Garber et al v. Office of the Commissioner of Baseball, Major League Baseball Enterprises Inc et al

Filing 1

COMPLAINT against Athletics Investment Group, LLC, Chicago National League Ball Club, LLC, Chicago White Sox, Ltd., Colorado Rockies Baseball Club, Ltd., Comcast Corp., Comcast Sportsnet Bay Area, L.P., Comcast Sportsnet Chicago, L.P., Comcast Sportsnet Philly, L.P., Directv LLC, Directv Sports Networks LLC, MLB Advanced Media L.P., New York Yankees Partnership, Office of the Commissioner of Baseball, lVlajor League Baseball Enterprises Inc, Pittsburgh Baseball, Inc, Root Sports Northwest, Root Sports Pittsburgh, Root Sports Rocky Mountain, San Francisco Baseball Associates, L.P., The Baseball Club of Seattle, L.P., The Phillies, L.P., Yankees Entertainment and Sports Networks, LLC. (Filing Fee $ 350.00, Receipt Number 1037774)Document filed by Robert Silver, Fernanda Garger, Marc Lerner, Derek Rasmussen.(mro)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Fernanda Garber, Marc Lerner, Derek
Rasmussen, and Robert Silver,
representing themselves and all others
similarly situated,

1
­
Civil Action No',

Plaintiffs,
v.
Office of the Commissioner of Baseball,
lVlajor League Baseball Enterprises Inc.,
MLB Advanced Media L.P., Directv LLC, .
Directv Sports Networks LLC, Root
Sports Pittsburgh, Root Sports Rocky
l\tlountain, Root Sports Northwest,
Comcast Corp., Comcast Sportsnet
Philly, L.P., Comcast Sportsnet Bay
Area, L.P., Comcast Sportsnet Chicago,
L.P., Yankees Entertainment and Sports
Networks, LLC, Athletics Investment
Group, LLC, The Baseball Club of
Seattle, L.P., Chicago National League
Ball Club, LLC, Chicago White Sox, Ltd.,
Colorado Rockies Baseball Club, Ltd.,
New York Yankees Partnership, The
Phillies, L.P., Pittsburgh Baseball, Inc.,
and San Francisco Baseball Associates,
L.P.,

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Defendants.

Plaintiffs Fernanda Garber, Marc Lerner, Derek Rasmussen, and Robert
Silver, by and through their attorneys, file this Complaint against Defendants and
allege as follows:

I.

NATURE OF THE ACTION

1.

Major League Baseball ("MLB" or "League") is comprised of thirty

separately owned and operated major league men's baseball clubs in the

nited

States and Canada. The MLB clubs, like other sports leagues, have structured their
governance to permit major decisions regarding on~field sporting competition and
off-field business competition to be made by the club owners themselves. In so
doing, the owners act in their own economic self-interest, including entering into a
series of agreements that eliminate, restrict, and prevent off-field competition.
These anti-competitive agreements go far beyond any cooperation reasonably
necessary to provide major league men's professional baseball contests that increase
fan appeal or respond to consumer preferences.
2.

This action challenges-and seeks to remedy-the defendants' use of

the illegal cartel that results from these agreements to eliminate competition in the
distribution of games over the Internet and television. Defendants have
accomplished this by agreeing to divide the live-game video presentation market
into exclusive territories, which are protected by anticompetitive blackouts. Not
only are such agreements not necessary to producing baseball contests, they are
directed at reducing competition in the live-game video presentation market,
involving and protecting third parties who operate only in that separate market.
In a 1998 complaint against the League and other clubs, the New York
Yankees conceded that the League is a cartel that has exceeded the boundaries of
necessary cooperation. (New York Yankees Partnership and Adidas America, Inc. v.
2

Major League Baseball Enterprises, Inc., et al., Case No. 98-civ-0129 (S.D.N.Y.),)
The Yankees sued when the League interfered with the Yankees' individual
licensing agreement with Adidas. As the Yankees stated in their complaint:
"Defendants operate a horizontal cartel, through which the Major League Clubs
have agreed not to compete with each other and thereby to fix prices and to reduce
output below competitive levels in the (i) professional baseball retail licensing
markets; and (ii) the professional baseball sponsorship markets." Id. at ~153. The
restraints articulated in the present complaint are no less anticompetitive or
justified as the restraints set forth in the Yankees' case against the

lea~ue.

(The

Yankees and the League reached a confidential agreement before any briefing on
the merits of the Yankees' suit.)
4.

Clubs in other sports leagues have also sued their respective leagues

on antitrust grounds, including challenges to the regional blackout system at issue
here. In 2007, Madison Square Garden, L.P., which owns the New York Rangers
Club, sued the National Hockey League to eliminate anticompetitive restraints that
are similar to those alleged in this complaint. The Rangers' complaint flatly
conceded that the NHL was a "cartel" and acknowledged that the League's
televising and streaming restrictions were anti-competitive and unlawful. (Madison

Square Garden, L.P. v. National Hockey League, et az', Case No. 07-8455 (S.D.N.Y.),
Amended Complaint ("MSG Complaint"),

~

6). After the Rangers defeated the

League's motion to dismiss the complaint, the League and the Rangers settled the
lawsuit.

3

5.

In an action brought by the Phoenix Coyotes hockey club against the

1'.llIL, the Coyotes stated, "The NHL and its members have conspired to create
exclusive television and radio broadcast rights within designated territories through
contracts with individual NHL members, thereby maintaining monopoly power
within each team's 'home territory' by preventing others from broadcasting events
within those territories." Second Amended Complaint, Coyotes Hockey LLC v. NHL,
Adv. No. 09-494 (Bankr. D. Ariz. June 5, 2009). That action was ultimately resolved
when the League obtained ownership of the Phoenix Coyotes through the club's
bankruptcy.
6.

Similarly, the Chicago Bulls sued the National Basketball Association,

"characterizing the NBA as a cartel that has slapped a limit on the output of
broadcast games, something that is illegal under the antitrust laws." Chicago

Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n, 961 F.2d 667,
669 (7th Cir. 1992). That case settled after the League agreed to allow the Bulls to
televise a greater number of games outside of its local territory.
7.

In American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201

(2010), the United States Supreme Court unanimously rejected the NFL's claim
that an agreement regarding the joint marketing of club-owned intellectual
property was the decision of a "single entity"-the league-not subject to section 1
of the Sherman Act. The Court reaffirmed lower court decisions that sports leagues
are subject to the antitrust laws and that league owners must refrain from
agreements that unreasonably restrain trade, The Court also reaffirmed its own

4

decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984), which held that the
hallmark of an unreasonable restraint is one that raises price, lowers output, or
renders output unresponsive to consumer preference. The Court's decision extended
a long line of precedents that recognize that sports leagues are subject to the
antitrust laws. Indeed, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania found over a half-century ago that television blackout agreements of
the very kind at issue in this case amount to "an unreasonable and illegal restraint
of trade." United States v. Nat'l Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 327 (E.D. Pa.
1953).
8.

The distribution of video presentations of baseball games is subject to

the antitrust laws. See Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n, Inc.,
541 F. Supp. 263 (D.C. Tex. 1982). Agreements with third parties to restrain
competition in the television and internet industry are well outside the narrow
exemption to the antitrust laws recognized in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
Nothing about these agreements reflect anything unique to baseball; they are
essentially identical to those in other major sports, and baseball itself has long
understood that broadcasting does not fall within the exemption, as has Congress.
9.

Despite these clear precedents, MLB's member clubs continue to agree

to divide the live-game video presentation market by assigning an exclusive
territory to each team and its television partners. In exchange for being granted
anticompetitive protections in its own home market, the team and its partners
expressly agree not to compete in the other teams' exclusive territories. The stated

5

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purpose of these policies is to create regional monopolies that protect the partners
from competition in their respective local areas.
10.

The only way consumers can watch video presentations of other teams

is through one of two exclusive "out-of-market" packages: "MLB.TV," which is
available through the Internet, or "MLB Extra Innings," a product similar to
MLB.TV, which the League offers through cable and satellite providers. For both
packages, the "in-market" games are blacked out to protect the local television
partner. Thus, a New York Mets fan living in New York cannot watch the }\Irets play
through the internet or television package. The fan must own a

televis~on

and

subscribe to a cable package that includes the channels that carry Mets' games.
11.

In addition, the Defendants have colluded to sell the "out of market"

packages only through the League. The League Defendants are then able to exploit
their illegal monopoly by charging supra-competitive prices. As a result of this
monopoly, moreover, the League is able to require purchasers of MLB.TV or MLB
Extra Innings to buy all "out-of-market" games of all the League's teams even if the
fan is. only interested in a particular team or a particular game. Thus, a Detroit
Tigers fan living in New York cannot watch the Tigers play, except occasional
games on network television, unless he purchases the entire package of League
games from the MLB's exclusive MLB.TV or 1vILB Extra Innings products.
12.

As one set of commentators has put it, "Absent the exclusive territorial

arrangements agreed to by league owners, individual teams would ... arrange for
their own games to be available out-of-market.... Fans wishing to see only their

6

favorite team now pay for more games than they want, so sports leagues are
currently using their monopoly power to effectuate a huge wealth transfer. Another
significant group of less fanatic consumers would be willing to pay a more modest
sum for their favorite teams' games only. As to these fans, the current scheme
reduces output." Stephen F. Ross & Stefan Szymanski, Fans of the World Unite!
(Stanford Univ. 2008).
13.

As MSG/New York Rangers stated in its antitrust complaint against

the NHL: "There are no legitimate, procompetitive justifications for these 'exclusive'
agreements and other competitive restraints, which have harmed cons~mers in
various ways .... " (MSG Complaint, ,-r 46). In particular, as MSG stated, these
restraints result in "reduced output, diminished product quality, diminished choice
and suppressed price competition." (ld. at ,-r45).
·14.

These restraints are not reasonably necessary to maintain a level of

competitive balance within the League that fans prefer, or to maintain the viability
of franchises. To the extent that competition among teams for internet or television
rights would result in revenue disparities that preclude a fan-optimal level of
competitive balance, agreements that require revenue sharing, if set at levels that
do not restrict output, is an obvious and well-recognized less restrictive alternative,
and one that baseball already employs.
15.

Plaintiffs are individuals who were, and continue to be, harmed by the

Defendants' anti-competitive agreements. They have either (1) purchased a cable
package that includes a network that is protected from competition and therefore is

7

overpriced or (2) purchased an "out-of-market" package (either online or through
their television provider) that is overpriced because of these unlawful agreements.
The Plaintiffs seek to restore off-field competition among and between the clubs and
their partners by ending the Defendants' collusive distribution agreements.

II.
PARTIES

A.

The Plaintiffs

16.

Plaintiff Fernanda Garber now lives in Burlingame, California. From

2009 through March 2011, she subscribed to Comcast cable service in Oakland,

California. Her service included Comcast Sportsnet California and Comcast
Sportsnet Bay Area. She was charged supra-competitive prices for her service due
to Defendants' conduct.
17.

Plaintiff Marc Lerner lives in Oxford, IVlississippi. Mr. Lerner

subscribed to the J\1LB.tv Internet streaming package in July 2011 for the 2011
season. His favorite team is the New York Yankees. He would prefer not to be
required to purchase a full "out-of-market" package to get New York Yankees
games, and would prefer not to have to subscribe to pay television to be able to
watch New York Yankees games involving the St. Louis Cardinals, Cincinnati Reds,
and Atlanta Braves, all of which are blacked out on MLB.tv in Oxford, Mississippi.
He was charged supra-competitive prices for his service due to Defendants' conduct.
18.

Plaintiff Derek Rasmussen lives in Fort Wayne, Indiana. He

subscribed to the JlvlLB.tv Internet streaming package during the 2011 season. His
favorite team is the Milwaukee Brewers. He would prefer not to be requil'ed to
8

purchase a full

"out~of-market"

package to get Milwaukee Brewers games.

Milwaukee Brewers games are blacked out in Fort Wayne when they play the
Detroit Tigers, Chicago Cubs, Chicago White Sox, and Cincinnati Reds. He was
charged

supra~competitive

19.

prices for his service due to Defendants' conduct.

Plaintiff Robert Silver lives in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Until 2010,

he subscribed to Directv satellite service and received channels carrying live
professional baseball games not available on a sponsored telecast. He was charged
supra-competitive prices for his service due to Defendants' conduct.

B.

The League Defendants

20.

The Office of the Commissioner of Baseball is an unincorporated

association also doing business as Major League Baseball ("MLB" or "the League")
and has as its members the 1Vlajor League Baseball Clubs. MLB's principal place of
business at 245 Park Ave, New York, New York. It is the most significant provider
of major league men's professional baseball games in the world.
21.

Each team, or club, that is a member of the MLB is a separate and

independent business with a separate and independent owner and significant
autonomy in its business operations. The teams cooperate to schedule and produce
baseball games and facilitate competition on the field, but the clubs compete off the
field in their businesses. The clubs compete with each other for the acquisition of
players, coaches, and management personal. They set their own prices for the sale
of tickets for attending games in person. The clubs also compete in the developing,
licensing, and marketing of their respective marks for various purposes.

9

22.

Defendant Major League Baseball Enterprises, Inc. ("MLB

Enterprises") is a New York corporation with its principal place of business in New
York, New York.
23.

Defendants MLB Advanced Media, L.P., a Delaware limited

partnership, and MLB Advanced Media, Inc., a Delaware corporation, have their
principal place of business at 75 Ninth Avenue, New York, New York ("MLB
Advanced Media"). MLB Advanced Media is ultimately owned and controlled by
IVILB and the MLB member clubs.
24.

MLB, MLB Enterprises, and MLB Advanced Media are cop-ectively

referred to herein as "the !ViLB Defendants" or "the League."

. C.
25.

The MLB Club Defendants
The member clubs of the MLB that are named as defendants are:
a.

Athletics Investment Group, LLC, is a California limited

partnership and owns and operates the Oakland Athletics .
.b.

The Baseball Club of Seattle, L.P., is a Washington limited

partnership and owns and operates the Seattle Mariners.
c.

Chicago National League Ball Club, LLC, is a Delaware

corporation and owns and operates the Chicago Cubs.
d.

Chicago White Sox, Ltd., is an illinois limited partnership and

owns and operates the Chicago White Sox.
e.

Colorado Rockies Baseball Club, Ltd., is a Colorado limited

partnership and owns and operates the Colorado Rockies.

10

f.

New York Yankees Partnership is an Ohio limited partnership

and owns and operates the New York Yankees.
The Phillies, L.P., is a Pennsylvania limited partnership and
owns and operates the Philadelphia Phillies.
h.

Pittsburgh Baseball, Inc. is a Pennsylvania corporation and

owns and operates the Pittsburgh Pirates. Pittsburgh Baseball, Inc. is a subsidiary
of Pittsburgh Baseball Holdings, Inc.
1.

San Francisco Baseball Associates, L.P. is a California limited

partnership and owns and operates the San Francisco Giants.
26.

The defendants identified in the preceding paragraph are collectively

referred to as "the Clubs" or "MLB Club Defendants."

.D.

Other MLB Clubs
a.

Angels

Baseball~

L.P., is a California corporation and owns and

operates the Los Angeles Angels.
b.

Arizona Diamondbacks is a Delaware limited partnership and

owns and operates the Arizona Diamondbacks.
c.

Atlanta National League Baseball Club, Inc., is a Georgia

Corporation and own and operates the Atlanta Braves. The Atlanta National
League Baseball Club is a subsidiary of Liberty Media LLC, which in turn is a
subsidiary of Liberty Media Corporation.
Baltimore Orioles, L.P., is a Maryland partnership and owns
and operates the Baltimore Orioles,

11

e.

Boston Red Sox Baseball Club, L. P., is a Massachusetts limited

partnership and owns and operates the Boston Red Sox.

f.

Cleveland Indians Baseball Company, Inc., is an Ohio

corporation and owns and operates the Cleveland Indians.
g.

Detroit Tigers, Inc., is a Michigan corporation and owns and

operates the Detroit Tigers.
h.

Florida Marlins, L.P., is a Florida limited partnership and owns

and operates the Florida Marlins.
1.

Houston McLane Company, Inc. is a Texas corporation and owns

and operates the Houston Astros.
J.

Kansas City Royals Baseball Corporation is a Missouri

corporation and owns and operates the Kansas City Royals.
k.

Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc., is a Delaware corporation and owns

and operates the Los Angeles Dodgers. On or about May 1, 2012, it was purchased
by Guggenheim Baseball Management, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership.
1.

Milwaukee Brewers Baseball Club, Inc., is a Wisconsin

corporation and owns and operates the IVlilwaukee Brewers.
m.

Minnesota Twins, LLC, is a IYlinnesota corporation and owns

and operates the Minnesota Twins.
n.

Padres, L.P., is a Delaware limited partnership and owns and

operates the San Diego Padres.

12

o.

Rangers Baseball Express LLC is a Delaware corporation and

owns and operates the Texas Rangers.
p.

Reds Baseball Partners, LLC, is an Ohio corporation and owns

and operates the Cincinnati Reds.
q.

St. Louis Cardinals, L.P., is a Missouri corporation and owns

and operates the St. Louis Cardinals.
r.

Sterling Mets, L.P., is a Delaware corporation and owns and

operates the New York Mets. Sterling Mets, L.P. is a subsidiary of Sterling
Equities, Inc.
s.

Tampa Bay Devil Rays, Ltd., is a Florida limited partnership

and owns and operates the Tampa Bay Rays.

t.

Toronto Blue Jays Baseball Club is a subsidiary of Rogers

Communications Inc., a Canadian corporation, and is located at 1 Blue Jays Way,
Rogers Centre, Toronto, Ontario.
u.

Washington Nationals, L.P., is a Delaware partnership and

owns and operates the Washington Nationals.

E.

The Television Defendants

27.

Defendant Directv, LLC, is a Delaware corporation whose principal

place of business is 2230 East Imperial Highway, El Segundo, California. Directv
and its subsidiaries provide satellite television service ("DBS") throughout the
United States.

13

28.

Defendant Directv Sports Networks LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary

controlled by Directv, is a Delaware limited liability company, whose principal place
of business is 2230 East Imperial Highway, EI Segundo, California.
29.

Defendant Root Sports Pittsburgh, alk/a "Directv Sports Net

Pittsburgh LLC," Defendant Root Sports Rocky Mountain, alkla "Directv Sports Net
Rocky Mountain LLC," and Defendant Root Sports Northwest alk/a "Directv Sports
Net Northwest LLC," are Delaware limited liability companies whose principal
place of business is 2230 East Imperial Highway, EI Segundo, California. Root
Sports Pittsburgh, Root Sports Rocky Mountain, and Root Sports NortI:-west are
wholly-owned subsidiaries of, and are controlled by, Directv and/or Directv Sports
Networks LLC. Root Sports Pittsburgh is a regional sports network that produces
and distributes video presentations for the Pittsburgh Pirates. Root Sports Rocky
1\lountain produces and distributes video presentations for the Colorado Rockies.
Root Sports Northwest produces and distributes video presentations for the Seattle
Mariners.
30.

Defendant Comcast Corporation ("Comcast") is a Pennsylvania

corporation whose principal place of business is 1701 John F. Kennedy Boulevard,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Comcast owns and operates cable systems throughout
the United States.
31.

Comcast owns and controls Comcast Sportsnet Defendants, which

include:

14

a.

Comcast Sportsnet Philly, L.P, located at 3601 South Broad

Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, a Regional Sports Network ("RSN'), which
produces and distributes video presentations for the Philadelphia Phillies;
b.

Comcast Sportsnet Bay Area, L.P., located at 370 3rd Street,

2nd Floor, San Francisco, California, which produces and distributes video
presentations for San Francisco Giants and Oakland Athletics through Comcast
Sportsnet Bay Al'ea and Comcast Sportsnet California;
c.

Comcast Sportsnet Chicago, L.P., located at 350 N. Orleans

Street, Suite Sl-100, Chicago, Illinois, which produces and distributes video
presentations for the Chicago Cubs and Chicago White Sox.
32.

Defendant Yankees Entertainment and Sports Networks, LLC ("YES")

is located at 405 Lexington Ave, 36th Floor, New York, New York. YES produces and
presents New York Yankees games.

F.

Other Relevant Entities

33.

Fox Sports Net, Inc., a subsidiary of News Corporation, owns and

controls a number of regional sports networks engaged in producing and presenting
Major League Baseball games and which are part of the conspiracy to divide the live
baseball video market:
a.

Fox Sports West and Prime Ticket are RSNs that carry Los

Angeles Angels and Los Angeles Dodgers games.
b.

Fox Sports Ohio carries Cincinnati Reds games.

c.

Fox Sports Southwest carries Texas Rangers games.

d.

Fox Sports South and SportSouth carry Atlanta Braves games.
15

e.

Fox Sports Houston carries Houston Astros games.

£.

Fox Sports Detroit carries Detroit Tigers games.

g.

Fox Sports Florida carries Florida Marlins games.

h.

Fox Sports North carriesl\iinnesota Twins games.

L

Fox Sports Ariwna carries Phoenix Diamondbacks games.

J.

Fox Sports Kansas City carries Kansas City Royals games.

k.

Fox Sports Midwest carries St. Louis Cardinals games.

1.

Fox Sports Wisconsin carries Milwaukee Brewers games.

m.

Sun Sports carries Tampa Bay Rays games.

n.

Fox Sports San Diego carries San Diego Padres games beginning

in 2012 (previously Channel 4 San Diego carried these games).
34.

Other RSNs carrying professional baseball games in the United States

include:
a.

New England Sports Network ("NESN"); which carries Boston

Red Sox games;
b.

Mid-Atlantic Sports Network ("MASN'), which carries Baltimore

Orioles and Washington Nationals games;
c.
d.
35.

Sportsnet New York, which carries New York 1\1ets games;
Sportstime Ohio, which carries Cleveland Indians games.

A few games of some teams are carried by local, over-the-air channels.

One of these is WGN-TV, a local Chicago television station that carries a minority of
both Chicago White Sox and Chicago Cubs games. These games are carried

16

nationwide on the WGN "superstation." WGN is the last of the superstations-Iocal
channels distributed nationwide through cable and satellite-to carry Major League
Baseball games. Major League Baseball demands payment of a fee to the league,
which is distributed to the other teams, to compensate them for facing this limited
competition. WGN presentations are typically blacked out in the local market of the
other (non-Chicago) team.
36.

Turner Broadcast System ("TBS") is a nationwide cable and satellite

television channel that carries Major League Baseball games nationwide. In the
regular season, those presentations are typically blacked out in the loca,l markets of
the teams involved in the game being presented.
37.

ESPN is a nationwide cable and satellite television channel that

carries Major League Baseball games nationwide. Certain of its video presentations
are exclusive for a given period of time, during which other networks may not show
any other game, regardless oflocation. Other games are not exclusive, with
blackout rules governed by Defendants' agreements designed to limit competition in
the market.
38.

Fox Broadcasting Company is an over-the-air television network that

carries Major League Baseball games nationwide. Most of these games are subject
to a nationwide exclusivity for a given period of time, which prevents the
presentation of any non-Fox games in any market.

17

III.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
39.

Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and as a class

action under the provisions of Rule 23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure on behalf of all persons in the United States (excluding Defendants,
their present and former parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, and Co-Conspirators, the
named Plaintiffs, and government entities) who fall within the following classes:
a.

Television Class: All individuals who purchased television

service from Directv and/or Comcast, or their subsidiaries, at any time within four
years prior to the filing of this complaint and until the effects of the anticompetitive conduct end, that included channels carrying video presentations of live
major league baseball games that were not available through a sponsored telecast
(as that term is used by the Sports Broadcasting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1291, et seq.).
b.

Internet Class: All individuals who purchased IvILB.tv in the

United States directly from any of the League Defendants or their subsidiaries at
any time within four years prior to the filing of this complaint and until the effects
of the anti-competitive conduct end.
40.

Due to the nature of the trade and commerce involved, Plaintiffs

believe that each class consists of at least many thousands of members, the exact
numher and their identitiesbeing known to Defendants and their co-conspirators.
41.

The Classes are so numerous and geographically dispersed that joinder

of all members is impracticable.

18

42.

There are questions of law and fact common to the Class, including:
a.

Whether MLB Defendants and their Co-Conspirators engaged in

a contract, combination, or conspiracy among themselves to fIx, raise, maintain or
stabilize prices of video presentations of live MLB games by blacking out potentially
competing presentations of MLB games;
b.

Whether Defendants and their co-conspirators engaged in a

contract, combination, or conspiracy among themselves to fIx, raise, maintain or
stabilize prices of MLB Extra Innings by preventing any competitor from offering
competing products;
c.

Whether Defendants and their co-conspirators engaged in a

contract, combination, or conspiracy among themselves to fix, raise, maintain or
stabilize prices of presentations ofMLB.tv by preventing any competitor from
offering competing products;
d.

The effect of Defendants' conspiracy on the prices of MLB.tv and

MLE Extra Innings in the United States during the class period;
e.

The effect of Defendants' conspiracy on the prices pay television

packages that include MLB games that are not available on a sponsored telecast;
f.

The identity of the participants of the conspiracy;

g.

The duration of the conspiracy alleged herein and the acts

performed by Defendants and their co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy;
h.

\\llether the alleged conspiracy violated Section 1 of the

Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1;

19

1.

Whether the alleged conspiracy violated Section 2 of the

Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2;
].

Whether the conduct of Defendants and their co-conspirators, as

alleged in this complaint, caused injury to the Plaintiffs and the other members of
the Classes;
k.
43.

The appropriate class-wide measure of damages.

Plaintiff Fernanda Garber was, during the class period, a subscriber to

pay television service provided by Comcast, which included channels carrying MLB
games that are not available on a sponsored telecast. Her claims are typical of the
claims of the Television Class members, and Ms. Garber will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of that Class.
44.

Plaintiff Robert Silver was a subscriber to pay television service

provided by Directv, which included channels carrying MLB games that are not
available on a sponsored telecast. His claims are typical of the claims of the
Television Class members, and Mr. Silver will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the Television Class.
45.

Plaintiffs lVlarc Lerner and Derek Rasmussen are direct purchasers of

MLB.TV. Their claims are typical of the claims of the Internet Class members, and
they will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class.
46.

Plaintiffs are represented by counsel who are competent and

experienced in the prosecution of antitrust and class action litigation.

20

47.

Given the high cost of establishing that the Defendants' agreements

violated the antitrust laws (including, but not limited to, substantial expert witness
costs and attorneys' fees), a class action is the only economically feasible means for
any plaintiffs to enforce his or her statutory rights.
48.

The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the

Classes would also create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications,

establishing incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants.

49.

The questions of law and fact common to the members of the Classes

predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, including legal
and factual issues relating to liability and damages.
. 50.

A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and

efficient adjudication of this controversy. The Classes are readily definable and is
one for which records should exist. Prosecution as a class action will eliminate the
. possibility of repetitious litigation. Treatment as a class action will permit a large
number of similarly situated persons to adjudicate their common claims in a single
forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the duplication of effort and expense
that numerous individual actions would engender. This class action presents no
difficulties in management that would preclude maintenance as a class action.
IV.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE
5L

Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Section 16 of the Clayton Act

(15 U.S.C. §26), for a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § L This

21

Court has subject matter jurisdiction over that claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331
and 1337.
52.

Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 and 15 U.S.C. § 22. The

Defendants transact business in this district, and are subject to personal
jurisdiction in this district.
53.

Class members were injured in this district.

V.

TRADE AND COMMERCE

54.

Major league men's professional baseball has attributes that are

attractive to sports fans that set it apart from other sports or leisure activities.
Close substitutes do not exist. Watching (or participating as a fan in) major league
baseball cannot be reasonably interchanged with watching (or participating as a fan
in) other sports or other leisure activities.
55.

The provision of major league baseball contests in North America is a

relevant productiservice market. This market is characterized by high barriers to
entry. Major League Baseball has market power as it is the only and dominant,
provider of this product/service. MLB, acting through and in combination with the
separate and independent clubs, also exercises market power through the exclusive
license agreements and the other unnecessary and unjustified restraints on each
club's competitive activities that are the subject of this complaint.
56.

Most importantly for this action, there is a relevant market for live

video presentations of major league baseball games over media such as cable and
satellite television and the Internet. MLB's dominance in the production of major
22

league baseball games in the United States gives it the ability, together with its
television partners, to exercise market power in the market for live video
presentations of MLB games.
57.

The relevant geographic market consists of North America, including

the United States. Various geographic submarkets also may exist.
58.

Defendants' conduct complained of herein has taken place in and

affected, and directly, substantially, and foreseeably restrained, the interstate and
foreign trade and commerce of the United States, by, inter alia, the interstate and
foreign distribution of video ofMLB games.
VI.

FACTS RELEVANT TO PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS
A.

The Anticompetitive Exclusive License Agreements.

59.

It has been long recognized that MLB clubs, like the member clubs of

all professional sports leagues, must cooperate to define, schedule, and produce
league contests. That limited cooperation is fully consistent with the antitrust laws.
But the member clubs continue to exist as separate businesses with separate
owners that retain significant degrees of autonomy in their operations. In these
operations, the clubs compete in business matters that are separate and distinct
from the facilitation of baseball games.
60.

Pursuant to a series of agreements between and among Defendants,

the League has obtained centralized control over distribution of live video
programming of MLB games. As described more fully below, as a result of these

23

agreements, the clubs have agreed not to compete in business matters related to the
video presentation of live major-league professional baseball games.
61.

The majority of MLB games are televised pursuant to contracts

entered into by the individual clubs with separate entities, primarily RSNs,
including Root Sports, various regional Comcast Sportsnets, and others.
62.

A smaller number of presentations are produced pursuant to national

agreements between the League and a national entity, including ESPN and TBS,
which require a subscription to a pay-television service, and Fox Broadcasting, an
over-the-air network. The League also owns its own channel, the MLB ,Network,
which televises nationally through certain cable and satellite providers.
1.

63.

Regional Blackout System

At the core of Defendants' restraint of competition in the video

programming market are the regional blackout agreements. The purpose and effect
of these agreements is to divide the market geographically, permitting only the
video presentations of a local team's television partner to be shown in that team's
"exclusive territory." The member clubs, through the League, have agreed that they
will not permit their television partners to compete with other member clubs'
partners. Each team's partner has a monopoly in its exclusive territory, except in
those cities where two teams are located. Only in one the four such locations-New
York City-are there two independent RSNs carrying major league baseball games.
64.

The purpose of these restrictions is to restrain competition by

protecting the local television telecasters of each MLB game in the local markets of

24

the teams. "Blackouts protect the local rights holders .... "
http://support.directv.com/app/answers/detail/a_idI17231723.
·65.

Defendants Comcast and Directv have joined the conspiracy by

agreeing to enforce and maintain these anticompetitive restrictions.
66.

The result of these agreements is a classic, horizontal, geographical

market division. In the absence of a separate out-of-market package or a national
telecast (both are discussed below), a consumer of video presentations of live major
league baseball is required to purchase the video presentation provided by the
consumers' local team.
67.

In the absence of these restrictions, fans would have access to live

video from teams throughout the United States and Canada. The availability of
multiple sources of major-league professional baseball programming would result in
competition among the Defendants, which would lower prices and increase choice
for consumers.

2.

68.

Implementation of the Blackout System
through Agreements Restraining
Competition Among Sports Networks

The clubs implement their system of exclusive territories through a

system of agreements with regional networks. These agreements require the
networks to agree not to compete with other regional networks in the presentation
of televised MLB games.
69.

The networks (and their corporate parents) agree to these

requirements knowing that other networks must agree not to compete in their

25

territories. The result is a horizontal division of the market that is enforced by the
horizontal agreement between the Defendants.
70.

In each case, the local television network (and the entity that controls

that network) agrees with the League and member clubs that it will not permit its
presentations of the games to be shown in areas outside of its exclusive territory,
knowing that other networks will likewise agree not to compete in their exclusive
home territory. The League and the network also agree that the network will not
carry games of other teams outside their territory.
71.

The Regional Sports Networks (RSNs) enter agreements 'Yith

multichannel video programming distributers (MV'"PDs), like defendants Comcast
and Directv, to implement the blackouts. But·for these agreements, the MPVDs
would facilitate "foreign" RSN entry and other forms of competition.
72.

The result is that each local network has a monopoly on live televised

baseball games in its exclusive territory. (This is true even in Chicago, Los Angeles,
and the Bay iuea, each of which has two teams that are carried by the RSNs with
the same owners. Only New York is not a pure monopoly, as RSNs carrying the
New York Yankees and New York Mets operate as a duopoly in that market). In
certain cases, the outer areas of a team's territory may overlap with another team's
or teams' territories, permitting a viewer to watch either team's games, if they are
available, and subjecting the viewer to local blackouts of all such teams games.
73.

These express restrictions on competition have made local sports

networks extremely valuable. The Federal Communications Commission has

26

repeatedly described RSNs as the clearest example of "must-have" channels because
of their exclusive control of sports programming. See, e.g., In re A.T&T Servs., Inc.,
FCC 11-168, 2011 WL 5534853, *3 (Nov. 10, 2011). In upholding FCC rules
designed to ensure that RSNs are not used to unfairly harm competition in the
rv[VPD market, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed that
this control of sports programming made RSNs "'must have' and nonreplicable."

Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. FCC, 649 F.3d 695, 702 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
74.

These restrictions have the purpose and effect of creating a series of

regional monopolies in order to increase the price that can be charged by the teams,
the television networks, and television distributers like Comcast and Directv.
Plaintiffs and all purchasers of video programming that include these networks
consequently pay higher prices for television services that include presentations of
major league professional baseball games.

B.

"Out-of Market" Packages

75.

With very limited exceptions, for a consumer to obtain out-of-market

games, there are only two options, both of which, as a consequence of agreements by
and among the member clubs, are controlled by the League: MLB.TV, which is
streamed over the Internet and is available only through the league; and MLB
Extra Innings, which is a similar service available only through cable and other
television distributors, including Directv.
76.

The League defines these products as "out-of-market" packages, and

games from outside of a protected territory as "out-of-market" games. "In-market"

27

and "out-of-market" are terms defined by reference to the anticompetitive
geographical restrictions imposed by Defendants and their co-conspirators.
77.

The League provides MLB.TV over the Internet directly to the

consumer. For 2011, the cost for MLB.TV was $99.99 for the season ($19.99 on a
monthly basis), or $119.99 for a premium subscription ($24.99 monthly), which
allows fans to obtain both home and away broadcasts.
78.

For most games, MLB.TV offers both the "home" and "away" feeds-a

feature the League actively markets-but the other team's feed is never available in
a game involving a local team. These "in-market" games are blacked out. Nationally
televised games are blacked out in the United States as a whole, and viewers
located in a team's exclusive territory are blacked out from all presentations of a
game involving the local team or teams.
79.

As the League explains on its website: "All live games on MLB.TV and

available through MLB.com Gameday Audio are subject to local blackouts. Such live
games will be blacked out in each applicable Club's home television territory,
regardless of whether that Club is playing at home or away. If a game is blacked out
in an area, it is not available for live game viewing."
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlblhelp/fa<Lsubscriptions .jsp#q 10
80.

The League offers MLB.TV as all-or-nothing. Purchasers ofMLB.TV

must buy all out-of-market games for all teams even if they are only interested in
watching the games of a particular team. They must choose to purchase at least one
month's games at a time.

28

81.

The clubs' horizontal elimination of competition for online streaming of

baseball games raises prices and reduces consumer welfare.
82.

Because of these restrictions on competition, there is no way for a

consumer to obtain live, internet-streaming of games involving a team from within
the exclusive territory of that team, with only very limited exceptions. No one in
New York, for example, has access to any live presentation of a contest involving
the Mets over the Internet, despite the fact that Mets' contests are routinely
streamed over the Internet to consumers elsewhere, and no additional cost would be
incurred by permitting Mets' games to be viewed by New York baseba~ fans. The
sole reason for this restriction is to interfere with competition.
83.

By agreement of the clubs, MLB.TV is the exclusive distributer of

nearly all live and recorded MLB games in the United States.
84.

ESPN has streamed certain games over its own Internet service, but

only where it already had the exclusive right to distribute that game, preventing
such streaming from competing with any other provider.
85.

Teams are prohibited from streaming their own games, even within

their own exclusive territories, unless they enter into a separate agreement with the
league that prevents any potential competition with other providers.
86.

The New York Yankees, through its television partner, the 'YES

Network, provide in-market streams, but only to consumers who already subscribe
to the YES Network through their television provider, and consumers are required

29

to pay an additional fee for this service. These restrictions serve to prevent any
competitive effects.
87.

Because the League is the only source of such programming, it is able

to charge monopoly pricing and limit the choices available to consumers. The
inevitable consequence is higher pricing, lower quality, less choice to consumers,
and lower output.
88.

MLB Extra Innings is similar to MLB.TV, but is available by satellite

through Directv and Dish Network, as well as through most cable companies
through In Demand, whose majority owner is Comcast. The price for

t~e

service for

the 2011 season was approximately $200.
89.

As with MLB.TV, all MLB Extra Innings games involving a team

whose exclusive territory encompasses the viewer's location are blacked out from
Extra Innings, regardless of whether the game is being held locally, and regardless
of whether the game is available to the viewer through a different network. The sole
purpose of these restrictions is to protect the local network from competition.
90.

As the parent company of the New York Rangers stated in objecting,

on antitrust grounds, to analogous packages for the National Hockey League, "the
clubs' horizontal elimination of competition against that package-given the
distinct market for professional ice hockey broadcasts-produces higher prices and
reduced consumer welfare." PI. Mem. Opp. Mot. Dismiss at 30, Madison Square

Garden, L.P. v. Nat'l Hockey League, No, 07-8455 (S.D.N.Y.). The same is true of
baseball.

30

91.

Defendants have restrained and threatened to restrain competition in

the carrying of games, seeking to control the delivery ofcontent through all media
platforms in ways that go beyond what is reasonably necessary to the production of
baseball contests or to the success of Major League Baseball.

C.

The Agreements Have Restrained Horizontal Competition and
Have Had Anticompetitive Effects and Led To Consumer Harm.

92.

The above-described agreements have restrained horizontal

competition between and among the MLB clubs and the MLB, including in the
commercial exploitation of video presentations of live games where the member
clubs could and would compete with each other. In particular, in the ab'sence of the
exclusive licenses and other competitive restraints, MLB clubs would co~pete with
each other in the presentation of their teams' games to a much greater extent than
the limited opportunities that are now available.
93.

The above-described agreements have adversely affected and

substantially lessened competition in the relevant markets. Output of presentations
of live MLB games, as well as output of game highlights and footage, is lower, and
prices are higher, than they would be in the absence of the agreements to restrict
competition. Moreover, output is unresponsive to consumer preference to view live
MLB games, including local games, through both Internet and television media.
94.

Competition by individual clubs independently acting to exploit the

distribution of their teams' games would produce consumer benefits, such as an
increase in the availability oflive video presentations over a wider range of media,
including cable, the internet and wireless devices.

31

95.

The above-described agreements do not concern matters of league

structure and do not concern any unique characteristic or need of baseball
exhibitions. These anticompetitive restraints are not necessary to the exhibition of
baseball and are not integral to the sport itself.
96.

Teams in Major League Baseball, like teams in other major sports

leagues 1 have made attempts to compete in the live video market outside of their
prescribed territories. As noted, the Chicago Cubs and Chicago White Sox continue
to carry a number of games on the WGN superstation. The League has waged a
campaign to limit the availability of games carried on a superstation, and has been
largely successful; at one time, at least four other teams' games were available
outside of their home markets on superstations. Now, the league levies a
substantial "tax" on superstations to ensure that other teams and their television
partners are compensated for the "harm" they suffer due to facing marketplace
competition.
9?

In the NHL, the parent company of the New York Rangers went so far

as to sue the league to challenge these limitations, acknowledging that in absence of
such restrictions, "[t]he teams would compete with each other in the broadcasting"
of NHL hockey games. (!VISG Complaint, , 42),
98.

The Chicago Bulls sued the National Basketball Association

challenging its rules limiting superstation presentations of live games. That case
ultimately settled when the parties agreed to permit the Bulls to carry a greater,
but still limited, number of games outside of the Chicago area.

32

99.

There are no legitimate, pro-competitive justifications for these

exclusive license agreements and other competitive restraints, which have harmed
consumers in various ways, including in the above-described ways.

D.

Plaintiffs' Have Suffered Antitrust Injury.

100.

Plaintiffs have been ovm'charged for the video presentation oflive MLB

games.
101.

Subscribers to pay-television service with standard channel packages

have been forced and will continue to be forced to overpay for their television service
because of the inclusion of sports networks that commands supra-competitive
pricing. Subscribers suffer this overpayment even if they do not watch sports
programming. See, e.g., Brian Stetler and Amy Chozick, Paying a 'Sports Tax,} Even

if Yo~ Don't Watch, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com
120l1/12/16fbusiness/media/for-pay-tv-clients-a-steady-diet-of-sports.htmL
102.

Subscribers to MLB Extra Innings have been forced and will continue

to be forced to overpay for "out-of-market" games because of the lack of competition
created by the geographical exclusivity system.
103.

Subscribers to MLB. TV have been forced and will continue to be forced

to overpay for Internet-delivered games and have been and will continue to be
forced to purchase Internet-delivered games in a bundle of all such games (other
than those blacked out), despite the fact that, in the absence of collusive
agreements, individual games and individual teams' games would be available at
substantially lower prices.

33

.104,

Plaintiffs have been and will continue to be prevented from obtaining

Internet-delivered videos of the games involving local teams.
105.

Plaintiffs have been and will continue to be prevented from obtaining

games involving a local team from any source other than the team's RSN partner,
which typically requires the purchase of a full pay-television subscription, including
tens or hundreds of other channels Plaintiffs may not want.
106.

Individual teams and their media partners are restrained from

distributing their games through cable, satellite, Internet and otherwise in ways
that they may determine are best suited to reaching their respective and potential
fan bases throughout the country and abroad.

VII.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
COUNT ONE

VIOLATION OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT

On Behalf of the Television Class

107.

Plaintiffs Garber and Silver, on behalf of themselves and the

Television Class, incorporate and reallege, as though fully set forth herein, each and
every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.
108.

Beginning at a time presently unknown to Plaintiffs, and continuing

through the present, the exact dates being unknown to Plaintiffs, Defendants and
their co-conspirators entered into a continuing agreement, combination or
conspiracy in restraint of trade with the purpose, intent, and effect of restraining
horizontal competition among the MLB member clubs and their television partners,
and between the clubs and the MLB, with the purpose, intent, and effect of
34

restraining trade and commerce in the distribution of major league professional
baseball games, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.
109.

The contract, combination or conspiracy has resulted in an agreement,

understanding, or concerted action between and among the Defendants and their
co-conspirators that regular season games will only be carried within a team's
protected geographical territory ("in-market games"). The agreement forbids the
carrying or online streaming of any MLB game in any geographic market except
those licensed by the MLB team in that geographical market.
110.

The contract, combination, or conspiracy has restrained C<?mpetition

between and among the Defendants in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. It
has led to anticompetitive effects in the relevant markets, as alleged above, and
caused injury to consumers and competition in those relevant markets and
elsewhere.
111.

The Defendants' contract, combination, agreement, understanding or

concerted action with the co-conspirators occurred in or affected interstate
commerce. The Defendants' unlawful conduct was through mutual understandings,
combinations or agreements by, between and among the Defendants and other
unnamed co-conspirators. These other co-conspirators have either acted willingly or,
due to coercion, unwillingly in furtherance of the unlawful restraint of trade alleged
herein.
112.

Defendants' anticompetitive conduct has directly and proximately

caused antitrust injury, in the form of higher prices and reduced choice, as set forth

35

above. Plaintiffs and other consumers win continue to suffer antitrust injury and
other ,damage unless Defendants are enjoined from continuing to engage in the
foregoing violations of law.

COUNT TWO

VIOLATION OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT

On Behalf of the Television Class

113.

Plaintiffs Garber and Silver, on behalf of themselves and the

Television Class, incorporate and reallege, as though fully set forth herein, each and
every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.
114.

Beginning at a time presently unknown to Plaintiffs, and continuing

through the present, the exact dates being unknown to Plaintiffs, Defendants and
their co-conspirators entered into a continuing agreement, combination or
conspiracy in restraint of trade with the purpose, intent, and effect of restraining
horizontal competition among the MLB member clubs and their television partners,
and between the clubs and the MLB, with the purpose, intent, and effect of
restraining trade and commerce in the distribution of major league professional
baseball games, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S. C. §
'115.

The contract, combination or conspiracy has resulted in an agreement,

understanding, or concerted action between and among the Defendants and their
co-conspirators that the League will be the exclusive provider of live "out-of-market"
games distributed through television providers. The Defendants and their co­
conspirators have agreed that no club or television partner will offer a competing

36

product, or make their programming available within another team's exclusive
territory.
116.

The contract, combination, or conspiracy has restrained competition

between and among the Defendants in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. It
has led to anticompetitive effects in the relevant markets, as alleged above, and
caused injury to consumers and competition in those relevant markets and
elsewhere.
117.

The Defendants' contract, combination, agreement, understanding or

concerted action with the co-conspirators occurred in or affected interstate
commerce. The Defendants' unlawful conduct was through mutual understandings,
combinations or agreements by, between and among the Defendants and other
unnamed co-conspirators. These other co-conspirators have either acted willingly or,
due to coercion, unwillingly in furtherance of the unlawful restraint of trade alleged
herein.
118.

Defendants' anticompetitive conduct has directly and proximately

caused antitrust injury, in the form of higher prices and reduced choice, as set forth
above. Plaintiffs and other consumers will continue to suffer antitrust injury and
other damage unless Defendants are enjoined from continuing to engage in the
foregoing violations oflaw.

37

COUNT THREE

VIOLATION OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT

On Behalf of the Internet Class

. 119.

Plaintiffs Lerner and Rasmussen, on behalf of themselves and the

Internet Class, incorporate and reallege, as though fully set forth herein, each and
every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.
120.

Beginning at a time presently unknown to Plaintiffs, and continuing

through the present, the exact dates being unknown to Plaintiffs, Defendants and
their co-conspirators entered into a continuing agreement, combination or
conspiracy in restraint of trade with the purpose, intent, and effect of restraining
horizontal competition among the MLB member clubs and their television partners,
and between the clubs and the MLB, with the purpose, intent, and effect of
restraining trade and commerce in the distribution of major league professional
baseball games, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1.
121.

The contract, combination or conspiracy has resulted in an agreement,

understanding, or concerted action between and among the Defendants and their
co-conspirators that the League will be the exclusive provider of live "out-of-market"
games over the Internet. The Defendants and their co-conspirators have agreed that
no club or television partner will offer a competing product, or make their
presentation of games over the internet available within another team's exclusive
territory.
122.

The contract, combination, or conspiracy has restrained competition

between and among the Defendants in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. It

38

has led to anticompetitive effects in the relevant markets, as alleged above, and
caused injury to consumers and competition in those relevant markets and
elsewhere.
123.

The Defendants' contract, combination, agreement, undel'standing or

concerted action with the co-conspirators occurred in or affected interstate
commerce. The Defendants' unlawful conduct was through mutual understandings,
combinations or agreements by, between and among the Defendants and other
unnamed co-conspirators. These other co-conspirators have either acted willingly or,
due to coercion, unwillingly in furtherance of the unlawful restraint of trade alleged
herein.
124.

Defendants' anticompetitive conduct has directly and proximately

caused antitrust injury, in the form of higher prices and reduced choice, as set forth
above. Plaintiffs and other consumers will continue to suffer antitrust injury and
other damage unless Defendants are enjoined from continuing to engage in the
foregoing violations of law.

COUNT FOUR

VIOLATION OF SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT

On Behalf of AU Classes

125.

Plaintiffs incorporate and reallege, as though fully set forth herein,

each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.
126.

Defendants and their co-conspirators, by the above-mentioned conduct,

possess monopoly power over the market for video presentations of major league
baseball games and Internet streaming of the same and have used that power for
39

the purposes of unreasonably excluding andlor limiting competition, in violation of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2. These activities have gone beyond
those which could be considered as "legitimate business activities," and are an
abuse of market position.
127.

Through the anti-competitive conduct described herein, Defendants

and their co-conspirators have willfully acquired and maintained, and unless
restrained by the Court, will continue to willfully maintain, that monopoly power by
anti-competitive and unreasonably exclusionary conduct. Defendants and their co­
conspirators have acted with an intent to illegally acquire and maintain that
monopoly power in the relevant product market, and their illegal conduct has
enabled them to do so, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2.
128.

Defendants' anticompetitive conduct has directly and proximately

caused antitrust injury, as set forth above. Plaintiffs and other consumers will
continue to suffer antitrust injury and other damage unless defendants are enjoined
from continuing to engage in the foregoing violations of law.

VIII.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
\\THEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray as follows:
A.

That the Court determine that this action may be maintained as a

class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that
Plaintiffs be named representatives of their respective classes.

40

B.

That the contract, combination or conspiracy, and the acts done in

furtherance thereof by Defendants and their co-conspirators as alleged in this
complaint, be adjudged to have been a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § L
C.

That the Defendants and their co-conspirators actions to illegally

acquire and maintain monopoly power in the relevant product market, be adjudged
to have been in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S. C. § 2.
D.

That judgment be entel'ed for Plaintiffs and members of the Class

against Defendants for three times the amount of damages sustained by Plaintiffs
and the members of the Class as allowed by law, together with the costs of this
action, including reasonable attorneys' fees, pursuant to Sections 4 and 16 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 26.
E.

That Plaintiffs and the Class be awarded pre-judgment and post-

judgment interest at the highest legal rate from and after the date of service of this
Complaint to the extent provided by law;
. F.

That Defendants and their co-conspirators be enjoined from further

violations of the antitrust laws; and,

41

G.

That Plaintiffs and members of the Class have such other, further or

different relief, as the case may require and the Court may deem just and proper
under the circumstances.
Dated: May 9,2012

POMERANTZ HAUDEK
GROSSMAN . . GROSS LLP

100 Park Avenue, 26th Floor
New York, NY 10017
Telephone: (212) 661"1100
Facsimile: (212) 661"8665
Edward Diver
Howard Langer
Peter Leckman

LANGER, GROGAN & DIVER, P.C.
1717 Arch Street, Suite 4130
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Telephone: (215) 320"5660
Facsimile: [phone]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Fernanda
Garber, Marc Lerner, Derek
Rasmussen, and Robert Silver

42