Thornhill v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.
Filing
29
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Finally, as the parties made no attempt in their most recent letter to justify keeping either the letter or their settlement agreement under seal, the Court finds that there is no basis to keep those documents confidenti al in light of the common law right of access to judicial documents. See Wolinsky, 900 F. Supp. 2d. at 337-40 (explaining the common law right of public access as it relates to settlement agreements in FLSA cases). Accordingly, as noted, the parties' most recent letter and their settlement agreement are attached to this Memorandum Opinion and Order. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case. All pending motions are moot. (Signed by Judge Jesse M. Furman on 3/20/2014) (mro)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------------------------------------------------X
:
CHRIS THORNHILL et al.,
:
:
Plaintiffs,
:
:
-v:
:
:
CVS PHARMACY, INC.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
------------------------------------------------------------------------X
03/20/2014
13 Civ. 5507 (JMF)
MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER
JESSE M. FURMAN, United States District Judge:
In February 2014, the parties advised the Court that they had reached a settlement in this
action, involving claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
By Order dated February 18, 2014, the Court directed the parties to submit the settlement
agreement for approval by the Court with a joint letter detailing the basis for the proposed
settlement and explaining why it should be approved per the factors set forth in Wolinsky v.
Scholastic, Inc., 900 F. Supp. 2d 332, 335-36 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). (Docket No. 27). The Court
further directed the parties to address the basis for any attorney’s fee award and to provide
documentation to support such an award. (Id.). Finally, to the extent relevant here, the Court
advised the parties that it would not approve any settlement agreement containing a
confidentiality provision, unless the parties could show that there were reasons, specific to the
case, sufficient to overcome the common law right of access to judicial documents. (Id.).
The parties submitted a letter dated February 19, 2014. (Docket No. 28 (attachment)
(“Feb. 19 Letter”)). Representing that “the amounts [Defendant] is paying compensate Plaintiffs
for the full amount of alleged lost wages, including liquidated damages,” the parties asserted that
1
“Court scrutiny [of their settlement agreement was] not required.” (Id. at 1). The parties’
representations aside, however, the letter provided insufficient information for the Court to
assess the fairness and reasonableness of the settlement or the reasonableness of the proposed
attorney’s fee award. Accordingly, by Order dated February 24, 2014, the Court directed the
parties to submit additional information. (Docket No. 28). Further, the Court docketed the
parties’ letter, finding “no basis to keep [it] confidential as it plainly qualifie[d] as a judicial
document subject to the presumption in favor of public access.” (Id. at 2 (citing Wolinsky, 900 F.
Supp. 2d at 337-40)). The Court reserved judgment on the parties’ request to keep the settlement
agreement itself confidential, advising that, should the parties wish to keep their agreement
confidential, they must cite additional authority to support that request. (Id.).
SETTLEMENT APPROVAL
The parties submitted a supplemental letter dated March 7, 2014 (a copy of which is
attached to this Order for reasons discussed below). (“Mar. 7 Letter”). Notably, despite the
parties’ representation in their February 19, 2014 letter, the new letter makes clear that the
settlement does not fully “compensate Plaintiffs for the full amount of alleged lost wages,” let
alone the full amount “including liquidated damages.” (Feb. 19 Letter at 1; Mar. 7 Letter at 2).
Nevertheless, based on a review of the settlement agreement (a copy of which is also attached to
this Order for reasons discussed below), the parties’ two letters, and the parties’ briefing on
Defendant’s earlier motion to dismiss (Docket Nos. 22, 25-26), the Court finds that the
settlement — totaling $48,090.00 when combined with the amount that Defendant has agreed to
pay in attorney’s fees and costs — is fair and reasonable.
As discussed in Wolinsky, a court must assess the settlement of claims under the FLSA
based on the totality of the circumstances, including:
2
(1) the plaintiff’s range of possible recovery; (2) the extent to which “the
settlement will enable the parties to avoid anticipated burdens and expenses in
establishing their respective claims and defenses”; (3) the seriousness of the
litigation risks faced by the parties; (4) whether “the settlement agreement is the
product of arm’s-length bargaining between experienced counsel”; and (5) the
possibility of fraud or collusion.
Wolinsky, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 335 (quoting Medley v. Am. Cancer Soc., No. 10 Civ. 3214 (BSJ),
2010 WL 3000028, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2010)). Applying those factors here, the Court
concludes that the settlement is fair and reasonable given the scope and nature of Plaintiffs’
claims and range of possible recovery, as well as the risks and expenses involved in additional
litigation (including the risk that the Court would have granted Defendant’s still-pending motion
to dismiss). See id. Additionally, although the FLSA places “strict limits on an employee’s
ability to waive claims . . . for fear that employers would [otherwise] coerce employees into
settlement and waiver,” id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted), those
concerns are not as pronounced when the plaintiffs no longer work for the defendant, as is the
case here, cf. Lujan v. Cabana Mgmt., Inc., No. 10 Civ. 755 (ILG), 2011 WL 3235628, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. July 27, 2011) (noting “the risk of explicit or implicit coercion in the employment
context” in FLSA litigation); Gortat v. Capala Bros., Inc., 07 Civ. 3629 (ILG) (SMG), 2009 WL
3347091, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2009) (noting the heightened concern over coercion in FLSA
litigation when plaintiffs “are involved in an ongoing business relationship with defendants, and .
. . are dependent on defendants for employment”), report and recommendation adopted by 07CV-3629 (ILG), 2010 WL 1423018 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2010).
3
ATTORNEY’S FEE AWARD APPROVAL
The parties also seek the Court’s approval to allocate $25,000 of the settlement fund to
attorney’s fees. 1 In evaluating an attorney’s fee request, a court must consider: (1) counsel’s
time and labor; (2) the case’s magnitude and complexities; (3) the risk of continued litigation; (4)
the quality of representation; (5) the fee’s relation to the settlement; and (6) public policy
considerations. See Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 50 (2d Cir. 2000). In
addition to considering those factors, commonly referred to as the “Goldberger factors,” a court
may use one of two methods to calculate attorney’s fees: the “lodestar” method or the
“percentage of the fund” method. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Cnty. of Schenectady, 595 F.3d 411,
417 (2d Cir. 2010). Either way, a court should be guided by the Goldberger factors when
determining what are reasonable attorney’s fees. See, e.g., Baffa v. Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette
Secs. Corp., No. 96 Civ. 583 (DAB), 2002 WL 1315603, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2002).
After due consideration of all the Goldberger factors, the Court finds that the proposed
attorney’s fee award here is excessive. Most significantly, the size of the requested fee in
relation to the total settlement — approximately 52% — is unreasonably high. In this Circuit,
courts typically approve attorney’s fees that range between 30 and 33⅓%. See Guzman v.
Joesons Auto Parts, No. 11 Civ. 4543 (ETB), 2013 WL 2898154, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 13, 2013)
1
In urging the Court to approve the proposed attorney’s fees, the parties emphasize that
those fees “were decided separately and apart from the award to Plaintiffs. In other words,
attorney’s fees in this case [sic], they were not allocated from the recovery Defendant awarded to
Plaintiffs.” (Mar. 7 Letter at 4). In the Court’s view, however, there is no legal or logical reason
to view the attorney’s fee award as distinct from the award to Plaintiffs; together, the two awards
constitute the total amount of money Defendant has agreed to pay to resolve Plaintiffs’ claims.
Accordingly, for purposes of reviewing the proposed settlement, the Court considered the total of
the two awards; and similarly, the Court treats the request for approval of the proposed attorney’s
fee award as a request for approval to allocate a portion of the overall settlement to Plaintiffs’
counsel as attorney’s fees. The Court also notes that, in the absence of viewing the settlement in
that manner, it might well have not approved the settlement as fair and reasonable.
4
(collecting cases); see also, e.g., Silverstein v. AllianceBernstein LP, No. 09 Civ. 5904 (JPO),
2013 WL 6726910, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2013); Beckman v. KeyBank, N.A., 293 F.R.D. 467,
481 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Indeed, courts in this Circuit have reduced attorney’s fee awards in FLSA
collective action cases at least in part because the proposed awards exceeded that range. See,
e.g., Pla v. Renaissance Equity Holdings LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5268 (JMF), 2014 WL 113721, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2014) (reducing a fee award from 44% of the settlement fund to 33⅓%);
Cisneros v. Schnipper Restaurant LLC, No. 13 Civ. 6266 (JMF), 2014 WL 67235, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2014) (reducing a fee award from 40% of the settlement fund to 25%);
Guzman, 2013 WL 2898154, at *4 (citing cases in reducing a fee award from 40% of the
settlement fund to 25% as to one plaintiff and 20% as to another settling party); cf. Mendez v.
Radec Corp., 907 F. Supp. 2d 353, 358-59 (W.D.N.Y. 2012) (discussing proportionality of
settlements to fee requests and reducing attorney’s fees in part on that basis). Although
Plaintiffs’ counsel’s lodestar — $85,275 — is higher than the fee requested — $25,000 — that
fact is “insufficient to justify either the application of the [lodestar] method or the award of a
higher fee.” Guzman, 2013 WL 2898154, at *5.
Additionally, the case involves a relatively straightforward wage-and-hour dispute arising
under the FLSA and NYLL. Notably, in their letter, the parties themselves acknowledge that this
case does not involve any “novel question of law” — that it is “a typical FLSA and state wageand-hour law case” involving “the application of existing law.” (Feb. 19 Letter at 5). Although
the case was styled as a collective action, Plaintiffs never filed a motion for certification of a
collective or a class action, and notices regarding FLSA claims were not distributed to other
employees. To be sure, Plaintiffs’ counsel did have to brief Defendants’ motion to dismiss, a
consideration that, with other factors, arguably justifies an award at the upper end of the range of
5
common awards — namely, 33⅓% of the total settlement. But, especially mindful of the Court’s
responsibility to guard the rights of the opt-in Plaintiffs who presumably did not bargain at arm’s
length to pay 52% of their recovery to Plaintiffs’ counsel, see City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.,
560 F.2d 1093, 1099 (2d Cir. 1977) (discussing the Court’s responsibility in class actions to act
“as a fiduciary who must serve as a guardian of the rights of absent class members”); see also
Goldberger, 209 F.3d at 52 (“The point is that plaintiffs in common fund cases typically are not
fully informed. Nor are they able to negotiate collectively, or at arm’s length. This is why we
emphasized . . . that awards in these cases are proper only if made with moderation.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)), anything above 33⅓% would be unreasonable. Accordingly, the
Court awards attorney’s fees totaling $16,030.00. The difference between the proposed award of
attorney’s fees and the reduced award shall be distributed among Plaintiffs on a pro rata basis.
CONFIDENTIALITY OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Finally, as the parties made no attempt in their most recent letter to justify keeping either
the letter or their settlement agreement under seal, the Court finds that there is no basis to keep
those documents confidential in light of the common law right of access to judicial documents.
See Wolinsky, 900 F. Supp. 2d. at 337-40 (explaining the common law right of public access as it
relates to settlement agreements in FLSA cases). Accordingly, as noted, the parties’ most recent
letter and their settlement agreement are attached to this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case. All pending motions are moot.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 20, 2014
New York, New York
6
FELDMAN
MORGADO
FELDMAN
MODO p a
pa
Friday, March 07, 2014
VIA U.S. MAIL & EMAIL
Honorable Jesse M. Furman
United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York
Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse
40 Foley Square
New York, New York 10007
Re:
Chris Thornhill et. al. v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.
Case No.: 1:13-cv-05507-JMF
Dear Judge Thurman:
Pursuant to the Order dated February 24, 2014, Plaintiffs and Defendant submit this
supplemental letter to demonstrate the fairness and reasonableness of the proposed settlement
between the parties and the stipulated attorney’s fees.
Calculations of What Damages Plaintiff Would Have Be Entitled To
Plaintiffs have been paid all or substantially all of the overtime wages they were entitled
to be paid. Plaintiffs claimed that during their employment at CVS they were required to clock
out and continue working during their designated thirty-minute meal break. Additionally,
Plaintiffs claimed that they did not receive compensation for 1 – 8 hours of overtime work
performed each week, while employed by the Defendant, and during the relevant statute of
limitations period.1 But like most Plaintiffs, they lacked time records to get an exact amount.
1
Further, Plaintiffs Thornhill and Drews claimed they should have received a night deferential (increase
hourly rate of .25 - .50 cents per hour on overnight shifts) on their unpaid minimum and overtime wage
claims.
Writers Contact Information:
dmorgado@ffmlawgroup.com
Mailing Address:
Bankers Trust Co. Building
14 Wall Street
20th Floor, Suite 2040
New York, New York 10005
www.feldman-morgado.com
New World Tower Building
100 N. Biscayne Blvd,
29th Floor, Suite 2902
Miami, Florida 33132
(212) 355-3555 DD
(212) 991-8431 PH
(212) 991-8439 FX
Qui Tams
Pensions
Securities
Wage & Hour
Class Actions
Employee Benefits
(305) 222-7853 DD
(305) 222-7850 PH
(305) 384-4676 FX
Federal Trial & Class Action Lawyers
t a mp a | N e w Y o r k | G r e e n w i c h | H o u s t o n | J a c k s o n v i l le | W a s h i n g t o n | M i a mi
During litigation the parties shared information to see how far apart their respective
positions were, and after reviewing shift’s they worked and clock-in and out records the
following prospective estimate of damages became the negotiating point of reference:
Shifts > 6 hrs
Wks Worked
Thornhill
402
80.4
Dorsey
76
15.2
Drews
695
139
Acosta
632
126.4
Ave. Hr Rate
$11.40
9.35
10.15
10.13
OT Rate
$17.10
14.03
15.23
15.20
Min. Wage Owed
$2,291.40 (.5/day)
$582.69 (.82/day)
$2,821.70 (.4/day)
$3,201.08 (.5/day)
OT Owed
$10,998.72 (8
hrs/wk)
$213.26 (1 hr/wk)
$4,233.94 (2
hrs/wk)
$3,842.56 (2
hrs/wk)
Total Wages
Claimed
$13,290.12
$795.95
$7,055.64
$7,043.64
Actual Settlement
Payment
$11,535
$472
$6,003.00
$5,080
Having calculated actual damages of each Plaintiff using the time card punches of each
they engaged in several discussions of the possible world of damages that may be awarded.
In the above calculation, and solely for the purposes of settlement discussions, double
damages were excluded, but a rate of 1.5 instead of half-time .5 (a rate Defendant insisted was
applicable) was used. Further, the parties used a constant estimate of 6 hours per week, when the
Plaintiffs estimated 1 – 8 hours of overtime per week. These were not so much compromises,
but rather exercises the parties went through to determine what the realistic maximum amount
postured by Plaintiffs was, assuming, of course, Plaintiffs were successful in proving all
violations to the maximum penalties of the FLSA and NYLL. In the end, the “Total Wages
Claimed” line in the above chart is accurate estimate of what the parties believed is the
maximum exposure to the Defendant, should Plaintiffs be 100% successful.2
When the case was accepted, the undersigned accepted this case into the Class Action
division, something that would not happen if there was not a real belief the case would be
litigated for years. Indeed, the firm budgeted in excess of $500,000 in hourly fees and costs, had
it been litigated to trial, and been converted into the Class/Collective Action foreseen.
2
Further, in coming to the calculation, Plaintiffs, Thornhill, Dorsey, and Acosta, claimed violations under the
FLSA and NYLL, so that a six year statute of limitations was applied as applicable, whereas, Drews, the
FLSA’s maximum three-year statute of limitations was adopted.
Dale James Morgado
www.feldman-morgado.com
[2]
dmorgado@fmlawgroup.us
The Defendant’s last offer was close, and it provided, at least arguable, all of the relief
Plaintiffs could have been granted. Having considered the case and what was available to the
Plaintiffs in the Defendant’s last offer, and despite the fact that it would come at loss to
Plaintiffs’ counsel in attorney fee time invested, counsel for Plaintiffs recommend to his client it
was in their best interest, and to accept the offer.
After making this recommendation, and discussing with each Plaintiff the offer, their
case, and its strengths, weakness, evidence, and damages, each Plaintiff decided to accept the
settlement offer and executed an Individual Approval Form.
Reasonableness of the Proposed Attorney’s Fee Award
The fees here are reasonable for several reasons: (1) they are $60,275.00 less than
counsel would have received had he charged his clients an hourly fee; (2) they are offered by the
Defendant to be paid as attorney’s fees, accepted by Plaintiffs’ counsel, with each Plaintiff’s
knowledge; (3) the FLSA states that a successful Plaintiff is to have their attorneys’ fees paid by
the Defendant; (4) Plaintiffs were successful in recovering substantially all of the damages they
could realistically have recovered should they have prevailed on the merits; and (5) counsel for
the Plaintiffs assumed the risk of not being paid at all, a risk Plaintiffs were not asked to bear, as
their agreement was that Plaintiffs would not be responsible for any attorneys’ fees or their
lawyers’ costs should this happen.
Transmitted separately by email, and marked as Exhibit A, are most of the
contemporaneously recorded time entries for the case.3 Plaintiffs’ counsel spent at least 189.5
hours on this case, which translates to $85,275.00 (at his typical rate of $450 per hour) or
$60,275 less than he would have charged a client on an hourly engagement.4
Knowledge to the Plaintiffs is present here as evidenced by the Settlement Agreement,
which clearly addresses the amount of costs and attorneys' fees (defined as the Fee
Reimbursement) separate from and independent of the settlement amount that will go to
Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs thus had a clear understanding of the amount of compensation the
Settlement Agreement contemplated their attorneys would receive, and Plaintiffs approved this
amount.
Exhibit A contains most of the records because during the course of this litigation, Plaintiffs’ counsel,
switched to a new practice management system and extracting some of this information provided to be both
time consuming and difficult. Additionally, the physical and electronic files were not reviewed to determine
whether time was invested, but not clearly recorded. In other words, the firm has a policy that every lawyer
is to record their time contemporaneously, regardless of whether the case is billed hourly, or taken on a
contingent basis. The hours from the print out are those hours. However, if a review is performed, it would
be expected to reveal at least some additional work performed but never entered into the system.
4
Plaintiffs’ contemporaneous time records have been submitted in camera.
3
Dale James Morgado
www.feldman-morgado.com
[3]
dmorgado@fmlawgroup.us
Further, the attorney’s fees provided to Plaintiff’s Counsel were decided separate and
apart from the award to Plaintiffs. In other words, attorney’s fees in this case, they were not
allocated from the recovery Defendant awarded to Plaintiffs. And as noted above, the FLSA
provides that in addition to any amount awarded to Plaintiffs, the court shall allow reasonable
attorney’s fees to be paid by Defendant. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Similarly, the Agreement here
provides attorney’s fees in addition to the proposed settlement to Plaintiffs.
Counsel’s regular rate of $450 (the rate used in his calculation) is reasonable under a
lodestar test because the fee was stipulated to, and because even a rate one third of his traditional
rate, e.g., $150 per hour, multiplied by the hours invested, would be more than the fees being
paid in this agreement. When this happens, the Court need not engage in strict review of a fee
ward. Lliguichuzhca v. Cinema 60, LLC, 948 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (internal
citations omitted). (According to the Southern District of New York, "[w]here the fees are set as
part of negotiations between the parties, 'there is a greater range of reasonableness for approving
attorney's fees."')
But notwithstanding the stipulated fee, the rate would be reasonable based of the
experience of counsel, risk in accepted the case, and diversion from counsel’s attention from
other cases, plus when comparing the rates of similar lawyers in Manhattan. See, e.g. Garcia v.
Oasis Legal Fin. Operating Co. LLC, 608 F. Supp 2d 975, 980 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (determining
reasonableness of rate by considering rates in the “local area”). The undersigned is a founding
shareholder of his multi-state office firm, with approximately 40 employees. He is managing
shareholder of the firm’s Miami and New York City Offices, and head of the firm’s Class Action
Division that represented the Plaintiffs in this case. He has been recognized for his work in
employment, ERISA, and wage and hour law and has been a contributing editor to the American
Bar Association’s Fair Labor Standards Act supplement reports publication for the past two
years. He regularly bills at a rate of $450 per hour in both Miami, Florida and New York City,
New York, spending time in both. Exhibit B contains the Professional Biography of Dale
Morgado.5
According to the Second Circuit, the number of hours an attorney spent on a case is
presumably a reasonable rate. Wolinsky v. Scholastic Inc., 900 F. Supp. 2d 332, 336 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (Furman, J.) (“[w]hile there is a strong presumption that the "lodestar" amount — that is,
the number of attorney hours reasonably expended times a reasonable hourly rate — represents a
reasonable fee the court may adjust the fee award upward or downward based on other
considerations”) (internal citations omitted).
Thus, Feldman Morgado accepted a significantly discounted fee in light of the work
5
Exhibit B contains practice areas, education, admissions, case experience, and writing and speaking
experience of Attorney Dale Morgado.
Dale James Morgado
www.feldman-morgado.com
[4]
dmorgado@fmlawgroup.us
performed on this case, for the benefit of their clients, and recovered substantially all of the relief
their clients would have been entitled to had they gone to trial.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Parties believe the proposed settlement and proposed attorney’s fee
award is fair and reasonable. As discussed above, each Plaintiff was made whole as a result of
the proposed settlement. All Plaintiffs prefer to settle this case and dismiss their claims rather
than continue litigation. Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees were decided separate and apart from the
settlement of Plaintiffs’ claims. The attorney’s fees to Feldman Morgado have been significantly
discounted from the original loadstar calculation. This letter has been reviewed by Counsel for
the Defendant and is being submitted without any objections by the Defendant.
/s/ Dale J. Morgado
Dale J. Morgado, Esquire
FELDMAN MORGADO, P.A.
14 Wall Street
20th Floor, Suite 2040
New York, New York 10005
T: 212-991-8431
F: 212-991-8439
E: dmorgado@fmlawgroup.us
4831-3069-0841, v. 1
Dale James Morgado
www.feldman-morgado.com
[5]
dmorgado@fmlawgroup.us
FELDMAN
MORGADO
EXHIBIT B
pa
Practice Areas
Class Actions
DALE J. MORGADO
Managing Shareholder – Miami / New York
Chair, Complex Litigation & Class Action Division
Qui Tams
Employment
ERISA - Employee Benefits
FLSA – Wage & Hour
Direct Miami (305) 222-7853
Securities
Direct New York (212) 355-3555
Email: dmorgado@ffmlawgroup.com
Dale Morgado heads the firm’s complex
litigation and class action division. His
federal law practice is national causing him
to litigate in a number of cities across the
United States. A frequent flyer not just for
cases, he also manages both the firm’s Manhattan and Miami office. Relying
on his MBA, Juris Doctorate, and experience from practicing with both
boutique and hundred-plus lawyer firm’s—he is able to advocate for his
clients having gained experienced on both sides of the bench.
Education
J.D. – University of Connecticut
M.B.A. – University of Massachusetts
B.S.B.A. – Suffolk University
Admissions
US Court of Appeals 11th Circuit
US Court of Appeals 2nd Circuit
US Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit
Legal Elite Honors
US Dist. Court, S.D. Florida
US Dist. Court, M.D. Florida
In 2011, Mr. Morgado was selected as a member of Florida Trend’s “Up and
Comer” in the yearly “Florida Legal Elite” rankings which nominates
Florida’s top attorneys. The publication recognizes less than 1.8 percent of
active Florida Bar members in the state who are nominated by their peers as
“those attorneys who are held in the highest regard and whom they would
recommend to others,” according to Florida Trend.
US Dist. Court, N.D. New York
Seven Figure Lawyers Membership
US Dist. Court, W.D. New York
In 2013, Mr. Morgado was inducted into “Seven Figure Lawyers”TM – a
collective list of lawyers who have received verdicts or settlements of
$1,000,000.00 dollars or more. Mr. Morgado obtained verdict for his clients
to be invited into this organization.
The Journey
US Dist. Court, N.D. Florida
US Dist. Court, S.D. New York
US Dist. Court, E.D. New York
US Dist. Court, S.D. Texas
US Dist. Court, N.D. Illinois
US Dist. Court, D. Connecticut
US Dist. Court, E.D. Michigan
US Dist. Court, W.D. Michigan
US Dist. Court, E.D. Arkansas
He began clerking for Phipps P.C. about twelve years ago, only to soon join
one of Boston’s 50 largest law firms, Deutsch, William, Brooks, Derensis &
Holland. After attending law school in Connecticut, he began practicing as
an attorney at the Hartford office of the nationally recognized ERISA class
action firm of Moukawsher & Walsh. Later he moved to Miami to join the
170-lawyer firm Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart, serving as associate counsel in
its employee benefit practice group. Ready to lead, he helped found
Feldman, Fox & Morgado in 2009 and remains with the firm today.
Bankers Trust Co. Building
14 Wall Street
20th Floor, Suite 2040
New York, New York 10005
(212) 991-8431
(212) 991-8439 Fax
www.feldman-morgado.com
Qui Tams
Pensions
Securities
Wage & Hour
Class Actions
Employee Benefits
US Dist. Court, W.D. Arkansas
US Dist. Court, D. Colorado
US Dist. Court, D. North Dakota
US Tax Court
State of Florida
State of Connecticut
New World Tower Building
100 N. Biscayne Blvd,
29th Floor, Suite 2902
Miami, Florida 33132
(305) 222-7850
(305) 384-4676 (fax)
Federal Trial & Class Action Lawyers
t a mp a | N e w Y o r k | G re e n w i c h | H o u s t o n | J a c k s o n v i l l e | Wa s h i n g t o n | M i a mi
F eldman M orgado
P A
Case Experience
Dale J. Morgado has been counsel of record in a number of cases.
Here is a list of some federal cases he has been involved with:
Case Title
Richards v. Fleetboston Financial Corp et. al.
Sparveri v. Rocky Hill
Pugliese v. United Tech Corp
Arivella et al v. Lucent Technologies, Inc. et. al.
Belanger et. al. v. Connecticut State Employees' Retirement Commission
Jefferson v. State of Florida Department of Corrections
Lombardi et al v. HealthMarkets, Inc. et. al.
Digital 1 Media, Inc. v. Almen et al
Esfahani v. The District Board of Trustees of South Florida
Synergy Healthcare Communications, Inc. et. al. v. Sudler & Hennessey, LLC
Brown-Rarick v. Dayton Andrews Dodge Inc.
Lacey v. Lakeland Regional Medical Center, Inc.
Barretto v. Hoover Industries, Inc.
Dingle v. City of Coleman et al
Slyker v. Ablest, Inc.
Blanton v. Bayport Inn, LLC et. al.
Espanol v. Avis Budget Group, Inc.
Deaguila v. Brighthouse LLC
Jackson v. Advanced-Pro Communications et al
Hickey v. Devens CPL, Inc.
Brown v. McDonald and Company Insurance Agency, Inc.
Groupware Solutions, Inc. v. GDKN Corporation, et al
Cohen et. al. v. Sudler & Hennessey, LLC
Dennison v. Dick Norris Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc.
Ryder v. Total Document Management, Inc.
Herrera v. Stepp's Towing Service Tampa, Inc.
Turpin v. General Capital Partners, LLC
Devenne v. Ignite Media Solutions, LLC
Wilkinson v. Certified Protective Services, LLC
Rigal v. Hearthstone Management, Inc.
Elder v. Life Path Hospice/HPC Healthcare, Inc.
Laico v. Suncoast Safety Council, Inc.
Mercado v. The Health Center of Hudson, Inc.
Regional Local Union No. 846, AFL-CIO et al
Moak v. Joe Allen Miami Beach LLC
Cheney v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Company et al
WADE v. Armstrong Relocation, Florida, LLC.
Freeman v. Key Largo Volunteer Fire and Rescue Department, Inc.
Cellucci v. Nova Southeastern University, Inc.
Hernandez v. Simply Wheelz, LLC
Armas v. Ignite Restaurant Group
Schenburn v. Big Lots Stores, Inc.
James v. Progress Energy Florida, Inc.
Hidalgo v. Caribbean Publishing Co., Inc.
Shedrick et al v. District Board of Trustees of Miami Dade College
Regional Local Union No. 846 et al v. Gulf Coast Rebar, Inc.
Wong v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation
Page 2 of 5
Federal Trial & Class Action Lawyers
Case Number
3:2004-cv-01638
3:2005-cv-00376
3:2006-cv-01013
1:2008-cv-10398
3:2008-cv-00584
8:2008-cv-01337
8:2009-cv-00914
8:2009-cv-01097
2:2009-cv-14215
8:2009-cv-02072
8:2009-cv-02487
8:2010-cv-00010
1:2010-cv-20284
5:2010-cv-00053
8:2010-cv-00656
8:2010-cv-00735
8:2010-cv-00944
8:2010-cv-01058
5:2010-cv-00210
4:2010-cv-10834
5:2010-cv-00232
0:2010-cv-60909
1:2010-cv-04321
8:2010-cv-01341
8:2010-cv-01404
8:2010-cv-01400
8:2010-cv-01415
8:2010-cv-01414
8:2010-cv-01460
8:2010-cv-01493
8:2010-cv-01560
8:2010-cv-01709
8:2010-cv-01772
1:2010-cv-05564
1:2010-cv-23304
3:2010-cv-01646
0:2010-cv-62030
4:2010-cv-10111
0:2010-cv-62557
1:2011-cv-20424
3:2011-cv-00147
2:2011-cv-00098
5:2011-cv-00175
1:2011-cv-21304
1:2011-cv-21457
3:2011-cv-00658
0:2011-cv-61269
F eldman M orgado
Wong et al v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation et. al.
Martinez v. Towncare Dental Partnership, INC.
Vince v. Specialized Services, Inc. et. al.
Rose v. City County Credit Union
Paul v. Noble International Investments, Inc.
Fonseca v. Commissioner of Social Security
Corbin v. Hartford Life Insurance Company et. al.
Langlais et. al. v. PennMont Benefit Services et. al.
Mykoo v. NJAP Express Parts, Inc., et al
Garcia v. Wellcare Health Plans, Inc. et al
Barnett v. Murphy's Paint & Body Shop, LLC. et al
Caporelli v. Ransom Everglades School, Inc. et al
Synergy Healthcare Communications Inc. v. Scibilia et. al..
Alpark v. 1220 Collins Ave, Inc. d/b/a The Webster
Alpark v. 1220 Collins Avenue, Inc.
Elliott v. Stoneybrook Golf & Country Club of Sarasota, Inc.
Jones v. Nationshealth et. al.
DeLeon v. Big Lots Stores, Inc.
Beaty v. Bechtel Construction Co.
Robertson v. Drug Abuse Comprehensive Coordinating Office, Inc.
Antomarchy v. Apple Express Courier, Inc. et. al.
Molina v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. et al
Coffeen v. Simplexgrinnell LP
United States of America et al v. Everglades College, Inc.
LaMorell v. Lockheed Martin Corporation
Sobalvarro v. G&K Services, Co.
Stewart v. U.S.A. Auto Care, Inc. et. al.
Wakefield v. Liberty Power Corp., LLC
Willinsky et al v. Martin et al
Kennedy et al v. Richard J. Geronemus, as Trustee et. al.
Williams v. United States Foundry & Manufacturing Corporation
United States of America et al v. Horizon Contractors, Inc. et al
Godwin v. Prestige Property Maintenance, Inc.
McWilliams v. Avis Budget Car Rental, LLC et. al.
Bernzott v. CFL Pizza, LLC
Lopez v. Setai Owners, LLC. et al
Charbonneau v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company
Ingram v. Ocean Village Property Owners Association, Inc.
Cook v. OTH Miami Inc et. al.
Tabora v. GC Realty Advisors, LLC.
Freier v. Raytheon Company
DeFreitas v. AT&T Corp.
Jackson v. F.I.R.S.T. Services Corp of Orlando et. al.
Block v. Ignite Media Solutions, LLC
Vivas v. ZGA Aircraft Parts, Inc. et al
Goldbaum et al v. Integrated Asset Services, LLC
Leafgreen v. Prince Preferred Hotels, Alamosa, LLC et. al.
Adams v. Mimac, LLC
Houck et al v. Career Education Corporation et. al.
Armour v. Surf Style Retail Management, Inc. et. al.
Paquette v. Morrissey Construction Company et. al.
Rosado v. eBay Inc.
Vierday v. Humana Cares, Inc.
Page 3 of 5
Federal Trial & Class Action Lawyers
P A
1:2011-cv-04749
1:2011-cv-22497
8:2011-cv-01683
0:2011-cv-61751
9:2011-cv-80899
8:2011-cv-01800
3:2011-cv-01302
2:2011-cv-05275
1:2011-cv-23011
8:2011-cv-02025
1:2011-cv-23207
1:2011-cv-23270
2:2011-cv-05679
1:2011-cv-23639
1:2011-cv-23642
8:2011-cv-02329
0:2011-cv-62310
1:2011-cv-23879
1:2011-cv-24076
8:2011-cv-02619
1:2011-cv-24191
1:2011-cv-24459
9:2012-cv-80016
0:2012-cv-60185
1:2012-cv-20475
8:2012-cv-00290
0:2012-cv-60262
0:2012-cv-60297
8:2012-cv-00370
1:2012-cv-20916
1:2012-cv-21027
1:2012-cv-21242
0:2012-cv-60650
1:2012-cv-21481
5:2012-cv-00192
1:2012-cv-21487
3:2012-cv-00602
2:2012-cv-14145
1:2012-cv-21837
9:2012-cv-80526
1:2012-cv-10969
1:2012-cv-22137
6:2012-cv-00980
8:2012-cv-01434
1:2012-cv-22421
1:2012-cv-01712
1:2012-cv-01717
1:2012-cv-11196
8:2012-cv-01506
0:2012-cv-61376
0:2012-cv-61381
5:2012-cv-04005
8:2012-cv-01734
F eldman M orgado
Blue Spike, LLC v. Texas Instruments, Inc.
Lytle v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc.
Tetreault v. Budget Rent A Car Systems, Inc.
Menkal v. Integrated Asset Services, LLC
French vs Shackleton, LLC
Wilson v. Jackson Memorial International et. al.
Roybal v. Integrated Asset Services, LLC
Cushman v. Devry University, Inc.
Bernard v. Allied Barton Security Services, LLC
Dunsing v. Stevens Ford, Inc.
Esposito v. UNUM Life Insurance Company of America
Miller v. GHD Enterprises Corp. et al
McFadden v. Camelot Inn Miami, LLC et. al.
Fulton v. Liggans
Barber v. McGuires Beautiful Outdoors, Inc. et. al.
Reddish v. Paragon Care, Inc. et al
Ruehling v. Florida Department of Health et. al.
Porter v. City of Sarasota et al
Nobel v. McGuires Beautiful Outdoors, Inc. et. al.
Valdez v. All American Security Services, Inc.
Clase v. American Fasteners, Inc. et al
Blue Spike, LLC v. Anviz Global, Inc.
Herrera v. Avis Budget Car Rental, LLC et. al.
Beaubrun v. Tropical Resorts, Inc.
Smyth v. Ayama, Inc. et. al.
Pipino v. Taxprep1, LLC
Melver v. Check 'N Go of Florida, Inc.
Gutierrez v. High Tech National, Inc.
Arce v. Checkmark Insurance, Inc. et. al.
Martin v. The Children's Home Society of Florida
Wroten v. American Trades Institute of Florida, Inc.
Farricy v. The Prudential Insurance Company of America
Yarbrough v. T.S. Global Label, LLC et. al.
McKeithan v. Church Pension Group Services Corporation
Munoz v. Leoni et. al.
Perez v. Inkolor, Corp. et al
Greenaway et al v. Apple-Metro, Inc. et. al.
Bauers v. Hartford Life Insurance Company
Suarez v. Joe Bonilla Associated, Inc. et. al.
Quintana v. Ghost Armor, LLC et al
Jackson v. Home Team Pest Defense, Inc.
Rivero v. Icon Prospects, Inc. et al
Broughton v. The Central Charter School Foundation, Inc. et al
ST. Gerard v. Infinity Sales Group LLC
Thomas v. Mallen et al
Castro et al v. City of Miami et al
Colonia v. Mean Cycles, Inc. et al
Johnson et al v. Avis Budget Car Rental, LLC. et. al.
Cardoza v. Golden Group Interiors, LLC et. al.
Thornhill v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.
Rodriguez v. John J Martin Jr. M.D., P.A. et. al.
Woodley v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.
McAree v. Advanced Surgical Associates et al
Page 4 of 5
Federal Trial & Class Action Lawyers
P A
6:2012-cv-00499
8:2012-cv-01848
2:2012-cv-13692
1:2012-cv-02329
8:2012-cv-02021
1:2012-cv-23237
1:2012-cv-02384
6:2012-cv-01405
1:2012-cv-23516
3:2012-cv-01411
3:2012-cv-01448
1:2012-cv-23717
1:2012-cv-23985
4:2012-cv-03268
8:2012-cv-02621
8:2012-cv-02714
8:2012-cv-02724
8:2012-cv-02770
8:2012-cv-02873
1:2012-cv-24556
1:2013-cv-20013
6:2013-cv-00039
1:2013-cv-20335
8:2013-cv-00288
3:2013-cv-00130
5:2013-cv-00076
1:2013-cv-20528
1:2013-cv-20634
1:2013-cv-20936
1:2013-cv-20937
1:2013-cv-21029
6:2013-cv-00513
1:2013-cv-21180
1:2013-cv-02607
1:2013-cv-21580
1:2013-cv-21584
2:2013-cv-02818
3:2013-cv-00769
1:2013-cv-21920
1:2013-cv-22059
6:2013-cv-00916
6:2013-cv-00939
0:2013-cv-61355
9:2013-cv-80631
1:2013-cv-22269
1:2013-cv-22661
1:2013-cv-22716
1:2013-cv-11796
1:2013-cv-22753
1:2013-cv-05507
1:2013-cv-23222
2:2013-cv-05152
2:2013-cv-14380
F eldman M orgado
Feinman v. MD1 Services FL, LLC et. al.
Maximovskikh v. Johnson Controls Inc., .
Swarn v. Bobby's Liquors, Inc. et al
Wakefield v. Citizens Information Associates, LLC et. al.
Prue v. Hudson Falls Post No. 574 et. al.
Solorzano v. Productions Plus, Inc
Moya v. Target Enterprise, Inc.
9:2013-cv-80980
0:2013-cv-62179
1:2013-cv-23638
1:2013-cv-23754
1:2013-cv-01280
2:2013-cv-14568
1:2013-cv-01377
Writing & Speaking
Contributor, American Bar Associations Subcommittee (Fair Labor Standards Act) 2013 and 2014 MidWinter Reports
Contributor, American Bar Associations Subcommittee (Employment Retirement Investment Act) 2007 MidWinter Report
Author, “Economic Consequences to Companies, States, and Municipalities Sponsoring Pension Plans from
the Recent Market Losses and Potential ERISA Fiduciary Liability to Investment Advisers that Follow.”
April 2009 Employee Benefit Plan Review
Author, “The Death Tax – How Will Obama’s Tax Plan Affect Your Estate Plan.” Published in December
2008 LeMieux Report
Co-Author, “Blessings Point to Cash Balance Prosperity for Interested Advisers.” Published in the September
2008 Employee Benefit Adviser
Author, “Sell it But Don’t Overstate it Unless You Want to Get Sued: When Does ERISA Liability Attach.”
Published in the July 2008 Employee Benefit Adviser
Co-Author, “The Pension Protection Act Brings Sweeping Changes.” Published in the 2007 Connecticut Bar
Association Employment Quarterly Vol. 13 Issue 2
Co-Author, “A Federal Agency Says You Are Disabled…And A District Court Agrees, The Relevance of
Social Security Disability Findings in ERISA Disability Insurance Benefit Litigation.” Published in the 2007
Connecticut Bar Association Employment Quarterly Vol. 13 Issue 3
Speaker, presenting “Privacy and Social Media in the Workplace “- for Sterling Education’s 6th Annual
Fundamentals of Employment Law on October 1, 2013
Interviewee , NPR’s Marketplace on privacy in the workplace, aired November 15, 2014
Page 5 of 5
Federal Trial & Class Action Lawyers
P A
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