Gladden v. City of New York et al
Filing
19
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 17 Motion to Dismiss. Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED. (Docket # 17.) The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for the defendants. Defendants' counsel is ordered to mail to the plaintiff copies of all unpublished authorities cited herein. (Signed by Judge P. Kevin Castel on 8/29/2013) (ja)
USDSSDNY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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LEROY GLADDEN,
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC #: _ _--,;_=----:-:DATE FILED: 8 ~;Zj-/3
Plaintiff,
12 Civ. 7822 (PKC)
-againstMEMORANDUM
AND ORDER
CITY OF NEW YORK, MAYOR
BLOOMBERG, COMMISSIONER DORA
SCHRIRO and COMMISSIONER DEPT. OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
Defendants.
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P. KEVIN CASTEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff Leroy Gladden, who is pro se, commenced this action on October 18,
2012, alleging that he was unlawfully exposed to methane gas while an inmate in Rikers Island.
(Docket # 1.) He aSSelts that this methane exposure violated the Eighth and Fourth Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution. (Docket # 1.)
On April 23, 2013, defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P. (Docket # 17.) Plaintiff filed no opposition papers and has made no
communications to the Comt over the succeeding four months.
For the reasons explained, the defendants' motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff asserts that from 1987 to 2002, he was exposed to methane gas at Rikers
Island. (Comp!'t § TILB.) As stated in the Complaint: "Up until this year, the deponentwas [sic]
unaware of the contaminated land. Deponent received a copy of the internet this week showing
the methane gas poison symptoms and the deaths on rikers [sic]." (Compl't § IILB.) He states
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that he was "unknowingly exposed to methane" and that no notice of methane leaks was posted
at the facility. (Compl't § III.C.) According to plaintiff, methane detectors were installed and
disabled to prevent acknowledgment of the leaks, and "doctors failed to identify the cause of the
ailments filed and reported while on Rikers," including plaintiff s "excessive headaches, he31t
palapations [sic], loss of breath, anxiety and unbalance." (Compl't §§ IILC, N.) According to
the Complaint: "Several years ago when original claims were filed they were placed under gag
order to prevent public knowledge. This was known to the city defendants as license [sic] were
issued for the detectors and they defendant [sic] the claims." (Comp!'t § IILC.) The Complaint
seeks $1 million in compensatory damages, as well as treble damages and $5 million in nominal
damages. (Compl't § V.)
The Complaint alleges that, by reason of the foregoing conduct, defendants
subjected plaintiff to cruel and unusual punishment in violation ofthe Eighth Amendment.
(Compl't § II.B.) Plaintiff also alleges that defendants violated the Fourth Amendment by failing
to keep him "safe and secure in person, places and effects." (Compl't § ILB.)
RULE 12(b)(6) STANDARD.
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. ",
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007». '''[L]abels and conclusions' or 'a fOlIDulaic recitation ofthe elements ofa cause of
action will not do.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A plaintiff must plead "factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonaole inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged." rd. However, '''detailed factual allegations'" are not necessary. Id.
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56).
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In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, all non-conclusory factual allegations are
accepted as true, see id. at 678-79, and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the
plaintiff. See In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47,50 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
Moreover, plaintiffs pro se pleadings are '''to be liberally construed ... [and], however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than fonnal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976». Finally, an unopposed Rule 12(b)(6) motion is still subject to review on the merits.
McCall v. Pataki, 232 F.3d 321, 322 (2d Cir. 2000).
DISCUSSION
1.
THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT PLAUSIBLY ALLEGE AN EIGHTH
AMENDMENT VIOLATION.
"To state an Eighth Amendment claim based on conditions of confinement, an
inmate must allege that: (1) objectively, the deprivation the inmate suffered was 'sufficiently
serious that he was denied the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,' and (2)
subjectively, the defendant official acted with 'a sufficiently culpable state of mind ... , such as
deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.'" Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir.
2013) (quoting Gaston v. Coughlin, 249 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir. 2001». "To meet the objective
element, the inmate must show that the conditions, either alone or in combination, pose an
unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health." Id. To meet the subjective element, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant "acted with more than mere negligence," and instead
knew of and disregarded an "excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Id. (quotation marks
omitted). Under the Eighth Amendment, officials may not "create inhumane prison conditions,
deprive inmates of basic necessities, or fail to protect their health or safety." Ovelton v.
Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 137 (2003).
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Loccenitt v. City of New York, 2012 WL 3822701, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 30,
2012), adopted, 2012 WL 3822213 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012) (Crotty J.), concluded that thirdpatty repOits of environmental problems at Rikers Island were insufficient to give rise to an
Eighth Amendment violation. "No facts are alleged linking any of plaintiff s alleged conditions
to any of the alleged environmental toxins; all the complaint offers are plaintiffs ipse dixit
pronouncements. Such conclusory statements do not satisfy Twombly." Id. Similarly, Cepeda
v. Bloomberg, 2012 WL 75424, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2012) (Pauley, J.), concluded that a
report about environmental contaminants at Rikers Island "is not an adequate factual basis for
[plaintiffs] claim that toxins have harmed him."
Here, as in Loccenitt and Cepeda, the plaintiff has not alleged in a non-conclusory
and plausible manner "sufficiently serious" deprivations to himself or a "sufficiently culpable
state of mind" on the part of defendants. See generally Walker, 717 F.3d at 125. The Complaint
is premised entirely on an unidentified internet posting that apparently asserts the presence of
methane on Rikers Island ii·om 1987 to 2002. (Compl't §I1I.B.) Plaintiff makes no factual
allegation that connects his purported injuries to methane exposure. Separately, he makes only
conclusory allegations about a culpable state of mind by defendants Bloomberg, City of New
York and the Department of Environmental Protection, and no allegations directed to the state of
mind of defendant Schriro.
Because the Complaint does not plausibly allege facts that satisfy the subjective
and objective prongs of an Eighth Amendment violation, the motion to dismiss is granted.
II.
THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT PLAUSIBLY ALLEGE A FOURTH
AMENDMENT VIOLATION.
Plaintiff asserts that defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights by failing
to keep him "safe and secure in person, places and effects." (Compl't § II.B.) "Fourth
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Amendment protections extend only to unreasonable governrnent intlUsions into legitimate
expectations of privacy. " United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2004) (quotation
marks and ellipsis omitted). The Complaint asselts no intmsions into plaintiffs privacy. His
Fourth Amendment claim therefore is dismissed.
III.
THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT PLAUSIBLY ALLEGE PERSONAL
INVOLVEMENT BY DEFENDANTS SCHRIRO AND BLOOMBERG.
"It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in
alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983."
Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep't of Con. Servs., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks
omitted). Plaintiffs claims are directed to methane exposure fi'om 1987 through 2002. (Compl't
§ III.B.) This COUlt takes judicial notice that defendant Schriro was appointed commissioner of
the New York City Department of COlTection on September 21, 2009 1 and that Michael
Bloomberg was sworn in as mayor of the City of New York in 2002. The Complaint therefore
fails to allege personal involvement by Bloomberg for any conduct that pre-dates 2002 and fails
to allege any personal involvement by Schriro.
IV.
THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT PLAUSIBLY ALLEGE MUNICIPAL
LIABILITY.
A municipality cannot be held liable for a damages claim unless plaintiffs injury
was a result of municipal policy, custom or practice. See generally Monell v. New York City
Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-94 (1978). Plaintiff has set fOlth only conclusory
allegations concerning a cover-up to conceal information about the alleged methane leaks at
Rikers Island. This is insufficient to allege municipal liability. See Roe v. City of Waterbury,
I
See http://www.nyc.gov/htmlldocihtmllabout/comm_bio.shtml.
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542 F.3d 31, 36-37 (2d Cir. 2008) (plaintiff must allege "deliberate conduct" that renders
municipality "the 'moving force' behind the alleged injury.").
CONCLUSION
Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED. (Docket # 17.) The Clerk is
directed to enter judgment for the defendants.
Defendants' counsel is ordered to mail to the plaintiff copies of all unpublished
authorities cited herein.
SO ORDERED.
United States District Judge
Dated: New York, New York
August 29, 2013
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