New York Life Insurance Company v. Aleandre

Filing 27

OPINION re: 11 FIRST MOTION to Deposit Funds, filed by New York Life Insurance Company, 14 MOTION to Add. FIRST MOTION for Default Judgment as to Kimberly Lionel, FIRST MOTION for Summary Judgment for Life Insurance Proceeds, filed by Johanne Lionel Aleandre. For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's motion is granted in part and denied in part: Plaintiff is (1) allowed to commence an interpleader action; (2) permitted to deposit the insurance policies' $50,00 0 death benefit proceeds with the court as relating to Aleandre; (3) discharged from any further liability under the policies to Defendants; and (4) Defendants are enjoined from commencing any further litigation against NY Life relating to the polici es in this court or elsewhere. Plaintiff's motion for an award of attorneys' fees and costs is denied. Defendant Aleandre's motion for default and summary judgment is denied, and Aleandre is compelled to submit further support for her right to the death benefits to this Court. It is so ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 12/16/2013) (ja)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

---------x
NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

13 Civ. 2384

-against-

OPINION

JOHANNE LIONEL ALEANDRE and KIMBERLY
LIONEL,
Defendants.

---------- -----x
A P PEA RAN C E S:

Defendant Johanne Lionel Aleandre
LAW OFFICES OF ERIC DINNOCENZO

641 Lexington Avenue

New York, NY 10022

By:
Eric Dinnocenzo, Esq.

Attorney for Plaintiff
WHITE AND WILLIAMS LLP
One Penn Plaza, 41st Floor, Suite 4110
New York, NY 10119
By: Andrew Hamelsky, Esq.

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Sweet, D.J.

Insurance Company ("NY Life")

iff New York

P

seeks inte

r pursuant to Rule 22, to deposit the funds of

the life

policies of Defendant Johanne

onel Aleandre

("Aleandre") with the Court's registry pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
attorneys'

P. 67, and
cross moves

es and costs.

Defendant Aleandre

r default judgment against De

Lionel ("Kimberly"), and

Kimberly

NY Life to be

red to pay

amounts due and owing directly to Defendant

eandre.

Upon the facts and conclusions set
Plaintiff's motion is g

rth below,
i

in part and

in part, and

is denied.

Defendant Aleandre's mot

Facts & Procedural History

Marie D.

1 (the "Insured") was issued a

Insurance Policy on November 26, 2001 ("
1.)

The Insured was also issued a se

which became effect
(Compl. Ex. 2.)

icy 1").

Life Insurance Policy

on September 23, 2008
policies have a

$50,000.00, and the benefit amount
1

(Compl. Ex.

("Policy 2") .

ce amount value of
le upon the Insured's

death

r each policy was $50,000.00.

the benefi

aries to both policies as

and her sister, Aleandre, with each rece

Insured i

ified

r daughter, Kimberly,
fifty

(Compl. Exs. 3-4.)

Policy 1 contains the following pertinent

sion

under § 2.4:

Beneficiary
beneficiary
r any life insurance
proceeds is
person or entity named in the
application, or in a notice you sign that
the
information we need.
If more than one
ary is
named, they can be classifi
as first, second, and so
on.
If two or more are
in a class, t
ir share
in the proceeds is equal, unless you state otherwise.
The stated shares will be
id to any first
benefici
es who survive
Insured.
If no first
benefi
s survive, payment will be
to any
benefi
surviving in
second class, and so on.

(Compl. Ex. 1.)
Policy 2 contains the following pertinent provision:

Naming of Beneficiary
stated
ne ciaries who
proceeds will be paid to any first
survive
Insured.
If no first
ficiaries
survive, payment will
made to any
ficiary
surviving in the second class, and so on.
ve in the same class have an
Bene
ries who s
equal
re in the proceeds, unless
shares are
stated otherwise.

(Compi. Ex. 2.)

2

The Insured di

on August 17, 2011.

the Insured had suf
siting Florida.

NY

arned

a gunshot wound to her torso while

(CompI. Ex. 5.)

,s

Following the I

death, Aleandre submitt

a claim for the death benefits under

the life insurance polic

s.

(CompI. Ex. 6.)

had received information t

Because NY

Insured's death was the result of a homic
investigated the

, NY

As part of this 1

i

on, John Murray

("Murray"), a Senior Representative in the CIa
Unit of the Se

benef

Insured.

See Affidavit of John Murray ("Murray

Murray attests that he contact

s cou

the Insured.

cts in the homicide of

be ruled out as

See id.

At first, Murray was

Orange County Sheriff's Department t
out as s
Murray lea
but
to

authorities on behalf

in November 2011 to ascertain whether the

i

i

Administration

ce Department of NY Life, investigated the

homicide of

of NY Life

fe further

ath of the Insured prior to

disability benefits.

Aff.").

the

cts.

See id.

Therea

was considered to

r considered a suspect,
involved and was refusing

sti

3

no one had been ru1

er, on October 25, 2013,

that Kimberly was no 10

e with the criminal

rmed by the

ion.

See id.

Murray

remained open

criminal investigation

d that t

was also repeatedly in
active.

In addition, Ken Smith, also a Senior
in the Claims Administration
NY Li

of the Se

, attested to the fact that

sentative

ce Department of

contacted

County Sheriff's Department numerous t

Orange

to ascerta

ficiaries had any involvement in t

death of the

See Affidavit of Ken Smith ("Smith Aff.U).

Insured.

whether

On

February 27, 2013, Smith contacted Detective Pelton of the
Orange County Sheriff's Department and was
had not

the Orange County She
re is an

r 10, 2013,

ion into

fe that

homicide of the

s are currently bei

ngs Letter ("Demings Let.U).

Jerry L.

Jerry L. Demings of

ff's Department advised NY

ing investi

Insured, and that su

developed.

As a res

See

of this

ion, taken together, NY Life informed Aleandre that it

was currently unable to pay her t
investigat
payment.

was ongo

death

fits while the

Aleandre continued to demand

Thereafter, NY Life commenced the instant action

pursuant to the Federal Interpl
P. 22.

eandre

ruled out as a suspect.

By letter dated Oct

in

sed that

Ai

r Act, 28 U.S.C.

Fed. R. Civ.

interposed an Answer to the First Amended
4

Complaint with Conterclaim and Cross-Claim, alleging that NY
Li

acted wrongfully and unreasonably by refusing to pay her

the

th bene

ts.

See

onel Answer.

To date, Defendant Kimberly has not interposed an
Answer in this matter.
hearing on t

Kimberly was present at the Court

instant motion on December 11, 2013 1 •

NY

fe has

agreed to pay Kimberly her share of the death benefits in the
amount of $50,000.00.

NY Li

maintains that they are currently

in the process of issuing benefit checks to Kimberly.

On November 12, 2013,
motion seeking an order:

Plaintiff filed the instant

(1) declaring and adjudicating that NY

fe's payment of $50,000.00 to the Court's Registry will be in
total satisfaction of both Ii
discharge and absolve NY
the parties hereto;

insurance poli

s and will

from any further liability to each

(2) releasing and discharging NY Life

from and against any and all liability relating to t
policies;

Insured's

(3) permanently restraining and enjoining the parties

hereto from instituting and/or prosecuting any other suit
or elsewhere; and (4) awarding NY Life attorneys'

fees, costs of

suit and such other and further relief as the Court deems
proper.

In turn, on November 26, 2013, Defendant Aleandre

1 As a result of Kimberly's appearance,
Defendant Aleandre's request for
default
t Kimberly is no longer
e.

5

cross

a default judgment

Court to

t

Kimberly and for the

r NY Life to directly pay

benefits of

the death

Insured.

Applicable Standard

1. Rule 22

Under

22, interpleader is

r

if

party

requesting it "is or may be exposed to double or mult
liability.

II

. R. Civ. P. 22(1). Rooted in equity,

interpleader is a

tool to protect a stakehol

multiple liability
to the same fund.
406-08
Kane,
500-03

le

r from

the vexation of defending mult
See

le claims

erally Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398,

(1939); 7 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Ma

Federal Prac

Procedure

ce

1702, 1704, at 493 97,

r Wright & Miller].

(2d ed. 1986)

what triggers inte

§§

r is "a real and reasonable

double liability or vexatious, conflicting claims . .

Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor
Cir. 1984)

K.

Baltimore, 741 F.2d 954,

(collecting citations),

105 S.Ct. 1753, 84 L.Ed.2d 817

of

r
1/

957

(7th

cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052,

(1985).

6

ly,

2. Rule 67

"If any part of the relief sought is a money judgment
or the dispos
thing, a

ion of a sum of money or some other delive

e

rty-on notice to every other party and by leave of

court-may deposit with the court all or
ng, whe

or not that party cIa

rt of the money or
any of it.

The

depositing party must deliver to the clerk a copy of the order
permitting a deposit." Fed. R. Civ.

P.

67.

Onder this rule, payments into the court are
aut

ized notwithstanding

claims to

fact that there are adverse

proceeds of the judgment.

See U.S. Overseas

Airlines, Inc. v. Compania Aerea Viajes Expresos De Venezuela,

S.A., 161 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
action, payment of insurance poli
appropriate to

ect a sta

In an interpleader

funds to t

Court may be

lder from multiple liability and

the vexation of defending multiple claims to the same fund .
Washington

ec. Co

. , Inc. v. Paterson, Walke & Pratt,

986 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1993).
the merits of competing claims.

This is true
John v. 50th

F.R.D. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).

7

P.C.,

ess of
's, Inc.,

141

I.
Interpleader is Appropriate and Plaintiff's Motion to

Deposit The Death Benefits is Granted

Plaintiff seeks

leader and to depos

benefits of the Insured's poli

relating to

the

eandre

the

Court's Registry.

An interple

action is appropriate when a

stakeholder "'legitimately fears mult
aga

a single fund,'" rega

competing

ims.

Ie [liability] direct

ess of the merits of

shna v. Col

te Palmolive Co., No. 90 Civ.

4116, 1991 WL 125186 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 1991)
1 Practice & Procedure

Wright, et al.,
1986)). Here,

PIa

iff faces

timately fears, doub
the Insured's homic
murderer.

(quoting 7 Charles
§

1704, at 501 (2d

prospect of, and

liability if the investigation into

ultimately reveals

eandre as the

Under New York's "Slayer Statute," the rule is that

"one cannot take property by inheritance or will from an
ancestor or benefactor whom he
115 N.Y. 506 (1889).

s murdered."

Riggs v. Palmer,

According to the Orange County She

ff's

Department, Defendant Aleandre is still being investigated in
the murder of the Insured.
Statute, Al
of

Pursuant to New York's Sla

r

would not be legally entitled to the proceeds

life insurance policies if she were convicted of the

murder of t

Insured.

See In re Gleason, 36 Misc.3d 486, 491
8

(Sup. Ct. Su

lk Cty. 2012).

Even in cases where the poli

beneficiary is merely a su
insured's mu

r, courts have

appropriate in
lty.

or person of interest in the

See, e.g.,

rmined that interpleader was

case that

beneficiary is later found

State Farm

, 2013 WL 3992754

and Assur. Co., Inc. v.

(W.D.N.Y. 2013)

Co. v. Marini, 1998 WL 704267

i

Metropolitan Life Ins.

(S.D.N.Y. 1998).

A beneficia's

nd upon criminal conviction.

disqualification thus does not
See Doe v. American General li

Ins. Co. of New York,

139

Misc.2d 80 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty. 1998).

The same holds true where, as here, NY Li
subject to multiple
Ale

if it gives t

rse cIa

and she is later convict

since the homicide

Co.,

s not entitle Defendant to t

funds,

has not been ruled out

investigation is ongoing.
1998 WL 704267, at *1 (no bad
company since "only two

homi

benefits to

Further, a two year delay

where NY Life has been told that
and t

could be

Ins.

See Metropolitan

ith or undue

1

by

ars" had passed since the

).

Plaintiff also seeks permission to deposit t
with the Court's Regist

under Rule 67.

9

funds

Unlike statutory interpleader, 28 U.S.C. § 1335, which
requires a stakeholder to deposit the asset with the court,
deposit of the asset is not a jurisdictional prerequisite for
rule interpleader. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. v.
Ambassador Group, Inc., 691 F.Supp. 618,

621

(E.D.N.Y.1988);

Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Eckman, 555 F.Supp. 775, 778

(D.

Del. 1983); 3A James W. Moore, et al., Moore's Federal Practice
~

22.10 (2d ed. 1989).

The Court, though, has discretion to

permit such a deposit under Rule 67. See Gulf States Util. Co.
v. Alabama Power Co., 824 F.2d 1465, 1475 (5th Cir.), modi
on other grounds, 831 F.2d 557

ed

(5th Cir. 1987); Bauer v.

Uniroyal Tire Co., 630 F.2d 1287, 1290 n.

4 (8th Cir. 1980).

"The purpose of Rule 67 is 'to relieve the depositor of
responsibility for a fund in dispute,' such as in an
interpleader action." Gulf States, 824 F.2d at 1474

(quoting *34

12 Charles Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure
§

2991

(1973)); see Prudential Ins. Co.

Am. v. BMC Indus.,

630 F. Supp. 1298, 1300 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The rule appl

s only

where a dispute exists concerning the funds or object. See
Baxter v. United Forest
1969),

Co., 406 F.2d 1120, 1126 (8th Cir.

cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1018

(1969); Manufacturers Hanover

Overseas Capital Corp. v. Southwire Co., 589 F.Supp. 214, 221
(S.D.N.Y.1984).

10

Because there are potential competing claims to the
funds at issue, exposing Plaintiff to liabil
Plaintiff, as an innocent s

y should

keholder, pay the claim of

Defendant Aleandre and then later find out she is not ent
to such payment, depos

led

is appropriate.

With respect to fees, a federal district court
scretion to awa
dis

reasonable attorneys'

rested stakeholder

fees and costs to a

an action brought under

interpleader statute." Guardian Life Ins. Co.
Ange, 2012 WL 463894, at * 2 (S.D.N.Y.
Septembertide Publi

nature of the 1
attorneys'
Co. v. Isra

ng, B.V. v. St

r. 1989).

675, 683 (2d

In

America v. St.

8, 2012)

(citing

n and Day, Inc., 884 F.2d

instant case, given the limited

igation and the circumstances of all parties,

fees are not awarded. See, e.g., Tra
,354 F.2d 488, 490

impressed with

s

(2d eir. 1965)

ers Indemni ty
("We are not

notion that whenever a minor problem arises

in the payment of insurance policies, insurers may, as a matter
of course, transfer a part of their ordinary costs of doing
bus

ss of their insured by bringing an action for

interpl

r.") i Feehan v. Feehan, 2011 WL 497852, at *7-8

(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2011)
costs where interple

(declining to award attorneys'

fees and

r action was not complex, involved no

unique problems, and insurer seeking interpleader provided no
11

unique se

ces and

iled to explain how any court submissions

exceeded the ordinary cost of doing business), adopted by 2011
WL 497776 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2011).

II. Defendant Aleandre's Motion for Summary Judgment is
Denied and Defendant Aleandre is Compelled to Submit
Further Information as to her Right to the Policy to this
Court

Defendant bases her motion for summary judgment on t
ct that

re are no adverse

aimants

r death benefits as

Kimberly has failed to respond or appear, and

cause t

only

evidence supporting that Aleandre is a suspect in the Insured's
murder contains inadmissible

say and is inaccurate.

Because

Kimberly has since appeared, Defendant's first argument is moot.

With re

ct to Defendant's second assertion, Aleandre

cites a letter from the S

fice sent on November 1,

riff's

2013 to her attorney stating: "[W]e have not indicated that your
client is a suspect or person of interest in this ongoing
investigation.

Our practice is to neither confirm, nor deny,

whether a person is a suspect in an open homicide
invest

ion.

N

Defendant acknowledges that the Sheriff's
its office is

Office released an October 10, 2013 letter
"engaged in an ongoing invest

ion in

12

homi

of Mar

Lionel.

Suspects are currently being developed."

Declarat

(Hamelsky

, Ex. 2.)

While these two letters alone do not, as Aleandre
contends,

justi

interpl

affidavits that t

NY Li
mot

Plaintiff has presented sworn

Orange County Sheriff's Office confirmed

that Aleandre had not
Kimberly had.

r,

n ruled out as a suspect, but that

This warrants interpleader action, as it exposes

to potential multiple competing claims, and Aleandre's
for summary judgment is therefore denied.

However, the

rties seem to disagree as to the

current status of the investigation into the Insured's Mu
and the stance of
should Defendant

She

ff's

fice as to Aleandre.

eandre still wish to retain

r,

As such,

proceeds of

the Insured's policy, she is compelled to submit further
briefing and support for

Farm

r claim to this Court.

See State

fe and Assur. Co., Inc. v. Epps, 2013 WL 3992754

(W.D.N.Y. 2013)

(defendant compelled to liti

proceeds in the court following deposit of
insurance company subject to Rules 22 and 67).

13

e her right to
funds by the

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above,

Plaintiff's motion is

granted in part and denied in part: Plaintiff is
commence an interpleader action;
insurance policies'

(1)

allowed to

(2) permitted to deposit the

$50,000 death benefit proceeds with the

court as relating to Aleandre;

(3)

discharged from any further

liability under the policies to Defendants; and

(4)

Defendants

are enjoined from commencing any further litigation against NY
Life relating to the policies in this court or elsewhere.
Plaintiff's motion for an award of attorneys'
denied.

fees and costs is

Defendant Aleandre's motion for default and summary

judgment is denied,

and Aleandre is compelled to submit further

support for her right to the death benefits to this Court.

It is so ordered.

New York, NY
December /6, 2013

U.S.D.J.
14