Woodason v. United States of America

Filing 4

OPINION AND ORDER. Woodasons March 26, 2013 petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied. In addition, a certificate of appealability shall be not granted. The petitioner has not made a substantial showing of a denial of a federal right and appell ate review is, therefore, not warranted. Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 241 (2d Cir. 1998); Rodriquez v. Scully, 905 F.2d 24, 24 (2d Cir. 1990). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), any appeal from this Opinion and Order would not be taken in good faith. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). The Clerk of Court shall close the case. (Signed by Judge Denise L. Cote on 2/20/2014) (gr)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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:
JAMES M. WOODASON,
:
:
Petitioner
:
:
-v:
:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
:
:
Respondent.
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:
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13 Civ. 2020 (DLC)
10 Cr. 1156 (DLC)

OPINION AND ORDER

APPEARANCES
For the Petitioner:
Stephen M. Smith
1425 N. Broad Street, Suite 201
New Orleans, LA 70119
For the Respondent:
Benjamin Sirota
U.S. Department of Justice
26 Federal Plaza, Room 3630
New York, NY 10278

DENISE COTE, District Judge:
On March 26, 2013, James Woodason (“Woodason”) filed a
petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 for a writ of habeas
corpus.

Woodason asserts that his defense counsel, a member of

the Federal Defender’s Office in this district, provided
ineffective assistance of counsel to him.

Because his petition

was filed more than a year after the one-year statute of

limitations for the filing of habeas petitions and because he
has failed to demonstrate a basis for equitable tolling, his
petition is denied.

BACKGROUND
On August 3, 2010, a criminal complaint was filed against
Woodason.

On November 19, he pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea

agreement to a four-count Information charging him with a scheme
to defraud his former employer, Con Edison.

The plea agreement

contained a customary waiver of appellate rights and the right
to bring a habeas petition, conditioned on the sentence not
exceeding the sentencing guidelines range.
On December 9, 2011, Woodason was sentenced principally to
70 months’ imprisonment, which was at the bottom of his
guidelines range.

Judgment was entered on December 15.

His

conviction became final on December 29, when his time to file an
appeal expired.
On January 17, 2013, Woodason’s attorney requested a 60-day
extension to file a § 2255 petition.

The request was denied on

January 23, in an order that cited Green v. United States, 260
F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 2001), and explained that, because the
Court lacked jurisdiction to consider Woodason’s request, the
timeliness of any § 2255 petition Woodason chooses to file would
be considered in due course.
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On March 26, 2013, Woodason’s petition and supporting
memorandum of law were docketed.

In an Order of April 1, the

Court, having concluded that the timeliness of the petition
should be addressed before reaching the merits, ordered the
Government to file a response to the petition.

The Government

filed its response on May 29, and Woodason his reply on July 12.

DISCUSSION
AEDPA provides a one-year period of limitations for a
federal inmate to file a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
which begins to run from the latest of a number of triggering
events, including “the date on which the judgment became final
by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time
for seeking such review,” id. § 2244(d)(1)(A), and “the date on
which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented
could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence,” id. § 2244(d)(1)(D).

The appropriate triggering

event here is the expiration of Woodason’s time for seeking
appellate review: December 29, 2011.

Accordingly, his time to

file a habeas petition expired on December 29, 2012.

Woodason’s

petition was not docketed until March 26, 2013 -- almost three
months after the one-year deadline had passed.
The one-year limitations period for § 2255 petitions may be
equitably tolled “where the petitioner shows (1) that he has
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been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely
filing.”

Rivas v. Fischer, 687 F.3d 514, 538 (2d Cir. 2012)

(citing Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)).

The

determination that circumstances faced by petitioner were
“extraordinary” “depends not on how unusual the circumstance
alleged to warrant tolling is among the universe of prisoners,
but rather how severe an obstacle it is for the petitioner
endeavoring to comply with AEDPA’s limitations period.”
(citation omitted).

Id.

As a general matter, “a garden variety

claim of excusable neglect,” id. (citation omitted), and “the
usual problems inherent in being incarcerated” are insufficient
to warrant equitable tolling.

Baldayaque v. United States, 338

F.3d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 2003).
“[M]edical conditions, whether physical or psychiatric, can
manifest extraordinary circumstances, depending on the facts
presented.”

Harper v. Ercole, 648 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2011).

Generally, however, “a party seeking equitable tolling based on
a medical condition or hospitalization would be expected to
provide corroborating evidence of the condition and its
severity.”

Id. at n.4.

In addition to demonstrating the existence of extraordinary
circumstances, petitioner “must further demonstrate that those
circumstances caused him to miss the original filing deadline.”
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Id. at 137.

The requisite causal link may be lacking “where the

identified extraordinary circumstances arose and concluded early
within the limitations period,” because in such cases “a
diligent petitioner would likely have no need for equity to
intervene to file within the time remaining to him.”

Id.

Woodason seeks equitable tolling on the ground that he was
unable to file timely his petition due to his medical
circumstances.

He alleges in his reply that, upon entering the

federal detention facility, he was immediately hospitalized for
treatment and care of his prostate cancer and diabetes.

It was

not until July 2012 that he was released to the general prison
population and able to access the prison law library and speak
with jailhouse lawyers.

Woodason asserts that it was not until

January 2013 that he became aware of how to attack his sentence
under § 2255.
These circumstances do not warrant equitable tolling.
Woodason has established neither an “extraordinary” circumstance
nor the causal link necessary to warrant equitable relief.
Woodason has failed to provide any evidence that corroborates
the severity of his medical condition, despite making the
seriousness of his condition central to his claim of an
“extraordinary” circumstance.

Cf. Harper, 648 F.3d at 137 n.4.

Additionally, because the alleged extraordinary circumstance
concluded in July 2012 –– five months before the one-year
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statute of limitations expired in December 2012 -- Woodason has
failed to establish any “need for equity to intervene” on his
behalf.

Id. at 137.

Woodason makes principally two arguments in response,
neither of which is persuasive.

First, Woodason invokes an

alternative triggering event for the statute of limitations.

He

contends that, because he was unable to conduct legal research
until July 2012, when he was released from the hospital, July
2012 is “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise
of due diligence,” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), and thus the oneyear statute of limitations expired in July 2013, not December
2012.

This argument fails.

“[I]t should go without saying that

a factual predicate must consist of facts.

Conclusions drawn

from preexisting facts, even if the conclusions are themselves
new, are not factual predicates for a claim.”
at 535.

Rivas, 687 F.3d

Woodason was allegedly unable to discover legal

conclusions, not the factual predicates giving rise to his
claim.
Second, to establish causation, Woodason seeks to analogize
his circumstances to those in Harper, in which equitable tolling
was granted.

648 F.3d at 142.

Harper, however, concerned a

situation in which an inmate, with 78 days left in the
limitations period, was hospitalized for 98 days.
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Id. at 135.

Because Harper’s hospitalization occurred immediately prior to
and through the deadline, the causal link between the alleged
extraordinary circumstance and the missed deadline was
sufficiently strong that the Court of Appeals stated that the
respondent “does not [] and cannot [] argue that this case
presents such a causation concern.”
added).

Id. at 138 (emphasis

Woodason’s hospitalization, by contrast, concluded five

months before the deadline for his habeas petition.

Thus Harper

provides no assistance to Woodason in demonstrating causation.

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CONCLUSION
Woodason’s March 26, 2013 petition for a writ of habeas
corpus is denied.

In addition, a certificate of appealability

shall be not granted.

The petitioner has not made a substantial

showing of a denial of a federal right and appellate review is,
therefore, not warranted.

Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235,

241 (2d Cir. 1998); Rodriquez v. Scully, 905 F.2d 24, 24 (2d
Cir. 1990).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), any appeal from

this Opinion and Order would not be taken in good faith.
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).

The Clerk

of Court shall close the case.

SO ORDERED:
Dated:

New York, New York
February 20, 2014
__________________________________
DENISE COTE
United States District Judge

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