Figueroa v. Puerschner et al
Filing
43
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. The Court has considered all of the arguments raised by the parties. To the extent not specifically addressed above, they are either moot or without merit. The defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment dismissing this case, to close all pending motions, and to close this case. re: 32 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Edmend Puerschner, Florence Seargent. (Signed by Judge John G. Koeltl on 2/5/2015) (rjm)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
────────────────────────────────────
WILLIAM FIGUEROA,
Plaintiff,
13 Cv. 4309 (JGK)
- against -
MEMORANDUM OPINION &
ORDER
EDMUND PUERSCHNER AND FLORENCE
SEARGENT,
Defendants.
────────────────────────────────────
JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge:
The pro se plaintiff, William Figueroa, was an inmate at
Sullivan Correctional Facility (“Sullivan”).
He brings this
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Correction
Officer Edmund Puerschner assaulted him and that Nurse Florence
Seargent was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
needs.
The defendants have moved for summary judgment pursuant
to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
For the
reasons explained below, the defendants’ motion is granted.
I.
The standard for granting summary judgment is well
established.
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986); Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs.,
1
Ltd. P’ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994).
“[T]he trial
court’s task at the summary judgment motion stage of the
litigation is carefully limited to discerning whether there are
genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to deciding
them.
Its duty, in short, is confined at this point to issue-
finding; it does not extend to issue-resolution.”
Gallo, 22
F.3d at 1224.
The moving party bears the initial burden of “informing the
district court of the basis for its motion” and identifying the
matter that “it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
The
substantive law governing the case will identify those facts
that are material, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”
Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a
court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable
inferences against the moving party.
See Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587–88 (1986)
(citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655
(1962)).
Summary judgment is improper if there is any evidence
in the record from any source from which a reasonable inference
could be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.
2
See Chambers v.
TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994).
If the
moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving party must produce
evidence in the record and “may not rely simply on conclusory
statements or on contentions that the affidavits supporting the
motion are not credible.”
Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York,
996 F.2d 522, 532 (2d Cir. 1993).
When, as here, a pro se plaintiff opposes summary judgment,
the Court must afford the plaintiff “special solicitude” in the
construction of the pleadings and the motions and in the
enforcement of procedural rules.
F.3d 90, 100–03 (2d Cir. 2010).
See Tracy v. Freshwater, 623
But this solicitude does not
“relieve [a] plaintiff of his duty to meet the requirements
necessary to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”
Jorgensen
v. Epic/Sony Records, 351 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Finally, summary judgment is appropriate when video
evidence shows that the challenged use of force was not
excessive.
See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81
(2007) (Fourth Amendment excessive force claim); McKinney v.
Dzurenda, 555 F. App'x 110, 11 (2d Cir. 2014) (excessive force
claim).
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II.
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
A.
At all relevant times, the plaintiff was an inmate
incarcerated in the Special Housing Unit at Sullivan.
Dep. Tr. at 7.
Figueroa
At all relevant times, Officer Puerschner and
Nurse Seargent worked at Sullivan.
See Puerschner Decl. ¶ 1;
Seargent Decl. ¶ 1.
At approximately 11:23 a.m. on April 11, 2013, Officer
Puerschner found liquid on the floor outside the plaintiff’s
cell door.
Figueroa Dep. Tr. at 16; Puerschner Decl. ¶ 4.
Officer Puerschner notified his supervisors.
Sargent Phelps
then recommended and Acting Deputy Superintendent of Security
Russo authorized the placement of a plastic cell shield on the
bottom of Figueroa’s cell door.
Def.’s Ex. A.
A video recording shows Officer Puerschner returning, with
two other officers, to Figueroa’s cell with the shield.
Ex. B, at 11:25 a.m.
Def.’s
From 11:25 a.m. to 11:33 a.m., the video
shows Officer Puerschner and the two other officers installing
the cell shield.
Officer Puerschner held the cell shield in
place while the other officers secured it.
Id. at 11:25 a.m. to
11:33 a.m.; see also Puerschner Decl. ¶¶ 8–9.
The video shows Figueroa punching the cell shield while the
officers installed it.
See Def.’s Ex. B, at 11:25 a.m. to 11:27
4
a.m.
Figueroa, who is deaf, explained: “I was signing to them,
‘No, no, no.
listen.
Please listen to me,’ but they didn’t want to
I’m signing, ‘No, no, no,’ through it and that’s when
they pushed back with the shield and hurt my thumb.”
Dep. Tr. at 21.
Figueroa
But the video of the incident shows the cell
shield being hit rather violently from within the plaintiff’s
cell.
See Def.’s Ex. B, at 11:25 a.m. to 11:27 a.m.
B.
Around noon that same day, Figueroa was taken to the
medical clinic at Sullivan, and his thumb was x-rayed.
Dep. Tr. at 28–29: Def.’s Ex. D.
Figueroa
The x-ray report states that
the plaintiff suffered a nondisplaced fracture on the tip of his
thumb.
Def.’s Ex. D.
That night, at approximately 7:00 p.m., Nurse Seargent made
sick rounds in the Special Housing Unit at Sullivan.
Decl. ¶ 4.
Seargent
In her declaration, she states that “I was made
aware that plaintiff had sustained a thumb injury earlier in the
day and was seen in the medical unit.”
Id. ¶ 5.
Nurse Seargent
declared that she “gave plaintiff two packs of Ibuprofen for
hand pain.
I passed the medication to plaintiff through the
hatch on his cell door.
and started yelling.
to his behavior.”
Plaintiff began punching the hatch door
I was unable to continue the sick call due
Id. ¶ 6.
Nurse Seargent reported this
incident and the medication provided in an “Ambulatory Health
5
Record Progress Note.”
Def.’s Ex. D.
The defendants
represented that there is no video of this incident.
The plaintiff disputes that he received Ibuprofen from
Nurse Seargent.
than clear.
But his description of the sick call is less
attention.
He testified that Nurse Seargent “wasn’t paying any
Arguing with another CO. . . .
Figueroa Dep. Tr. at 38.
And they left.”
He testified that “[s]he didn’t know
that my thumb was injured,” id. at 39, but also testified that
Nurse Seargent saw his thumb that night.
Id. at 68.
He
testified that he did not yell at Nurse Seargent, id. at 40, but
admitted to punching his cell door.
Id. at 41.
And the
plaintiff testified that he tried “many times” to be seen by a
doctor or nurse, id. at 63, but also stated that he did not try
to see a nurse on April 12 “because [he] was very upset and
frustrated.”
Id. at 65.
The plaintiff testified that the medical staff later
removed his thumbnail and “put like some ointment like Vaseline”
on his thumb.
Id. at 60.
He claims that the pain subsided a
week and a half after the injury.
Id. 60–61.
C.
The plaintiff delivered his complaint to prison authorities
on June 14, 2013, and it was received by this Court on June 20,
2013.
The defendants moved for summary judgment in July 2014.
The defendants provided the plaintiff with a “Notice to Pro Se
6
Litigant” as required by Local Rule 56.2, which sets out the
responsibilities of a pro se plaintiff in responding to a motion
for summary judgment.
In a letter to the Court dated September 23, 2014, the
plaintiff asked the Court to “rely on his complaint and
deposition as a reply to the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment.” 1
IV.
A.
The plaintiff claims that Officer Puerschner used excessive
force when installing the cell shield.
The Eighth Amendment
prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments” on
those convicted of crimes.
A claim of excessive force requires
a plaintiff to satisfy both an objective and a subjective prong.
See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992).
“[C]ourts
considering a prisoner’s claim must ask both if ‘the officials
act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind’ and if the
alleged wrongdoing was objectively ‘harmful enough’ to establish
a constitutional violation.” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501
U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).
1
Summary judgment may also be appropriate because the
plaintiff failed to respond to the defendants’ motion. See In
re Towers Fin. Corp. Noteholders Litig., 996 F. Supp. 266, 273–
74 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (collecting cases) (Report and Recommendation
adopted by the district court).
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The objective prong “focuses on the harm done, in light of
contemporary standards of decency.”
Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d
255, 268 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
“[W]hen prison officials use force to cause harm
maliciously and sadistically, ‘contemporary standards of decency
always are violated . . . whether or not significant injury is
evident.’”
Id. at 268–69 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9).
The subjective prong “requires a showing that the defendant
had the necessary level of culpability, shown by actions
characterized by wantonness in light of the particular
circumstances surrounding the challenged conduct.”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 268
“The core
judicial inquiry . . . [is] not whether a certain quantum of
injury was sustained, but rather whether force was applied in a
good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or
maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”
Wilkins v. Gaddy,
130 S.Ct. 1175, 1178 (2010) (per curiam) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Floyd v. Bailey, No.
10cv7794, 2013 WL 929376, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2013).
The “force” used by Officer Puerschner was not excessive,
and there is no evidence that he acted with malice.
The
plaintiff does not dispute that Officer Puerschner followed New
York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision
procedures when he requested permission install the cell shied.
8
See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 305.6.
Figueroa
instead insists that Officer Puerschner intentionally smashed
the plaintiff’s thumb when he installed the cell shield.
However, the video of the incident show that Officer
Puerschner held the cell shield in place while two other
officers installed it.
During the installation, the plaintiff
repeatedly hit the shield.
Nothing in the video shows Officer
Puerschner acting maliciously.
The plaintiff hurt his thumb
because he hit the cell shield and his finger became wedged
between the shield and the door.
Indeed, the plaintiff admits
that he put his hands on the cell bars when the officers were
installing the shield.
Figueroa Dep. Tr. at 18–19.
Moreover, the “force was applied in a good faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline.”
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.
312, 320 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly,
J.)).
Water appeared to be coming from the plaintiff’s cell,
and Officer Puerschner received permission to install the cell
shield.
And holding the cell shield in place—while the
plaintiff punched it—was a “good faith effort” to prevent the
plaintiff from disrupting the installation of the shield.
reasonable jury could find that Officer Puerschner acted
maliciously or used excessive force.
9
No
Accordingly, Officer Puerschner’s motion for summary
judgment on the excessive force claim is granted.
B.
The plaintiff next claims that Nurse Seargent was
deliberately indifferent to his thumb injury on April 11, 2013.
Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment if they are
deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs.
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
Like the excessive force claim, this claim includes both a
subjective component (deliberate indifference) and an objective
component (a serious medical need).
“An official acts with the
requisite deliberate indifference when that official ‘knows of
and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the
official must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,
and he must also draw the inference.’”
Chance v. Armstrong, 143
F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).
A medical need is sufficiently serious
“where ‘the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result
in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain.’”
Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 136
(2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Chance, 143 F.3d at 702).
plaintiff’s claim fails on both fronts.
10
The
First, there is no evidence that Nurse Seargent acted with
deliberate indifference.
x-ray after the injury.
The plaintiff immediately received an
The plaintiff does not identify what
other medical treatment—besides a painkiller—he should have
received when Nurse Seargent made a sick call on April 11.
Nurse Seargent declared—and her contemporaneous notes
substantiate—that she gave the defendant Ibuprofen, but she
could not provide further treatment because the defendant was
yelling and pounding the cell door.
Seargent Decl. ¶ 6; Def.’s
Ex. D.
The plaintiff insists that Nurse Seargent did not give him
any Ibuprofen because she “didn’t know that [his] thumb was
injured.”
Figueroa Dep. Tr. at 39.
The plaintiff’s testimony
does not support an Eighth Amendment claim because if—as the
plaintiff alleges—Nurse Seargent had no knowledge of the
plaintiff’s injury, she did not act with deliberate
indifference.
See Hernandez v. Keane, 341 F.3d 137, 144 (2d
Cir. 2003) (requiring a “state of mind that is the equivalent of
criminal recklessness” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Second, the plaintiff’s injury was not sufficiently
serious.
The plaintiff had a nondisplaced fracture on the tip
of his thumb.
The plaintiff testified that he was in pain for
“maybe a week and a half,” lost his thumbnail, and experienced
swelling.
Figueroa Dep. Tr. at 60–61.
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“Courts in this Circuit,
as well as in other jurisdictions, consistently have found that
a broken finger is not sufficiently serious as a matter of law.”
Colon v. City of New York, No. 8cv3142, 2009 WL 1424169, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2009) (collecting cases).
In the rare case,
courts have found a broken finger sufficiently serious when the
plaintiff alleges something more, such as “an allegation that
surgery was required due to the lack of proper initial treatment
of an injured finger.”
Leacock v. N.Y.C. Health Hosp. Corp.,
No. 03cv5440, 2005 WL 1027152, at *5 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2005).
There is no such allegation here.
Accordingly, Nurse Seargent’s motion for summary judgment
on the deliberate indifference claim is granted.
CONCLUSION
The Court has considered all of the arguments raised by the
parties.
To the extent not specifically addressed above, they
are either moot or without merit.
summary judgment is granted.
The defendants’ motion for
The Clerk is directed to enter
judgment dismissing this case, to close all pending motions, and
to close this case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:
New York, New York
February 5, 2015
____________/s/________________
John G. Koeltl
United States District Judge
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