [the privilege created by Section 160.50] with the need for the information
sought to be protected by the privilege." Id (citing Burka v. NYC. Transit Auth., 110 F.R.D. 660,
664 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). Applying that balancing test, "federal courts ... have commonly rejected
confidentiality arguments premised on [Section 160.50]." Haus v. City ofNY, No. 03 Civ. 4915
(RWS) (MHD), 2006 WL 1148680, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2006) (citing cases).
3
Applying that balancing test here, the Court finds that unsealing and disclosure is warranted.
The "overriding aim" of the sealing requirement of Section 160.50 is "to ensure confidentiality for
people who are arrested and thereby to avoid attaching any public stigma to them." Haus, 2006 WL
1148680, at *2 (citing Harper v. Angiolillo, 89 N.Y.2d 761, 766 (1997)). In this case, however, that
interest is weak, as the fact of Mr. Ruiz's arrest is already a matter of public record by virtue of
Plaintiffs complaint and the present motion. Further, the District Attorney's Office's concern"that unsealing the file in a case like this, where Carlos Ruiz was actually a complaining witness
against [Plaintiff], could have a chilling effect upon citizens' willingness to make complaints to the
police" (Docket No. 37)- does not militate strongly against disclosure, as Mr. Ruiz's identity and
the fact that he complained to the police are already known to Plaintiff. On the flip side, given the
allegations in the Complaint relating to the altercation between Plaintiff and Mr. Ruiz and their
arrests, Mr. Ruiz's arrest records may well lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, including
the identity of the Parks Department officials, if any, who supported Mr. Ruiz's version of the
events resulting in Plaintiffs arrest (and, by extension, termination of his contract with the City).
Under the circumstances, therefore, Section 160.50 must yield to "the federal interest in presenting
relevant information to a trier of fact." Daniels, 2001 WL 228091, at *1 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Moreover, the burden on Mr. Ruiz's legitimate privacy interests can be further minimized by
a protective order designating the unsealed records as "attorney's-eyes-only" and restricting use of
the documents to this litigation. See MacNamara, 2006 WL 3298911, at *4 (granting a motion to
unseal the arrest records of non-parties sealed pursuant to Section 160.50 and designating them
"attorney's-eyes-only" to minimize "the burden on the legitimate privacy interests of the non-party
... arrestees"). Accordingly, the Court hereby orders that the records relating to Mr. Ruiz's May
13, 2009 arrest shall be unsealed for the limited purpose of disclosing them to counsel in this case.
4
See, e.g., Cruz, 1997 WL 839483, at *2 (stating that where, as in this case, a plaintiff has issued a
subpoena to the District Attorney's Office and the District Attorney's Office has objected, "it is
within the power of this Court to issue an order compelling production"). Defense counsel shall
take whatever steps are necessary to obtain the documents and shall disclose them to Plaintiffs
counsel no later than January 25, 2013. Unless and until the Court orders otherwise, the records
shall be designated as "attorney's-eyes-only"- meaning that Plaintiffs counsel may not show
them to anyone outside of his office, including Plaintiff himself- and their use is limited to this
litigation.
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Ruiz's motion to quash is DENIED. Further, Plaintiffs
counsel is hereby ordered to this serve this Memorandum Opinion and Order on Mr. Ruiz by email
at empanadasba@gmail.com and by certified mail, return receipt, and to file proof of such service
promptly thereafter. In addition, unless Mr. Ruiz confirms by e-mail that he received the
Memorandum Opinion and Order, Plaintiffs counsel must call Mr. Ruiz to confirm he received it.
Defense counsel is hereby ordered to send a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to
Assistant District Attorney Sarah Hines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate Mr. Ruiz's motion (Docket No. 21).
SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 16, 2013
New York, New York
5
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?