Sagastivelsa-Garcia v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER re: 13 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Commissioner of Social Security. The Court has reviewed the entire record and finds that the ALJ's determination is free from legal error and supported by substa ntial evidence in the record. Accordingly, the Commissioners motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED, and the Complaint is dismissed in its entirety. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to Plaintiff, to terminate Docket No. 13, and to close the case. (Signed by Judge Jesse M. Furman on 1/6/2014) (lmb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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CARMEN IVETTE SAGASTIVELSA-GARCIA,
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Plaintiff,
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-v:
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CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
:
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
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Defendant. 1
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01/06/2014

12 Civ. 9168 (JMF)
MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER

JESSE M. FURMAN, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Carmen Sagastivelsa-Garcia, proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (the “Act”), challenging a final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) finding her ineligible for Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”). Pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Commissioner moves, without opposition, for judgment on the pleadings. (Docket No. 13). For
the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The following background is derived from the administrative record, which the
Commissioner filed with the Court pursuant to Title 42, United States Code, Section 405(g).
(Transcript of the Administrative Record (“Tr.”) (Docket No. 11)). Plaintiff first applied for SSI
benefits on July 13, 2009 (id. 248-59), reporting April 1, 2009, as the onset date for her disability

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On February 14, 2013, Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of Social
Security. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, she is substituted as
Defendant. The Clerk of Court is directed to modify the caption accordingly.

(id. 253, 283). She claimed that she was entitled to receive SSI benefits because of a disability
of degenerative disc disease of lumbar spine, depressive disorder with psychosis, and asthma.
(Id. 283). The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied the application. (Id. 60-64).
Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (Id. 67-68). On June
14, 2011, Plaintiff and her attorney appeared before the ALJ for the hearing. (Id. 23). On
August 23, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the
meaning of the Act. (Id. 23-32). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on
November 30, 2012, thus rendering the ALJ’s decision final. (Id. 1-8). Plaintiff subsequently
sought review in this Court.
DISCUSSION
An ALJ determines whether an applicant is disabled using a five-step, sequential inquiry
that considers whether the applicant (1) is “doing substantial gainful activity”; (2) has a “severe
medically determinable physical or mental impairment that meets the duration requirement in [20
C.F.R.] § 404.1509, or a combination of impairments” that does so; (3) has an “impairment(s)
that meets or equals one of [the] listings in appendix 1 of [§ 404.1520]”; (4) is still able to
“do . . . past relevant work” depending on an “assessment of [the applicant’s] residual functional
capacity . . . and past relevant work”; and (5) whether the applicant can “make an adjustment to
other work” depending on an “assessment of [the applicant’s] residual functional capacity . . . ,
age, education, and work experience.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). Judicial review of a decision
by the Commissioner is limited. In particular, a court may set aside a final decision only if the
Commissioner’s findings are not supported by “substantial evidence” or the decision was based
on legal error. Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 2010); accord Shaw v. Chater, 221
F.3d 126, 131-32 (2d Cir. 2000). Neither is the case here.

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First, the ALJ properly applied the five-step sequential evaluation process in determining
that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. Specifically, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since July 13, 2009, the date of her
application, and that she had two severe impairments — degenerative disc disease of lumbar
spine as well as depressive disorder — pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). (Tr. 25). At the third
step of the inquiry, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s impairments did not “meet or medically
equal” any of the listings in appendix 1 of Section 404.1520. (Id. 26-27). Proceeding to the
fourth step, therefore, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was able to perform sedentary work that
did not involve either exposure to “excessive smoke, dust, or other known respiratory irritants”
or “detailed and complex work requiring constant contact with others and the general public.”
(Id. 27). The ALJ found that Plaintiff was not able to perform her past relevant work as a cashier
because that “type of work necessarily demands . . . constant contact with the general public”
and that Plaintiff’s “mental residual functional capacity would not allow her to still perform
th[at] type of work.” (Id. 30-31). The ALJ thus proceeded to the fifth and final step of the
inquiry, finding — based on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines set forth at 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 2 — that, in view of Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and
residual functional capacity, there were a significant number of jobs available in the national
economy that Plaintiff could perform. (Id. 31-32).
Those findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record, including both
medical and non-medical evidence. Among other things, the findings are supported by the
assessment of Plaintiff’s treating orthopedist, Dr. Dassa, who found some motion limitations and
strain in Plaintiff’s spine, but no indication of disc herniation or impairment in the motor system
and reflexes (id. 592; see also id. 28, 567-68, 570, 589-90); and the opinions of a consulting

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physician, Dr. Bougakov, that Plaintiff did not have memory difficulties or a thought disorder,
and that she could follow and understand simple directions and instructions (id. 30, 507-09). To
be sure, Plaintiff herself claimed greater limitations, and her treating psychiatrist, Dr. Fruitman,
also reported greater restrictions on mental functioning. (Id. 28-30). But the ALJ found
Plaintiff’s testimony not credible based on, among other things, the fact that it was not
substantiated by the objective findings in the record, was inconsistent with the full range of daily
activities she engaged in, and was belied by the overall conservative treatment she had received.
(Id.). And the ALJ declined to rely on Dr. Fruitman’s more restrictive findings both because
they were inconsistent with other evidence in the record — namely, Dr. Bougakov’s assessments
— and because they were inconsistent with other findings and opinions of Dr. Fruitman himself.
(Id. 30). Based on a review of the entire record, the Court cannot say that these conclusions were
in error. See, e.g., Gates v. Astrue, 338 Fed. App’x 46 (2d Cir. 2009); Pidkaminy v. Astrue, 919
F. Supp. 2d 237 (N.D.N.Y. 2013); Harris-Batten v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 05 Civ. 7188
(KMK), 2012 WL 414292 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2012); McDonaugh v. Astrue, 672 F. Supp. 2d 542
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); Barringer v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 358 F. Supp. 2d 67 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).
CONCLUSION
The Court has reviewed the entire record and finds that the ALJ’s determination is free
from legal error and supported by substantial evidence in the record. Accordingly, the
Commissioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED, and the Complaint is
dismissed in its entirety. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this Memorandum
Opinion and Order to Plaintiff, to terminate Docket No. 13, and to close the case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 6, 2014
New York, New York

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