Miller Investment Trust v. Chen et al
Filing
60
OPINION AND ORDER re: 53 MOTION for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b) filed by Hansen, Barnett & Maxwell, P.C. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Hansen's Motion Requesting Certification Under Rule 54(b) is denied. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the motion at docket entry 53. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 10/25/2013) (lmb)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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:
MILLER INVESTMENT TRUST, et al.,
:
Plaintiffs,
:
:
-against:
:
XIANGCHI CHEN, et al.,
:
Defendants. :
:
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10/25/13
12 Civ. 04997 (LGS)
OPINION AND ORDER
LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge:
This case is now before the Court upon Defendant Hansen’s Motion Requesting
Certification Under Rule 54(b) (“Motion”). For the following reasons, Defendant’s Motion is
denied.
I.
BACKGROUND
On June 26, 2012, Plaintiffs, investors in ShengdaTech, Inc., brought this action against
its directors and officers. In their First Amended Complaint, dated August 22, 2012, Plaintiffs
added Hansen, Barnett & Maxwell, P.C. (“Hansen”) as a Defendant, alleging negligent
misrepresentation. On March 14, 2013, Plaintiffs filed the Third Amended Complaint, the
currently operative complaint.
On June 21, 2013, the Court granted Defendant Hansen’s motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction. On October 11, 2013, Defendant Hansen filed the instant Motion asking
the Court to certify the judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
II.
STANDARD
Rule 54(b) provides that “when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry
of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court
expressly determines there is no just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). “It is left to the
sound judicial discretion of the district court to determine the appropriate time when each final
decision in a multiple claims action is ready for appeal.” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “This discretion is to be
exercised in the interest of sound judicial administration . . . as well as the equities involved.
Consideration of the former is necessary to assure that application of the Rule effectively
preserves the historic federal policy against piecemeal appeals.” Id. (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). “‘[T]here must be some danger of hardship or injustice through delay
which would be alleviated by immediate appeal.’” Brunswick Corp. v. Sheridan, 582 F.2d 175,
183 (2d Cir. 1978) (quoting Western Geophysical Co. of Am. v. Bolt Associates, Inc., 463 F.2d
101, 103 (2d Cir. 1972)).
III.
DISCUSSION
A certification of the Court’s judgment as final would not dispel the “cloud of legal
uncertainty” over Defendant Hansen, and would not promote judicial economy. In light of these
considerations, the Court finds that there are just reasons for delay and that entry of final
judgment as to Defendant Hansen therefore would be premature.
Defendant Hansen argues that it has “a clear and valid interest in having the cloud of
legal uncertainty . . . definitively removed at an early point.” As Plaintiffs note, however,
Defendant Hansen was dismissed from this action for lack of personal jurisdiction and not
because of any adjudication on the merits of its defense. Plaintiffs may sue Defendant Hansen in
another forum any time before the statute of limitations expires. Defendant Hansen will continue
to experience legal uncertainty until then whether or not the judgment is final.
Defendant Hansen next argues that “[i]f Plaintiffs are somehow successful on appeal, it
behooves this Court to have Hansen re-enter the litigation as soon as possible to participate in
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discovery, expert disclosures, court conferences, and dispositive motion practice.” Defendant
Hansen, however, chose to wait until more than three months after its dismissal and two months
after the Court had set a schedule for discovery to move for certification of the judgment. An
appeal filed now would be unlikely to reach resolution until long after all fact discovery outside
of China closes on January 23, 2014, precluding a smooth reentry into litigation by Defendant
Hansen following any appellate decision. The only way to minimize redundancy now would be
to stay discovery pending the appeal, an outcome that Defendant Hansen does not seek and one
that the Court would not in any event order.
An immediate appeal offers no benefits to the remaining parties and claims but does risk
inefficiency. An appellate decision would not narrow or clarify the claims or issues that remain
in the case. However, requiring Plaintiff to appeal now may delay the progress of the action.
The Court has set an ambitious discovery schedule, which it intends to enforce. Plaintiffs
hopefully are devoting their full attention to discovery, and an immediate appeal could interfere
with those efforts and necessitate extensions to the current schedule. In the absence of any
hardship or injustice that could be remedied by an immediate entry of a final judgment, such
interference is unjustified.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Hansen’s Motion Requesting Certification Under
Rule 54(b) is denied.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the motion at docket entry 53.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 25, 2013
New York, New York
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