Kripalani v. AMR Corporation et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER re: 14 MOTION to Dismiss filed by American Airlines, Inc., AMR Corporation. For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss Counts II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI, XII, XIII, and XIV is GRANTED. Only Count I, seeking relief under the Montreal Convention, shall proceed. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate the motion at ECF No. 14. (Signed by Judge Katherine B. Forrest on 4/30/2013) (mro)
LJSUC SONY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
... -------------------------------------------------------------------
)(
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC#:
" DATE F-IL-ErA""71ItiPR~3-:-0-20-13-'
RENU K. KRIPALANI,
12 Civ. 5609 (KBF)
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
-vAMR CORPORATION, AMERICAN
AIRLINES INC., and JOHN DOES 1 and 2,
Defendants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------KATHERINE B. FORREST, District Judge:
)(
Plaintiff Renu K. Kripalani seeks relief for alleged shoving, harassment, and
humiliation committed by flight attendants during a 2011 American Airlines flight
from New York to St. Maarten.
Before this Court is defendants American Airlines, Inc. and AMR Corp.'s
motion to dismiss all but one of plaintiffs causes of action. Defendants filed the
instant motion on March 8, 2013. (ECF No. 14.) Plaintiff failed to file any timely
opposition. By letter dated April 17, 2013 - well after the March 22, 2013 deadline
for an opposition brief - plaintiffs counsel requested an extension to respond the
motion until April 29, 2013. (ECF No. 19.) That deadline, too, has passed. The
Court will therefore treat defendants' motion as unopposed. For the reasons set
forth below, defendants' unopposed motion is GRANTED.
1
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
On July 21,2011, plaintiff was a passenger on American Airlines Flight No.
667 from John F. Kennedy Airport ("JFK"), New York to St. Maarten. (CompI.
~
13,
ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff claims that, during the course of the flight, an unnamed
American Airlines flight attendant, John Doe I, harassed her. ilil:. ~ 25.) She
claims that, while she was standing and waiting to use the restroom, he accused her
of taking his photograph with her cell phone camera. ilil:. ~ 15.) He then insisted
that plaintiff delete the photograph. (Id.) When plaintiff told him that she had not
taken his picture but was instead looking through her own photographs, John Doe I
allegedly lunged backwards and pushed plaintiff. (Id.
~
17.) He then blocked her
path and ordered her to return to her seat and stay there for the remainder of the
flight. ilil:. ~~ 18, 19.)
Once seated, plaintiff claims that John Doe I and another flight attendant,
John Doe II, repeatedly harassed, humiliated, and threatened plaintiff, including
promise of arrest and imprisonment upon her arrival at St. Maarten. (Id.
~
23.)
Plaintiff alleges she remained fearful for the rest of the flight and, as a result, did
not move or speak. (Id.
~~
36, 37.) She also alleges, as a result of this treatment,
headaches, stomach cramps, increased heart rate, and burning sensations in her
urinary tract, which allegedly caused her incontinence. (Id.
~~
38, 39.)
Upon arrival, plaintiff claims that defendants contacted the St. Maarten
authorities to arrest her. (Id.
~
42.) The St. Maarten immigration authorities
boarded the aircraft and escorted plaintiff off the aircraft. (Id.
2
~
43.) She was
detained by the immigration authorities for over five hours, where she was
interrogated by defendants' representatives and the St. Maarten authorities. ad.
~~
44, 45.) The authorities examined plaintiffs cell phone and deleted some of its
contents. (ld.
~~
46, 47.) Plaintiff also contends the authorities did not find any
photographs of John Doe I on plaintiffs phone. (ld.
~
48.) Plaintiff does not allege
that St. Maarten authorities ever arrested her or charged her with any criminal act.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In response to a motion to dismiss, this Court "must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint" See Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'" Id. (guoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007».
"Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. Thus, while "Rule 8 marks a notable and
generous departure from hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, it
does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than
conclusions." Id. at 678-79. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged
but it has not shown - that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. at 679 (internal
punctuation omitted).
Although defendants' motion is unopposed, the Court nevertheless must
assess whether, based on the complaint and governing law, the defendant is entitled
to relief. See McCall v. Pataki, 323 F.3d 321, 322-23 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that
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district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs complaint based solely on plaintiffs
failure to file a response to a motion to dismiss).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs complaint asserts thirteen counts. 1 Specifically, she asserts a
claim under the Montreal Convention, five common-law tort claims (negligence,
gross negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of
emotional distress, and assault and battery), three Constitutional claims (violations
of the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments), two federal discrimination claims
(violations of 42 U.S.C. §1981 and 42 U.S.C. §2000d), a New York State Human
Rights law claim, and a New York City Human Rights law claim. Defendants argue
that the Montreal Convention preempts plaintiffs twelve other causes of action.
The Court agrees.
Montreal Convention
The Montreal Convention preempts any state law causes of action relating to
personal injuries sustained in the course of international air travel. Article 29 of
the Convention, entitled "Basis of Claims", describes the preemptive nature of the
Convention:
In the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo, any action for damages,
however founded, whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort or
otherwise, can only be brought subject to the conditions and such limits of
liability as are set out in this Convention ...
Conv. for Int'l Carriage by Air ("Montreal Conv.") Art. 29, 1999 WL 33292734, at
*38.
1
While the complaint purports to contain fourteen counts, it lacks a Count X.
4
Thus, like the Warsaw Convention that preceded it, the Montreal Convention
"precludes passengers from bringing actions under local law when they cannot
establish air carrier liability under the treaty." EI AI Israel Airlines v. Tseng, 525
U.S. 155, 175 (1999). This means that if an action for damages falls within one of
the treaty's damage provisions, then "the Convention provides the sole cause of
action under which a claimant may seek redress for his injuries." Weiss v. EI Al
Israel Airlines, Ltd., 433 F.Supp.2d 361, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing Tseng. 525 U.S.
at 176). Article 17 applies only to legal claims for injuries suffered by passengers
during "international carriage," however. See Montreal Conv. Art. 17, 1999 WL
33292734, at *33. So long as a plaintiffs injury occurs during embarking,
disembarking, or the course of the flight, the injury meets the "international
carriage" requirement and Article 17 preempts all other claims. See King v.
American Airlines, 284 F.3d 352,360 (2d Cir. 2002).
Here, plaintiffs tort, discrimination, human rights, and Constitutional claims
all arise from physical and emotional injuries suffered during international flight
and are therefore preempted by the Convention. See id. at 358-360 ("[As long as]
the events giving rise to the claim occurred in the course of international 'carriage of
passengers and baggage', the Montreal Convention preempts claims for
discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §1981."); see also Turturro v. Continental Airlines,
128 F.Supp.2d 170, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (Montreal Convention preempts state tort
actions for injuries sustained while in international carriage).
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Plaintiffs counts numbered II-IX and XI-XIV are therefore preempted by the
Convention and must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss Counts II, III, IV, V,
VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI, XII, XIII, and XN is GRANTED. Only Count I, seeking relief
under the Montreal Convention, shall proceed.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate the motion at ECF No. 14.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:
New York, New York
Aptl\'l -;0 , 2013
KATHERINE B. FORREST
United States District Judge
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