Palmer v. State of New York, Department of Corrections et al
Filing
21
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 18 Motion to Dismiss. For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED and defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Defendants' counsel is ordered to mail to the plaintiff co pies of all unpublished authorities cited herein. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge P. Kevin Castel on 3/28/2014) (ajs)
USDS SDNY
nOCTTMENT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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LLD i1WNICALLY FILED
DOC #: _. _______--,-:--:DATE FlLED:
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31-/1../
CARL PALMER,
Plaintiff,
13 Civ. 2529 (PKC)
-against-
MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER
STATE OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, DR. HARI P.
CHAKRAVORTY, DR. FREDERICK
BERNSTEIN, DR. CARL J. KOENIGSMANN,
RITA GRINBERGS,
Defendant.
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CASTEL, U.S.D.J.
Plaintiff Carl Palmer brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by acting with deliberate indifference to his
allegedly serious medical needs. Plaintiff, who proceeds pro se, seeks appointment of counsel.
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(I) and (6), Fed. R. Civ. P. FOI' the
reasons stated below, plaintiffs motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED, and defendants'
motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Palmer is an inmate in the custody of the New Yark State Department of
COl1'ections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS") at Green Haven Correctional Facility. In
1997, after complaining of a "sharp gravel pain" in his right eye, Mr. Palmer was diagnosed with
conjunctivitis in his right eye. (Compi. at 3.) DOCCS issued him a pair of eyeglasses. (Id.) At
some point, Mr. Palmer was examined by a facility optometrist, and a growth was found in his
right eye. Mr. Palmer made "continuous complaints" of pain, blurred vision and double-vision
in his right eye to Dr. Chakravorty, his health care provider. (rd.) No treatment was offered.
(rd.) He experienced, and continues to experience "severe eye irritation due to bright lights" and
"was precluded from daily activities." (Id.) At some point, Mr. Palmer requested transitional
lenses, but Dr. Chakravorty and Dr. Bernstein, the facility health services director, denied his
request. (Id.) Mr. Palmer was prescribed eye drops and ointment to treat a growth, which he
describes as a "benign tumor," in his right eye. (Id.) Neither treatment was effective. (rd.) Mr.
Palmer's condition subsequently occUlTed in his left eye. (Id.) Mr. Palmer's further requests for
medical care and treatment have been denied. (rd.) Mr. Palmer filed a grievance with the Green
Haven Correctional Facility Grievance Office, which was denied, and filed administrative
appeals. (rd. at 4.) Additionally, he sent the DOCCS Medical Review Board a written complaint
and letters informing it that he was denied treatment. @, at 4-5.)
Mr. Palmer alleges that Dr. ChakravOity recently diagnosed him with a condition
called pteryguim, and not conjunctivitis as previonsly diagnosed. Mr. Palmer contends that
removal of growths is sometimes appropriate treatment to reduce iuitation and prevent changes
in vision. (Id. at 12.) He also alleges that the defendants' failure to act has exposed him to an
unreasonable risk of future harm because over the course of several years the growth in his eye
has grown, causing fi·equent pain, blurred vision, and double vision, which causes him to lose his
balance, and requires him to stay away fi·om light. He states that "[b ]ecause of the defendants
refusal the petitioner continues to langnish in pain, while these symptoms persist the petitioner
continued to face life changing experience in his day to day life." (Id.)
Mr. Palmer submitted a letter to "B. Kelly RN (Medical Director)" on January 10,
2012, challenging the accuracy of his health care record and seeking amendment of his health
record to note the presence of growths in both his right and left eyes. (rd. at 11.) On February 2,
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2012, Mr. Palmer received a response from Russell Blair ofthe Medical Forensic Unit of the
State Commission of Correction, directing Mr. Palmer to fOlward his concerns in writing to his
facility superintendent or to Dr. Carl Koenigsmaml. (Id. at 10.) On February 6, 2012, Dr.
Frederick Bernstein responded to a letter Mr. Palmer wrote on January 27,2012, stating that Dr.
Bernstein had reviewed the health services policy cited in Mr. Palmer's letter, but found that
there was no procedure through which a patient could submit a document or make an entry on
his own medical record. (Id. at 9.) On March 1, 2012, on behalf of Dr. Koenigsmann, Rita
Grinbergs, Regional Health Services Administrator for DOCCS responded to Mr. Palmer's letter.
She stated that the Division of Health Services had investigated Mr. Palmer's concerns with the
medical staff at Green Haven Correctional Facility, and discovered that Mr. Palmer was seen by
an ophthalmology specialist in April of2010. As a result, Dr. Chakravorty's subsequent request
for a consultation with a specialist was denied by DOCCS. (kL. at 8.)
Mr. Palmer filed a complaint on April 15, 2013, seeking $250,000 in
compensatory damages and injunctive relief in the form of an order preventing DOCCS from
continuing to deny him adequate medical treatment for his eye condition and providing him with
surgery to remove the growths ji"om his eyes. (Compl., Docket No.2, at 5.) In an order dated
May 2, 2013, this Court dismissed Mr. Palmer's claims against the New York State Depmtment
of COlTections and Community Services on immunity grounds. (Docket No.6.) On September
24, 2013, the remaining defendants filed a motion to dismiss. In a letter dated August 30, 2013,
Mr. Palmer notified the Cout1 that due to an unrelated medical condition, he is "unable to attend
to personal matters in any meaningful manner; including the instant matter now before the
Cout1," and sought appointment of counsel. (Docket No. 17.) In a letter to this Court dated
November 25,2013, Mr. Palmer sought appointment of counsel and discovery. (Docket No. 20.)
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LEGAL STANDARDS
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., "a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as hue, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). '''Labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56). A plaintiff must
plead "factual content that allows the
COUlt
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. However, '''detailed factual allegations'" are not
necessary. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56).
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, all non-conclusory factual
allegations are accepted as hue, see id. at 678-79, and all reasonable inferences are drawn in
favor of the plaintiff. See In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 2007) (per
curiam). Moreover, plaintiffs pro se pleadings are '''to be liberally construed ... [and], however
inartfuUy pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976)). "[T]he complaint is deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an
exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference." Chambers v. Time
Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting InCI AudiotextNetwork, Inc. v. Am.
Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cit'. 1995) (per curiam)).
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is decided under the same standards as a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See Lerner v. Fleet Bank,
N.A., 318 F.3d 113,128 (2d Cit'. 2003) (Sotomayor, J.). In opposing a Rule 12(b)(I) motion, the
"plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the
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evidence." Aurecchione v. Schoolman TranspOltation Systems, Inc., 426 F.3d 635,638 (2d Cir.
2005).
DISCUSSION
1. Palmer's Motion for Appointment of Counsel
The appointment of counsel is not a right automatically afforded to plaintiffs
asserting section 1983 claims. "[C]ounsel should not be appointed in a case where the merits of
the indigent's claim are thin and his chances of prevailing are therefore poor." Catmona v. U.S.
Bureau of Prisons, 243 F.3d 629, 632 (2d Cir. 2001); accord Palacio v. City of New York, 489 F.
Supp. 2d 335,344 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (counsel should not be appointed unless claim "justif{ies]
using the scarce resource of volunteer lawyers."). Because the motion to dismiss tums upon the
application of well established legal principles to plaintiff s complaint, the COUIt declines to
appoint counsel in this case.
II. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
a. Claims Seeking Money Damages against the Defendants in Their
Official Capacities
The complaint does not specify whether Palmer sued the defendants in their
individual or official capacities. Construing the complaint liberally, the Court will assume that
Mr. Palmer brought claims against the defendants in both their individual and official capacities.
To the extent that Mr. Palmer seeks money damages against the defendants in their official
capacities, these claims are balTed by the Eleventh Amendment. "The Eleventh Amendment
bars the award of money damage against state officials in their official capacities." Ford v.
Revnolds, 316 F.3d 351, 354 (2d Cir. 2003). It does not bar "a suit for injunctive relief
challenging the constitutionality ofa state official's actions in enforcing state law under the
theory that such a suit is not one against the State. Id. at 354-55. Accordingly, the defendants'
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motion is granted as to Mr. Palmer's claims for money damages against the defendant in their
official capacities.
b. Claims Seeking Injunctive Relief against the Defendants in Their
Official Capacities and Claims against the Defendants in Their
Individual Capacities
Section 1983 provides a civil claim for damages against any person who, acting
under color of state law, deprives another of a right, privilege or immunity secured by
Constitution or the laws of the United States. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635,638 (1980).
"[T]o state a civil rights claim under [section] 1983, a complaint must contain specific
allegations of fact which indicate a deprivation of constitutional rights; allegations which are
nothing more than broad, simple, and conclusory statements are insufficient to state a claim
under [section] 1983." Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 887 (2d Cir. 1987). "Because
vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... [section] 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). The plaintiff must plead that a
defendant acted with "purpose rather than knowledge" to satisfy this standard. Id. at 677.
The govemment must "provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by
incarceration." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). To establish a claim for failure to
provide medical care, the plaintiff must allege that he suffered from a serious injury caused by
the defendants' "deliberate indifference." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,832 (1994). A valid
Eighth Amendment claim requires the satisfaction of two elements: (1) the deprivation alleged
must be, objectively, sufficiently serious; and (2) the prison official must have a sufficiently
culpable state of mind, which, in this case, is one of deliberate indifference. See Farmer v.
Bfelman, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
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A sufficiently serious deprivation requires that the prison official's act or
omission result in the denial of "the minimal civilized measure oflife's necessities." rd. (quoting
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981». To detelmine whether an alleged deprivation of
medical care was objectively serious, a court must inquire whether the inmate was "actually
deprived of adequate medical care" and "the inadequacy in medical care [was j sufficiently
serious." Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 279-80 (2d Cir. 2006). Accordingly, "prison
officials who act reasonably [in response to an inmate-health risk j cannot be found liable under
the ClUel and Unusual Punishments Clause." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845. "'Failing 'to take
reasonable measures' in response to a medical condition can lead to liability." Salahuddin, 467
F.3d at 280 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847).
A deliberately indifferent state of mind is more culpable than a negligent mind but
less so than purposeful or knowing state of mind. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836. It requires that the
prison official subjectively know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.
rd. at 837. This test for deliberate indifference is akin to "subjective recklessness" in the
criminal law. rd. at 839. "[Aj complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or
treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the
Eighth Amendment." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.
Mr. Palmer has alleged that his injury is sufficiently serious. Diminished eyesight
can be sufficiently serious to provide the basis for an Eighth Amendment claim for the denial of
medical care. Koehl v. Dalsheim, 85 F.3d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that a prisoner who was
denied prescription eyeglasses necessary to correct double vision and a loss of depth perception
and who experienced headaches and injuries from walking into objects as a result had a
sufficiently serious medical condition.). Mr. Palmer complains of an eye injury that impedes his
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daily activities. The "growths" in his eyes have caused "frequent pain and blurred-blacken
double vision." (Id.) Although Mr. Palmer has alleged that his injury is sufficiently serious, his
complaint fails to state a claim because he has not alleged that the defendants exhibited
deliberate indifference to his injury.
Mr. Palmer fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Dr. Chakravorty.
Dr. Chakravorty, Mr. Palmer's primary care physician, issued him eye drops and ointment,
monitored his condition, and submitted a request for Mr. Palmer to meet with the ophthalmology
specialist. Mr. Palmer has not stated any facts indicating that Dr. Chakravorty has not acted
reasonably in response to Mr. Palmer's condition or has been deliberately indifferent to Mr.
Palmer's condition. Accordingly, Mr. Palmer's claim against Dr. ChakravOlty is dismissed.
Mr. Palnler also fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Dr. Bernstein.
At an unspecified time, Dr. Bernstein denied Mr. Palmer's request for a transitional lens. Mr.
Palmer's allegation that Dr. Bernstein denied his request for a transitional lens, in the context of
the treatment that Mr. Palmer did receive, does not plausibly allege deliberate indifference. On
Febluary 6,2012, Dr. Bernstein denied Mr. Palmer's request to change or make an entry or
submit a document for placement on his medical record. Dr. Bernstein's response that Mr.
Palmer was unable to amend his medical record does not constitute deliberate indifference to his
medical needs. Mr. Palmer has not plausibly alleged that Dr. Bernstein was aware of and
knowingly disregarded an excessive risk to Mr. Palmer's health and safety.
The complaint also fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Dr.
Koenigsmann or Ms. Grinbergs. Dr. Koenigsmann received a letter fi-om Mr. Palmer, to which
Ms. Grinbergs responded. Mr. Palmer has not alleged that either exhibited a sufficiently
culpable state of mind to state a claim for deliberate indifference. The DOCCS review board
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denied Dr. ChakravOlty's request for Mr. Palmer to see another specialist. Ms. Grinbergs's
letter, on behalf of Dr. Koenigsmann, informing Mr. Palmer of that decision, does not evince a
culpable state of mind on the part of Dr. Koenigsmann or Ms. Grinbergs. Mr. Palmer has not
plausibly alleged that Dr. Koenigsmann or Ms. Grinbergs were aware of and knowingly
disregarded an excessive risk to Mr. Palmer's health and safety.
Mr. Palmer has failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim upon which relief may
be granted. Accordingly, plaintiff s claim is dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs motion for appointment of counsel is
DENIED and defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Defendants' counsel is ordered to
mail to the plaintiff copies of all unpublished authorities cited herein.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this
order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in fOima pauperis status is denied for the
purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438,444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.
evin Castel
United States District Judge
Dated: New York, New York
March 28,2014
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