Roland III v. McMayle et al

Filing 126

OPINION AND ORDER re: 122 MOTION for Reconsideration re: 118 Memorandum & Opinion filed by Jed Saul, Daniel McMonagle, Justin Taft. Having reviewed the record and the parties' memoranda of law, including each of the cases Defend ants' cite to support their argument, the Court concludes that it overlooked neither a controlling issue of law nor a crucial fact in the record. Plaintiff's motion to reconsider is therefore DENIED. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion at Docket Number 122. (As further set forth in this Order.) (Signed by Judge J. Paul Oetken on 11/16/2015) (kko)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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THOMAS M. ROLAND III,
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Plaintiff,
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-v:
DANIEL McMONAGLE, JUSTIN TAFT, JED :
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SAUL, JOSEPH HOROS, and MICHAEL
McCOOEY,
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Defendants.
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12-CV-6331 (JPO)
OPINION AND ORDER

J. PAUL OETKEN, District Judge:
This case involves the alleged forced medication and physical assault of Plaintiff Thomas
M. Roland III, a prisoner in New York. On October 9, 2015, the Court issued an Order denying
the motion for summary judgment on Roland’s due process claim filed by Defendants Daniel
McMonagle, Justin Taft, and Jed Saul (collectively “Defendants”). (Dkt. No. 118.) That Order
rejected Defendants’ argument that they were entitled to summary judgment because they acted
in reliance on the judgment of Diane Stefanuk, a prison nurse. (Id. at 8.) Defendants now move
for reconsideration of the Court’s decision. (Dkt. No. 122.)
“A motion for reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly in the
interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources.” Drapkin v. Mafco Consol.
Grp., Inc., 818 F. Supp. 2d 678, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citation and quotations omitted). To
prevail, the movant must demonstrate either (i) an intervening change in controlling law; (ii) the
availability of new evidence; or (iii) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.
Jacob v. Duane Reade, Inc., 293 F.R.D. 578, 580–81 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (Oetken, J.) (citation
omitted). Ordinarily, the final showing—manifest injustice—requires that the movant
demonstrate that the Court overlooked a key fact in the record or a controlling point of law. See
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Cioce v. County of Westchester, 128 Fed. App’x 181, 185 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Generally, motions
for reconsideration are not granted unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or
data that the court overlooked—matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to
alter the conclusion reached by the court.”).
Defendants previously argued that any force they used to medicate Roland was
reasonable because they were “entitled to rely on and not question the medical judgment of the
mental health nurse if she found it medically necessary to medicate [P]laintiff.” (Dkt. No. 101 at
7.) The Court rejected this argument because, while prison officials may be entitled to rely on a
nurse’s determination that forced medication is necessary, Defendants stipulated that Nurse
Stefanuk made no such judgment in this case. (Dkt. No. 118 at 8.) The Court’s Order cited
Defendants’ Rule 56.1 Statement, in which they averred (1) that forced medication requires
documentation and (2) that Nurse Stefanuk had “only had one occasion where medication was
administered over an inmate’s objection in her presence . . . which did not involve [P]laintiff
. . . .” (Dkt. No. 100 ¶¶ 16-17.) The Court also reviewed Nurse Stefanuk’s declaration, which
Defendants filed in support of their motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 105.) In that
declaration, Nurse Stefanuk stated that, had she made a judgment that forced medication was
necessary, she would have documented it. (Id. at ¶¶ 5-7.)
Defendants now argue that, if they forcibly medicated Roland, they did so in reliance on
“the apparent medical judgment of Nurse Stefanuk.” (Dkt. No. 122 at 2.) They assert, in other
words, that even if Nurse Stefanuk did not in fact authorize forced medication, they were entitled
to assume that she had. This argument recasts Defendants’ earlier assertions and highlights
disputed issues of material fact about Nurse Stefanuk’s conduct. It does not, however, alter the
Court’s analysis of the law.

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Having reviewed the record and the parties’ memoranda of law, including each of the
cases Defendants’ cite to support their argument, the Court concludes that it overlooked neither a
controlling issue of law nor a crucial fact in the record. Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider is
therefore DENIED.
The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion at Docket Number 122.

SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 16, 2015
New York, New York

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J. PAUL OETKEN
United States District Judge

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