Bak et al v. Metro-North Railroad Company et al
Filing
230
OPINION & ORDER #105456 re: 175 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Fusco Management Company, LLC, 182 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Metro-North Railroad Company, 187 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Tams Consultants, Inc., 173 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by ABM Industries Inc. For the reasons g1ven above, the court grants the motions for summary judgment filed by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), and TAMS Consultants, Inc. The court denies the motions for summary judgment filed by Metro-North Railroad Company, Fusco Management Company, LLC, and ABM Industries Inc. This opinion and order resolves the items listed as document numbers 173, 175, 182, and 187 in this case. (Signed by Judge Thomas P. Griesa on 4/16/2015) (mro) Modified on 4/17/2015 (soh).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------------x
:
BAK, et al.,
:
Plaintiffs,
:
:
– against –
:
:
METRO-NORTH RAILROAD COMPANY,
:
et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
:
--------------------------------------------x
12-CV-3220 (TPG)
OPINION & ORDER
Plaintiff Chan Young Bak brings this wrongful death and negligence
action on behalf of his mother Hyang Ja Bak Lee’s (“decedent”) estate. The
decedent fell 20 feet from a platform at the Bridgeport Train Station and
died two hours later. There are six defendants in the case. Three of the
defendants are public entities: the Metropolitan Transportation Authority
(“MTA”); Metro-North Railroad Company (“Metro-North”); and the National
Railroad Passenger Corporation (“Amtrak”). The other three defendants are
private companies: Fusco Management Company, LLC (“Fusco”); ABM
Industries
Inc.
(“ABM”);
and
TAMS
Consultants,
Inc.
(“TAMS
Consultants”).
Defendants have moved for summary judgment, arguing that: (1) the
court lacks jurisdiction to try this case because there is no diversity of
citizenship and no federal question presented; and (2) they owed no duty
of care to decedent. For the following reasons, the court denies the motions
for summary judgment filed by Metro-North, Fusco, and ABM. The court
grants the motions for summary judgment filed by the MTA, Amtrak, and
TAMS Consultants.
Facts
The Bridgeport Train Station is owned by the Connecticut
Department of Transportation (“CDOT”), which is not a defendant in this
action. Wilhelmy Dep. at 132:16–18. On April 26, 2011, decedent was
standing on the southbound platform of the Bridgeport Train Station. See
Incident Report, M.T.A. Police Dep’t, at 2. At 9:14 a.m., video footage shows
decedent walking backward toward the southern end of the platform. See
Defs’. Ex. L. A guardrail was present at the southern edge of the platform,
but it did not cover the entire width of the platform. Torres Dep. at 74:7.
This gap was present in the original designs of the train station dating
back to December of 1971. See Letter from Randall E. Morris to Ioana
Wenchell (Aug. 12, 2014) (hereafter “Morris Letter”) at 1.
Still walking backward, decedent reached the end of the platform,
passed through the gap in the guardrail, and fell approximately 20–25 feet
to the pavement below. Torres Dep. at 74:7. Decedent suffered injuries to
her head, face, and legs. Incident Report at 2. A security guard discovered
decedent on the sidewalk “bleeding from her face” and called the police.
See Fusco Mgt. Co. Incident Report at 1. Decedent was transported to St.
Vincent’s Medical Center, and admitted at 9:44 a.m. See Hospital Report
of Death at 2. She died at 11:22 a.m. Id.
A. The Public Entity Defendants.
-2-
The MTA is a New York public authority whose purpose is “the
continuance, further development and improvement of commuter
transportation.” N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 1264. It has a broad array of
powers, including the ability to borrow and invest money, enter into
contracts and leases, and own real property. Id. § 1265. The MTA
maintains offices at the Bridgeport Train Station for MTA police. Wilhelmy
Dep. at 18.
Metro-North is a wholly owned subsidiary of the MTA. See Cert.
Incorporation Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co.; see also Celli v. MetroN. Commuter R.R., 891 F. Supp. 124, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) aff'd, 101 F.3d
108 (2d Cir. 1996). Metro-North’s duties include the operation and
improvement of railroad facilities. Cert. Incorp. ¶ 4. Metro-North operates
train service between Connecticut and New York City along a line known
as the “New Haven Line.” Wilhelmy Dep. at 23. This line is separated into
upper and lower parts. Id. at 23–25. One of the stops on the upper part of
the New Haven Line is the Bridgeport Train Station. Id. at 25:6–9. The
Bridgeport Train Station is not “operated” by Metro-North. Id. at 26:-3–4.
Metro-North does, however, maintain ticketing operations there. Id. at
117. Metro-North also posts signs at the train station, and uses the
stations’ public address system to make announcements and warnings to
passengers. Id. at 119–12. Metro-North also stores “bridge plates,”
equipment to assist customers in boarding and leaving trains, on the
Bridgeport Train Station platforms. Id. at 135:16–17. Finally, after
-3-
decedent’s fall from the platform at the Bridgeport Train Station, MetroNorth employees constructed a barrier that filled the gap between the
guardrail and the platform edge. Id. at 57–59.
Amtrak is a passenger railroad carrier established by Congress and
incorporated in the District of Columbia. See Pub. Law 91-518, 91st Cong.
(1970); D.C. Code Ann. § 29-301 et seq. Like Metro-North, Amtrak runs
trains that stop at the Bridgeport Train Station. Wilhelmy Dep. at 173:13.
Amtrak’s rights and duties are outlined in a “Trackage Rights Agreement.”
See Defs. Ex. LL. The Trackage Rights Agreement provides that MetroNorth and the State of Connecticut would make the rails available to
Amtrak and its locomotives. Id. §§ 3.1. These entities would maintain and
repair the tracks. Id. § 4.2.
Amtrak’s presence at the Bridgeport Train Station, besides its
running of trains there, is limited to the keeping of two electronic ticketing
machines and the posting of train schedules at the station. Freer Dep. 29–
30, 34. Inspection of the station is generally left to Metro-North and the
State of Connecticut, See Trackage Rights Agreement § 7.3, although
Amtrak performs inspections twice a year to ensure that train platforms
are clear of debris and tripping hazards. Freer Dep. at 45–48. Amtrak
performs no inspection of guardrails. Id. at 52–53.
B. The Private Entity Defendants.
Fusco Management Company, LLC is a Connecticut company that
manages, operates, and maintains the Bridgeport Train Station pursuant
-4-
to a contract with the Connecticut Department of Transportation. See
generally Property Management Services Agreement Between the State of
Connecticut and Fusco Management Company LLC (“Fusco Management
Agreement”). The contract tasks Fusco with all required and necessary
building operation activities including “preventative maintenance . . . and
basic/general repair and maintenance” for a variety of building systems.
Fusco Management Agreement at 29. It requires Fusco, in performing this
work, to comply with “all applicable Federal and State codes, standards,
and guidelines.” Id. at 4.
ABM Industries Inc. is a Delaware corporation and one of Fusco’s
subcontractors. See Agreement for Services between Fusco Management
Company, LLC and ABM/ACSS Security Services (“ABM Agreement.”).
ABM is responsible for providing “24 hour security” at the Bridgeport Train
Station. Id. at 2. Its duties include patrolling platforms and pedestrian
bridges at the station. Id. at 6. Security personnel patrolling the train
platforms are required to “observe and report any and all suspicious
activity,” and to note “conditions of walkways, lighting, cameras, stairs,
code blue emergency units[,] platforms[,] and overall safety for the general
public . . . .” See Sample Post Orders for Stamford Transportation Center
at 10 (referring to “Post 5”). Finally, ABM security guards are also
responsible for monitoring 25 video screens showing live feeds of all the
station platforms and other areas. See Torres Dep. at 66.
-5-
TAMS Consultants, Inc. is a New York engineering, architecture,
and construction management firm. Murphy Dep. at 10:4–5. In 1993, the
Connecticut Department of Transportation retained TAMS Consultants to
make upgrades to the Bridgeport Train Station to comply with the
Americans with Disabilities Act. See Personal Services Agreement of June
28, 1993. TAMS Consultant’s duties were subsequently expanded to
“propos[ing] recommendations or environmental enhancements in and
around the station building." Personal Services Agreement of April 27,
1994 at 4. To this end, TAMS Consultants inspected interior and exterior
finishes, lighting, landscaping, and the HVAC system. Id.
Discussion
The standard governing motions for summary judgment is wellsettled. A court may grant summary judgment only when the moving party
shows that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Cartrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “When
considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all
inferences in that party's favor.” Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549,
553 (2d Cir. 2005).
1. Whether the Court Has Jurisdiction to Try This Case.
-6-
Defendants argue that the court lacks jurisdiction to try this
wrongful death and negligence case because the parties are not diverse.
Indeed, there is a lack of complete diversity among the parties here
because plaintiff and a number of the defendants are citizens of New York
State. Thus, absent some federal question, this court lacks jurisdiction to
try the case. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. In response to this argument,
plaintiff claims to have invoked federal question jurisdiction because he
named a federal corporation, Amtrak, as a defendant.
Plaintiff is correct in arguing that a suit against Amtrak invokes
federal question jurisdiction. Federal courts have jurisdiction over all civil
suits arising under the constitution and laws of the United States. 28
U.S.C. § 1331. A suit against a corporation established by Congress is
generally considered to arise under the laws of the United States, Fed.
Intermediate Credit Bank of Columbia, S.C., v. Mitchell, 277 U.S. 213, 214
(1928), but only where the United States owns more than half of the
corporation’s stock. See 28 U.S.C. § 1349. Since the United States owns
more than 50% of Amtrak stock, federal courts have clear jurisdiction in
lawsuits where Amtrak is a party. See, e.g., Aliotta v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger
Corp., 315 F.3d 756, 758 n.1 (7th Cir. 2003).
A more difficult question arises because defendant Amtrak will be
dismissed from the case. This wrongful death lawsuit involves the state
common-law tort of negligence, and does not invoke any federal cause of
action. With Amtrak a defendant in the case, the court could adjudicate
-7-
the tort claim as an exercise of its supplemental jurisdiction. Carlsbad
Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009). However, with Amtrak
dismissed from the case, an issue arises as to whether the court may
continue to exercise jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Making this
decision is a matter of discretion. In deciding whether to adjudicate the
state law claim, the court must consider notions of fairness, judicial
economy, convenience, and comity. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484
U.S. 343, 350 (1988). For example, the court should consider whether
dismissal would occur at an early stage of the proceedings, or whether
issues of state law predominate. Id.
The court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s
wrongful death/negligence claim even though Amtrak will be dismissed
from the case. The case is scheduled to go to trial on May 11, 2015, a little
more than three weeks from the date of this opinion and order. The parties
have devoted significant resources to preparing for trial, including
exchanging large volumes of discovery material and conducting lengthy
depositions. It would be decidedly unfair to the parties for the court to
dismiss the entire action at this late stage. Moreover, the risk of the court
deciding novel issues of state law is slim because the action involves
straightforward questions of negligence. Finally, judicial economy would
not be served by dismissing the case at this late stage only to have it refiled
in state court. Thus, the court will, as a matter of discretion, exercise
-8-
supplemental jurisdiction over the case even though defendant Amtrak
will be dismissed.
2. Choice of Law Analysis.
The parties dispute whether New York or Connecticut law governs
in this case. A federal court adjudicating state law claims pendent to a
federal claim applies the choice of law rules of the forum state. Rogers v.
Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1002 (2d Cir. 1989). Here, the forum state is New
York. When confronted with conflicting laws of different jurisdictions, a
New York court will conduct an “interest analysis” to determine which
state has a greater interest in having its law applied in the litigation.
Padula v. Lilarn Properties Corp., 84 N.Y.2d 519, 521 (1994). This is done
by evaluating the facts or contacts that relate to the purpose of the law in
conflict. Id. The court will look to: (1) the significance of the parties’
contacts to the jurisdiction, meaning their domicile and the locus of the
tort; and (2) whether the purpose of the law is to regulate conduct or
allocate loss. See id. If the purpose of the law is to regulate conduct, the
law of the place of the tort will apply. Id. at 522. If the purpose of the law
is to allocate loss, the law of the common domicile of the parties will apply.
To begin, the court must determine whether there is a conflict
between New York and Connecticut’s negligence law and wrongful death
statutes. There is generally no conflict between the negligence law of the
two states, except that they differ in regard to liability for third party
contractors. New York generally precludes liability for third-party
-9-
contractors except in unusual circumstances, and Connecticut generally
allows liability for third party contractors whose activities bear a direct
relationship to the plaintiff’s harm. Compare Espinal v. Melville Snow
Contractors, Inc., 773 N.E.2d 485, 487 (N.Y. 2002), with Gazo v. City of
Stamford,765 A.2d 505, 509 (Conn. 2001).
Additionally, although the two states’ wrongful death statutes are
facially similar, there is a key difference between them. Connecticut’s
wrongful death statute allows recovery for the decedent’s loss of enjoyment
of life, see Sanderson v. Steve Enterprises, Inc., 491 A.2d 389, 397 n.12
(Conn. 1985), but New York’s wrongful death statute does not allow
recovery for loss of enjoyment of life. Sand v. Chapin, 238 A.D.2d 862, 863
(N.Y. App. Div. 1997). Thus, there is a conflict of laws with regard to the
duty owed by third-party contractors and with regard to recovery under
wrongful death statutes.
Given this conflict, the interest analysis referred to above requires
that the court determine the significance of the parties’ contacts with the
jurisdiction and the locus of the tort. The more significant contacts in this
case are with Connecticut. Decedent, according to plaintiff’s testimony,
was living in Connecticut at the time of her accident. See Bak Dep. at 9:17–
19. While plaintiff and some of the defendants are New York residents, all
of the defendants have clear ties to Connecticut, either by running trains
along the New Haven line or in performing their contracts. Most
importantly, the tort itself occurred in Connecticut, as decedent was
- 10 -
injured when she fell from the platform at the Bridgeport Train Station.
Thus, the first factor in the interest analysis favors applying Connecticut
law.
The second choice of law factor requires the court to determine
whether the law asserted regulates conduct, or alternatively whether it
allocates loss. Here, plaintiff asserts a wrongful death cause of action
premised on negligence. The law of negligence is a conduct-regulating rule
because it seeks to hold defendants to a standard of care. See, e.g., 2002
Lawrence R. Buchalter Alaska Trust v. Philadelphia Fin. Life Assur. Co., No.
12-CV-6808 KMK, 2015 WL 1455805, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015)
(collecting cases). However, wrongful death statutes are loss allocating
because they assign liability after a tort has occurred. Padula, 84 N.Y.2d
at 522. Since the instant motions involve questions regarding negligence,
and since negligence is a conduct-regulating rule, this factor also weighs
in favor of applying Connecticut law.
Because the forum is New York, the court will apply New York
negligence law in determining the duties owed by the public entity
defendants, the MTA, Metro-North, and Amtrak. The court will apply
Connecticut law with regard to the three private contractor defendants,
Fusco, ABM, and TAMS Consultants.
3. Whether Defendants Owed Decedent a Duty of Care.
There are four elements to a negligence claim under both
Connecticut and New York Law: (1) duty, (2) breach of that duty; (3)
- 11 -
causation; and (4) actual injury. RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 650
A.2d 153, 155 (Conn. 1994); Akins v. Glens Falls City Sch. Dist., 53 N.Y.2d
325, 333 (1981). Defendants argue that they did not owe a duty of care to
decedent, and that that as a result, plaintiff’s negligence/wrongful death
claim fails as a matter of law.
There is no “algebraic formula” for determining the existence of a
duty. Palka v. Servicemaster Mgmt. Servs. Corp., 83 N.Y.2d 579, 585
(1994). Rather, a duty “coalesces from vectored forces including logic,
science, weighty competing socioeconomic policies and sometimes
contractual assumptions of responsibility.” Id. In determining the
existence of a duty, the court will consider “the reasonable expectations of
parties and society generally, the proliferation of claims, the likelihood of
unlimited or insurer-like liability, disproportionate risk and reparation
allocation, and public policies affecting the expansion or limitation of new
channels of liability.” Id. at 586.
Landowners generally owe a duty to act as a reasonable person and
maintain the premises in a safe condition in view of all the circumstances.
Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241 (1976). This duty can extend to nonlandowners. One who assumes a landowner’s duty to act, either by
contract or voluntarily, assumes the duty to act carefully. See Kaplan v.
Dart Towing, Inc., 159 A.D.2d 610, 612 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). Assumption
of a duty will occur where one exercises a degree of control over the
premises approaching the landlord’s, thus incurring the landlord’s
- 12 -
responsibility to maintain the premises in a safe condition. Ginsburg v.
City of Ithaca, 5 F. Supp. 3d 243, 248 (N.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing In re Kush v.
City of Buffalo, 59 N.Y.2d 26, 29 (1983)); Espinal v. Melville Snow
Contractors, Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 136, 140 (2002).
Under Connecticut law, a contractor may assume a duty to others
even though it has not entirely displaced the owner’s control of the
premises. The duty will arise where there is a direct relationship between
the contractor’s activities and the foreseeable harm suffered by the
plaintiff, and if public policy supports holding the contractor liable. Gazo
v. City of Stamford, 765 A.2d 505, 508–09 (Conn. 2001). For example, a
contractor who shovels snow from sidewalks assumes a duty to prevent
foreseeable injuries resulting directly from slips on un-cleared ice, and
public policy supports imposing such a duty on them. Id. at 509.
A. Whether the Public Entity Defendants Owed a Duty of Care.
In the instant case, defendant Metro-North argues that it owed no
duty to decedent because it neither owned the Bridgeport Train Station
nor assumed responsibility to maintain the platform railings. This is not
borne out by the facts. Of course, it goes without saying that Metro-North
does not own the Bridgeport Train Station. However, plaintiff has provided
evidence that Metro-North exhibited a significant degree of control over the
station and platforms. Its managers inspect stations along the New Haven
Line at least every two weeks, looking for issues of “cleanliness and
structural damage.” Wilhelmy Dep. at 29:9-10. These managers are also
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tasked with inspecting platform guardrails. Id. at 31. It is their job to “look
at them [guardrails] and make sure that the screws are all on the bottom
and if anything appears loose . . . report it.” Id. at 32: 20-22. Finally, and
perhaps most tellingly, Metro-North actually performed repairs on the
guardrail at issue in this case. 1 Id. at 57. After the decedent’s fall, the
Metro-North “structures department” installed wooden two-by-fours to
expand the guardrail. Id. at 69. This is dispositive to the question of
control. By making repairs to the guardrail, Metro-North demonstrated a
significant ownership-like control over the platform. That control is
sufficient, as a matter of law, to impute to Metro-North a duty of care to
detect and prevent foreseeable injuries that could result from “defective”
guardrails. It owed this duty to visitors to the train station, including the
decedent. Thus, Metro-North’s argument that it did not owe decedent a
duty of care is unavailing.
Unlike Metro-North, the other public entity defendants did not
exercise control over the Bridgeport train station. The MTA’s primary role
is to provide financing to entities like Metro-North, not to maintain
stations. See N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 1265. Indeed, New York courts
routinely dismiss the MTA as a defendant in tort actions because its
functions “do not include the operation, maintenance, and control of any
As plaintiff correctly points out, evidence of subsequent repairs is admissible to show
ownership or control, and for present purposes, for determining whether Metro North
owed decedent a duty of care. See Fed. R. Evid. 407.
1
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facility.” See, e.g., Cusick v. Lutheran Med. Ctr., 105 A.D.2d 681, 681 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1984). Plaintiff argues that the MTA has assumed control over
the Bridgeport Train Station, but inexplicably conflates the MTA’s duties
there with Metro-North’s duties. See Pls’ Mem. L. Opp. Metro Defs’ Mot.
Summ. J. at 9. In fact, it appears that the MTA’s sole tangible connection
to the Bridgeport Train Station is that it maintains offices there for MTA
police. Wilhelmy Dep. at 18. MTA police walk the station platforms looking
for unattended bags and criminal activity. Corcoran Dep. at 19:2–4. While
they may also look for other hazards, id., there is no evidence that the MTA
has undertaken any responsibility to actually maintain or report on the
status of platforms or guardrails. Given that the MTA’s functions are
limited in nature, it cannot be said that the MTA exerted sufficient control
over the Bridgeport Train Station to assume a duty to report, maintain, or
repair defective guardrails.
The same is true of defendant Amtrak. Amtrak’s sole relationship to
the Bridgeport Train Station is that it runs trains that stop there, keeps
two electronic ticketing machines there, and posts train schedules. Freer
Dep. 29–30, 34. Amtrak does perform twice annual inspections of the
platform, but only to look for debris and other hazards. Id. at 46. Amtrak
does not inspect platform guardrails. Id. at 52–53. Plaintiff notes that
Amtrak conductors exit the train at each stop, but it would be an
exaggeration to characterize this as an “inspection.” Indeed, Amtrak
conductors only exit the train to ensure that customers have boarded or
- 15 -
deboarded. Freer Dep. at 38–39. They do not inspect the platforms in any
meaningful sense, much less platform guardrails. Simply put, the limited
nature of Amtrak’s connection to the Bridgeport Train Station is
insufficient, as a matter of law, to impute to it a duty of care of the type
asserted here. Amtrak has not, by contract or control, assumed a duty to
report, maintain, or repair defective guardrails.
B. Whether the Private Entity Defendants Owed a Duty of Care.
Defendant Fusco Management Company, the manager and operator
of the Bridgeport Train Station, argues that it owed no duty of care to
decedent because it never agreed to repair the station platforms and
guardrails. This understates Fusco’s activities at the station. Fusco’s
agreement with the Connecticut Department of Transportation requires it
to complete “all required and necessary building operation activities
including preventative maintenance . . .and basic/general repair and
maintenance.” Fusco Management Agreement at 29. These activities
include, but are “not limited to,” a host of services including electrical
work, plumbing, trade work (masonry etc…) and “oversight of current and
future operational needs.” Id. at 29–30. Moreover, Fusco is authorized to
make emergency repairs at the station, and to enter into service contracts
for repairs. Id. arts. 10, 25. Fusco is also required to appoint an
environmental and safety officer for the station. Id. at 33. Finally, in 2010
Fusco expressly agreed to include maintenance of the station platforms in
the scope of its duties. See Bordiere Dep. at 29–31.
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There is a direct relationship between Fusco’s duties at the
Bridgeport Train Station and the type of harm suffered by the decedent.
Fusco agreed in its contract to make general repairs at the station.
Inherent in making repairs is the task of inspecting structures to ensure
their safety. Fusco owed a duty to inspect platform guardrails and to notice
defects, and the “defect” in the guardrail at issue in this case is directly
related to decedent’s injury. Consequently, there is a direct relationship
between Fusco’s activities and the harm suffered. Moreover, public policy
favors holding those tasked with maintaining and repairing structures to
a standard of care. Thus, Fusco’s argument that it owed no duty to
decedent is without merit.
Defendant ABM Management argues that as a security company, it
owed no duty to decedent because it had no obligation to report safety
hazards on the train platforms. AMB is correct in that its duties did not
include maintenance or repair of platform guardrails. However, this
overlooks the fact that ABM may have assumed a duty to monitor the train
station to discover injured visitors. ABM is required by contract to provide
24-hour security at the station. See ABM Agreement at 2. This includes
patrolling the station at regular intervals. Id. at 6. Moreover, ABM security
guards are responsible for monitoring 25 video screens showing live feeds
of all the station platforms and other areas. See Torres Dep. at 66. Security
guards can manipulate the cameras from the control room, and zoom in
on areas at the station that merit close scrutiny. Id. at 69.
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The court is satisfied that, as a matter of law, ABM owed no duty to
report, maintain, or repair defective guardrails. However, by providing
constant video surveillance of the train station, ABM assumed a duty to
discover and react to unusual circumstances such as visitors behaving
strangely. Moreover, ABM also assumed a duty to summon help upon
discovering injured visitors. Indeed, this is exactly what occurred when an
ABM security guard discovered the decedent approximately 22 minutes
after her fall. Thus, there is a direct relationship between ABM’s activities
at the station, providing constant video surveillance and patrols, and the
22 minute length of time decedent remained undiscovered after her fall.
Thus, ABM owed a duty of care to the decedent to notice her fall, or to
discover her after the fall and summon help. Whether ABM’s twenty-two
minute delay in doing so actually constituted a breach of that duty is an
issue of fact for trial.
Defendant TAMS Consultants owed no duty of care to decedent.
TAMS Consultants was hired by the Connecticut Department of
Transportation to perform Americans with Disabilities Act compliance
upgrades to the station in 1993. See Personal Services Agreement of June
28, 1993. TAM Consultants also upgraded the building’s HVAC system.
Murphy Dep. at 14. However, TAMS Consultants did not construct the
original guardrail at issue, which was actually part of the original
construction of the station dating to 1971. See Morris Letter. Nor did it
perform any upgrades to the guardrail. Id. at 3. These facts reveal that
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there was absolutely no direct relationship between what TAMS
Consultants did at the station, provide upgrades for ADA compliance, and
decedent’s injury, which occurred when she walked through the
unguarded gap at the edge of the platform. TAMS Consultants simply did
not undertake, by its contract or activities, to recognize or improve all
safety related hazards at the Bridgeport Train Station. Rather, TAMS
Consultants simply agreed to make the station ADA compliant. Since
decedent’s injury bears no relationship to ADA compliance, the court is
satisfied that TAMS Consultants owed no duty of care to decedent.
Having assessed each defendant’s relationship to the Bridgeport
Train Station, the court finds that the MTA, Amtrak, and TAMS
Consultants owed no duty of care to the decedent. Thus, plaintiff’s claim
against those entities fails as a matter of law, and their motions for
summary judgment will be granted. The remaining defendants, MetroNorth, Fusco, and ABM, all owed a duty of care to decedent.
The remaining defendants raise additional arguments in support of
their motions for summary judgment, such as: decedent’s own actions
were the proximate cause of her death, the hazard was open and obvious,
or that they lacked notice of the dangerous condition. But each of these
arguments raises significant issues of fact, and having reviewed the
evidence submitted, the court finds that such issues are in clear dispute.
Thus, having concluded that Metro-North, Fusco, and ABM owed a duty
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of care to decedent, the court is satisfied that the remaining elements of
plaintiffs negligence claim deserve to be presented for trial.
Conclusion
For the reasons g1ven above, the court grants the motions for
summary judgment filed by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the
National
Railroad
Passenger
Corporation
(Amtrak),
and
TAMS
Consultants, Inc. The court denies the motions for summary judgment
filed by Metro-North Railroad Company, Fusco Management Company,
LLC, and ABM Industries Inc.
This opinion and order resolves the items listed as document
numbers 173, 175, 182, and 187 in this case.
SO ORDERED
Dated: New York, New York
April 16, 2015
nesa
U.S. District Judge
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