Mahon v. Doe et al

Filing 60

OPINION & ORDER re: 49 MOTION for Reconsideration re; 48 Clerk's Judgment, filed by Kalonji Mahon. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is denied. The Clerk of Court is requested to close the motion pending at docket entry 49 and to transmit the record of this decision to the Court of Appeals, see Dkt. 56. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Ronnie Abrams on 5/21/2015) (ajs)

USDC-SDNY
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONI CALLY FILED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MAY 2 1 ·2015
- ·
'

DOC#:
DATE FILEb':

KALONJI MAHON,
Plaintiff,
v.

No. 13-CV-2076 (RA)

NYC Corrections Officer ROSSLYN
MCCALL, NYC Corrections Officer
KIMBERLY WILLIAMS, DEBORAH
MOULTRIE, Grievance Supervisor at NYC
Corrections/Rikers Island,

OPINION & ORDER

Defendants.

RONNIE ABRAMS, United States District Judge:
PlaintiffKalonji Mahon, proceedingpro se, seeks reconsideration of the Court's September
15, 2014 decision granting Defendants' motion to dismiss his Amended Complaint. Plaintiff
argues that the Court misunderstood his allegations regarding Defendants McCall and Williams,
the Correction Officers ("COs") whom he claims deliberately mishandled his legal mail while he
was in custody at the George R. Vierno Center ("GRVC") on Rikers Island. Properly understood,
he contends, his allegations amount to a legally sufficient claim that both Defendants denied him
his right of access to the courts. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration
is denied.

BACKGROUND
As the Court explained in its Opinion and Order ("Opinion") granting Defendants' motion
to dismiss, Dkt. 47, Plaintiff alleges that on July 12, 2012, he visited the GRVC mailroom to send
a piece of legal mail. Am. Compl. (Dkt. 15) at 3. The nature of this legal mail was unclear from
the face of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint; Plaintiff appeared to allege either that it was a letter

requesting additional time to file a pro se motion to set aside the verdict in a then-active state
criminal court case, or that it was the prose motion itself. Am. Compl. 3; Op. 2. Nevertheless,
after completing the necessary forms, Plaintiff handed his legal mail to Defendant McCall, the onduty mail officer, who purportedly told him his mail would "go out as soon as possible." Am.
Compl. 3. He further alleges that Defendant McCall was aware both that his mail was legal material
and that it was urgent. Id. According to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff's mail-whatever its
contents-was due in state court no later than July 16, 2012. Id.
When Plaintiff appeared in state court on July 16, 2012, however, he was told that his
"motion" had not arrived. Id. The Court read Plaintiff's Amended Complaint to nevertheless
suggest that the state court judge granted him a one week extension-until July 24, 2012-to file
a prose motion to set aside the verdict. Op. 3. Upon his return from state court, Plaintiff inquired
with Defendant Williams, the on-duty mail officer, as to the status of the legal mail sent on July
12, 2012. Am. Com pl. 3. Defendant Williams purportedly informed Plaintiff that the status of his
mail was "unknown," but on August 6, 2012, Plaintiffs legal mail was returned to him by
Defendant McCall, who allegedly told him he had filled out the "wrong form even though she had
supposedly processed [his] legal mail." Id.
Plaintiff contends that the handling of his mail by Defendants McCall and Williams was
performed with "deliberate indifference and disregard," that this indifference caused him "to miss
deadline by court in order to preserve and address issues of constitutional and due process
dimensions," and that-had the state court received his prose motion by July 24, 2012-he would
have "been entitled to 'some form ofrelief as a clear matter of law." Am. Compl. 4. It is on this
basis that Plaintiff claims to have been denied his right of access to the courts.

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As the Court noted in its Opinion, however, two pieces of information cast doubt on
Plaintiffs claims of constitutional injury. First, the September 10, 2012 New York State Supreme
Court opinion attached to Plaintiffs opposition papers clearly indicates that the court received a
pro se motion to set aside the verdict, Opp. (Dkt. 45) Ex. B at 2, which, because Plaintiff's

Amended Complaint describes only one pro se motion, seemed to undermine his claims of
constitutional injury. Second, in his own opposition papers, Plaintiff acknowledges that his legal
mail-despite Defendants' purported tampering-did eventually reach state court, albeit on
August 14, 2014, several weeks after the July 24, 2012 deadline, but nearly a full month before
the state court's September 10, 2012 opinion denying his motion. Opp. 2.
Finding that Plaintiff had thus failed '"to allege any cognizable injury," and that Plaintiff
had-at best-alleged a mere "delay in communicating with the state court," the Court granted
Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's right of access to the courts claim. Op. 6.
In his motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff argues that the Court misunderstood his factual
allegations, and offers several new factual clarifications. Although he acknowledges that the state
court did consider, as it indicated in its opinion, a pro se motion he filed, Plaintiff contends that
this motion was "inchoate," and not the "perfected" motion he later placed in the mail at GRVC
on July 12, 2012 (the "Perfected Motion"). Mot. for Recons. (Dkt. 49) at 2. 1 Plaintiff now alleges
that he submitted two prose motions to state court-the earlier, "inchoate" motion (the "Inchoate
Motion") and the later, Perfected Motion. Id. It was this Perfected Motion, with which Defendants
allegedly interfered, that contained the additional legal arguments-purported Rosario violations

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In his motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff clarifies that it was the Perfected Motion that he mailed on July
12, 2012, and not a letter requesting an extension of time to file that motion. Mot. for Recons. 4. Plaintiff also clarifies
that the state court did not grant an extension from July 16, 2012 to July 24, 2012. Id at 5. Instead, "replacement
counsel simply moved trial court to hear his motion on July 23, 2012, from July 16, 2012." Id.

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and new grounds for finding his trial counsel ineffective-Plaintiff contends entitled him to relief
as a matter oflaw. /d. at 2-3. It is on this basis that Plaintiff seeks reconsideration. 2

LEGAL STANDARD
The standard for granting a motion for reconsideration "is strict, and reconsideration will
generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court
overlooked-matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion
reached by the court." Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). A motion
for reconsideration is not an opportunity for the parties to "present new facts or theories,"
Greenblatt v. Gluck, 265 F. Supp. 2d 346, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), and should only be granted "if

there is an intervening change of controlling law, new evidence becomes available, or there is a
need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice." Goldstein v. State of New York, No. 00
CIV. 7463 (LTS), 2001 WL 893867, at* 1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2001) aff'd, 34 F. App'x 17 (2d Cir.
2002).

DISCUSSION
Even assuming, in light of the latitude granted pro se litigants, Chavis v. Chappius, 618
F.3d 162, 171 (2d Cir. 2010), that the existence of a previously undisclosed third motion to set
aside the verdict does not constitute a "new fact," Greenblatt, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 350, Plaintiff's
motion for reconsideration is denied. Although his motion does cast doubt on whether it was the
Perfected Motion that the state court referred to in its September 10, 2012 decision, as opposed to
the Inchoate Motion, Mot. for Recons. 2, the state court at the very least considered two of
Plaintiff's motions, one of them counseled.

2

Plaintiff does not appear to challenge the Court's dismissal of his due process claim.

4

In any event, Plaintiff does not challenge the Court's conclusion that his July 12, 2012 legal
mail did eventually arrive in state court, on August 14, 2012, and was thus before the court at the
time it rendered its September 10, 2012 decision. Op. 6; see also Opp. 2. Indeed, his motion for
reconsideration makes clear that it was his Perfected Motion-which contained the additional
arguments not raised in his Inchoate Motion-that Plaintiff attempted to mail on July 12, 2012 and
that ultimately reached the state court in mid-August. Opp. 2; Mot. for Recons. 2. 3
Therefore, even considering the facts provided in Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration in
addition to those asserted in his Amended Complaint and opposition materials, the Court
concludes, as it did originally, that Plaintiff cannot show the "actual injury" necessary to state a
claim for denial of right of access to the courts, Collins v. Goard, 581 F. Supp. 2d 563, 573
(S.D.N.Y. 2008), and that a second opportunity to amend would therefore be futile. At the very
least, in light of the full record now before it, the Court cannot find that its decision granting
Defendants' motion to dismiss was "clear error." Goldstein, 2001 WL 893867, at* 1.

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To the extent Plaintiff alleges that the state court did not consider the Perfected Motion in addition to the
counseled motion and Inchoate Motion because the Perfected Motion was submitted after its due date, it is worth
noting that under New York law, "a defendant has no constitutional right to conduct a pro se defense while
simultaneously being represented by counsel." People v. Jordan, 466 N.Y.S.2d 486, 488 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) afj'd,
466 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1984). See also People v. White, 539 N.E.2d 577, 583 (N.Y. 1989) (rejecting defendant's
argument that "unless the [court] accepts prose supplemental briefs filed by indigent defendants, the result will be
that counsel's decision not to raise all nonfrivolous issues will bar defendants from obtaining a complete review of the
merits"). Indeed, whether to entertain a pro se motion by an otherwise counseled defendant-and even whether to
first ''inquire into whether the defense attorney is aware of the existence of the motion and has discussed its contents
with his or her client"~is a "matter committed to the sound discretion of the Trial Judge." People v. Rodriguez, 741
N.E.2d 882, 885 (N.Y. 2000) (quotation omitted).

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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration is denied. The Clerk of Court is
requested to close the motion pending at docket entry 49 and to transmit the record of this decision
to the Court of Appeals, see Dkt. 56.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

May 21, 2015
New York, New York
Ro nie Abrams
United States District Judge

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