Levy et al v. Young Adult Institute, Inc. et al

Filing 668

OPINION AND ORDER. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' motion for an award of attorney's fees and costs is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiffs are hereby awarded the amount of $2,170,778.14 in attorney's fees and cos ts. Plaintiffs are granted leave to file a supplemental motion for attorney's fees and costs with respect to fees and expenses incurred from September 1, 2017 to the present. Defendants may file an opposition to any such motion within fourteen d ays of the filing of Plaintiffs' supplemental motion. The Court will separately address any such supplemental motion for an award of attorney's fees and costs. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motions at Docket Numbers 635 and 66 6. SO ORDERED. re: 666 LETTER MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Attorney Fee Motion addressed to Judge J. Paul Oetken from Michael C. Rakower dated February 26, 2019. Document filed by Joel M. Levy, Judith W. Lynn, 635 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs filed by Judith W. Lynn, Joel M. Levy. (Signed by Judge J. Paul Oetken on 3/30/2019) (rjm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
JOEL M. LEVY and JUDITH W. LYNN,
Plaintiffs,

13-CV-2861 (JPO)

-v-

OPINION AND ORDER

YOUNG ADULT INSTITUTE, INC., et
al.,
Defendants.
J. PAUL OETKEN, District Judge:

Plaintiffs Joel M. Levy and Judith W. Lynn brought this action against Young Adult
Institute, Inc., d/b/a YAI National Institute for People with Disabilities (“YAI”), the Board of
Trustees of YAI (“the Board”), the Pension Retirement Committee of the Board, the
Supplemental Pension Plan and Trust for Certain Management Employees of YAI, and the Life
Insurance Plan and Trust for Certain Management Employees of YAI (collectively,
“Defendants”) under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., seeking to recover benefits due under a supplemental
executive retirement plan (“SERP”).
Familiarity with this case and with its lengthy history is presumed. See generally Levy v.
Young Adult Inst., Inc., 744 F. App’x 12 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 2019 WL 368708 (Feb. 25,
2019). Before the Court now is Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees and costs incurred in
connection with this case from February 21, 2013 through August 31, 2017 (Dkt. No. 635; see
also Dkt. No. 658), as well as Plaintiffs’ motion to file a supplemental request for additional fees
and costs incurred from September 1, 2017 to the present (Dkt. No. 666).

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I.

Legal Standard
Pursuant to ERISA § 502(g)(1), a court “in its discretion may allow a reasonable

attorney’s fee and costs of [an ERISA] action to either party.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). The
Supreme Court has permitted courts to award attorney’s fees and costs to an ERISA claimant
pursuant to § 502(g)(1) so long as that claimant has had “some degree of success on the merits.”
Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 255 (2010) (quoting Ruckelshaus v.
Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 694 (1983)). Such success must be more than “trivial success on the
merits” or a “purely procedural victory,” id. at 256, but the standard may be satisfied so long as a
“court can fairly call the outcome of the litigation some success on the merits without conducting
a ‘lengthy inquir[y] into the question whether a particular party’s success was “substantial” or
occurred on a “central issue,”’” id. at 255 (alteration in original) (quoting Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S.
at 688 n.9). While courts may be free to consider additional factors in assessing whether an
award of attorney’s fees and costs is warranted in a given case, see id. at 249 n.1, 255 n.8,
“whether a plaintiff has obtained some degree of success on the merits is the sole factor that a
court must consider in exercising its discretion” with respect to awarding attorney’s fees and
costs under ERISA, Donachie v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Bos., 745 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 2014).
In other words, “a court may, without further inquiry, award attorneys’ fees to a plaintiff who has
had ‘some degree of success on the merits.’” Id. (quoting Hardt, 560 U.S. at 255).
Any such award to an ERISA claimant must be limited to “reasonable attorney’s fee[s]
and costs.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (emphasis added). “Both [the Second Circuit] and the
Supreme Court have held that the lodestar—the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the
reasonable number of hours required by the case—creates a ‘presumptively reasonable fee.’”
Millea v. Metro-N. R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Arbor Hill Concerned

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Citizens Neighborhood Assoc. v. Cty. of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 183 (2d Cir. 2008)); see also
Wallace v. Grp. Long Term Disability Plan for Emps. of TDAmeritrade Holding Corp., No. 13
Civ. 6759, 2015 WL 4750763, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2015) (acknowledging that the lodestar
method applies in the ERISA context). The party seeking an award of attorney’s fees “bears the
burden to submit sufficient evidence to support the hours worked and the rates claimed.”
Wallace, 2015 WL 4750763, at *5. “‘In determining what fee is reasonable, the court takes
account of claimed hours that it views as excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary’ and
‘may look to its own familiarity with the case and its experience generally as well as to the
evidentiary submissions and arguments of the parties.’” Id. (quoting Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d
204, 213 (2d Cir. 2009)). The “reasonable hourly rate” charged by the claimant’s counsel must
be “in line with . . . prevailing [rates] in the community for similar services by lawyers of
reasonably comparable skill, expertise and reputation.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting
McDonald ex rel. Prendergast v. Pension Plan of the NYSA-ILA Pension Tr. Fund, 450 F.3d 91,
96 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)). “Although there is a strong presumption that the lodestar figure
represents a reasonable fee, a district court may adjust the lodestar figure [either upwards or
downwards] based on several factors, including in particular the results obtained.” Mason
Tenders Dist. Council v. Aurash Constr. Corp., No. 04 Civ. 2427, 2006 WL 647884, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
II.

Discussion
Plaintiffs request an award of attorney’s fees and costs in the following amounts:

(1) $3,195,812.05 in hourly fees generated by Rakower Law PLLC in connection with the
underlying litigation; (2) $30,961.15 in hourly fees generated by Cadwalader, Wickersham &
Taft LLP (“Cadwalader”) in connection with the underlying litigation; (3) $283,395.80 in costs

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incurred in connection with the underlying litigation; and (4) $107,794.56 in fees and costs
arising from Plaintiffs’ counsel’s work in connection with the instant motion. (Dkt. No. 654 at
15; Dkt. No. 658 at 1.) Plaintiffs’ total request is thus for an award of $3,617,963.56.
The parties agree that Plaintiffs have achieved “some” degree of success on the merits
such that they are eligible to recover an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to
ERISA § 502(g)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). (Compare Dkt. No. 638 at 6, with Dkt. No. 644 at
1.) 1 But Defendants introduce two categories of objection to Plaintiffs’ requested sum: (1) that
Plaintiffs’ request should be adjusted downward to remove fees and costs that Defendants
contend are not recoverable for a prevailing ERISA party or are unreasonable (Dkt. No. 644 at
4–16; Dkt. No. 662); and (2) that Plaintiffs’ partial success in this litigation warrants a wholesale
percentage reduction of their requested award (Dkt. No. 644 at 17–25). The Court addresses
each category of objection in turn.
A.

Plaintiffs’ Requests for Unrecoverable Costs and Fees

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ request should be adjusted downward to remove fees
and costs that are not recoverable. (Dkt. No. 644 at 4–16.) The Court primarily focuses on those
aspects of Plaintiffs’ requested award that the Court deems unrecoverable. In doing so, the Court
follows the practice that other courts in this Circuit have taken when “[s]ome reduction in
plaintiffs’ fee award is warranted”:

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In acknowledging this point, both parties recognize that this Court is under no
obligation to consider additional factors to determine whether or not an award of attorney’s fees
and costs is warranted. (See Dkt. No. 638 at 6; Dkt. No. 644 at 1 n.2.) Mindful that “whether a
plaintiff has obtained some degree of success on the merits is the sole factor that a court must
consider in exercising its discretion” with respect to awarding attorney’s fees and costs under
ERISA, Donachie, 745 F.3d at 46, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ success on the merits here
warrants such an award and declines to further consider whether additional factors would
likewise support the propriety of an award of attorney’s fees.
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The Court will address each area of contention below and explain
its reasoning with regard to any reduction. However, rather than
reducing a certain number of unreasonably billed hours, the Court
will make an across-the-board percentage cut in plaintiffs’ fee award
as is necessary and appropriate.
Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani, 111 F. Supp. 2d 381, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (collecting
cases employing a similar methodology); see also id. at 401 (same).
1.

Plaintiffs’ Request for Pre-Litigation Attorney’s Fees

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ request for pre-litigation attorney’s fees must be
rejected because such costs are not recoverable for a prevailing ERISA party. (Dkt. No. 644 at
4–5.) In response, Plaintiffs contend that these fees are recoverable because they were
reasonably incurred in connection with the commencement of this action. (Dkt. No. 654 at 3–4.)
The Court agrees with Defendants that ERISA “authorizes a district court to award fees
incurred only after a district court has assumed jurisdiction over a case.” Peterson v. Cont’l Cas.
Co., 282 F.3d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 2002). That said, ERISA does permit an award of “fees incurred
in relation to a suit filed in a court of competent jurisdiction,” id. at 121 (emphasis added), and
“time spent drafting the complaint,” for example, “is properly considered part of the litigation in
a district court, even though it occurs prior to filing,” id. at 121 n.5. Courts in this District have
thus allowed ERISA claimants to recover attorney’s fees for “work done pre-filing,” which may
include “such preparatory work as meeting with the client,” as well as “sending a demand letter
and attempting . . . reasonable pre-complaint negotiating efforts.” Lampert v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., No. 03 Civ. 5655, 2004 WL 1395040, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2004) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Having reviewed Plaintiffs’ requested fees for the relevant work billed by Cadwalader
and Rakower Law prior to the commencement of this action, the Court finds both firms’ requests

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to be reasonable and of sufficient relation to Plaintiffs’ initiation of this action to warrant
Plaintiffs’ recovery of these fees under ERISA.
2.

Clerical Work

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ request should be adjusted downward to remove their
request for reimbursement for their attorneys’ and paralegals’ time doing clerical work. (Dkt.
No. 644 at 6.) Plaintiffs do not dispute that certain purely clerical work is not recoverable, and
they concede that they erroneously included requests for certain unrecoverable clerical work in
their initial motion. (Dkt. No. 654 at 5.) However, Plaintiffs note that an attorney’s or
paralegal’s work on “quasi-clerical tasks” may be recoverable, and they dispute the number of
hours Defendants seek to have stricken from their award on this basis. (Id. at 5 n.4.)
While purely “clerical and secretarial services are part of overhead and are not generally
charged to clients,” Plaintiffs are correct to note that semi-clerical work such as the “organizing
[of] countless number[s] of documents in [a complicated] case” or other work that requires “a
comprehensive understanding of, and familiarity with, the substance of the case” may be
recoverable. Marisol A., 111 F. Supp. 2d at 390. Having reviewed Plaintiffs’ counsel’s billing
statements and the disputed entries, the Court agrees with Defendants that certain of Plaintiffs’
requested charges constitute purely clerical work—even if not to the full extent identified by
Defendants, but certainly to a greater extent than was conceded by Plaintiffs in their reply brief.
(Compare, e.g., Dkt. No. 639-2 at 37 (billing 0.4 hours for “assembl[ing]” and “circulat[ing]”
PDF portfolio of case briefs) with Dkt. No. 657-9 at 3 (confirming that this charge was not
among the deductions Plaintiffs conceded as constituting pure clerical work)). The Court will
take this into account when it adjusts Plaintiffs’ fee award.

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3.

Redacted Entries

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ award must be reduced to the extent that it is based on
redacted time entries, because Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the work associated with the
redacted entries is compensable. (Dkt. No. 644 at 7.) The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that their
redacted entries are limited, and in those few instances in which the redactions fully preclude a
reader from assessing the work rendered, the Court has consulted the unredacted documents
submitted by Plaintiffs and concluded that the requested fees are reasonable. (Dkt. No. 654 at 5.)
The Court thus declines to reduce Plaintiffs’ fee award on the basis of its inclusion of redacted
time entries.
4.

Rate of Interest Charged

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs should not be entitled to an award of any late fees they
have incurred on past-due payments, because (1) Plaintiffs’ counsel Rakower Law has not shown
that it typically assesses such a fee; and (2) the 6% interest rate Plaintiffs initially requested is
excessive. (Dkt. No. 644 at 7–8.) In reply, Plaintiffs point to evidence showing that their
counsel does customarily charge such a late fee, but also arguing that if the Court is disinclined
to grant 6%, the Court should grant an interest rate of 4.25%, the prime interest rate in effect
when Plaintiffs filed the instant motion. (Dkt. No. 654 at 6.)
“[I]t [is] within [a] district court’s discretion to compensate . . . counsel fully for the delay
[in payment during the prosecution of an action] by taking into account the prevailing time-value
of money—whether by applying the [statutory] judgment interest rate . . . or the historic prime
rate.” Grant v. Martinez, 973 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1992). The Court is persuaded by Plaintiffs’
evidence that Rakower Law customarily charges its clients interest on past-due payments. (Dkt.
No. 657 ¶ 7.) But the Court concludes that it is appropriate to award Plaintiffs the historic prime

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rate rather than the 6% rate they request. In addition, the Court concludes that the appropriate
prime rate is not the 4.25% rate in effect when Plaintiffs filed this fee motion, but rather the 4%
rate in effect when final judgment was entered. (See Dkt. No. 644 at 8.) The Court will take this
downward adjustment into account when it adjusts Plaintiffs’ fee award.
5.

Plaintiffs’ Expert Fees

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs should not be reimbursed for expert fees incurred by
experts who did not testify but who only prepared analyses and reports in connection with this
litigation. (Dkt. No. 644 at 9–11.) In support of this contention, Defendants cite cases limiting
ERISA claimants’ requested reimbursement for expert fees to the per diem allowances provided
for by 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b). See, e.g., Agredano v. Mut. of Omaha Cos., 75 F.3d 541, 544 (9th
Cir. 1996) (“We therefore hold that section 502(g)(1)’s allowance for ‘costs of action’ empowers
courts to award only the types of ‘costs’ allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 1920, and only in the amounts
allowed by section 1920 itself, by 28 U.S.C. § 1821 or by similar such provisions.”); Harris Tr.
& Sav. Bank v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 137 F. Supp. 2d 351, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 2001),
vacated on other grounds, 302 F.3d 18, 34–35 (2d Cir. 2002) (“As the cases have uniformly
held, because section 502(g) does not explicitly permit the recovery of expert witness fees,
expert witness fees are not allowable in these types of cases.”) (collecting cases); Garlock v.
Nelson, No. 96 Civ. 1096, 1998 WL 315089, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. June 9, 1998) (“ERISA does not
specifically permit fee-shifting for expert witness fees, and therefore the limitations provided in
28 U.S.C. § 1821 are applicable.”) (collecting cases).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request for expert witness fees is denied, except that Plaintiffs
may be awarded expert witness fees and expenses limited to $40 per day for each expert witness
who testified at a deposition or at trial (including any additional travel days), together with

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corresponding travel expenses to the extent permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 1821. The Court will take
this into account when it adjusts Plaintiffs’ fee award. 2
6.

Plaintiffs’ Remaining Costs

Defendants suggest that a number of Plaintiffs’ other remaining requests for costs, which
include requests for costs of travel, copying, shipping, meals, and other expenses are
impermissible because Plaintiffs are entitled to only those costs specifically enumerated in 28
U.S.C. § 1920 and Local Rule 54.1(c). (Dkt. No. 644 at 12.) Plaintiffs contend that “Second
Circuit case law shows that awards based on fee-shifting statutes, like ERISA § 502(g)(1), are
not limited to the strictures of 28 U.S.C. § 1920 or Local Civil Rule 54.1.” (Dkt. No. 654 at 9.)
The weight of authority supports Plaintiffs’ contention, because “Section 502(g)(1) of
ERISA refers to an award of ‘costs’, [and] that term apparently covers not only taxable costs
under 28 U.S.C. § 1920, but also other disbursements that are customarily charged to the client.”
Algie v. RCA Glob. Commc’ns Inc., 891 F. Supp. 875, 898 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (collecting
cases). Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiffs have met their burden of showing that their
requested costs (other than the expert costs addressed above) are reasonable costs customarily
charged to clients, Plaintiffs may be entitled to recover them.
However, Defendants identify a number of other issues with Plaintiffs’ request for costs
(see generally Dkt. No. 644 at 12–16), including Plaintiffs’ failure to submit invoices for nearly
$159,000 worth of expenses (Dkt. No. 644 at 12–13). While Plaintiffs submitted some invoices
for their requested costs in connection with their reply brief (see Dkt. No. 656 ¶¶ 15–57),

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Moreover, Local Rule 54.1(c)(3) requires that “[f]ees for expert witnesses are taxable
only to the extent of fees for ordinary witnesses unless prior court approval was obtained.”
S.D.N.Y. Rule 54.1(c)(3). The Court declines Plaintiffs’ request to grant approval for its
unapproved expert fees nunc pro tunc. (See Dkt. No. 654 at 11–12.)
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Plaintiffs also conceded that at least $47,000 of their initially requested costs were based on
billing errors (Dkt. No. 656 ¶ 58–59, 61). The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs have
failed to meet their “burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of each charge,” and that
Plaintiffs’ “failure to provide adequate documentation of costs incurred [should] limit, or even
defeat, recovery” of some of Plaintiffs’ requested costs. Saucedo v. On the Spot Audio Corp.,
No. 16 Civ. 00451, 2016 WL 8376837, at *20–21 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2016) (report and
recommendation), adopted, 2017 WL 780799 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2017), vacated on other
grounds, 2018 WL 4347791 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2018). The Court will take this into account in
adjusting Plaintiffs’ fee award.
7.

Plaintiffs’ Costs Incurred in Connection with the Instant Motion

Defendants argue that the amount of attorney’s fees that Plaintiffs seek to recover for
briefing the instant motion is unreasonable and excessive. (Dkt. No. 662.)
The Second Circuit recognizes that “the district judge [has] great leeway” in assessing
whether “to award [any] fees for the time spent litigating [a] fee petition.” K.L. v. Warwick
Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 584 F. App’x 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2014) (first quoting Gagne v. Maher, 594
F.2d 336, 344 (2d Cir. 1979)). The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s
billing for its work in connection with the instant motion appears excessive. The Court will take
this into account when it adjusts Plaintiffs’ fee award.
8.

Net Reduction

In light of the foregoing, the Court determines that a 5% reduction in Plaintiffs’ requested
award for attorney’s fees and costs is warranted.

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B.

Plaintiffs’ Partial Success on the Merits

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ partial success in this litigation warrants a wholesale
percentage reduction of their requested award. (Dkt. No. 644 at 17–25.) Plaintiffs counter that
no such reduction is warranted here given that none of their unsuccessful claims are severable
from their successful claims. (Dkt. No. 654 at 12–15.)
The Supreme Court has provided the following guidance to courts confronting requests
for attorney’s fees in cases involving a prevailing party’s incomplete success:
If . . . a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success, the
product of hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole
times a reasonable hourly rate may be an excessive amount. This
will be true even where the plaintiff's claims were interrelated,
nonfrivolous, and raised in good faith. Congress has not authorized
an award of fees whenever it was reasonable for a plaintiff to bring
a lawsuit or whenever conscientious counsel tried the case with
devotion and skill. Again, the most critical factor is the degree of
success obtained.
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983) (addressing attorney’s fees awarded under 42
U.S.C. § 1988); see also Kassim v. City of Schenectady, 415 F.3d 246, 256 (2d Cir. 2005)
(recognizing that a “district judge’s authority to reduce the fee awarded to a prevailing plaintiff
below the lodestar by reason of the plaintiff’s ‘partial or limited success’ is not restricted either
to cases of multiple discrete theories or to cases in which the plaintiff won only a nominal or
technical victory”). Courts in this District apply the Hensley standard to requests for awards of
attorney’s fees and costs brought under ERISA. See, e.g., Trs. of the Bricklayers & Allied
Craftworkers Local 5 N.Y. Ret., Welfare & Training Funds v. Helmer-Cronin Constr., Inc., No.
03 Civ. 0748, 2005 WL 3789085, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2005).
This is a case where such a reduction is warranted. As Defendants note, Plaintiffs did not
prevail on approximately three-quarters of the claims they brought against Defendants, and
Plaintiffs prevailed on only half of the claims that proceeded to discovery in this matter. (See
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Dkt. No. 644 at 19.) Plaintiffs’ ultimate monetary recovery also fell substantially short of their
requested damages. (Dkt. No. 644 at 19–21.) Finally, the vast majority of Plaintiffs’ recovery
was obtained pursuant to a summary judgment order issued nearly a year before this case was
closed, and a substantial portion of Plaintiffs’ requested fees relate to the latter half of this case’s
proceedings, most noticeably a bench trial that resulted in the incurring of substantial legal fees
but produced a small percentage of Plaintiffs’ net recovery. (Dkt. No. 644 at 22–24.) It is
common for courts in this Circuit to consider circumstances such as these in determining whether
and by how much to reduce a requested award of attorney’s fees and costs. See, e.g., L.I. Head
Start Child Dev. Servs., Inc. v. Econ. Opportunity Comm’n of Nassau Cnty., Inc., 865 F. Supp.
2d 284, 296–97 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 710 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2013) (collecting cases).
The Court concludes that an additional 35% reduction of Plaintiffs’ requested attorney’s
fee award is warranted given Plaintiffs’ incomplete success.
C.

Resulting Calculation

As noted, Plaintiffs’ request for an award of attorney’s fees and costs totals
$3,617,963.56. (See Dkt. No. 654 at 15; Dkt. No. 658 at 1.) Having concluded that a 40%
reduction in Plaintiffs’ requested award is warranted given Plaintiffs’ request for some fees and
costs that are not recoverable for a prevailing ERISA party and on the basis of Plaintiffs’ partial
success on the merits, see supra Sections II.A.8, II.B., Plaintiffs are as a result entitled to an
award of $2,170,778.14.
III.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for an award of attorney’s fees and costs is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiffs are hereby awarded the amount of
$2,170,778.14 in attorney’s fees and costs.

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Plaintiffs are granted leave to file a supplemental motion for attorney’s fees and costs
with respect to fees and expenses incurred from September 1, 2017 to the present. Defendants
may file an opposition to any such motion within fourteen days of the filing of Plaintiffs’
supplemental motion. The Court will separately address any such supplemental motion for an
award of attorney’s fees and costs.
The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motions at Docket Numbers 635 and 666.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 30, 2019
New York, New York
____________________________________
J. PAUL OETKEN
United Sed States District Judge

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