Reyes v. Rite-Line Transportation, Inc. et al

Filing 15

OPINION: re: 8 MOTION to Remand filed by Rosa Reyes. Upon the facts and conclusions set forth above, the Plaintiff's motion to remand is granted and the action is remanded to Bronx Supreme Court. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 6/26/2013) (cd)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

------x
ROSA REYES,
Plaintiff,

13 Civ. 968

-against-

OPINION

RITE-LINE TRANSPORTATION, INC. and
JAMES DUGAN,
Defendants.

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A P PEA RAN C E S:

Atto

Plaintiff

. RAPHAELSON AND LEVIN LAW FIRM P.C.

14 Penn Plaza

New York, NY 10122

By: Andrew Jason Levine, Esq.

Att

s

LAW OFFICES OF LORNE M. REITER, LLC

14 Wall Street, 20~ Floor

New York, NY 10005

By: Lorne M. Reiter, Esq.

Sweet, D.J.

Plaintiff Rosa Reyes ("Reyes") has moved to remand
this case to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Bronx
County (the "Bronx Supreme Court") pursuant to New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR")
Plaintiff originally

§

led a ve

602 and 28 U.S.C.
fied complaint

"Complaint") in the Bronx Supreme Court aga
Line Transportation, Inc.
("Dugan")

§

1447{e).

(the

st defendants Rite­

("Rite-Line") and James Dugan

(collectively the "Defendants") for negligence.

Defendants removed the action to the Southern District of New
York based on

versity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.

§

1441.

Plaintiff now moves to remand the case back to the Bronx Supreme
Court so that the action may be consolidated with a case
currently pending in the Bronx Supreme Court.

Upon the facts and conclusions set forth below,
Plaintiff's motion is granted and the action is remanded to the
Bronx Supreme Court.

I. Prior Proceedings

1

Plaintiff brought an action against Defendants in the
Bronx Supreme Court, under Index Number 20129/2013, by filing
Complaint on January 11, 2013.

Plaintiff alleges that as a

result of Defendants' negligence in an automobile collision that
occurred on January 14, 2012, she suffered severe and personal
injuries to her mind and body, and was subjected to great
physical pain and mental anguish.
11, 2013, the Defendants fil

(Compl.

~

41).

a notice of removal,

On February
removing the

action from the Bronx Supreme Court to this Court on the ground
of diversity.

Plaintiff was granted an extension of time to file a
motion to remand, and filed the motion on May 8, 2013.
Defendants opposed the motion on May 28, 2013.

The instant

motion was marked fully submitted on June 19, 2013.

II.

The Facts

Reyes is a resident of the County of Bronx and the
State of New York.

(Compl.

~

1).

According to the Plaintiff,
State of Nebras

(Id.

~

2).

Dugan is a resident of the

According to the Defendants,

2

Dugan is a citizen and resident of Johnville, New Brunswick,
(Notice of Removal

Canada.

~

7) .

According to the Plaintiff, Rite-Line is a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Montana,
with
(Compl.

s principal place of business in the State of Montana.
~

3).

According to the Defendants, Rite-Line is a

citizen and resident of
(Notice of Removal

~

orenceville, New Brunswick, Canada.

6).

This matter arises out of an accident involving three
vehicles on January 14, 2012.

According to the Police Accident

Report, which is attached to Plainti
operator of a vehic

's motion,

Reyes was the

,which was involved in an accident with a

vehicle operated by Dugan and owned by Rite-Line, as well as a
vehicle operated by non-party Mike Tamay ("Tamay") and owned by
Manuel Tamay (the "Tamay vehi

e").

According to the Plaintiff,

non-party Carlos Duran-Para ("Duran-Para") was the operator of
the Tamay vehicle.

See Motion at 1,

~

5)

However, the

supporting documents attached to the motion suggest that DuranPara was actually a passenger in the vehicle driven by Reyes. 1

It is noted that there appears to be a conflict between Plaintiff's
assertion and Duran-Para's verified complaint, which is attached to the
Plaintiff's motion.
Motion at 1, 1 5 (alleging that ~[als a result
of the impact to the rear of her vehicle REYES was pushed into a third
vehicle which was operated
non party CARLOS DURAN-PARA") and Duran-Para's
3

Pr

to Reyes filing her action in the Bronx Supreme

Court, Duran-Para commenced a lawsuit in that court, under Index
Number 304346/2012.

That action arose from the same accident

and involved the same part

as the instant action.

However,

because Duran-Para made allegations of negligence against the
Defendants to this case Dugan and Rite-Line as well as the
Plaintiff Reyes, a resident of New York, his case is ineligible
for removal to federal court as complete divers
destroyed.

A preliminary conference was

y would

d on February 15,

2013, wherein document discovery was ordered and party
depos

ions were directed to occur on May 15, 2013.

(Motion at

2, 'lI 8).

Reyes now seeks remand on the grounds that because her
lawsuit and Duran-Para's arise out of the same set of facts,
they should be consolidated and

rd by one court, the Bronx

Supreme Court, in order to avoid inconsistency of discovery and
t

1 outcome in the two cases.

III. The Motion to Remand is Granted

complaint at ~~ 19-20 (alleging that "REYES controlled a motor vehicle
bearing New York
stration number, FG5482 . . . [and that] DURAN-PARA was
a passenger in the motor vehicle
New York registration number,
FGE5482.")). Because this fact is not dispositive to the instant motion, the
Court merely notes this apparent incongruity to the parties.
4

Plaintiff seeks remand on the basis of CPLR § 602
which states that "when actions involving a common question of
law or fact are pending before a court, the court may rna

such

other orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid
unnecessary costs or

lay."

CPLR § 602.

As the Defendants point out however, the two cases
that Plaintiff seeks to consolidate are pending
dif

rent courts, one federal and one state.

fore two

Thus, contrary to

Plaintiff's assertion that this motion is a simple matter to
consolidate under CPLR § 602(a), the issue is more complex.
Moreover, New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules apply to state
courts and is inapplicable to a federal court's procedure.
Accordingly, an examination of Plaintiff's secondary argument is
required.

"It is a fundamental princ
courts of limited jurisdiction.
jurisdiction, whether impos

e that federal courts are

The limits upon federal

by the Constitution or by

Congress, must be neither disregarded nor evaded."
ion Co. v
Ct. 2396, 57 L. Ed. 2d 274

r,
(1978).

Owen

437 U.S. 365, 378, 98 S.
Normal

,a

strict court

has subject matter jurisdiction over a civil action if the
5

matter involves a fede

question or if

controversy exceeds

$75,000 and is between citizens of different states.
U.S.C.

1331, 1332 (a) (1).

Sign i

See 28

cant 1 y, '" [i] n 1 i g h t

0

f the

congressional intent to restrict federal court jurisdiction, as
well as the importance of preserving
governments,

independence of state

ral courts construe the removal statute

narrowly, resolving any doubts against removability.'"
Pharma L.P. v. Kentuc

Cir. 1994)

, 704 F.3d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 2013)
fairs Int'l

(quoting

Purdue

Inc., 28 F.3d 269, 274

(2d

(alteration in original)) .

aintiff reI

s upon an application of 28 U.S.C. §

1447(e), which states that "[iJf after removal the plaintiff
seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would destroy
subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or
permit joinder and remand the action to the State court."

In

the interest of avoiding multiple and duplicative litigation,
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e), which awards federal
courts "discretion when deciding whether to remand a case to
state court by balancing the equit

s involved and weighing the

interests and prejudices to each party involved."
Southland Co

Morze v.

816 F. SUppa 369, 370 (E.D.Pa. 1993).

as Defendants correctly point out, Section 1447(e) is

6

However,

ause there are no

inapplicable as to the instant case

additional defendants seeking joinder to destroy diversity.

Plaintiff also

es to Mensah v. World Truck Co

210 F. Supp. 2d 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), for the proposition that
courts have the

ght to exe

se discretion with respect to
ing the equities,

remanding a case back to state court by ba

interests and prejudices of the parties involved.

Plaintiff

contends that this Court should adopt the Mensah court's
reasoning and cons

r the request to remand under the rubric of

Section 1447(e).

Plaintiff advances that the present facts are
virtually indistinguishable from those in Mensah.
the defendants Edward Manning and Wo
involved
Mensah.

d Truck Corporation were

an accident with a vehicle operat
Id. at 321.

In Mensah,

by plaintiff Yaw

Like Reyes, Mensah filed the original case

the Bronx Supreme Court and

fendants subsequently removed

the case to federal court on the

sis of diversity.

Id.

Shortly thereafter, the two passengers in Mensah's car filed two
separate actions in the state court.
not removed.

Id.

Id.

Those actions were

Discovery proceeded slowly in the federal

case, the parties failed to meet a schedule trial date, and the
case did not settle.

The defendants then sought to remand the
7

case back to state court where it could be consolidated with the
purposes of a joint t

other two actions for
plaintiff did not oppose.

aI, which the

Id.

In its opinion, the Mensah court acknowledged that
such an issue of remand "seems to be a situation of first
impression in this Circuit."

Id. at 321 n.1.

The court also

recognized that "section 1447(e) addresses the situation, where,
after removal, a plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants
whose joinder would
at 322.

stroy subject matter jurisdiction."

Id.

It recognized, however, that "[s]uch a situation [did]

not exist[] in [that] case, but the policy rationa
section 1447(e)

[could] be applied.

rd.

behind
The court

concluded that it would make "an effort to avoid piecemeal
litigation and the
results."

sk of inconsistent and contradictory

By granting remand, the court found that "the

interests of justice" was best served because "all of the claims
of the parties will be heard in one forum,

reducing the risk of

inconsistent results and allowing for a comprehensive resolution
of this conflict."

rd.

The Court also stressed that "both

parties support remand to state court[,]" which weighed in favor
of just

being served by the remand.

8

rd.

The Plaintiff also relies on Morze to support
motion.

816 F. Supp. at 369.

an action aga

iff commenced

In Morze, a pIa

st defendants for damages sustained on property

leased by the defendants.
ba

r

on diversity.

Id.

rd.

Defendants removed the case

During discovery, plaintiff

scovered

franchisee had a duty to clean up the area, and choose

that

to pursue a cause of action against him in state court.
Plaintiff therea

moved to remand the federal court action to

state court to consolidate it with the action fil
franchisee.

rd.

against the

The joinder of the franchisee, however, "would

destroy diversity and thereby divest th[e] court of subject
matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims."

In consi

ring the motion, the Morze court noted that

purpose of the federal statute

rmitting remand is to

prevent multiple and duplicative litigation.
the same plaintiff

Id.

It determined that

a potential cause of action against both

defendants and that "the elements and facts relevant to
cause of action overlap considerably."

rd.

Thus, the court

held that the plaintiff's motion to remand was an attempt to
promote t

judicial economy contemplated by the statute.

A strict application of 28 U.S.C.
result in the grant of remand only where a p
9

§

Id.

1447(e) would
intiff seeks to

j

additional

remanded action.

fendants who would destroy diversity in the
Mensah and Morze 1

However,

suggest that the policy rationale of

of cases

ction 1447(e) could, and

should, extend to avoid "multiple and duplicative litigation[.]"
Mensah, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 322.

While the

ies

Mensah

supported the remand in that case, the Court found it to be but
one factor and stat

and

that "[t]he most logical, economi

equitable approach is to determine the respective rights and
liabilit
Id.

of all relevant parties inter se in one proceeding."

(quoting Morze, 816 F. Supp. at 371).

Accordingly, in weighing the interests and prejudices
to

party involved, this matter and the Bronx Supreme Court

action appear to share the same operative facts from the events
of January 14, 2012, the same evidence such as the Police
Accident Report, and involve the same part
Absent remand,

aintiff will most li

simultaneously 1

igate

s and counsel.

ly unnecessari

ical facts in two j

and

sdictions,

conduct two courses of discovery, and appear for multiple
deposit

While Defendant's oppos

jurisdiction has

that divers

y

established is duly noted and appreciated,

remand seems especially approp

ate

re considering the real

risk of inconsistent verdicts, inconsistent testimony, and the

10

potential of the lack of congruity in the resolution of this
conflict.

IV.

Lastly,

judicial economy weighs in favor of remand.

Conclusion

upon the facts and conclusions set forth above, the
Plaintiff's motion to remand is granted and the action is
remanded to

Bronx Supreme Court.

It is so ordered.

New York, NY
June ),..b, 2013

ROBERT W. SWEET
U.S.D.J.

11