National Association of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. et al v. City of New York et al

Filing 88

OPINION. The court grants the city's motion for summary judgment in its entirety. Accordingly, the court denies plaintiffs' request for a declaratory judgment and for a permanent injunction. This opinion resolves the following motions liste d as item numbers 22, 60, and 63 on the docket. re: 63 MOTION for Summary Judgment Defendants' Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment filed by New York City Department of Consumer Affairs, Alba Pico, Beth E. Goldman, Mary Bassett , Melissa Mark-Viverito, Bill De Blasio, New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, New York City Department of Finance, New York City Council, City of New York, 60 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by American Snuff Comp any, New York Association of Convenience Stores, National Association of Tobacco Outlets, Inc., Bodega Association of the United States, Inc., John Middleton Company, Philip Morris USA Inc., Lorillard Tobacco Company, R.J. Reynolds Tobacc o Co., Inc., U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Brands Inc., 22 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by American Snuff Company, New York Association of Convenience Stores, National Association of Tobacco Outlets, Inc., Bodega Association of the United States, Inc., John Middleton Company, Philip Morris USA Inc., Lorillard Tobacco Company, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Inc., U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Brands Inc. (Signed by Judge Thomas P. Griesa on 6/18/2014) (rjm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
TOBACCO OUTLETS, INC., et al.,
14 Civ. 00577

Plaintiffs,

v.
OPINION
CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,
Defendants.

Plaintiffs in this case—a group of tobacco manufacturers and retailers—
seek a declaratory judgment that a recently enacted New York City Ordinance
that prohibits them from selling or offering to sell cigarettes and tobacco
products below the listed, or advertised, price (1) violates their rights under the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Free Speech Clause
of the New York State Constitution, (2) is preempted by the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1331, and (3) is preempted by New
York State Public Health Law, Article-F-Regulation of Tobacco Products, Herbal
Cigarettes and Smoking Paraphernalia; Distribution to Minors, § 1399-bb.
Plaintiffs also request a permanent injunction again the city’s enforcement of
the ordinance. The parties have cross-moved for summary judgment.
The court grants the city’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety.
1

Facts
On October 30, 2013, the New York City Council passed Local Law 1021A-2013 and former Mayor Michael Bloomberg signed it into law on November
19, 2013, whereupon it became Local Law 97 of 2013 (“Local Law 97”). The
provisions in Local Law 97 work together to create higher prices for cigarettes
and tobacco products in New York City.
In its legislative findings, the City Council detailed its reasons for passing
Local Law 97. See Decl. of Nicholas R. Ciapettta, Ex. A. The City Council
highlighted the well-known health risks associated with tobacco use and
explained that it is the leading cause of preventable death in New York City.
Id. at 1. Additionally, the City Council noted that smoking-related illnesses
cost New Yorkers billions of dollars annually in health care costs and lost
productivity. Id. As a result of the significant human and economic costs
associated with tobacco use, over the years, the City Council has taken steps
both to reduce tobacco use among adults and to prevent youths from beginning
to use tobacco products. Id. at 1-2. The City Council explained that through a
variety of programs, it succeeded in reducing the prevalence of adult tobacco
use from 21.5% in 2002 to 15.5% in 2012. Id. at 2. Similarly, youth smoking
rates declined from 17.6% in 2001 to 8.5% in 2007. Id. However, youth
smoking rates have plateaued since 2007. Id.
Consequently, given that tobacco use persists among youths and adults,
the City Council elected to take further action to lower smoking rates and
2

passed Local Law 97. The City Council explained that numerous studies have
demonstrated that high tobacco prices reduce consumption among both
youths, who are especially price-sensitive, and adults. For instance, a 10%
increase in cigarette prices reduces demand among adult smokers by 3-5% and
among youth smokers by 7%. Id. In all, high tobacco prices reduce the
prevalence of tobacco use, the likelihood of trying tobacco for the first time, the
average number of cigarettes consumed per smoker, the initiation of daily
smoking, and the initiation of daily heavy smoking. Id.
Local Law 97 works to achieve the goal of raising the price of cigarettes
and tobacco products and thus, reducing tobacco consumption in the following
four ways: (1) reducing the illegal evasion of cigarette excise taxes; (2)
prohibiting the sale of tobacco products below the listed, or advertised, price;
(3) creating a price floor for a package of cigarettes and little cigars; and (4)
requiring inexpensive cigars to be sold in packages of no fewer than four.
Plaintiffs1 only challenge a narrow provision of Local Law 97—namely,
N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 17-176.1 (b) and § 17.176.1(c) (collectively, “the
ordinance”). The ordinance prohibits the sale and the offer to sell cigarettes
and tobacco products below the listed, or advertised price. The ordinance
Plaintiffs are a group of tobacco manufacturers and retailers, including the
National Association of Tobacco Outlets, Inc., the New York Association of
Convenience Stores, the Bodega Association of the United States, Inc., Lorillard
Tobacco Company, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Inc., Philip Morris USA Inc.,
U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Brands Inc., American Snuff Company, and John
Middleton Company.
1

3

defines listed price “as the price listed for cigarettes or tobacco products on
their packages or on any related shelving, posting, advertising or display at the
place where the cigarettes or tobacco products are sold or offered for sale,
including all applicable taxes.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 17-176.1(a). The two
challenged provisions—§ 17-176.1(b) and § 17-176.1(c)—contain the same
prohibitions and only differ in so far as § 17.176.1(b) regulates cigarettes and
§ 17.176.1(c) regulates tobacco products.2
In particular, § 17-176.1(b) and § 17-176.1(c) provide that no retailer
may:
1. Honor or accept a price reduction instrument in any transaction
related to the sale of cigarettes [or tobacco products] to a consumer;
2. Sell or offer for sale cigarettes [or tobacco products] to a consumer
through any multi-package discount or otherwise provide to a
consumer any cigarettes [or tobacco products] for less than the listed
price in exchange for the purchase of any other cigarettes [or tobacco
products] by the consumer;
3. Sell, offer for sale, or otherwise provide any product other than
cigarettes [or tobacco products] to a consumer for less than the listed
price in exchange for the purchase of cigarettes [or tobacco products]
by the consumer; or
4. Sell, offer for sale, or otherwise provide cigarettes [or tobacco
products] to a consumer for less than the listed price.
The ordinance defines “tobacco product” as any product which contains
tobacco that is intended for human consumption, including any component,
part, or accessory of such product. Tobacco product shall include, but not be
limited to, any cigar, little cigar, chewing tobacco, pipe tobacco, roll-your-own
tobacco, snus, bidi, snuff, tobacco-containing shishas, or dissolvable tobacco
product. Tobacco product shall not include cigarettes or any product that has
been approved by the United States food and drug administration for sale as a
tobacco use cessation product or for other medical purposes and that is being
marketed and sold solely for such purposes. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 17-176.1(a).
2

4

N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 17-176.1(b); § 17.176.1(c) (relevant language added in
brackets).
In the ordinance, the City has prohibited common methods that tobacco
manufacturers and retailers undertake to sell cigarettes and tobacco products
below the listed price. In practice, these pricing practices often play out in the
following manner:
1. §17.176(b)(1). A consumer receives a coupon in the mail from the
Lorrilard Tobacco Company offering $1 off of the listed price for a
pack of Newport cigarettes. The consumer may redeem the coupon at
any store that sells Newport cigarettes.
2. §17.176(b)(2). A retailer provides a promotion whereby upon
purchasing two packs of Marlboro cigarettes, a consumer receives $2
off of the listed price for purchasing a third pack of Marlboro
cigarettes.
3. §17.176(b)(3). In exchange for purchasing a pack of Camel cigarettes,
a retailer provides a consumer with a free, or discounted, lighter
bearing the Camel logo.
4. §17.176(b)(4). A retailer provides a one-day sale where all American
Spirit cigarettes are sold at $1 off of the listed price.
These examples merely provide a sample of the many ways in which tobacco
manufacturers and retailers employ these discount pricing practices.
The practical effect of the ordinance is that by prohibiting tobacco
manufacturers and retailers from utilizing these discount pricing practices, the
city has made it so that tobacco manufacturers and retailers may only sell
cigarettes and tobacco products at the listed price. Tobacco manufacturers
and retailers will no longer be able to employ any pricing practices to generate
sales below the listed price. Naturally, tobacco retailers may change the listed
5

price for cigarettes and tobacco products and a City implementing rule for the
ordinance, makes clear that retailers may “inform[] customers that the listed
price has changed.” R.C.N.Y. § 13-02(d)(ii). But as a result of the ordinance,
this method—changing the listed price—is the only manner in which
manufacturers and retailers will be able to effect the price of cigarettes and
tobacco products. Moreover, Local Law 97 has established a price floor for
cigarettes and little cigars of $10.50.3 Thus, at no may point may retailers
reduce the price below this point. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 17.176.1(d).4
In an effort to detail the policy reasons for the ordinance in particular, as
opposed to Local Law 97 writ large, discussed supra at 2-3, the city submitted
two affidavits by Dr. Mary T. Bassett, Commissioner of the New York City
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. Dr. Bassstt reiterated the city
Council’s fundamental premise that tobacco users are price-sensitive. See Dr.
Bassett Decl. in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, ¶¶ 3, 34-41.
With respect to the challenged ordinance, Dr. Bassett explained that
“[n]umerous studies and tobacco industry documents show that the tobacco
industry manipulates prices of tobacco products through various discounting
schemes to encourage price-conscious customers like teenagers and lowincome smokers to buy their addictive and deadly products.” Id. at ¶ 4.
Tobacco manufacturers and retailers, according to Dr. Bassett, utilize these
pricing practices in order to offset the impact of tobacco tax increases and
Plaintiffs do not contest this provision of Local Law 97.
§ 17.176.1(d) only sets a price floor for cigarettes and little cigars. There is no
price floor for all other tobacco products.
3
4

6

other tobacco control efforts. Id. at ¶ 48. Dr. Basset went on to explain that
there is a “pronounced association between the availability of price-reducing
strategies and the progression from experimentation with cigarettes to regular
use, and ultimately, addiction.” Id. at ¶ 5. Accordingly, given that these
pricing practices result in increased tobacco use, especially among youths, Dr.
Bassett recommended that the city undertake the restrictions in the ordinance
to reduce tobacco consumption in New York City. Id. at ¶¶ 63-65.
Procedural Posture
On January 30, 2014, plaintiffs filed their complaint. Plaintiffs allege
that the ordinance (1) violates their rights under the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution and the Free Speech Clause of the New York State
Constitution, (2) is preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1331, and (3) is preempted by New York State
Public Health Law § 1399-bb.
On February 16, plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction to enjoin the city from enforcing the challenged
provisions of Local Law 97—N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 17-176.1(b) and
§ 17.176.1(c)—pending the final resolution of this litigation. The ordinance was
originally scheduled to go into effect on March 19, 2014.
The court held a conference on the motion for a preliminary injunction
on March 14, 2014, where the parties jointly suggested that the case proceed
to summary judgment. The parties agreed that there are no factual disputes in
7

the litigation and as such, that the court should resolve the case on summary
judgment. Accordingly, on March 19, 2014, the parties filed a stipulation
staying enforcement of the challenged provisions of Local Law 97 until May 23,
2014. See Order, Mar. 19, 2014, ECF No. 55.
On March 20, 2014, the city filed an answer to the complaint in which it
denied all of plaintiffs’ allegations.
The parties filed their motions for summary judgment on April 25. The
parties filed their reply briefs on May 2.
On May 6, the Court held a hearing on the cross-motions for summary
judgment. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court issued an order (1)
directing the parties to submit supplemental briefing on the issue of whether
the ordinance is preempted by New York State Public Health Law § 1399-bb
and (2) extending the stay of enforcement of the ordinance until June 20, 2014.
See Order, Apr. 23, 2014, ECF No. 83. The parties completed supplemental
briefing on June 5, 2014.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment may be granted if there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact, such that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is material only if it “might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). A dispute is genuine if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

8

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. The movant has the
burden of showing that no genuine factual dispute exists. Id. However, in
determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must
construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and
draw all justifiable inferences in that party's favor. Id. at 249. “When both
sides have moved for summary judgment, each party's motion is examined on
its own merits, and all reasonable inferences are drawn against the party
whose motion is under consideration.” Chandok v. Klessig, 632 F.3d 803, 812
(2d Cir. 2011).
Discussion
First Amendment
The court first considers plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge that the
ordinance violates their rights under the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution and the Free Speech Clause of the New York State Constitution.
Plaintiffs allege that the ordinance unconstitutionally prohibits commercial
speech and cannot survive strict scrutiny under Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corporation v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). More
specifically, plaintiffs allege that through prohibiting the sale and the offer to
sell cigarettes and tobacco products below the listed price, the ordinance
impermissibly restricts plaintiffs’ ability to communicate discount pricing and
deal information to consumers. Plaintiffs claim that they use coupons and
discount offers to tell their consumers that they are “getting a deal” if they
9

purchase the product at a particular price, to encourage them to purchase a
particular brand, or to make their purchase at a particular location.
In National Association of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v. City of Providence,
Rhode Island, 731 F. 3d 71 (1st Cir. 2013), the First Circuit considered a
similar challenge to the one presently before this court. The First Circuit
reviewed and upheld a Providence, Rhode Island city ordinance that prevented
the city’s tobacco retailers from selling tobacco products at a discount through
coupons and multi-pack discounts. Id. at 74. The Providence ordinance is not
as expansive as the New York City ordinance presently before this court, in
that it does not prohibit the receipt of non-tobacco goods in exchange for
tobacco purchases or contain a general prohibition on the sale of cigarettes and
tobacco products below the listed price. Nevertheless, in its consideration of
the constitutionality of the Providence ordinance, the First Circuit set forth
well-reasoned arguments that this court finds to be very persuasive and
relevant to its analysis and to its determination that the challenged New York
City ordinance lawfully regulates pricing, not speech, and thus, does not violate
the First Amendment.
As a general matter, the Supreme Court has held that pricing
information concerning lawful transactions is protected speech. See Virginia
State Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 761-764 (1976). Thus, tobacco manufacturers and retailers have an

10

undisputed First Amendment right to advertise the listed price of their
products to their consumers.
In National Association of Tobacco Outlets, the First Circuit found that
the challenged ordinance did “not restrict the dissemination of pricing
information generally.” 731. F.3d at 77. The court provided the following
explanation:
Nothing in the Price Ordinance restricts retailers or anyone else from
communicating pricing information concerning the lawful sale price of
cigarettes. Rather, the ordinance has more limited objectives. It (1)
restricts the ability of retailers to engage in certain types of pricing
practices, namely accepting or redeeming coupons for tobacco
purchases, and selling tobacco products by way of multi-pack
discounting, and (2) bars retailers from offering to engage in these
prohibited pricing practices. See Providence, R.I., Code of Ordinances
Sec. 14-303. Neither type of regulation is barred by the First
Amendment.
Id. Thus, the First Circuit determined that pricing practices, such as accepting
coupons and providing multi-pack discounts, are not protected by the First
Amendment because they do not communicate pricing information to
consumers. Id.
In arriving at its decision, the First Circuit largely relied upon 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1986), where a majority of the
Justices, in striking down a contested ban on liquor price advertising, made
clear that price regulations and other forms of direct economic regulation do
not implicate First Amendment concerns. National Association of Tobacco
Outlets, Inc., 731 F.3d at 77. In relying upon 44 Liquormart, Inc., a plurality
opinion, the First Circuit explained that “[i]n determining the views of the court
11

as a whole, we may aggregate the views expressed in the various separate
opinions.” Id. (citing League of the United Latin American Citizens v. Perry,
548 U.S. 399, 413-414 (2006)).
The principal opinion in 44 Liquormart, Inc. (representing the views of
four justices) explained that while the statute at issue was an unconstitutional
restriction on speech, “alternatives forms of regulation that would not involve
any restriction on speech” could have advanced the state’s interest in reducing
alcohol consumption. 617 U.S. at 507 (Stevens, J.). For example, the Court
explained that “higher prices can be maintained either by direct regulation or
by increased taxation” and that “per capita purchases could be limited.” Id. at
507 (Stevens, J.). Justice O’Connor, joined by three justices, in this respect
agreed with the principal opinion and explained that the state had “other
methods at its disposal” to discourage liquor consumption that included
“establishing minimum prices.” Id. at 530 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment). Justice O’Connor explained that these alternative measures would
have accomplished the state’s goal of reducing alcohol consumption “without
intruding on sellers’ ability to provide truthful, nonmisleading information to
consumers.” Id.
These views, expressed by a majority of the Court, demonstrate that
price regulations designed to discourage consumption of a potentially harmful
product do not violate the First Amendment so long as they do not preclude the
effected retailers’ ability to provide truthful, nonmisleading information about

12

the regulated product to consumers. In National Association of Tobacco
Outlets, the First Circuit applied this general principle to tobacco regulation
and found that the prohibition of discounting practices, such as coupon
redemption and multi-pack discounts, did not violate the First Amendment.
Id. at 77.
This court agrees. Under the ordinance, retailers may continue to
communicate the listed price “for cigarettes or tobacco products on their
packages or on any related shelving, posting, advertising or display at the place
where the cigarettes or tobacco products are sold or offered for sale.” N.Y.C.
Admin. Code § 17-176.1(a). The ordinance only regulates an economic
transaction—the sale of tobacco products below the listed price. It does not
restrict the dissemination of pricing information and thus, it does not violate
the First Amendment.5

Plaintiffs contend that in Bailey v. Morales, 190 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 1999) and
Discount Tobacco City & Lottery Inc. v. United States, the Fifth and Sixth
Circuit Courts of Appeals “recognized that offering a rebate, discount, or free
gift—with or without a coupon—in connection with a purchase is speech
protected by the First Amendment.” Plt. Joint Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, at 6-7. The court finds neither one of these
cases to be persuasive. In Bailey, the Fifth Circuit considered an as applied
challenge by chiropractors to a state statute that prohibited chiropractors and
other service professionals from soliciting employment. 190 F.3d at 321. The
court found that the statute violated the First Amendment because it
prohibited a wide-range of advertising techniques that included solicitations as
well as marketing promotions, such as free trials or rebates. Id. at 325.
However, this factually dissimilar case provides little guidance on whether a
city may prohibit pricing practices that prevent tobacco manufacturers and
retailers from selling cigarettes and tobacco products below the listed price.
Discount City Tobacco at least concerns the area of tobacco regulation. In this
case, the Sixth Circuit rejected a host of challenges to the Family Smoking
5

13

Accordingly, the challenged city ordinance lawfully prohibits tobacco
manufacturers and retailers from using the pricing practices of accepting
coupons and price reduction instruments (§ 17.176.1(b)(1)) as well as providing
multi-pack discounts (§ 17.176.1(b)(2)). See National Association of Tobacco
Outlets, Inc., 731 F.3d at 77. Moreover, the court finds that the two additional
restrictions on discount pricing unique to the New York City Ordinance—the
prohibition on the receipt of non-tobacco goods in exchange for the purchase of
cigarettes or tobacco products (§ 17.176.1(b)(3)) and the prohibition on selling
or offering to sell cigarettes or tobacco products below the listed price (§
17.176.1(b)(4))—are permissible “forms of regulation that [do] not involve any
restriction on speech.” 44 Liquormart, Inc., 617 U.S. at 507. These
regulations are different variations of the same strategy—regulating the sale of
cigarettes and tobacco products below the listed price—that simply approach
the issue in a different manner.
Additionally, as the First Circuit found in National Association of Tobacco
Outlets, it is not just the restrictions on pricing that do not violate the First
Amendment, but also the restrictions on offers to engage in any of the pricing
discounts that do not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 78. In the case at
bar, the ordinance regulates offers to sell cigarettes and tobacco products
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act. Yet, the court found that one provision of
the Act impermissibly restricted the First Amendment rights of tobacco
manufacturers and retailers—namely, the provision prohibiting continuity
programs. 674 F.3d at 518. However, continuity programs, which reward
customers for their purchases largely in the same way as a frequent flyer
program—loyal customers collect points which they can later redeem for goods
and merchandise—are not relevant to the case at bar.
14

through multi-package discounts, offers to provide a non-tobacco product in
exchange for the purchase of cigarettes or a tobacco product, and offers to sell
cigarettes and tobacco products below the listed price. N.Y.C. Admin. Code
§ 17-176.1 (b)(2-4).6
In their filings with the court, plaintiffs have emphasized that the
ordinance impermissibly restricts commercial speech in that it prevents them
from offering to sell cigarettes and tobacco products below the listed price. The
court does not find this argument to be persuasive. The court has already
found that the city may lawfully restrict the sale of cigarettes and tobacco
products below the listed price. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has made
clear that the “government may ban commercial speech related to illegal
activity.” Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-564. The Supreme Court has
added that “offers to engage in illegal transactions are categorically excluded
from First Amendment protection.” United States v. Williams, 533 U.S. 285,
297 (2008). In this case, the offers that are restricted by the ordinance are
offers to engage in an unlawful activity—namely, the sale of cigarettes and
tobacco products below the listed price. Thus, the ordinance lawfully prohibits
retailers from offering what the ordinance explicitly forbids them to do. See
National Association of Tobacco Outlets, 731 F.3d at 78.
Federal Preemption

Notably, § 17.176.1(b)(1) does not prohibit retailers from offering to accept
coupons or price reduction instruments.
6

15

Plaintiffs’ second challenge to the ordinance is that it is preempted by the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (“Labeling Act”), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1331. Once again, in considering this issue, the court finds persuasive the
analysis by the First Circuit in National Association of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v.
City of Providence, Rhode Island, 731 F. 3d 71, where the First Circuit
considered a nearly identical challenge and found that the Labeling Act did not
preempt the Providence ordinance. This court finds that the Labeling Act does
not preempt the challenged New York City ordinance.
In passing the Labeling Act, Congress set out “to establish a
comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising.”
15 U.S.C. § 1331. The Labeling Act requires that cigarette manufacturers and
retailers alert consumers to the adverse health effects of cigarette smoking by
including a warning notice on each package of cigarettes as well as in each
advertisement for cigarettes. Id. at § 1331(1). In an effort to protect commerce
and the national economy, Congress mandated there may not be “diverse,
nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations with
respect to any relationship between smoking and health.” Id. at § 1331(2).
Accordingly, in 15 U.S.C. § 1333, the Labeling Act prescribes the content
and format of the health warnings that are required to appear on cigarette
packages and in cigarette advertisements. The Labeling Act includes a list of
permissible warnings that manufacturers and retailers may include on their
cigarette packages and advertisements, such as “WARNING: Cigarettes are

16

addictive,” “WARNING: Cigarettes cause cancer,” and “WARNING: Smoking can
kill you.” Id. at §§ 1333(a)(1) & 1333(b)(1). The Labeling Act also mandates the
placement of the warning requirement and the typography in which it must be
written for both cigarettes packages and advertisements. Id. at §§ 1333(a)(2) &
1333(b)(2).
Congress included a preemption provision in the Labeling Act to protect
its determinations. 15 U.S.C. § 1334. The preemption provision provides that
“[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed
under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes,
the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this
chapter.” Id. at § 1334(b).
However, in 2009, Congress enacted an exception to the § 1334(b)
preemption provision that permits states and local governments to restrict
certain advertising and promotional activity by tobacco manufacturers and
retailers. This exception, § 1334(c), provides that:
Notwithstanding subsection (b), a State or locality may enact statutes
and promulgate regulations, based on smoking and health… imposing
specific bans or restrictions on the time, place, and manner, but not
content, of the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes.
Id. at § 1334(c). The 2009 addition to the preemption provision mandates that
any state or local regulation concerning the promotion or advertising of
cigarettes must meet two requirements in order to be exempt from preemption:
(1) the regulation must be content-neutral; and (2) the regulation must only

17

concern the time, place, or manner of the advertising or promotion. See
National Association of Tobacco Outlets, 731 F.3d at 80.
As a threshold matter, the court finds that the challenged ordinance
satisfies the second requirement of § 1334(c) in that it qualifies as a time,
place, or manner restriction on the sale of cigarettes and tobacco products.
Plaintiffs do not contest this issue. The ordinance prohibits retailers and
manufacturers from providing consumers with promotions, multi-package
discounts, coupons, and giveaways. These methods clearly constitute a
manner in which tobacco manufacturers and retailers advertise and promote
their products.
Plaintiffs focus their challenge on the first requirement of § 1334(c) and
contend that the ordinance impermissibly regulates the content of promotions
and advertising. More specifically, plaintiffs argue that the ordinance restricts
the content of discount offers and other price communications to sell cigarettes
and tobacco products below the listed price. For instance, under the
ordinance, manufacturers and retailers may no longer issue coupons,
promotions, or multi-pack discounts, which tell consumers that they are
“getting a deal” or a “bargain” by purchasing cigarettes or tobacco products.
According to plaintiffs, Congress intended to preempt this type of regulation as
it affects the content of tobacco advertising and promotion.
However, in its argument, plaintiffs mistakenly rely upon the assumption
that the content prohibition of § 1334(c) concerns the regulation of pricing.
18

Instead, this court finds, as the First Circuit did in National Association of
Tobacco Outlets, 731 F.3d at 79-81, and as the Second Circuit did in 23-34
94th Street Grocery, 685 F.3d at 184-185, that the content prohibition of
§ 1334(c) concerns content relating to the inclusion of health information on
cigarette packages. As the First Circuit explained, this understanding “is
consistent with the overall purpose of the Labeling Act’s preemption provision,
which is to ensure that federal regulation in this respect is not ‘impeded by
diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising
regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and health.’”
National Association of Tobacco Outlets, 731 F.3d 80-81 (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 1331). Similarly, this court’s summary of the different sections of the
Labeling Act, see supra at 16-18, demonstrates that the Act is singularly
focused on the content of health warnings on cigarette packages and
advertisements.
In arriving at its understanding of § 1334(c), the First Circuit largely
relied upon the analysis by the Second Circuit in 23-34 94th Street Grocery,
685 F.3d. 174. The Second Circuit was the first Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals to interpret § 1334(c). In 23-34 94th Street Grocery, the Second Circuit
considered a challenge to a New York City ordinance that required tobacco
retailers to prominently display tobacco health warnings and smoking
cessation signage produced by the New York City Department of Health. 685
F.3d. at 179. While the ordinance at issue in 23-34 94th Street Grocery is
different than the challenged ordinance in the case at bar, it is the analysis by
19

the Second Circuit and in particular, its examination of the scope and purpose
of the exception to the Labeling Act’s preemption provision, that is central to
this court’s holding.
The Second Circuit found that the city could not require manufacturers
or retailers to display supplemental content at the point of purchase, because
the Labeling Act specifically preempts state regulation addressing the health
risks associated with smoking. Id at 185. The Second Circuit explained that
the Labeling Act “contemplates that Congress, and only Congress, will amend
the content of warnings required of manufactures to educate consumers…
without interference or supplementary efforts by state or local authorities.” Id.
The court added that “[a]llowing state or local authorities to mandate
supplementary warnings on or near cigarette displays risks the creation of
‘diverse, nonuniform, and confusing’ regulations.” Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 1331(2)(B)).
After finding the ordinance in question to be preempted by federal law,
the Second Circuit provided what appears to be a cautionary warning, advising
that legislators and courts should not read the opinion as prohibiting local
governments from regulating the sale of tobacco products. The Second Circuit
explained that under § 1334(c), “states and localities remain free to impose
time, place, and manner restrictions on the advertising of cigarettes, and to
engage in anti-smoking campaigns using their own resources. Our holding
today should not be read to curtail in any way state and locally funded efforts

20

to further educate consumers and counter cigarette advertising and
promotion.” Id.
This court, as the First Circuit did in National Association of Tobacco
Outlets, finds that the ordinance in question is one of these permissible forms
of regulation contemplated by the Second Circuit. The ordinance (1) is a lawful
restriction on the manner in which tobacco manufacturers and retailers
advertise and promote their products and (2) does not regulate the content of
cigarette sales and advertising as it relates to health warnings. See National
Association of Tobacco Outlets, 731 F.3d at 80 (discussing requirements to
qualify for § 1334(c), the exception to the preemption provision). Instead, the
ordinance is content neutral as it merely regulates the sale and offer to sell
cigarettes below the listed price. Accordingly, the court finds that the
ordinance is not preempted by the Labeling Act.
State Preemption
Plaintiffs’ final challenge to the ordinance is that it is preempted by New
York State Public Health Law § 1399-bb, a detailed state statute that regulates
the sampling and free distribution of tobacco products and that expressly
preempts local governments from regulating this area of law. Plaintiffs
argument is that in § 1399-bb, the state Legislature addressed both free and
partially discounted tobacco products and that since the challenged city
ordinance also addresses both free and partially discounted products, the court
should find that the ordinance is preempted by § 1399-bb.
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However, plaintiffs’ argument misses the mark. While both the
ordinance and § 1399-bb address tobacco regulation, the court finds that
§ 1399-bb does not preempt the ordinance because ultimately, § 1399-bb and
the ordinance regulate two different subjects. § 1399-bb only addresses the
sampling or the distribution of free tobacco products; it does not, as plaintiffs’
contend, address partially discounted tobacco products. Similarly, the
ordinance only addresses the sale of partially discounted cigarettes and
tobacco products (i.e. sales below the listed price); it does not, as plaintiffs’
contend, address the distribution of free cigarettes and tobacco products.
Thus, there is no conflict between the ordinance and § 1399-bb, and the court
finds that the ordinance is not preempted.
In this analysis, the court first reviews general principles of New York
State preemption law. Local governments, such as New York City, only have
the lawmaking powers that the state legislature has granted to them. See DJL
Restaurant Corporation v. City of New York, 96 N.Y.2d 91, 94 (2001). Article
IX, § 2(c) of the New York State Constitution provides that “every local
government shall have the power to adopt and amend local laws not
inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution or any general law… except
to the extent that the legislature shall restrict the adoption of such a local law.”
Accordingly, there are two firm restrictions on the authority of the local
government: (1) it may not exercise its police power by adopting a local law that
is inconsistent with constitutional or general law; and (2) it may not legislate
when the State Legislature has restricted such an exercise by preempting the
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area with regulation. See New York State Club Association v. City of New York,
69 N.Y. 2d 211, 217 (1987).
Preemption may be express or implied. Id. Express preemption occurs
when the Legislature expressly assumes full regulatory responsibility in a field
by including a preemption clause in a statute. Implied preemption occurs
when the Legislature has not explicitly expressed its desire to preempt. See
Albany Area Builders Association v. Town of Guilderland, 74 N.Y. 2d 372, 377
(1989). “This intent may be implied from the nature of the subject matter
being regulated and the purpose and scope of the State legislative scheme,
including the need for state-wide uniformity.” Id. When the Legislature has
preempted an entire field of law, a local law that attempts to regulate the same
subject matter is inconsistent with the state’s interest if it either “(1) prohibits
conduct which the state law accepts or at least does not specifically proscribe
or (2) imposes restrictions beyond those imposed by the state law.” Vatore v.
Commissioner of Consumer Affairs, 83 N.Y.2d 645, 649 (1994).
Whether the New York State Legislature intended to address partially
discounted cigarettes and tobacco products
In determining whether the legislature intended to preempt the
regulation of partially discounted tobacco products, the court looks to both the
text of the statute as well as the legislative history surrounding its passage. See
Riley v. County of Broome, 95 N.Y. 2d 455, 463 (2000). Ultimately, both the
text of § 1399-bb as well as the legislative history surrounding its passage,
demonstrate that the Legislature was only concerned with regulating the
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sampling and free distribution of tobacco products. As neither the text of the
statute nor the legislative history addresses partially discounted products, the
Legislature could not have intended to preempt local regulation of tobacco
discounting practices, such as the challenged ordinance.
In 1992, the New York State Legislature established a detailed statutory
scheme in the New York Public Health Law—Article 13 F, Regulation of
Tobacco Products, Herbal Cigarettes and Smoking Paraphernalia: Distribution
to Minors—to address the sale and distribution of tobacco products. Within
this scheme, the Legislature included sections on the sale of tobacco products
to minors (§ 1399-CC), the sale of tobacco products from vending machines (§
1399-DD), out-of packages sales and minimum package sales (§ 1399-GG), and
the section at issue in the present litigation, the “Distribution of Tobacco
Products or Herbal Cigarettes without charge” (§ 1399-bb). See New York
Public Health Law § 1399.
In enacting § 1399-bb, the Legislature created a framework for regulating
the sampling and free distribution of tobacco products. First, the Legislature
set forth the following general regulation prohibiting the distribution of (1) free
tobacco products and (2) coupons which are redeemable for tobacco products:
1. No person engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing
tobacco products or herbal cigarettes for commercial purposes, or any
agent or employee of such person, shall knowingly, in furtherance of
such business:
(a) distribute without charge any tobacco products or herbal cigarettes
to any individual, provided that the distribution of a package
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containing tobacco products or herbal cigarettes in violation of this
subdivision shall constitute a single violation without regard to the
number of items in the package; or
(b) distribute coupons which are redeemable for tobacco products or
herbal cigarettes to any individual, provided that this subdivision
shall not apply to coupons contained in newspapers, magazines or
other types of publications, coupons obtained through the purchase
of tobacco products or herbal cigarettes or obtained at locations which
sell tobacco products or herbal cigarettes provided that such
distribution is confined to a designated area or to coupons sent
through the mail.
New York Public Health Law § 1399-bb(1).
Notably, while the Legislature set forth a general prohibition on the
sampling and free distribution of tobacco products, the Legislature also
expressly allowed for the distribution of coupons via certain media or in certain
settings: (1) “coupons contained in newspapers, magazines or other types of
publications,” (2) “coupons obtained through the purchase of tobacco products
or herbal cigarettes or obtained at locations which sell tobacco products or
herbal cigarettes,” and (3) “coupons sent through the mail.” § 1399-bb(1)(b).
Second, the Legislature then built upon these enumerated exceptions by
mandating certain locations where the provisions of § 1399-bb(1) would not
apply and retailers, or manufacturers, could distribute free tobacco products
as well as coupons redeemable for tobacco products:
2. The prohibitions contained in subdivision one of this section shall not
apply to the following locations:

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(a) private social functions when seating arrangements are under the
control of the sponsor of the function and not the owner, operator,
manager or person in charge of such indoor area;
(b) conventions and trade shows; provided that the distribution is
confined to designated areas generally accessible only to persons over
the age of eighteen;
(c) events sponsored by tobacco or herbal cigarette manufacturers
provided that the distribution is confined to designated areas
generally accessible only to persons over the age of eighteen;
(d) bars as defined in subdivision one of section thirteen hundred
ninety-nine-n of this chapter;
(e) tobacco businesses as defined in subdivision eight of section
thirteen hundred ninety-nine-aa of this article;
(f) factories as defined in subdivision nine of section thirteen hundred
ninety-nine-aa of this article and construction sites; provided that the
distribution is confined to designated areas generally accessible only
to persons over the age of eighteen.
§ 1399-bb(2)(a-f).
Third, in § 1399-bb, the Legislature included the following two provisions
in order to regulate the sampling and free distribution of tobacco products as
permitted by § 1399-bb(2).
3. No person shall distribute tobacco products or herbal cigarettes at the
locations set forth in paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) of subdivision two of
this section unless such person gives five days written notice to the
enforcement officer.
4. The distribution of tobacco products or herbal cigarettes pursuant to
subdivision two of this section shall be made only to an individual
who demonstrates, through a driver's license or other photographic
identification card issued by a government entity or educational
institution indicating that the individual is at least eighteen years of
26

age. Such identification need not be required of any individual who
reasonably appears to be at least twenty-five years of age; provided,
however, that such appearance shall not constitute a defense in any
proceeding alleging the sale of a tobacco product or herbal cigarette to
an individual.
§ 1399-bb(3). Together, § 1399-bb(2),(3),&(4), work to ensure that tobacco
retailers and manufacturers may only distribute free tobacco products in
locations where there will not be any consumers under the age of eighteen.
Finally, the Legislature then chose to protect the judgments that it made
in § 1399-bb with an express preemption clause that it passed in a separate
piece of legislation that accompanied § 1399:
The provisions of section 1399-bb of Article F of the public health law
added by section three of this act, shall govern and take precedence over
the provisions of any local law, ordinance, rule, regulation, resolution,
charter or administrative code hereafter enacted by any political
subdivision of the state.
1992 N.Y. Laws 2219, 2223, ch. 799 § 6. The Court of Appeals has interpreted
this preemption clause as a “narrow express preemption provision giving
preclusive effect to section 1399-bb of article 13-F, governing the distribution
of tobacco products without charge.” Vatore, 83 N.Y. 2d at 649-650 (emphasis
added).
In the legislative findings that, along with the express preemption
provision, accompanied § 1399-bb, the Legislature clearly indicated that the
purpose of § 1399-bb was to regulate the sampling and distribution of tobacco
products without charge:

27

[T]he legislature finds that the unrestricted distribution or furnishing of
tobacco products to members of the general public without charge
encourages the use of tobacco products by minors and is detrimental to
the public health… Therefore, it is the purpose of this act … to restrict
the distribution of tobacco products for purposes of encouraging the use
or sale of such products…”
1992 N.Y. Laws 2219, 2223, ch. 799 § 1 (emphasis added).
Thus, the text of the statute as well as its accompanying express
preemption clause and legislative findings, demonstrate that in enacting
§ 1399-bb, the Legislature only intended to regulate the distribution of tobacco
products without charge and to preempt local governments from passing
conflicting laws on this narrow subject. There is no mention anywhere in the
text of the statute of potentially discounted cigarettes or tobacco products.
Notably, in § 1399-bb(1)(b), the Legislature allowed for tobacco manufacturers
to “distribute coupons which are redeemable for tobacco products” via certain
media and in particular settings. This provision has been the source of much
debate between the parties. But, it is clear that the coupons at issue in this
statute, as will be discussed in greater detail below, see infra at 30-31, are
coupons that provide consumers with a free tobacco product. They are not the
type of coupons, which are one of the many price reduction instruments that
the challenged ordinance prohibits.
Along these lines, the legislative history surrounding the passage of
§ 1399-bb, confirms that § 1399-bb only concerns the sampling and
distribution of tobacco products without charge. Assemblyman Alexander P.
Grannis served as the primary sponsor for § 1399 and introduced the
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legislation in Assembly Bill 3900-E. Assemblyman Grannis drafted a
memorandum in support of Assembly Bill 3900-E, and its Senate companion
bill, S.5374-A, that demonstrates that the legislation clearly intended to
regulate the sampling and free distribution of tobacco products:
The bill also addresses the issue of free distribution of tobacco products.
The unrestricted free distribution of cigarettes all too often results in
distribution of tobacco products to minors and is an inducement to
smoke. The free distribution of cigarettes also encourages non-smokers
to start smoking and encourages smokers to continue. This bill limits
free distribution to defined situations and controls distribution from a
focus point…Tobacco manufacturers who participate in a given event
may distribute samples under the circumstances specified… Under the
bill, people who wish a free tobacco product sample will have to approach
the product rather than having the product approach the person as
distribution now most often occurs.
Memorandum in Support of A. 3900-E, (emphasis added), Ex. B. to
Supplemental Declaration of Nicholas Ciappetta Concerning State Law
Preemption.
During the Assembly debate on New York Public Health Law § 1399,
Assemblyman Grannis similarly described the bill as an effort to prohibit the
sampling and free distribution of tobacco products:
[T]he distribution of free sampling would be banned in New York State
except at private social functions and tobacco businesses and several
other designated areas; and in those cases, everybody that wants to do
free sampling, wants to hand out free samples of cigarettes[s] would have
to provide five days’ written notice to the local health department and
would require a proof of age for every person to whom a free sample was
to be given.

29

NYS Assembly July 29, 1992, at 166-167 (emphasis added), Ex. C to
Supplemental Declaration of Nicholas Ciapetta Concerning State Law
Preemption.
During its debate over the law, the Legislature only addressed coupons in
so far as it recognized that in its effort to regulate the sampling and
distribution of free tobacco products, it would also need to regulate the
distribution of coupons that could be redeemed for free tobacco products.
An assembly memorandum in support of Assembly Bill 3900-D, an earlier draft
of Assembly Bill 3900-E, explained that “prohibiting the distribution of
redeemable coupons will prevent use of that technique as a means of avoiding
a ban that only encompassed the distribution of [tobacco] products.” Assembly
Memorandum in Support of A. 3900-D, Ex. H to Supplemental Declaration of
Nicholas R. Ciapetta Concerning State Law Preemption. For example, without
the provisions surrounding coupons (§ 1399-bb(2)), a tobacco manufacturer,
while unable to provide a consumer with a free pack of cigarettes, could
provide the same consumer with a coupon that could be redeemed for a free
pack of cigarettes. Thus, by including coupons in § 1399-bb, the Legislature
did not intend to regulate one of the pricing practices at issue in the present
litigation, such as coupons for $1 off of the listed price for a pack of cigarettes;
rather, the Legislature intended to prohibit coupons that could be redeemed for
free tobacco products.

30

Finally, in signing the bill into law, Governor Cuomo reiterated that in
enacting § 1399-bb, the Legislature and the Executive intended to regulate the
sampling and free distribution of tobacco products. In his Memorandum of
Approval, Governor Mario Cuomo explained that the bill was necessary
because the “free distribution of cigarettes inevitably results in distribution of
tobacco products to minors and is an inducement to smoke. The free
distribution of cigarettes also encourages non-smokers to start smoking and
encourages smokers to continue.” Memorandum filed with Assembly Bill
Number 3900-E, Aug. 7, 1992, Ex. D to Supplemental Declaration of Nicholas
R. Ciapetta Concerning State Law Preemption. Governor Cuomo then
explained that that bill will correct this problem by “prohibit[ing] sellers and
distributors of tobacco products from distributing tobacco products without
charge, except for distributions at certain locations, and subject to notification
of an enforcement officer.” Id.
Plaintiffs dispute this characterization of the legislative history.
Plaintiffs’ contend that in addition to choosing to regulate the distribution of
free tobacco products, in enacting § 1399-bb, the legislature deliberately chose
not to regulate and thus, to allow partially discounted tobacco sales, such as
the pricing practices at issue in the present litigation. Consequently, according
to plaintiffs, in enacting the challenged ordinance and allowing for the
regulation of discount pricing practices, the city has impermissibly regulated a
body of law that the state has chosen to allow and preempted local
governments from regulating. See Vatore, 83 N.Y.2d at 649.
31

In advancing this argument, plaintiffs rely upon an early draft of the law,
Assembly Bill 3900-D § 1399-bb. In this version of the law, the New York State
Assembly provided that no tobacco retailer or manufacturer shall:
(a) distribute without charge or for a charge less than basic cost any
tobacco products or herbal cigarettes to any individual, provided that the
distribution of a package containing tobacco products or herbal
cigarettes in violation of this subdivision shall constitute a single
violation without regard to the number of items in the package
Assembly Bill 3900-D § 1399-bb(1)(a) (emphasis added), Ex. A. to Affirmation of
Michael Edney Concerning State Law Preemption. The relevant term in
plaintiffs’ analysis is “for a charge less than basic cost.” The bill defined “basic
cost” as “a nominal price, or any other price less than the costs of the
distributor, plus the amount of any taxes not included in such costs.” Id. at
§ 1399-aa(3). Plaintiffs argue that the “less than basic cost” provision
encompasses all of the discounting practices at issue in the present litigation.
Thus, if this draft of the bill had been enacted, according to plaintiffs, this
provision would have prohibited all of plaintiffs’ discounting practices.
However, upon receiving the bill from the State Assembly, the New York
State Senate made a variety of changes to the law as originally proposed,
including removing the “less than basic cost” provision. See New York State
Senate Bill 5734-A § 1399-bb(a), Ex. C to Affirmation of Michael Edney
Concerning State Law Preemption. The Assembly accepted this revision in its
final version of the legislation. See Assembly Bill 3900-A, § 1399-bb(1)(a).

32

Plaintiffs contend that the Legislature’s decision to remove the “less than
basic cost” provision amounted to a decision by the Legislature to allow for
tobacco manufacturers and retailers to engage in the pricing practices at issue
in the present litigation. Plaintiffs’ argue that this determination was then
protected by the express preemption clause.
However, this argument must fail for two reasons. First, plaintiffs’
argument cannot survive, because plaintiffs’ fundamentally misunderstand the
term “less than basic cost.” The Legislature did not originally include the “less
than basic cost” provision to regulate the type of discounting practices at issue
in the present litigation. Instead, similar to its decision to include a prohibition
on the distribution of coupons redeemable for tobacco products, the Legislature
decided to include the “less than basic cost” provision in order to ensure that
tobacco manufacturers and retailers could not circumvent the prohibition on
the free distribution of tobacco products by offering tobacco products to
consumers at a nominal price. In an Assembly Memorandum in support of the
earlier legislation, the Legislature advanced this position:
Free distribution of cigarettes inevitably results in distribution of tobacco
products to minors and is an inducement to smoke. The free
distribution of cigarettes also encourages non-smokers to start smoking
and encourages smokers to continue. Restricting the distribution of
tobacco products at less than basic cost will prevent distributors from
avoiding the ban on free distribution by “selling” tobacco products for a
penny, a nickel or some other minimal amount. Similarly, prohibiting
the distribution of redeemable coupons will prevent use of that technique
as a means of avoiding a ban that only encompassed distribution of
products.

33

Memorandum Filed in Support of Assembly Bill 3900-D (emphasis added), Ex.
H to Supplemental Declaration of Nicholas R. Ciapetta Concerning State Law
Preemption. Ultimately, for the Legislature, “less than basic cost” really meant
a nominal price, such as a penny or nickel. Thus, the Legislature never so
much as considered, let alone sanctioned, the pricing practices at issue in the
present litigation.
Second, even assuming that the “less than basic cost” provision includes
the pricing practices at issue in this litigation, plaintiffs’ argument must fail
because it is incorrect as a matter of law. Plaintiffs contend that when the
Legislature has considered imposing an additional restriction in a statute,
declined to do so, and then enacted the statute with an express preemption
clause, that local governments cannot then adopt a regulation of the same type
that the Legislature rejected. However, the Court of Appeals has held that
“legislative inaction, because of its inherent ambiguity, affords the most
dubious foundation for drawing positive inferences.” Clark v. Cuomo, 66
N.Y.2d 185, 191 (1985); See also, New York State Health Facilities Association,
Inc. v. Axelrod, 77 N.Y.2d 340,348 n.2 (1991); Brooklyn Union Gas Company v.
New York State Human Rights Appeal Board, 41 N.Y.2d 84, 89-90 (1976).
Thus, despite plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary, this court will not make any
inferences as to the Legislature’s intention in removing the “less than basic
cost” provision from § 1399-bb(1)(a). This court does not conclude that by
removing this provision, the legislature intended to sanction the pricing
practices that are prohibited by the challenged ordinance.
34

Whether the ordinance regulates the distribution of free cigarettes and
tobacco products
Despite the fact that the court has found that § 1399-bb does not
preempt the city’s regulation of discounted tobacco products, the court could
still find that the ordinance is preempted by § 1399-bb if the court were to
conclude, as plaintiffs argue, that the ordinance prohibits the distribution of
free tobacco products. There is no doubt that the city is preempted from
regulating the free distribution of cigarettes and tobacco products. See 1992
N.Y. Laws ch. 799 § 6. However, the court finds that the ordinance does not
regulate the free distribution of cigarettes and tobacco products.
This issue can be dealt with quickly and does not require detailed
analysis of the text of the ordinance or of the legislative history surrounding its
passage. The challenged ordinance—§ 17.176.1—will be part of § 17.176 of
New York City’s Administrative Code. § 17.176, entitled “Prohibitions on the
distribution of tobacco products,” already addresses the distribution of free
cigarettes and tobacco products in New York City. This regulation essentially
codifies New York Public Health § 1399-bb as part of the New York City
Administrative Code. § 17.176 prohibits the distribution of free, or nominally
priced, cigarettes and tobacco products in public places and at public events.
N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 17.176(b). Like § 1399-bb, § 17.176 allows for tobacco
manufacturers and retailers to distribute free cigarettes and tobacco products
at private events, or in stores that sell tobacco products to the general public.
Id. at § 17.176(c)(i-ii).

35

The court reads these two regulations-§ 17.176 and§ 17.176.1together in an effort to give meaning to each provision and to harmonize each
section with the other. See Friedman v. Connecticut General Life Insurance
Company, 9 N.Y. 3d 105, 115 (2007); see also McKinney's Consolidated Laws of
New York, Book 1, Statutes§ 97. Thus, it is clear that the two sections
regulate different areas-§ 17.176 regulates the free distribution of cigarettes
and tobacco products and§ 17.176.1 regulates the sale of cigarettes and
tobacco products below the listed price. Together, the two ordinances work to
regulate tobacco sales in New York City.
Therefore, as§ 17.176.1 does not regulate the free distribution of tobacco
products, the court finds that it is not preempted by§ 1399-bb.

Conclusion
The court grants the city's motion for summary judgment in its entirety.
Accordingly, the court denies plaintiffs' request for a declaratory judgment and
for a permanent injunction.
This opinion resolves the following motions listed as item numbers 22,
60, and 63 on the docket.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: New York, New York
June 18, 2014

USDCSDNY
OOOJMENT

ELECTRONICALLY FILED

~~--.-.:---......,.__

Thomas P. Griesa
United States District Judge

36