McCord v. The City of New York et al
Filing
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ORDER: The motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute is GRANTED. This action is dismissed with prejudice. The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a)(3), that any appeal from its order would not be taken in good faith and, therefore, that in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). (Signed by Judge Alison J. Nathan on 9/4/2014) (djc)
USDCSDNY
DOCUMENT
UNTTFD STATES DTSTRTCT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC#:
DAT£
ANTHONY MCCORD,
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FILED~Sf P C~
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2014
Plaintiff,
13-cv-2008 (AJN)
-vORDER
CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,
Defendants.
ALISON J. NATHAN, District Judge:
Before the Co mi is Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(b) for Plaintiffs failure to prosecute the action. For the reasons stated below, the
motion is granted.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Sing Sing Correctional Facility, filed this action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prose on March 25, 2013. Dkt. No. 2 (Compl.). His complaint alleges
that two New York Police Department officers violated several of his constitutional rights in the
course of his arrest and prosecution on robbery, burglary, and assault charges. Id The case was
referred to Magistrate Judge Cott on August 21, 2013. Dkt. No. 8. On October 1, 2013,
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt.
No. 15. In light of his pro se status, the Court set an extended deadline of October 28, 2013 for
Plaintiff to amend the Complaint or file his opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss. Dkt.
No. 18. The plaintiff had filed neither an amended complaint nor an opposition by November
15, 2013, so the Court issued another Order giving Plaintiff a final chance to file by December
16, 2013. Dkt. No. 19.
Plaintiff again did not file, and on January 6, 2013, the Court granted Defendants' motion
to consider the motion fully submitted. Dkt. No. 21. On June 6, 2014, the Court granted
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Defendants' motion in part and denied it in part, and ordered the Plaintiff to file a letter by July
7, 2014 indicating whether he wished to file an amended complaint to state an excessive force
claim or proceed on his original complaint. Dkt. No. 22. The order warned Plaintiff that failure
to file a letter by the deadline could result in dismissal for failure to prosecute, in light of his lack
of communication in response to the motion to dismiss. Id.
The Plaintiff again did not respond, and on August 11, 2014, the Defendants filed a letter
requesting that the Court dismiss for failure to prosecute. Dkt. No. 24. In response, the Court set
August 31, 2014 as a final deadline for the Plaintiff to submit a letter, and stated that it would
dismiss his remaining claims for failure to prosecute if he did not respond. Dkt. No. 25. That
deadline has since passed without a filing from the Plaintiff.
II.
DISCUSSION
Under Rule 41(b), "If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a
court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it." Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(b). The Second Circuit has held that
a district court contemplating dismissing a plaintiffs case, under Rule 41 (b), for
failure to prosecute must consider: "[ 1] the duration of the plaintiffs failures, [2]
whether plaintiff had received notice that further delays would result in dismissal,
[3] whether the defendant is likely to be prejudiced by further delay, [4] whether
the district judge has take[ n] care to strik[ e] the balance between alleviating court
calendar congestion and protecting a party's right to due process and a fair chance
to be heard ... and [5] whether the judge has adequately assessed the efficacy of
lesser sanctions."
LeSane v. Hall's Sec. Analyst, Inc., 239 F.3d 206, 209 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Alvarez v.
Simmons Mkt. Research Bureau, Inc., 839 F.2d 930, 932 (2d Cir. 1988)) (alterations in original).
Because "Rule 41 (b) dismissal remains a 'harsh remedy to be utilized only in extreme
situations,"' LeSane, 239 F.3d at 209 (quoting Theilmann v. Rutland Hospital, Inc., 455 F.2d
853, 855 (2d Cir. 1972) (per curiam)), it is a remedy that should be "employ[ed] only when [the
district court] is sure of the impotence of lesser sanctions.'" Thrall v. Cent. N. Y Reg 'l Transp.
Auth., 399 F. App'x 663, 666 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Martens v. Thomann, 273 F.3d 159, 179
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(2d Cir. 2001 )) (alterations in original). Prose litigants are given special solicitude in complying
with procedural requirements. Lucas v. Miles, 84 F.3d 532, 535 (2d Cir. 1996).
Even with this deference to Plaintiffs prose status, dismissal is warranted here. First,
the Court has received no communication from Plaintiff since the Complaint was filed nearly a
year and a half ago. Second, the Court has extended deadlines for Plaintiff to file on several
occasions, including with regard to the earlier motion to dismiss and with the more recent order
to indicate Plaintiffs intent to proceed. Both of those extensions were accompanied by warnings
that the action could be dismissed if Plaintiff did not respond, as was the Court's order directing
Plaintiff to file a letter by July 7, 2014. Third, Defendants can have no means to prepare a
defense or expect a resolution of this case in light of Plaintiffs failure to proceed at all since
filing the Complaint. Fourth, Plaintiff has been given multiple opportunities to be heard, and a
portion of his Complaint survived dismissal under Rule l 2(b)( 6) despite his lack of action. And
fifth, there is no lesser sanction available after such a lengthy period of inaction. See, e.g., Ruzsa
v. Rubenstein & Sendy A ttys. at Law, 520 F.3d 176, 178 (2d Cir. 2008) ("[I]n light of [plaintiffs]
failure to respond to the notice threatening dismissal, it is equally unclear that a 'lesser sanction'
would have proved effective in this case."); Lehman v. Garfinkle, No. 08 Civ. 9385 (SHS), 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149016, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2013) ("Lehman has still not responded to
this Court's September 24 order to show cause, making it unclear how any sanction short of
dismissal with prejudice would prove effective."); Blake, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15120, at *5-6
(dismissing case with prejudice for failure to prosecute after substantial period of time passed
with no contact from plaintiff); Jones v. Reid, No. 85 Civ. 4515 (PKL), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14591, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 1990) (dismissing case with prejudice due to "plaintiffs refusal
to comply with [magistrate judge's] repeated orders [that] caused [the] case to stagnate for
almost a year").
III.
CONCLUSION
The motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute is GRANTED. This action is dismissed
with prejudice. The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 19 l 5(a)(3), that any appeal from its
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order would not be taken in good faith and, therefore, that in forma pauperis status is denied for
the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.
, 2014
Dated: Sept. ~
New York, New York
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