Woodward v. Correctional Officer Perez et al

Filing 39

OPINION AND ORDER re: 28 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Deputy Commissioner of Correctional Services Joseph F. Bellnier, Correctional Superintendent of Downstate Correctional Facility Perez, Correctional Officer Perez: For the reasons s et forth above, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion, Doc. 28, to mail a copy of this Opinion and Order to Plaintiff, and to close the case. Furthermore, the Court c ertifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this Opinion and Order would not be taken in good faith; therefore, in forma pauperis status is denied for purposes of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). (Signed by Judge Edgardo Ramos on 8/29/2014) (tn)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------------------------------------------------x
SHAWN WOODWARD,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
- against :
:
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER PEREZ, CORRECTIONAL :
LIEUTENANT JOHN DOE, CORRECTIONAL
:
SUPERINTENDENT OF DOWNSTATE
:
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY PEREZ, and DEPUTY
:
COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES
:
JOSEPH F. BELLNIER,
:
:
Defendants.
:
------------------------------------------------------------------------x

OPINION AND ORDER
12 CV. 8671 (ER)

Ramos, D.J.:
Pro se plaintiff Shawn Woodward (“Plaintiff” or “Woodward”) brings this suit pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Woodward alleges that on March 14, 2012, Correctional Officer Perez,
Correctional Lieutenant John Doe, 1 Correctional Superintendent of Downstate Correctional
Facility Perez, and Deputy Commissioner of Correctional Services Joseph F. Bellnier
1

Correctional Lieutenant John Doe has yet to be served. On January 8, 2013, the Court entered an order of service
in accordance with Valentin v. Dinkins, 121 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1997), directing the New York State Attorney General
to ascertain the identity of Correctional Lieutenant Doe and the address at which he may be served. Doc. 10. The
Court ordered that within thirty days of receiving this information, “Plaintiff must file an amended complaint
identifying Correctional Lieutenant ‘John Doe.’” Id. By letter dated February 14, 2013, the Office of the Attorney
General informed the Court that the “only Lieutenant on duty at the facility was Lieutenant Kevin Coffey, who was
the facility watch commander.” February 14, 2013 Letter of Richard W. Brewster. Despite this identifying
information for Correctional Lieutenant John Doe, Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint.

Because Plaintiff’s claims against Lieutenant Doe suffer from the same deficiencies as against the other defendants,
the Court will treat the instant motion as if it were brought on behalf of all defendants. Cf. Hamilton v. Broomfield,
No. 95 Civ. 3241 (MBM), 1998 WL 17697, at *1n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 1998) (dismissing claims against unserved
defendants because they were identical to claims against defendants who filed the motion to dismiss); Johnson v.
New York City, No. 12 Civ. 4379 (KBF), 2013 WL 950870, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013) (“As the same conviction
underlies plaintiff’s claims against defendant Thomas Woods (who has not yet been served in this action), the Court
dismisses the Complaint with respect to Woods sua sponte.”); Virtual Dates, Inc. v. Afternic.com, Inc., No. 01 Civ.
4023 (LAK), 2001 WL 1646451, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2001) (“Although Unodotcom evidently has not been
served and did not join in this motion, this order dismisses as to it on the same grounds, as precisely the same points
control the claims against it. The Clerk shall close the case.”).

(collectively, “Defendants”) violated his constitutional rights during his incarceration at
Downstate Correctional Facility in Fishkill, New York (“Downstate”). 2 Plaintiff claims that
Defendants substantially burdened the exercise of his Muslim faith under both the First
Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) by
forcing him to shower in the presence of a female officer and another inmate identified as a
“known homosexual.” 3 Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss the
Complaint. Doc. 28. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is
GRANTED.
I.

Factual Background 4
On the afternoon of March 14, 2012, Woodward, a Muslim male inmate, was returned to

Downstate Correctional Facility from a court visit. Compl. at 4-5. After Plaintiff was processed,
Correctional Officer Perez (“Officer Perez”) subjected him to a strip search. Id. at 4. Woodward
was then told to walk naked to the shower and to use a delousing treatment on his private parts,
under his arms, and on the top of his head. Id. There were approximately eight people in the
shower area, including a “known homosexual.” Id. Plaintiff was able to identify this inmate as
homosexual “due to, inter alia, him being in the same [facility], . . . going to Court on [an earlier

2

Woodward is no longer incarcerated at Downstate. In October 2013, Woodward was transferred to the Southport
Correctional Facility. See October 21, 2013 Letter of Shawn Woodward (Doc. 33). As of July 2014, Plaintiff was
an inmate at Elmira Correctional Facility. See July 21, 2014 Letter of Shawn Woodward (Doc. 38).

3

Plaintiff originally brought a claim under the Eighth Amendment, alleging that showering in the vicinity of the
female guard and the known homosexual was cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff has since voluntarily
withdrawn this claim. Pl. Opp. Mem. L. 19.

4

For purposes of the instant motion, the Court assumes the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint and opposition to the
motion to dismiss to be true and relies exclusively on the information contained therein. See Walker v. Schult, 717
F.3d 119, 122 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013) (instructing that a “district court deciding a motion to dismiss may consider factual
allegations made by a pro se party in his papers opposing the motion.”).

2

date] with plaintiff, having the same judge as plaintiff and arriving on Rikers Island on the
sameday [sic] as plaintiff.” Id.
Woodward alleges that a female correctional officer was also present at that time and saw
him completely nude. Pl. Opp. Mem. L. 7. Woodward complained to Officer Perez that it was
against his Muslim faith to be exposed in public while a female was “walking around,” and other
inmates including the homosexual were naked around him. Compl. at 4. After Officer Perez
dismissed Woodward’s objection, Woodward asked to speak with Correctional Lieutenant John
Doe (“Lieutenant Doe”). Id. at 5-A. Officer Perez declined this request, so Plaintiff called out to
Lieutenant Doe, who then came over to the shower where Plaintiff was concealing himself with a
towel. Id. Woodward described his concerns to no avail: Lieutenant Doe “told plaintiff that if
he didn’t get into the shower that he would go to the box. Thereafter plaintiff got into the shower
naked and expose[d] to the eyes of other inmates.” Id. 5
There is no allegation that the defendants other than Officer Perez and Lieutenant Doe
were present in the shower area that day. Correctional Superintendent Perez (“Superintendent
Perez”) was named in the Complaint by virtue of her role as Lieutenant Doe and Officer Perez’s
supervisor. Id. Plaintiff sued Deputy Commissioner of Correctional Services Joseph Bellnier
(“Deputy Commissioner Bellnier”) because Bellnier refused to change the practices at
Downstate despite Plaintiff’s complaint to the Commissioner of the Department of Correctional
and Community Services. Id.
Plaintiff seeks two forms of relief. First, he requests “an injunction ordering [the New
York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision] to provide shower curtains .

5

Woodward further acknowledges that he “was not forced to be touched by a female staff or searched by her or
forced to come in contact with any other inmate.” Pl. Opp. Mem. L. 18.

3

. . which will cover at-least the private parts of the body.” Id. at 7. Second, he seeks monetary
damages in the amount of $7,500. Id.
II.

Discussion

A. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Standard
When ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2014). However,
the court is not required to credit “mere conclusory statements” or “threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173
L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167
L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)); see also id. at 681 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 551). “To survive a motion
to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter ... to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially
plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 556). More specifically, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show “more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. If the plaintiff has not “nudged [his]
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [the] complaint must be dismissed.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680.
The question on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “‘is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail
but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.’” Sikhs for Justice v.
Nath, 893 F. Supp. 2d 598, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien,
56 F.3d 375, 278 (2d Cir.1995)). “[T]he purpose of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ‘is
4

to test, in a streamlined fashion, the formal sufficiency of the plaintiff's statement of a claim for
relief without resolving a contest regarding its substantive merits,’” and without regard for the
weight of the evidence that might be offered in support of Plaintiff's claims. Halebian v. Berv,
644 F.3d 122, 130 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Global Network Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of New York,
458 F.3d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 2006)).
The same standard applies to motions to dismiss pro se complaints. See Zapolski v. Fed.
Republic of Germany, 425 F. App’x 5, 6 (2d Cir. 2011). However, the Court remains obligated
to construe a pro se complaint liberally, Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011), and
to interpret a pro se plaintiff’s claims as raising the strongest arguments that they suggest.
Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006). In order to survive a
motion to dismiss, a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings still must contain “more than an unadorned, the
defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation.” Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 678. A complaint that “tenders
naked assertion[s] devoid of further enhancement” will not suffice. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 557) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Triestman, 470 F.3d at 477 (“[P]ro se
status ‘does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and
substantive law.’” (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)).
B. First Amendment
The First Amendment guarantees the right to the free exercise of religion. Convicted
felons do not relinquish this right upon incarceration. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S.
342, 348 (1987) (“Inmates clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, including
its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.” (internal citations omitted));
Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 588 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Prisoners have long been understood to
retain some measure of the constitutional protection afforded by the First Amendment’s Free
5

Exercise Clause.” (internal citation omitted)). It is well-accepted, however, that a prisoner’s
right to exercise his religion involves considerations that do not apply to persons outside of the
penal system. Specifically, the prisoner’s right is “not absolute or unbridled, and is subject to
valid penological concerns, including those relating to institutional security.” Johnson v.
Guiffere, No. 9:04-CV-57, 2007 WL 3046703, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2007); see also
Salahuddin v. Coughlin, 993 F.2d 306, 308 (2d Cir. 1993) (“A prisoner’s right to practice his
religion is . . . not absolute.”).
“It has not been decided in this Circuit whether, to state a claim under the First
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, a ‘prisoner must show at the threshold that the disputed
conduct substantially burdens his sincerely held religious beliefs.’” Holland v. Goord, --- F.3d ---, 2014 WL 3360615, at *4 (2d Cir. July 10, 2014) (quoting Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263,
274-75 (2d Cir. 2006)). 6 However, the Court will analyze the free exercise claim under this
standard because it finds that Woodward has satisfied this threshold step. 7 Defendants would
“then bear the relatively limited burden of identifying the legitimate penological interests that
justify the impinging conduct.” Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 275. It would be Woodward’s ultimate
burden to demonstrate that Defendants’ penological concerns were irrational. Id.
Woodward argues that showering in the presence of the female guard and the
homosexual inmate infringed on his First Amendment right to the free exercise of his Muslim

6

In Holland, the Second Circuit noted the appellant’s challenge to the “continued viability of the ‘substantial
burden’ test in light of the Supreme Court’s statement in Employment Division v. Smith that application of the test
‘embroils courts in the unacceptable business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims.’” 2014
WL 3360615, at *4 (quoting Ford, 352 F.3d at 592 (quoting Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990))).
7

Cf. Holland, 2014 WL 3360615, at *4 (analyzing First Amendment claim with the substantial burden requirement
because “even assuming the continued vitality of [this requirement], our precedent squarely dictates that Holland’s
religious exercise was unconstitutionally burdened . . . .”).

6

religion. 8 To assess a free exercise claim, the Court must evaluate: (1) whether the practice
asserted is religious in the person’s scheme of beliefs, and whether the belief is sincerely held;
(2) whether the challenged practice of the prison officials infringes upon the religious belief; and
(3) whether the challenged practice of the prison officials furthers some legitimate penological
objective. Farid v. Smith, 850 F.2d 917, 926 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.
78, 89-91 (1987). The Court assumes that Woodward is a sincere believer in the tenets of Islam,
and that male nudity in the presence of women is prohibited in the Islamic faith. See JeanLaurent v. Lawrence, No. Civ. 1502 (JPO) (SN), 2013 WL 1129813, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19,
2013) (noting that the “taboo in the Islamic faith” concerning male nudity in the presence of
women is well known and that the court would not question the plaintiff’s allegation that being
forced to stand in his underwear similarly infringed upon his freedom of religion); see also
McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting the unacceptable practice of
passing judgment on the “centrality of different religious practices” (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted)). The Court’s analysis of the free exercise claim will therefore focus on
the alleged infringement upon Woodward’s beliefs and whether any legitimate objective was
furthered by the presence of the female guard in the shower area.
A substantial burden on an individual’s religious beliefs exists “where the state ‘put[s]
substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.’” Jolly v.
Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 477 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp. Sec.
Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718, 101 S. Ct. 1425, 1432 (1981)). “Significantly, the plaintiff’s burden in
“demonstrating substantial burden is ‘not a particularly onerous task.’” Fifth Ave. Presbyterian
Church v. City of New York, No. 01 Civ. 11493 (LMM), 2004 WL 2471406, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
8

Though Plaintiff does not distinguish the issues presented by the female guard and the homosexual inmate, the
Court will consider them separately.

7

Oct. 29, 2004) (quoting McEachin, 357 F.3d at 202). However, “[t]his Court has explained that
a ‘mere inconvenience’ is insufficient to establish a substantial burden.” Salvatierra v. Connolly,
No. 09 Civ. 3722 (SHS) (DF), 2010 WL 5480756, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2010), adopted by,
2011 WL 9398, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2011) (quoting Pugh, 571 F. Supp. 2d 477, 505
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
According to Woodward, “[b]eing covered or shielded when bathing outside the presence
of one’s wife is not only central to plaintiff’s . . . religious doctrine, but is one of a fundamental
principle believed by all sects in orthodox Islaam.” Pl. Opp. Mem. L. 17-18. Plaintiff further
notes that, “[j]ust because [he] was not forced to be touched by a female staff or searched by her
or forced to come in contact with any other inmate does not decrease the substantial burden on
plaintiff’s religious exercise.” Id. at 18.
Defendants principally argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the First
Amendment because Southern District courts have held that strip searches do not violate the free
exercise rights of Muslim inmates. Defs. Mem. L. 6 (citing Shabazz v. Pico, 994 F. Supp. 460,
473 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), vacated in part on other grounds, 205 F.3d 1324 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Defendants rely on Shabazz, where the court dismissed on summary judgment a Muslim
inmate’s First Amendment challenge to a strip frisk policy, for the principle that it is not
unreasonable to require inmates to remove their clothing to permit a visual inspection of the
naked body. Defendants also cite to Smith v. Russell, No. 9:04cv1136, 2007 WL 274756, at *1
(N.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2007), where the court rejected on summary judgment a Muslim inmate’s
challenge to a metal detector search in the presence of a female corrections officer. Defs. Mem.
L. 6. There, the plaintiff “was never naked in front of [the female officer], and his genitals were
never exposed in her presence or in the presence of any officers during the search.” Smith, 2007
8

WL 274756, at *1. Smith and Shabazz are inapposite, however, because those cases were
decided at the summary judgment phase and because neither of those cases involved the forced
nudity of a Muslim inmate in the presence of a female officer. Thus, neither can stand for the
proposition that plaintiff’s claims here are precluded as a matter of law.
“At this juncture (on a motion to dismiss), the Court only reviews the pleadings and takes
factual allegations at their word.” Bikur Cholim, Inc. v. Vill of Suffern, 664 F. Supp. 2d 267, 276
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). Indeed, as the court in Bikur Cholim noted, whether the defendants’ actions
support the plaintiff’s contention that the enforcement of a challenged policy would in fact create
a substantial burden on the plaintiff’s religious exercise “is not a question to be answered on a
rule 12(b) motion to dismiss.” Id. On a motion to dismiss, the court’s inquiry on substantial
burden “turns on whether [being covered outside the presence of one’s wife] ‘is considered
central or important to [Plaintiff’s] practice of Islam.’” Covington v. Mountries, No. 13-CV-343
VEC, 2014 WL 2095159, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2014) (quoting Ford, 352 F.3d at 593-54).
Based on Plaintiff’s contention that showering in the presence of a female guard violated a
central tenet of his religion, the Court finds that Woodward has met the “not . . . particularly
onerous task” of establishing a substantial burden at the motion to dismiss stage. 9
The Court reaches the same conclusion with respect to Woodward’s allegation regarding
the presence of the homosexual inmate. Plaintiff claims that “[t]he unlawfulness of being nude
outside of ones [sic] wife is a general one of prohibitedness in the [M]uslim religion that applies
to being nude in the presence of the same sex . . . .” Pl. Opp. Mem. L. 17. Woodward further
9

See also Covington, 2014 WL 2095159, at *4 (“Applying [the substantial burden] test is not always easily
accomplished on a motion to dismiss, given that ‘the substantial burden test requires courts to distinguish important
from unimportant religious beliefs.’ ‘Always present is the danger that courts will make conclusory judgments
about the unimportance of the religious practice to the adherent rather than confront the often more difficult
inquiries into sincerity, religiosity and the sufficiency of the penological interest asserted to justify the burden.’”
(quoting Ford, 352 F.3d at 593)).

9

alleges that being naked in the presence of the homosexual inmate satisfies the burden of
establishing that he was pressured to commit an act forbidden by his religion. Id. Defendants
look to Livingston v. Griffin, No. 9:04-cv-00607-JKS, 2007 WL 1500382, at *15 (N.D.N.Y. May
21, 2007), for the argument that a court in this Circuit has held that it is not a substantial burden
on an individual inmate’s religious beliefs to be near another prisoner perceived as homosexual.
Defs. Mem. L. 6. 10 In Livingston, the court rejected on summary judgment the First Amendment
claim of a Muslim prisoner who refused to be shackled to, or seated next to, an inmate he
described as transsexual or homosexual. 2007 WL 1500382, at *16. The court found that the
plaintiff’s discomfort and stress did not amount to a substantial burden, but instead were “so
peripheral to Plaintiff’s religion that the burden is constitutionally de minimis.” Id. at *16 (citing
Ford, 352 F.3d at 593)).
Defendants’ reliance on Livingston fails for the same reasons that their reliance on Smith
and Shabazz fails. Livingston was decided at summary judgment and does not involve the forced
nudity of a Muslim inmate in the presence of a homosexual. Because Plaintiff has pleaded that
being nude outside the presence of one’s wife is a general prohibition in the Muslim faith—and
has specified that this prohibition applies to nudity in the presence of members of the same sex—
the Court finds that Woodward has also met the substantial burden standard with respect to the
presence of the homosexual inmate. 11

10

Defendants mistakenly claim Livingston to be a decision from this Court.

11

To be sure, courts have routinely denied free exercise claims involving allegations similar to those pleaded by
Woodward. See, e.g., Kent v. Johnson, Civ. A. No. 84-CV-71307-DT, 1990 WL 507413, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 3,
1990) (determining on summary judgment that female guards’ observation of Muslim male prisoner in showers on
only three occasions during a two-and-a-half year period to be a “sparse number of viewings [that] is de minimis and
do not constitute any cause of action under the law”); Johnson v. Pennsylvania Bureau of Corr., 661 F. Supp. 425,
429, 438 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (granting motion for directed verdict where plaintiff’s allegation that female guards
observed plaintiff using the toilet in his cell at least ten, and perhaps more than 100, times was found to be
insufficient under the First Amendment); see also Sam’I v. Mintzes, 554 F. Supp. 416 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (granting

10

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint sufficiently states a First Amendment violation to
survive a motion to dismiss. 12
C. RLUIPA
RLUIPA offers similar protections to prisoners as the Free Exercise Clause but
“heightens the standard for both plaintiffs and defendants.” Graham v. Mahmood, No. 05 Civ.
10071 (NRB), 2008 WL 1849167, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2008). 13 “RLUIPA protects
inmates by providing that a government shall not ‘impose a substantial burden’ on the ‘religious
exercise’ of inmates in certain institutions unless the government shows that the burden furthers
a compelling interest by the least restrictive means.” Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 273 (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)); see also Holland, 2014 WL 3360615, at *7. “Only if a plaintiff shows
that his religious exercise has been substantially burdened, do the defendants need to show
something more than a rational relationship between the policy at issue and a governmental
interest.” Graham, 2008 WL 1849167, at *13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
For the required showing of a substantial burden under RLUIPA, Woodward must
demonstrate that the government’s action pressured him to commit an act forbidden by his
religion or prevented him from engaging in conduct or having a religious experience mandated
by his faith. See Muhammad v. City of New York Dep’t of Corr., 904 F. Supp. 161, 188
(S.D.N.Y. 1995). Additionally, “this interference must be more than an inconvenience; the
summary judgment on free exercise claim involving female guard’s pat-down search of Muslim male prisoner);
Jones v. Shabazz, Civ. No. H-06-119, 2007 WL 2873042, at *16 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2007) (dismissing on summary
judgment a Muslim inmate’s claim that “routinely strip-searching him in the presence of people, including female
officers” violated his First Amendment rights). However, none of the above cases were decided at the motion to
dismiss stage or are binding on this Court.
12

Cf. Covington, 2014 WL 2095159, at *5.

13

“RLUIPA does not authorize claims for monetary damages against state officers in either their official or
individual capacities.” Holland, 2014 WL 3360615, at *7. Accordingly, Plaintiff can recover only injunctive relief
in connection with the RLUIPA claim.

11

burden must be substantial and an interference with a tenet or belief that is central to religious
doctrine.” Davidson v. Davis, No. 92 Civ. 4040 (SWK), 1995 WL 60732, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
14, 1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Defendants’ principal argument with regard to RLUIPA is that this case is “highly
comparable” to the types of cases in which courts do not find a substantial burden. Defs. Mem.
L. 13 (citing Graham, 2008 WL 1849167, at *14). In Graham, the court dismissed an RLUIPA
claim on summary judgment because the correctional facility’s prohibition on attending more
than one weekly Nation of Islam meeting did not require plaintiff to “commit an act forbidden by
his religion [or prevent him] from engaging in conduct mandated by his faith.” 2008 WL
1849167, at *14 (internal quotation marks omitted). 14 However, because Graham was decided
on summary judgment and did not involve the issue of public nudity, Defendants’ argument is
unavailing.
For the same reasons as discussed above, Plaintiff has pleaded that his religious exercise
has been substantially burdened. Accordingly, Woodward has stated a claim for relief under
RLUIPA.
D. Qualified Immunity
Defendants contend that they are shielded from Plaintiff’s claims by the doctrine of
qualified immunity. Defs. Mem. L. 7. Under this doctrine, “government officials performing
discretionary functions generally are granted a qualified immunity and are ‘shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Wilson v. Layne, 526
14
Defendants similarly cite to Livingston to argue that showering in the presence of the homosexual inmate was not
a substantial burden under RLUIPA. Because the plaintiff in Livingston did not bring a RLUIPA claim, and again
because the court decided the issue on summary judgment, any reliance on Livingston here is unwarranted.

12

U.S. 603, 609, 119 S. Ct. 1692 (1999) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.
Ct. 2727 (1982)). “A defendant will thus not be liable for damages ‘if he did not violate clearly
established law or if it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that he was not violating
clearly established law.’” Pugh, 571 F. Supp. 2d at 510 (quoting Luna v. Pico, 356 F.3d 481,
490 (2d Cir. 2004)). As the Second Circuit has noted, a right is clearly established if (1) it is
defined with reasonable clarity; (2) the Supreme Court or the Second Circuit has recognized the
right; and (3) a reasonable defendant would have understood from the existing law that his
conduct was unlawful. Anderson v. Recore, 317 F.3d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Young v.
Cnty. of Fulton, 160 F.3d 899, 903 (2d Cir. 1998)); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 640, 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987) (“[O]ur cases establish that the right the official is alleged to
have violated must have been ‘clearly established’ in a more particularized, and hence more
relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”). The Second Circuit has further
established that “[t]he question is not what a lawyer would learn or intuit from researching case
law, but what a reasonable person in the defendant’s position should know about the
constitutionality of the conduct.” McCullough v. Wyandanch Union Free Sch., 187 F.3d 272,
278 (2d Cir. 1999). For qualified immunity to bar suit at the motion to dismiss stage, “[n]ot only
must the facts supporting the defense appear on the face of the complaint, but, as with all Rule
12(b)(6) motions, the motion may be granted only where it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.”
McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).

13

Defendants claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity because the First
Amendment right at issue was not clearly established. Defs. Mem. L. 8. To the contrary,
Plaintiff argues that Defendants “violated a clearly established law, . . . that strip frisk of
[Muslim] men is constitutional so long as the search is reasonable and not abusive.” Pl. Opp.
Mem. L. 14. Construing Plaintiff’s submissions liberally, the Court will examine whether
Woodward, or any other practicing Muslim inmate, had a clearly established right not to shower
in the presence of a female guard or a homosexual inmate.
The parties have not cited—and the Court has not found—any Supreme Court or Second
Circuit precedent establishing such a right. In Jean-Laurent, the court considered a Muslim
inmate’s claim that his being subjected to strip searches in the presence of female guards at
Downstate violated his First Amendment rights. 2013 WL 1129813, at *8. The court noted that
“[t]he taboo in the Islamic faith concerning male nudity in the presence of women is well
known,” and stated that it would not “second guess Plaintiff’s allegation that being forced to
stand in his underwear similarly infringed upon his freedom of religion.” Id. Nonetheless, the
court granted the Downstate officials’ motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds because
“no case law from the United States Supreme Court or the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
supports the theory that it violates a Muslim inmate’s constitutional rights to be searched in his
underwear in the presence of a female officer.” Id. at *9. 15 Like in Jean-Laurent, because of the

15

Cf. Smith, 2007 WL 274756, at *3 (dismissing complaint on summary judgment because a female correctional
officer “could not have understood that it was unlawful to be present while a male officer searched [the plaintiff]
with a metal detector while [he] was clothed in his undershorts, revealing his knees but not his genitals.”); Canedy v.
Boardman, 91 F.3d 30, 34 (7th Cir. 1996) (defendants entitled to qualified immunity on Muslim inmate’s claim that
strip searches in the presence of female guards violated his First Amendment rights because “it was not at all clear”
that the plaintiff’s “interest in observing Islam’s nudity taboos” outweighed the prison’s “very strong interest in
having its guards observe prisoners at all times and in all situations, and [its other] interest in providing equal
employment opportunity to women”).

14

absence of a clearly established right here, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
Woodward’s claims for damages are therefore DISMISSED. 16
E. Claims Against Deputy Commissioner Bellnier and Superintendent Perez
Even if Plaintiff’s claims for damages against Deputy Commissioner Bellnier and
Superintendent Perez were not barred by qualified immunity, Woodward has failed to show their
personal involvement in the conduct at issue. Indeed, Plaintiff makes clear that he has sued
Deputy Commissioner Bellnier because he “answer[ed] a complaint” that Woodward wrote to
the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Correctional and Community Services
“[i]n which [the Deputy Commissioner] refused to change the unconstitutional practices at
Downstate . . . .” Compl. at 5-A. Plaintiff further claims that Deputy Commissioner Bellnier is
liable because he failed to remedy the wrong by either allowing the inmates in the intake to use
the shower curtains used in the general prison population or to shower in their underwear. Pl.
Opp. Mem. L. 20. Superintendent Perez is named in the instant action merely because of her
role as Lieutenant Doe and Officer Perez’s supervisor. Compl. at 5-A.
In Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995), the Second Circuit established
that the personal involvement of a supervisory defendant may be shown by evidence that the
defendant (1) participated directly in the alleged violation; (2) failed to remedy the violation after
learning of it through a report or appeal; (3) created a custom or policy fostering the violation or
allowed the custom or policy to continue after learning about it; (4) was grossly negligent in
supervising the officers involved; or (5) exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of inmates
by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring. Colon v.
16

See Samuels v. Selsky, No. 01 Civ. 8235 (AGS), 2002 WL 31040370, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2002) (“As a
preliminary matter, it should be noted that qualified immunity is only a defense to claims for money damages and
[is] not a defense for equitable relief or injunctions.”).

15

Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995). In Iqbal, the Supreme Court noted that “[b]ecause
vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.” 556 U.S. at 676. As the Second Circuit recently observed, the limitation on
supervisory liability in Iqbal “has, of course, engendered conflict within our own Circuit about
the continuing vitality of the supervisory liability test set forth in Colon . . . .” Reynolds v.
Barrett, 685 F.3d 193, 205 n.14 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Aguilar v. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement Div., 811 F. Supp. 2d 803, 814 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The Court of Appeals has not yet
definitively decided which of the Colon factors remains a basis for establishing supervisory
liability in the wake of Iqbal, and no clear consensus has emerged among the district courts
within the circuit.”). Regardless of the viability of the factors established in Colon, Plaintiff has
failed to plead the level of personal involvement required to sustain a claim against Deputy
Commissioner Bellnier or Superintendent Perez.
It is well-established that a supervisory defendant’s receipt of a single letter identifying
an alleged wrong is insufficient for liability under Section 1983. See, e.g., Bellamy v. Mount
Vernon Hosp., No. 07 Civ. 1801 (SAS), 2009 WL 1835939, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2009)
(“The Supreme Court [in Iqbal] explicitly rejected the argument that . . . a supervisor’s mere
knowledge of his subordinate’s discriminatory purpose amounts to the supervisor’s violating the
Constitution. . . . For example, [t]he allegation that plaintiff sent defendant[] letters complaining
of prison conditions is not enough to allege personal involvement.” (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)); Higgins v. Artuz, No. 94 Civ. 4810 (SAS), 1997 WL 466505, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 14, 1997) (dismissing claims against the superintendent of correctional facility even where
the plaintiff alleged that he had personally informed the defendant of certain misconduct because
16

“[the] pleadings fail to allege facts demonstrating that [the defendant] had any direct
involvement, knowledge of, or responsibility for the alleged retaliation against plaintiff”);
Greenwaldt v. Coughlin, No. 93 Civ. 6551 (LAP), 1995 WL 232736, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19,
1995) (“[I]t is well-established that an allegation that an official ignored a prisoner’s letter of
protest and request for an investigation of allegations made therein is insufficient to hold that
official liable for the alleged violations. . . . To the extent that [the plaintiff] relies upon his
allegations that he sent letters to the defendants, his complaint must be dismissed.”).
Accordingly, even if qualified immunity did not apply, Woodward’s claims for damages against
Deputy Commissioner Bellnier could not be sustained.
Similarly, Supervisor Perez cannot be held liable “merely because [she was a]
supervisor[] or occupied a high position.” Martino v. Westchester Cnty. Dep’t of Corr., No. 06
Civ. 9900 (PKC), 2008 WL 144827, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2008); see also Balkum v. Sawyer,
No. 6:06-CV-1467, 2011 WL 5041206, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2011) (“Where a defendant is a
supervisory official, a mere linkage to the unlawful conduct through the prison chain of
command . . . is insufficient to show his personal involvement in that unlawful conduct.”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Because the only allegation relating to
Supervisor Perez is that she was a supervisor of certain other defendants, Woodward’s claims
against her are insufficient.
F. Claims for Injunctive Relief
Finally, the Court must consider Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief. “Under Article
III, section 2 of the Constitution, federal courts lack jurisdiction to decide questions that cannot
affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.” Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93, 99 (2d
Cir. 2003). “Such situations arise when ‘there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged
17

violation will recur, and interim relief of events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the
effects of the alleged violation.” Bellezza v. Fischer, No. 05 Civ. 98 (DLC), 2006 WL 3019760,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2006) (quoting Davis, 316 F.3d at 99). “In this circuit, an inmate’s
transfer from a prison facility generally moots claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against
officials of that facility.” Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 272. Woodward is no longer incarcerated at
Downstate Facility, and there is no allegation that he is currently under the supervision of Officer
Perez, Lieutenant Doe, or Superintendent Perez. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive
relief cannot be sustained against those defendants. Cf. Prins v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 504, 506 (2d
Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (“Since Prins is no longer incarcerated at either Green Haven or Clinton,
he cannot get injunctive relief.”). The Court further finds Woodward’s claim for injunctive relief
against Deputy Commissioner Bellnier moot because Plaintiff has provided no indication that he
will be, or has been, forced to shower naked in the presence of a female guard or homosexual
inmate at Elmira Correctional Facility. The Court therefore concludes that there is no reasonable
expectation that the alleged violations will recur. Cf. Andino v. Fischer, 698 F. Supp. 2d 362,
380 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“It appears that Madison’s claims for such relief extended only so far as
his denial of participation in the feed-in program at Woodbourne. As he has not indicated that he
has applied for, or been denied participation in, such a program at Mid-State, any prospective
relief claims should be dismissed.”); Kee v. Hasty, No. 01 Civ. 2123 (KMW) (DF), 2004 WL
807071, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2014) (“Since Kee is no longer being held at the MCC, there is
‘no reasonable expectation’ that alleged wrongful conduct directed toward him will be repeated.
Therefore, to the extent that they request prospective relief, Kee’s claims are moot, and I

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