Rullan v. New York City Sanitation Department
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The plaintiff is directed to file an amended complaint containing the information specified above. The amended complaint must be submitted to this Courts Pro Se Office within sixty days of the date of this Order. Further , the amended complaint must be captioned as an AMENDED COMPLAINT and bear the same docket number as this Order. An Amended Complaint for Employment Discrimination form, which the plaintiff should complete as specified above, is attached to this Orde r. No summons will issue at this time. If the plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed as barred byres judicata and collateral estoppel, and for failure to s tate a claim. The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith. In forma pauperis status is therefore denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). (Signed by Judge John G. Koeltl on 8/5/2013) (djc) Modified on 8/6/2013 (djc).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
__________________________________________
JUAN RULLAN,
13 Civ. 5154 (JGK)
Plaintiff,
Memorandum
Order
Opinion
and
-againstNEW YORK CITY SANITATION
DEPARTMENT,
Defendant.
__________________________________________
JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge:
The plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, and the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112-12117, alleging
discrimination and retaliation on the basis of his disability or
perceived disability.
The Court directs the plaintiff to submit
an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this Order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court has the authority to dismiss a frivolous complaint
sua sponte, even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fee.
Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362,
363 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citing Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d
14, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that Second
Circuit Court of Appeals has inherent authority to dismiss
frivolous appeal)).
A claim is “frivolous when either: (1) the
factual contentions are clearly baseless, such as when
allegations are the product of delusion or fantasy; or (2) the
claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.”
Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir.
1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
District
courts “remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint
liberally.”
Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009).
Thus, courts should read pro se complaints with “special
solicitude” and interpret them to “raise the strongest arguments
that they suggest.”
Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470
F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, Juan Rullan, first filed a discrimination
lawsuit in this Court on October 25, 2010. The plaintiff alleged
that his employer, the New York City Department of Sanitation
(“DOS”), and the New York State Division of Human Rights (“DHR”)
discriminated again him in violation of the ADA and Title VII.
See Rullan v. New York City Dep’t of Sanitation, No. 10 Civ.
8079, 2011 WL 1833335, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2011).
By Order
dated May 12, 2011, the Honorable Robert P. Patterson, Jr.
granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the case.
Judge
Patterson dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against the DOS based
on the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel because
the plaintiff had filed and received final judgment in state
court based on the same allegations.
Id. at *3-5.
Judge
Patterson also dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
claim because the plaintiff’s complaint stated only that he
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suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, asthma, and high
blood pressure, and did not demonstrate that the DOS
discriminated or retaliated against the plaintiff.
Id. at *6.
Judge Patterson later denied the plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration.
Rullan v. New York City Dep’t of Sanitation,
No. 10 Civ. 8079, 2012 WL 76926 at * 1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2012).
The plaintiff now files in this Court a second complaint for
employment discrimination.
He alleges that he worked for the DOS
and was discriminated against because of his post-traumatic
stress disorder.
To support his allegations, the plaintiff has
attached five documents to his complaint: (1) a right-to-sue
letter from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) dated May 3, 2013, in which the EEOC adopted the
findings of the state local fair employment practices agency that
investigated the charge; (2) a petition that the plaintiff
apparently filed in New York Supreme Court against the DOS and
the DHR, seeking to reverse a March 4, 2010 decision by the DHR;
(3) an answer from the DHR to the plaintiff’s petition in which
the DHR stated that it found no probable cause for the
plaintiff’s discrimination charge; (4) a memorandum from the
DOS’s medical division director in which he states that the
plaintiff was exposed to asbestos while working near the World
Trade Center debris on or after September 11, 2001; and (5)
medical notes from the DOS which state that the plaintiff
suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and depression.
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No
further facts are alleged. The plaintiff seeks twenty-five
million dollars in damages.
DISCUSSION
A.
Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
Like the claims dismissed in Rullan, 2011 WL 1833335 at *1,
the plaintiff’s claims here may be barred by the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel.
The Court may raise the issues
of res judicata and collateral estoppel sua sponte.
See Scherer
v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of U.S., 347 F.3d 394, 398 n. 4
(2d Cir. 2003).
Res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to
cases that are dismissed for failure to state a claim.
See
Berrios v. New York City Hous. Auth., 564 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir.
2009) (“As the sufficiency of a complaint to state a claim on
which relief may be granted is a question of law . . . the
dismissal for failure to state a claim is a final judgment on the
merits and thus has res judicata effects.”) (internal citations
omitted).
“Under the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion,
‘[a] final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the
parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or
could have been raised in that action.’”
St. Pierre v. Dyer, 208
F.3d 394, 399 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc.
V. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1991)).
A claim is precluded under
this doctrine if “(1) the previous action involved an
adjudication on the merits; (2) the previous action involved the
[parties] or those in privity with them; [and,] (3) the claims
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asserted in the subsequent action were, or could have been,
raised in the prior action.”
Monahan v. New York City Dep’t of
Corr., 214 F.3d 275, 284-85 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
“The doctrine of collateral estoppel (“or issue preclusion”) bars
relitigation of a specific legal or factual issue in a second
proceeding where (1) the issues in both proceedings are
identical, (2) the issue in the prior proceeding was actually
litigated and actually decided, (3) there was [a] full and fair
opportunity to litigate in the prior proceeding, and (4) the
issue previously litigated was necessary to support a valid and
final judgment on the merits.”
Grieve v. Tamerin, 269 F.3d 149,
153 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
The plaintiff’s complaint does not state what acts of
alleged discrimination he is challenging.
To the extent that the
plaintiff is raising the same claim or claims that he could have
brought in previous litigation against the DOS, the plaintiff is
barred from raising those claims by the doctrines of res judicata
and collateral estoppel.
See Rullan, 2011 WL 1833335 at *3-5.
However, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel do
not preclude the plaintiff from filing similar claims that arose
after he filed his previous action.
See Storey v. Cello
Holdings, LLC, 347 F.3d 370, 383 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Claims arising
subsequent to a prior action . . . are not barred by res judicata
regardless of whether they are premised on facts representing a
continuance of the same ‘course of conduct[.]’”).
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The plaintiff
may file similar claims based on facts occurring after the date
of the last operative complaint from the prior case.
See Manbeck
v. Micka, 640 F. Supp. 2d 351, 364-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
The
plaintiff therefore is not barred from alleging discrimination
claims against the DOS if the factual basis for those claims
arose after October 25, 2010, when he filed his complaint in
Rullan, 2011 WL 1833335 at *1.
Because the plaintiff may bring
claims predicated on facts that arose after his previous
complaint was filed, the plaintiff is given leave to amend his
complaint to provide further details about his discrimination
claims.
The plaintiff may detail any actions that allegedly
constitute discrimination and detail when such actions occurred
to show that his claims are not barred by the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel.
B.
Rule 8 Pleading Requirements
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Rule 8(d)(1) requires that
each allegation be “simple, concise, and direct.”
The Supreme
Court recently clarified the Rule 8 pleading standard, holding
that:
a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” A
claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“A pleading that
offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Id.
The
plausibility standard applies to all civil actions.
Id. at 684.
As currently stated, the plaintiff’s allegations are
insufficient to state a plausible claim of discrimination or
retaliation.
The plaintiff’s complaint in this case appears to
suffer from the same defects as the complaint he filed in Rullan,
2011 WL 1833335 at *1.
Here, the plaintiff states that he was
discriminated against because of his post-traumatic stress
disorder.
He provides documents showing that he has filed a
state court discrimination lawsuit against the DOS and that he
suffered from asbestos exposure and depression.
But the
plaintiff’s bare assertion that he suffers from post-traumatic
stress disorder and other maladies fails to show that the DOS
discriminated against him because of his disability.
Therefore,
in light of the plaintiff’s pro se status, he is directed to
submit an amended complaint providing facts from which an
inference can be made that the DOS discriminated and retaliated
against him in violation of the ADA and Title VII.
C.
Leave to Amend
The plaintiff is granted leave to amend his complaint to
elaborate on his ADA and Title VII claims.
To the extent
possible, the plaintiff’s amended complaint must:
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(a) state the names and titles of all
relevant persons;
(b) describe all relevant events and state
the facts that support the plaintiff’s case,
including what each defendant did or failed
to do;
(c) state the dates and times of each
relevant event or, if unknown, the
approximate date and time of each relevant
event;
(d) state the location where each relevant
event occurred;
(e) describe how each defendant’s acts or
omissions violated the plaintiff’s rights and
describe the injuries that the plaintiff
suffered; and
(f) state what relief the plaintiff seeks
from the Court, such as money damages,
injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, the body of the plaintiff’s amended complaint
must tell the Court: who violated his federally protected rights;
what facts show that his federally protected rights were
violated; when such violation(s) occurred; where such
violation(s) occurred; and why the plaintiff is entitled to
relief.
The plaintiff’s amended complaint will completely
replace, not supplement, his original complaint.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff is directed to file an amended complaint
containing the information specified above.
The amended
complaint must be submitted to this Court’s Pro Se Office within
sixty days of the date of this Order. Further, the amended
complaint must be captioned as an “AMENDED COMPLAINT” and bear
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the same docket number as this Order.
An Amended Complaint for
Employment Discrimination form, which the plaintiff should
complete as specified above, is attached to this Order.
summons will issue at this time.
No
If the plaintiff fails to
comply within the time allowed, and cannot show good cause to
excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed as barred by
res judicata and collateral estoppel, and for failure to state a
claim.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any
appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith. In forma
pauperis status is therefore denied for the purpose of an appeal.
See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED:
/s/
JOHN G. KOELTL
United States District Judge
Dated:
August 5, 2013
New York, New York
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