WSP USA Corp. v. Marinello
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 9 Motion to Dismiss: Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to plaintiff's claims for defamation and accounting. It is denied in all other respects. The Clerk is directed to terminate the motion. (Docket # 9.). The parties are directed to attend an Initial Pretrial Conference on January 16, 2014 at 11 a.m. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge P. Kevin Castel on 12/18/2013) (ja)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
DATE FILED: •/cJ.- ~/,1-13
WSP USA CORP.,
13 Civ. 4591 (PKC)
CASTEL, District Judge:
PlaintiffWSP USA Corp. ("WSP") brings claims for relief against John
Marinello, its former director of information technology. Among other alleged miscondnct, it
asserts that, upon Marinello's voluntary departure from WSP, he appropriated and retained
confidential company information in violation ofthe parties' Separation Agreement and General
Release executed by the parties (the "Agreement"), shared that information with his new
employer, and personally retained valuable electronics equipment that belongs to WSP.
Marinello moves to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., arguing
that a general release provision in the Agreement bars WSP's claims in their entirety. (Docket #
The Agreement's release provision includes broad language that govems known
and unknown claims that were in existence at the time of the Agreement's execution. Because
WSP's claims for breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets and conversion did not
arise until after the Agreement's execution, they are not barred by the release, and the motion to
dismiss these claims is denied. The motion to dismiss is granted as to WSP' s defamation claim
and its accounting claim.
In reviewing the Complaint, the Court accepts all non-conclusory factual
allegations as true, and draws every reasonable inference in favor ofthe plaintiff as the nonmovant. See In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47,50 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam). The
Agreement, including the release provision, is annexed to the Complaint at Exhibit A, and is
properly considered on a motion to dismiss.
In re Thelen LLP, 736 F.3d 213, 219 (2d
PlaintiffWSP is a New York corporation with its principal place of business in
New York. (Comp!'t ~ 1.) Defendant Marinello is a citizen of New Jersey. (Compl't'12.)
Subject matter jurisdiction is premised upon complete diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a). (Compl't ~ 3.)
WSP is an engineering consulting firm. (Comp!'t ~ 5.) In July 2012, an
engineering firm named Genivar acquired WSP's parent company, with the combined entity
rebranded as WSP+Genivar. (Compl't '1'113-14.) Defendant Marinello began employment with
WSP in 2001. (Compl't ~ 7.) He continued to work in the company's New York office through
January 2013, at which point he had the job title ofInformation Technology Director, and was
responsible for overseeing IT functions for the company's U.S. businesses. (Compl't '1'15-9.)
The Complaint alleges, upon information and belief, that in or about October
2013, Marinello began employment negotiations with a direct competitor ofWSP, Syska
Hennesy. (Comp!'t '115.) WSP alleges, upon information and belief, that on or about
November 29, 2012, defendant Marinello accepted an offer of employment from Syska
Hennessy, and signed a letter of employment that provided a start date ofJanuary 31, 2013.
(Compl't ~ 16.) At the time, WSP was unaware that defendant had accepted this position or was
seeking employment elsewhere. (Comp!'t "17.) Defendant Marinello did not give notice to
WSP at the time he accepted the offer from Syska Hennessy.
On January 23,2013, WSP announced that it would delay payment of employee
bonuses to some point beyond the planned payment date in Febmary 2013. (Compl't ~ 19.) On
or about January 25, defendant asked when he should expect to receive his annual bonus, stating
that he was closing on a new house and needed the money. (CompI'! ~ 20.) WSP's chief
financial officer stated that he would not be able to give a date certain until the following week.
(Comp!'t ~ 20.) On or about January 30, 2013, defendant gave notice to WSP, stating that his
last day of work would be February 19, and that he expected to receive a full atlliual bonus.
WSP initially refused to pay defendant's bonus, stating that it was under no
obligation to do so. (Compl't ~ 22.) It then decided "to pay most of defendant's expected
bonus" after receiving a letter from his attorney. (Compl't ~~ 23-25.) On Febmary 28, 2013, the
parties executed a Separation Agreement and General Release (the "Agreement"), which, among
other things, provided a payment of$26,500 to the defendant. (Compl't ~~ 26-27.)
Two of the Agreement's provisions are particularly relevant to this motion. The
first governs defendant's obligations concerning confidential WSP information, and is the basis
for plaintiffs breach of contract claim:
Protection of Confidential Information. Employee will not
directly or indirectly (without the Company's prior written
consent), use for himself or use for, or disclose to, any party other
than the Company, any Confidential Information.
Confidential Information is, and will remain, the Company's
exclusive property from its conception or acquisition. To the
extent the Employee is in possession of any of said items,
Employee shall promptly deliver to the Company all memoranda,
notes, records, plans, designs, blueprints, flow charts, customer
list, and other infonnation, data, video or audio recordings or other
documents made or compiled by, delivered to, or otherwise
acquired by Employee concerning, evidencing representing, or
otherwise relating to said Confidential Information.
(Agreement'1l3.) The Agreement defines confidential information to include "any data or
information regarding the business of the Company that is not generally known to the public
which has economic value, and which the company keeps confidential .... " (Agreement'1l4.)
Separately, the Agreement includes parallel general release provisions for both
WSP and defendant Marinello. (Agreement'16.) The language releasing claims by WSP
contains broad language that releases "known and unknown claims ... which the Company has
or may have against Employee as of the date of execution of the Agreement and General
Release." (Agreement'1l6.) It states in full:
General Release of All Claims by Company. Company hereby
knowingly and voluntarily releases and forever discharges the
Employee, his successors, and assigns, from any and all claims,
known and unknown, asserted or unasserted, which the Company
has or may have against Employee as of the date of execution of
this Agreement and General Release.
(Agreement '16.) Defendant Marinello argues that this release bars WSP's claims in their
WSP asserts that on or about May I, 2013, two months after the Agreement's
execution, it discovered that defendant Marinello had opened a Twitter account using the
"WSP+Genivar" name, and that he was posting "libelous and disparaging" statements about the
company. (Comp!'t'131.) Among other things, the Twitter account stated that WSP prioritized
shareholders above its clients and work quality, "profit[ ed] fr0111 others misfortunes" and that
employees were underpaid and worked in "unsanitary conditions." (Compl't '131.) At WSP's
request, Twitter closed this account. (Compl't '133.)
WSP then "performed a full forensic audit of defendant's activities during his
employment .... " (Comp!'t '134.) The Complaint sets forth several instances of alleged
misconduct, including defendant's failure to return company electronics (including two laptops,
an iPad and three phones) assigned to him during his employment, extensive personal use of the
company FedEx account, failure to reimburse the company for personal expenditures, accessing
confidential and proprietary information for personal use, and the impermissible monitoring of
executive e-mails that discussed his annual bonus. (Compl't't\34.) WSP claims that defendant
has ignored requests to return the allegedly misappropriated items. (Compl 't 't\'t\35-36.) The
Complaint asserts claims for breach of contract, defamation, misappropriation of trade secrets
and conversion, and seeks an accounting. (Comp!'t '1'137-54.)
RULE 12(b)(6) STANDARD.
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'"
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007». "'[L]abels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation ofthe elements of a cause of
action will not do. '" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A plaintiff must plead "factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged." Id. However, '''detailed factual allegations'" are not necessary. Id.
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Affirmative defenses, including the enforcement of a general release, are properly
considered by a court as part ofa motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
Hartford Fin. Services 01])" Inc., 547 F.3d 406, 425 (2d Cir. 2008) (Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is
appropriate when an affirmative defense "is clear from the face of the complaint" and other
materials properly considered in a motion to dismiss); Tromp v. City of New York, 465 Fed.
Appx. 50, 51-52 (2d Cir. 2012) (affirming district court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal based on
language in general release).
The Complaint Plausibly Alleges that Defendant Marinello Breached
Paragraph Three of the Agreement, and that He Has Misappropriated
The Agreement provides that it "shall be construed according to the laws of the
State of New York, without regard to its conflict oflaw rules." (Agreement "1110.) Under New
York law, "[a] release is a contract, and its construction is governed by contract law." Cardinal
Holdings, Ltd. v. Indotronix Int'l Corp., 73 AD.3d 960, 962 (2d Dep't 2010) (quotation marks
omitted). "'[W]hen parties set down their agreement in a clear, complete document, their writing
should as a rule be enforced according to its terms. '" RKO Props. Ltd. v. Boymelgreen, 62
AD.3d 683, 684 (2d Dep't 2009) (quoting Reiss v. Fin. PerfOlmance Corp., 97 N.Y.2d 195, 198
(2001)). "However, 'if from the recitals therein or otherwise, it appears that the release is to be
limited to only particular claims, demands or obligations, the instrument will be operative as to
those matters alone.'" Kaminsky v. Gamache, 298 AD.2d 361, 361 (2d Dep't 2002) (quoting
Perritano v. Town of Mamaroneck, 126 AD.2d 623, 624 (2d Dep't 1987)).
A defendant has the initial burden of establishing that a release bars plaintiffs
claims. Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v. America Movil, S.AB. de C.V., 17 N.Y.3d 269,
276 (2011). The burden then shifts to the plaintiff'''to show that there has been fraud, duress or
some other fact which will be sufficient to void the release. '" Id. (quoting Fleming v. Ponziani,
24 N.Y.2d 105, III (1969)). "Notably, a release may encompass unknown claims, including
unknown fraud claims, if the parties so intend and the agreement is 'fairly and knowingly
made.'" Id. (quoting Mangini v. McClurg, 24 N.Y.2d 556-67 (1969)). Centro Empresarial
concluded that the "broad language of the release," which barred "all manner of actions ...
whatsoever ... whether past, present or future, actual or contingent," reflected an intention to
release defendants from claims that were unknown at the time that the release was executed. Id.
Applying New York law, the express and unambiguous language of the
Agreement establishes that WSP has released "any and all claims, known and unknown, asserted
or unasserted" that WSP had or may have had as of the February 28, 2013 execution ofthe
Agreement. (Agreement ~ 6.) The release language bars WSP from bringing claims that were in
existence on February 28, 2013, but that WSP had not yet discovered. WSP may therefore
pursue only claims that arose after February 28.
WSP's breach of contract claim is directed to Paragraph Three of the Agreement,
in which defendant Marinello promised that he "will not directly or indirectly ... use for himself
... or disclose ... any Confidential Information." Paragraph Three also required that, to the
extent defendant Marinello possessed confidential information, he "shall promptly deliver" all
such information to WSP. (Agreement '13.) As noted, the Agreement's definition of
"Confidential Information" is broad, and encompasses "any data or information regarding the
business of the Company that is not generally known to the public which has economic value,
and what the company keeps confidential .... " (Agreement '14.) WSP contends that defendant
Marinello has breached his obligations under Paragraph Three, and he continues to retain
materials that include "business head counts, head count map and breakdown, organization chart
by entity with names, positions salaries, bonuses, and other remunerations for fiscal years 2007
through 2012," as well as "business plans, IT due diligence documents, [and] IT meeting minutes
· ... " (Comp!'t 'I~ 29, 34(e), (g), 38-39.) The Complaint alleges upon information and belief
that defendant Marinello has shared this information with his new employer. (Compl't ~ 40.)
According to defendant Marinello, however, at the time of execution, the
Agreement relieved him from any ongoing obligation to retUITI confidential infonnation. He
cites to Paragraph Two, which states in full:
Consideration. In consideration for signing this Agreement and
complying with its terms, the Company agrees to pay to Employee
the total amount of Twenty-Six Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
and Zero Cents ($26,500), less lawful deductions, within 10
business days after the Company's receipt of an original of this
Agreement signed by Employee.
(Agreement'12.) As characterized by defendant, "[t]he wording of this paragraph makes clear
that [defendant's] signature and compliance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement were
conditions that necessarily preceded in time Plaintiffs payment of the monetary consideration"
to defendant. (Def. Mem. at 2.) Defendant Marinello also asserts that Paragraph Five of the
agreement "makes certain" that vVSP' s payment to him was premised on past performance under
the Agreement. That provision states:
No Consideration Absent Execution of This Agreement.
Employee understands and agrees that Employee would not
receive the monies specified in Paragraph 2 above, except for
Employee's execution of this Agreement and the fulfillment of the
promises contained herein.
Neither Paragraph Two nor Paragraph Five relieved defendant Marinello of his
express obligation to return any "Confidential Info11nation" to WSP. Paragraph Two merely
requires the defendant to adhere to the Agreement's te11ns, and Paragraph Five makes explicit
that WSP's payment of consideration is made in exchange for defendant's performance.
Paragraph Three, however, which govelTIS defendant Marinello's obligations concerning
"Confidential Information," is written in the future tense, stating that he "will not" use or
disclose such information and that he "shall promptly deliver" any such information to WSP.
(Agreement ~ 3; emphasis added.) The text of the Agreement expressly sets forth future and
ongoing obligations conceming the defendant's handling of "Confidential Information," and his
assertion that the Agreement required him to comply with this provision solely in advance of its
execution, and not thereafter, is without merit.
The Complaint alleges specific items of information that WSP believes to be in
defendant's possession, the timeframes in which they were accessed and asserts that these
materials have not been retumed. (Comp!'t ~~ 34(e), (g), 39.) While defendant Marinello may
have accessed this information prior to execution ofthe Agreement, the Complaint alleges
ongoing conduct that specifically violates Paragraph Three ofthe Agreement - namely, that he
has retained WSP's "Confidential Information" and shared it with his new employer, Syska
Hennessy. (Compl't ~~ 38-40.) The Complaint plausibly alleges that plaintiff has breached
Paragraph Three of the Agreement. J
For the same reasons, the Complaint plausibly alleges that defendant Marinello
has misappropriated trade secrets. Under New York law, '''[tlo establish a claim for
I wSP argues in its memorandum oflaw that, in the event the Court concludes that is has plausibly alleged a breach
of contract claim, the remainder of the agreement should be deemed rescinded. Rescission is an "extraordinary"
equitable remedy. Ellington v. SonY!ATV Music Pnbl'g LLC, 85 A.D.3d 438, 439 (I st Dep't 20 II). "As a general
rule, rescission of a contract is permitted 'for such a breach as substantially defeats its purpose. It is 110t permitted
for a slight, casual, or technical breach, but ... only for such as are material and willful, or, it not willful, so
substantial and fundamental as to sh'ongly tend to defeat the object of the parties in making the contract.'" RR
Chester, LLC v. Arlington Bldg. Com., 22 A.D.3d 652, 654 (2d Dep't 2005) (quoting Callanan v. Keeseville,
Ausable Chasm & Lake Champlain R.R. Co., 199 N.Y. 268 (1910». The Complaint includes no rescission claim.
To the extent that plaintiff, for the first time, asserts a rescission claim in its motion papers, parties may not amend
pleadings through statements in briefs. See, lWk, Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 1998).
Separately, plaintiffs allegations that the alleged breach of Paragraph Three "had the effect of vitiating" the
Agreement and "rendering it null and void in all respects," (Comp!'t ~~ 28-29, 41) is a legal conclusion not afforded
the presumption of truth. Igbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Complaint makes no allegations as to the willfulness of the
breach and does not detail how the breach was "so substantial and fundamental" that the breach defeated the object
ofthe contract. RR Chester, 22 A.D.3d at 654. The Agreement sets forth other, additional consideration required by
defendant Marinello, including a lengthy release provision in which Marinello agreed to release any possible claims
directed toward WSP. (Agreement ~ 6.) Plaintiffs rescission argument is therefore without merit.
misappropriation of trade secrets, a plaintiff must show that it possesses a trade secret, and that
defendant is using that trade secret in breach of an agreement, confidence, or duty, or as a result
of discovery by improper means. ", Novus Partners, Inc. v. Vainchenker, 32 Misc.3d 1241(A), at
*6-7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2011) (Fried, J.) (quoting Sylmark Holdings Ltd. v. Silicone
Zone Int'! Ltd., 5 Misc.3d 285, 297 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2004»; see also Front, Inc. v.
Khalil, 103 A.D.3d 481, 483 (1st Dep't 2013) (allegation that defendant fOlwarded plaintiffs
confidential business information to competitors stated a claim for misappropriation oftrade
secrets). A trade secret is "any formula, pattern, device or compilation ofinfonllation which is
used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not know or use it." Ashland Mgt. Inc. v. Janien, 82 N.Y.2d 395, 407
(1993) (quotation marks omitted).
The Complaint alleges that defendant Marinello continues to retain confidential
information that he improperly obtained while employed at WSP, and that, after the Agreement's
execution, he shared this information with his new employer, Syska Helmessy. (Compl't '1'13436,40,45-47.) This infol1nation allegedly includes WSP's business plans. (Compl't '1'134,46.)
As with the breach of contract claim, this claim is directed toward alleged conduct that occurred
after the Agreement's execution, specifically including the allegation made on information and
beliefthat defendant has shared this information with his new employer. (Comp!'t 'I~ 40, 46.)
The claim is not premised merely on plaintiffs allegedly improper access of company
information during his employment at WSP, but his subsequent and allegedly ongoing misuse of
this inf0l111ation. As such, it is not barred by the Agreement's release provision.
- 10 -
Accepting the truth ofthese non-conclusory factual allegations, the Complaint
plausibly alleges that defendant Marinello breached Paragraph Three of the Agreement, and that
he has misappropriated trade secrets.
The Complaint Plausibly Alleges Conversion.
"A conversion takes place when someone, intentionally and without authority,
assumes or exercises control over personal property belonging to someone else, interfering with
that person's right of possession." Colavito v. New York Organ Donor Network, Inc., 8 N.Y.3d
43, 49-50 (2006). "Two key elements of conversion are (1) plaintiffs possessory right or
interest in the propelty and (2) defendant's dominion over the property or interference with it, in
derogation of plaintiff's rights." Id. at 50. "[I]t is well settled that, where the original possession
is lawful, a conversion does not occur until after a demand and refusal to return the property."
D' Amico v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 285 A.D.2d 166, 172 (1st Dep't 2001).
WSP's conversion claim is based on defendant's alleged appropriation of
electronics equipment that defendant took and retained during his employment at WSP.
(Compl't ~~ 48-50.) A full list of items includes three phones, unlocked SIM cards, prepaid
airtime of $200 per phone, a Toshiba laptop, a Lenovo laptop, an iPad, a cellular phone and a
Samsung tablet. (Compl't '1 34(a), (d).) WSP demanded the return of these materials in a letter
dated June 5, 2013, and defendant Marindlo has never responded. (Compl't ~~ 35-36.)
Because "a conversion does not occur until after a demand and refusal to return
the property," D' Amico, 285 A.D.2d at 172, plaintiff had no conversion claim until June 2013,
when defendant allegedly refused plaintiffs demand. Defendant Marinello asserts that the
release bars this claim because WSP could have discovered his possession of these materials
prior to executing the release (Reply at 6-7), but in D'Amico, the First Department distinguished
- 11 -
discovery of a defendant's possession from the requirement of demand and refusal. 285 AD.2d
at 172-73. D'Amico concluded that possession is not hostile until a demand for return is refused.
Id. Even though, as Marinello points out, WSP could have discovered defendant's retention of
company electronics before execution of the Agreement, it had no conversion claim until
defendant refused its demand of return. According to the Complaint, defendant Marinello has
not responded to counsel's demand of June 5, 2013.
Because WSP conversion claim did not arise until defendant refused the demand
to return company electronics, the claim is not barred by the release, and the motion to dismiss is
Plaintiffs Defamation Claim Is Dismissed.
A The General Release Bars the Defamation Claim.
The Complaint quotes three statements that defendant Marinello allegedly posted
to Twitter under the "WSP+Genivar" account. (Compl't ~ 31.) Of the three statements, one was
posted on February 26,2013, and the other two were posted on February 28. (Compl't ~ 31.)
The Settlement Agreement was executed on February 28,2013. The Complaint does not cite
any allegedly defamatory statements made after February 28. Because the Complaint does not
identify any statements that postdate the Agreement's execution, plaintiffs defamation claim is
barred by the release.
B. In Addition, with One Exception, the Complaint Fails to Plausibly the
Existence of Allegedly Defamatory Statements.
Separately, ifit were not barred by the Agreement's release provision, WSP's
defamation claim would be dismissed in part because it fails to set forth facts that plausibly
allege defamation. "A claim for defamation must allege a false statement, published without
privilege or authorization to a third party, constituting fault as judged by, at a minimum, a
- 12 -
negligence standard, and it must either cause special hann or constitute defamation ill'! se."
O'Neill v. New York University, 97 A.D. 3d 199, 212 (1st Dep't 2012) (quotation marks
omitted). Statements of opinion are not actionable. Thomas H. v. Paul B., 18 N.Y.3d 580, 584
(2012). In determining whether a statement is a fact or opinion, courts weigh 1.) whether the
defendant used words with a "precise meaning" that is "readily understood," 2.) whether the
statement can be proved true or false, and 3.) whether the statement's "full context" or its
"broader social context and surrounding circumstances" signal that the statement "is likely to be
opinion, not fact." Id. The Second Department has observed that "readers give less credence" to
"rhetorical hyperbole" and "vigorous epithet[ s]" posted on the internet, and concluded that
calling the member of a town board a "terrorist" constituted an opinion and not defamation per
se. LeBlanc v. Skilmer, 103 A.D.3d 202,213 (2d Dep't 2012).
The Complaint identifies three allegedly defamatory statements: 1.) "WSP is a
shareholder driven firm with little concem for design quality or client Services
http://wspgroup.com .. ; 2.) "How do shareholders feel when they are investing in a company that
has staff working for less than 2 Euros per day in unsanitary conditions"; and 3.) "Happy to be
profiting from others misfortunes." (Compl't '131.) Of these statements, only the assertion that
that WSP "has staff working for less than 2 Euros per day in unsanitary conditions" could
plausibly give rise to a defamation claim. That assertion has a precise meaning, can be proved
true or false, and, depending on context that is not apparent at the pleading stage, may plausibly
be construed as a statement of fact and not opinion. Thomas H., 18 N.Y.3d at 584. The
assertions that WSP is shareholder-driven and is happy to profit from misfortune are nonactionable opinion. See id.
- 13 -
Therefore, if plaintiffs defamation claim were not barred by the general release, it
would be dismissed in pati due to its failure to allege actionable statements of defamation.
The Accounting Claim Is Dismissed.
"To be entitled to an equitable accounting, a claimant must demonstrate that he or
she has no adequate remedy at law." Unitel Telecard Distribution Corp. v. Nunez, 90 AD.3d
568, 569 (1st Dep't 2011). "The right to an accounting is premised upon the existence of a
confidential or fiduciary relationship and a breach of the duty imposed by that relationship
respecting property in which the party seeking the accounting has an interest." Lawrence v.
Kmmedy, 95 AD.3d 955, 958 (2d Dep't 2012). An employee-employer relationship is
insufficient to establish a fiduciary role. Id. at 958; accord Berke v. Hamby, 279 AD.2d 491,
492 (2d Dep't 2001) (dismissing employee's accounting claim directed to corporate assets).
The Complaint sets forth no allegations that, if accepted as true, establish a
fiduciary relationship between WSP and defendant Marinello, and instead alleges a typical
employer-employee relationship. It also includes no allegations that could support a conclusion
that WSP lacks adequate remedies at law, particularly given that its accounting claim is directed
toward defendant's retention of electronics equipment and confidential information. (Compl't ~
54.) Plaintiff brings claims at law for this conduct, seeking $100,000 in money damages for each
Because the Complaint has not alleged a fiduciary relationship with the defendant,
and because it has not alleged that plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law, WSP's accounting
claim is dismissed.
- 14 -
Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to plaintiffs claims for
defamation and accounting. It is denied in all other respects. The Clerk is directed to terminate
the motion. (Docket # 9.)
The parties are directed to attend an Initial Pretrial Conference on January 16,
2014 at 11 a.m.
United States District Judge
Dated: New Yark, New York
December 18, 2013
- 15 -
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?