Curtis v. Cenlar FSB et al
Filing
38
OPINION & ORDER denying 22 Motion to Remand to State Court. (Signed by Judge Denise L. Cote on 10/3/2013) Copies Mailed TO Thomas M. Curtis By Chambers. (gr)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------- X
:
THOMAS M. CURTIS,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
-v:
:
CENLAR FSB, d/b/a CENTRAL LOAN
:
ADMINISTRATION & REPORTING; CENLAR
:
AGENCY, INC., FEDERAL HOME LOAN
:
MORTGAGE CORPORATION; AMERICAN
:
SECURITY INSURANCE COMPANY; and
:
ASSURANT, INC.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
:
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13 Civ. 3007 (DLC)
OPINION & ORDER
For the plaintiff:
Thomas M. Curtis, proceeding pro se
1385 York Avenue, Suite 32-B
New York, NY 11021
For the defendants Assurant, Inc., and
American Security Insurance Company:
Robert D. Helfand
Jorden Burt
Jorden Burt, LLP
175 Powder Forest Drive, Suite 301
Simsbury, CT 06089
Andrew T. Solomon
Karen E. Abravanel
Sullivan & Worcester, LLP
1633 Broadway
New York, NY 10019
DENISE COTE, District Judge:
On June 14, 2013, pro se plaintiff Thomas M. Curtis filed a
motion to remand this case to state court on the basis of
purported lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Because this
Court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 and 12 U.S.C. § 1452(f)(2), the motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
Pro se plaintiff Thomas M. Curtis (“Curtis”) filed this
breach of contract action in state court against defendants the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”), Cenlar
FSB, American Security Insurance Co., and Assurant, Inc.
(collectively, “the defendants”).
On May 3, 2013, the
defendants filed a notice of removal of this case to federal
court.
On June 14, 2013, Curtis filed a motion to remand this
case to state court for purported lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
DISCUSSION
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 a federal court has federal question
subject matter jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”
The codified statute that created Freddie Mac, 12 U.S.C. §
1452(f)(2), (“Section 1452(f)(2)) provides as follows:
[A]ll civil actions to which [Freddie Mac] is a party shall
be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States, and
the district courts of the United States shall have
original jurisdiction of all such actions, without regard
to amount or value.
2
12 U.S.C. § 1452(f)(2).
Freddie Mac is a party here.
action.
This action is a civil
Therefore this action is “deemed to arise under the
laws of the United States,” and this Court has subject matter
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and Section 1452(f)(2).
See, e.g., Mendrala v. Crown Mortgage Co., 955 F.2d 1132, 1136
(7th Cir. 1992) (“the legislative history of 12 U.S.C. § 1452(f)
. . .
suggests that this part of the provision is indeed
concerned . . . with suing in and removing to federal court.”).
Curtis contends that Section 1452(f)(2) does not give this
Court subject matter jurisdiction because it only allows Freddie
Mac, not other defendants, to remove to federal court, and that
Freddie Mac is not the moving party here.
In addition to being
conclusory, Curtis’s argument is misplaced because it confuses a
statutory grant of jurisdiction with a removal statute.
1452(f)(2) is not itself a removal provision.
Section
It is a conferral
of jurisdiction and does not speak to which party can remove.
The process of removal itself is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441
(“Section 1441”), which provides that
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress any civil
action brought in a State court of which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may
be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the
district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place where such action is pending.
3
28 U.S.C. § 1441 (emphasis added).
In the absence of contrary
federal law, Section 1441 only requires that the moving party be
“the defendant” and that the court to which the action is
removed has “original jurisdiction.”
It is true that 12 U.S.C. §1452(f)(3)(“Section 1452(f)(3)”)
does speak to the mechanics of removal.
Section 1452(f)(3)
provides that:
[A]ny civil or other action . . . [may] be removed by
[Freddie Mac], without the giving of any bond or security,
to the district court of the United States for the district
and division embracing the place where the same is pending
. . . by following any procedure for removal of causes in
effect at the time of such removal.
12 U.S.C. § 1452(f)(3).
But nothing in Section 1452(f)(3)
limits the right of other defendants to remove under the general
Section 1441 removal provision when a federal court would have
had original subject matter jurisdiction.
And Section
1452(f)(2) expressly provides that “district courts of the
United States shall have original jurisdiction” over cases “to
which [Freddie Mac] is a party.”
Consequently this Court has
federal question jurisdiction here.
come to the same conclusion.
Other district courts have
See, e.g., Fed. Home Loan Mortgage
Corp. v. Matassino, 911 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1278 (N.D. Ga. 2012)
(noting in a case in which a party who was not Freddie Mac
removed that “the unambiguous language of [Section 1452(f)(2)]
gives this court original and removal jurisdiction over a civil
4
action to which Freddie Mac is a party”). 1
CONCLUSION
Curtis’s June 14, 2013 motion to remand this case to state
court is denied.
SO ORDERED
Dated:
New York, New York
October 3, 2013
____________________________
DENISE COTE
United States District Judge
1
Because this Court has federal question jurisdiction it is
unnecessary to determine whether it also has diversity
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
5
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