Securities and Exchange Commission v. Penn et al
OPINION AND ORDER: re: 381 MOTION to Vacate, Alter, or Amend the Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule Of Civil Procedure 60(B) filed by The Camelot Group International, L.L.C., Camelot Acquisitions Secondary Opportunities Management, L.L.C., 384 SECOND MOTION to Vacate 300 Judgment Vacate, Alter, or Amend the Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule Of Civil Procedure 60(B) filed by Lawrence E. Penn, 350 MOTION turnover of assets and dismissal of Count VI filed by Securities and Exchange Co mmission. For the reasons discussed above, Defendants' Rule 60(b) motions are DENIED, the SEC's turnover motion is GRANTED, the SEC's request to lift the freeze on certain accounts and on the contents of a safe deposit box is GRANTED, and the SEC's request to amend theComplaint to exclude Count VI is GRANTED. The Court will direct the financial institutions to turn over the funds and will direct the relevant non-parties to release the asset freeze on certain accounts by separ ate orders. By no later than Friday, April 9, 2021, the SEC must file a proposed amended judgment as to Penn that includes the correct amount of pre-judgment interest owed. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the open motions at docket entries 350, 381, and 384. SO ORDERED., ( Motions due by 4/9/2021.) (Signed by Judge Valerie E. Caproni on 3/31/2021) (ama)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
DATE FILED: 3/31/2021
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
- against LAWRENCE E. PENN, III, MICHAEL ST. ALTURA
EWERS, CAMELOT ACQUISITIONS SECONDARY
OPPORTUNITIES MANAGEMENT LLC, THE
CAMELOT GROUP INTERNATIONAL, LLC, and
OPINION AND ORDER
- and A BIGHOUSE PHOTOGRAPHY AND FILM STUDIO
VALERIE CAPRONI, United States District Judge:
This Court previously entered final judgments against Defendant Lawrence Penn, III
(“Penn”) and against Defendants Camelot Acquisitions Secondary Opportunities Management
LLC (“CASO Management”) and Camelot Group International, LLC (“CGI”) (collectively, the
“Entity Defendants”) for violations of federal securities laws. Dkts. 300, 339, 340. Each
Defendant was permanently enjoined from further violations of the securities laws and ordered to
pay disgorgement, pre-judgment interest, and civil penalties. Id. Defendants, with Penn
proceeding pro se, have moved pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
for relief from the portions of the judgments that order disgorgement, arguing that the
disgorgement orders conflict with Liu v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 140 S. Ct. 1936
(2020), a Supreme Court case decided after the judgments were entered. Dkts. 381, 384. The
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has separately moved for orders that (i) direct
certain financial institutions to turn over funds held in frozen accounts in partial satisfaction of
the three judgments; (ii) lift freeze orders on a safe deposit box and on accounts that do not
contain any funds; and (iii) amend the Complaint to dismiss Count VI, which the SEC no longer
wishes to pursue. Dkt. 350. Defendants, as well as non-parties Camelot Acquisitions Secondary
Opportunities GP, LLC (“CASO GP”) and CASO Co-Invest A, LLC (“CASO Co-Invest”) have
opposed the SEC’s motion. Dkts. 375, 378. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ Rule
60(b) motions are DENIED, and the SEC’s motion is GRANTED.
The Court assumes familiarity with the Court’s numerous prior opinions issued over the
course of this seven-year litigation and will summarize only the most pertinent facts.1 From
2007 to February 2014, Penn managed a registered private equity fund called Camelot
Acquisitions Secondary Opportunities LP or the “Fund.” Penn Remedies I, 14-CV-581, 2017
WL 5515855, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2017). In early 2014, the Fund’s auditors discovered
that Penn had misappropriated approximately $9.3 million from the Fund. Penn and an
accomplice had used Ssecurion, LLC, a shell corporation, to send the Fund invoices for “due
diligence” services that it had not performed; the Fund paid the invoices. Ssecurion forwarded
most of the proceeds it received to CASO Management and CGI, other entities controlled by
See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Penn, 225 F. Supp. 3d 225 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“Penn Liability”); Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n v. Penn, No. 14-CV-581, 2017 WL 5515855 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2017) (“Penn Remedies I”); Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n v. Penn, No. 14-CV-581, 2018 WL 4378444 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2018) (“Penn Remedies II”); Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n v. Penn, No. 14-CV-581, Dkt. 309 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019) (“Penn First Rule 60(b) Motion”); Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n v. Penn, No. 14-CV-581, Dkt. 319 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2019) (“Order on Motion to Disqualify”); Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n v. Penn, No. 14-CV-581, 2020 WL 1272285 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2020) (“Entity Defs. Liability &
Penn.2 Id. On March 16, 2015, Penn pled guilty in New York state court to one count of grand
larceny and one count of falsifying business records.3 Id.
In 2014, the SEC commenced this parallel civil enforcement action against Penn, CASO
Management, CGI, and others. Compl., Dkt. 1. The Court granted a temporary restraining order
to freeze assets held in bank accounts associated with Penn, CASO Management, CGI, CASO
GP, CASO Co-Invest, and another non-party entity, CM Growth Capital Partners, L.P., which
was formerly known as Camelot Acquisitions Secondary Opportunities Offshore, LP (“CASO
Offshore”). Dkt. 2. The Court issued preliminary injunctions to extend the asset freeze pending
resolution of this matter. Dkts. 56, 58.
On December 21, 2016, the Court granted the SEC’s motion for summary judgment on
its claims that Penn violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act and Sections 204
and 206 and Rule 204-2 of the Investment Advisers Act. Penn Liability, 225 F. Supp. 3d 225,
230 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). As discussed at length in the Court’s opinion, Penn admitted, as part of his
allocution in his criminal case and in his answer in this case, to stealing millions of dollars from
the Fund, including by mischaracterizing expenses and diverting funds to entities that he
Most of the money fraudulently obtained from the Fund appears to be unaccounted for.
Despite his guilty plea, Penn moved to vacate the New York state judgment, asserting that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel, among other claims. He argued that his guilty plea contravened a New York Court
of Appeals’ decision, People v. Zinke, which held that a general partner of a limited partnership cannot commit
larceny when he takes property owned by the partnership. 556 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1990). The New York Supreme Court
found that not only did Penn fail to provide necessary documentation to support his claims, but that Zinke was
inapplicable to his conviction. See N.Y. Sup. Ct. Order, Dkt. 391-5 (“The People have provided sufficient
information to establish that the defendant did not serve as a partner, either general or limited, of the fund at the time
of the theft. Therefore, the defendant’s reliance on [Zinke] is misplaced.”). Penn appealed, and the Appellate
Division, First Department, affirmed. See People v. Penn, 60 N.Y.S.3d 664, 665 (1st Dep’t 2017) (finding that
Penn’s guilty plea precluded appellate review, but that “[i]n any event, the record before us establishes that, unlike
the situation in People v. Zinke, defendant adopted a form of business organization whereby he held no ownership
interest in the stolen money at the time of the theft.”) (cleaned up). The New York Court of Appeals declined to
review that decision, People v. Penn, 77 N.Y.S.3d 6 (2018), and then denied reconsideration, People v. Penn, 79
N.Y.S.3d 107 (2018). See also Penn First Rule 60(b) Motion, Dkt. 309 at 7–8, 8 n.4.
controlled. Id. at 231. Penn also directly conceded violations of Section 204 of the 40 Act and
Rule 204–2 thereunder. Id.
Moving to remedies, on August 22, 2017, the Court granted the SEC’s motion to
permanently enjoin Penn from further violations of the securities laws, Penn Remedies I, 2017
WL 5515855, at *1, and on September 14, 2018, the Court ordered disgorgement in the amount
of $9,286,916.65, plus interest, and a monetary civil penalty in the same amount, Penn Remedies
II, No. 14-CV-581, 2018 WL 4378444, at *3, 7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2018). On October 1, 2018,
the Court entered a final judgment against Penn. Judgment, Dkt. 300. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit summarily dismissed Penn’s appeal. See Mandate, Dkt. 334
(“Upon due consideration, it is hereby ordered that the appeal is dismissed because it lacks an
arguable basis either in law or in fact.”) (cleaned up).
On March 17, 2020, the Court granted the SEC’s motion for summary judgment on its
claims against CASO Management and CGI, two of the entities that Penn controlled and used to
commit the securities law violations.4 Entity Defs. Liability & Remedies, No. 14-CV-581, 2020
WL 1272285, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2020). The Court found there was no dispute that Penn
founded, owned, and controlled the two entities: CASO Management was a registered
investment adviser that acted as the investment manager for the Fund, and CGI functioned as an
affiliate or parent organization of CASO Management. Id. at *2. Penn admitted that he had
primary responsibility for CASO Management’s business decisions and that he owned at least
99% of both entities. Id. Given Penn’s dominance over the entities, the Court imputed Penn’s
conduct to them and found CASO Management and CGI liable for violating the securities laws.
Id. at *1.
Despite two sua sponte extensions by the Court of their time to respond, see Dkts. 319, 323, CASO
Management and CGI did not respond to the SEC’s motion for summary judgment.
With respect to remedies, the SEC used bank records to establish with reasonable
certainty that, after receiving fraudulent due diligence payments from the Fund, Ssecurion
transferred over $9 million of those payments, either directly or through an intermediate account,
to CASO Management and CGI. Specifically, CASO Management received $440,000 of the
fraudulent fees, and CGI received $8,627,004. Id. at *6. The Court enjoined CASO
Management and CGI from further violations of the securities laws and ordered CASO
Management to disgorge the $440,000 and CGI to disgorge the $8,627,004. Both entities were
ordered to pay pre-judgment interest, and, for each, a civil penalty was set equal to the amount of
that entity’s disgorgement. Id. at *7. On April 30, 2020, the Court entered judgments against
CASO Management and CGI. Judgments, Dkts. 339, 340.
Throughout this litigation’s seven-year history, Penn has expressed no remorse for his
conduct, and, despite his guilty plea, he continues to profess his innocence. See, e.g., Dkts. 161,
275, 282, 303, 378, 385. Despite the overwhelming evidence of his guilt, Penn asserts that he is
the victim of a giant conspiracy among the New York District Attorney’s Office, the SEC, this
Court, and others to seize unlawfully his control in the Fund. See First Motion to Disqualify,
Dkt. 318; Second Motion to Disqualify, Dkt. 372. Moreover, Penn has taken numerous actions
to prolong unnecessarily these proceedings, including waiting until moments before deadlines or
conferences to make meritless requests for adjournments.5 See Penn Remedies II, 2018 WL
4378444, at *2–3 (describing such efforts); Order on Motion to Disqualify, No. 14-CV-581, Dkt.
319 at 4–5 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2019) (same). The Court sincerely hopes that today’s order will
finally bring this drama to a close.
The Court views Defendants’ opposition to the SEC’s turnover motion and Defendants’ Rule 60(b) motions
as yet another example of such foot dragging.
Defendants’ Rule 60(b) Motions
A. Legal Standard
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), the Court may grant relief from a final
judgment in six circumstances, only three of which have been raised here: “(1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b). Any such motion must be made within a reasonable time. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).6
Regardless of which provision a party invokes, Rule 60(b) requires courts to “strike a
balance between serving the ends of justice and preserving the finality of judgments.” Nemaizer
v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986) (collecting cases). To strike this balance, Rule 60(b)
motions “should be broadly construed to do substantial justice, yet final judgments should not be
lightly reopened.” Id. (cleaned up). Accordingly, Rule 60(b) is “a mechanism for extraordinary
judicial relief invoked only if the moving party demonstrates exceptional circumstances.”
Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (cleaned up); see also Miles v.
N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 802 F. App’x 658, 659 (2d Cir. 2020). The decision whether to grant such
relief is “committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” Shanfa Li v. Chinatown TakeOut Inc., 812 F. App’x 49, 53 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal citation omitted); Nemaizer, 793 F.2d at
With respect to motions made pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), the Rule caps what can be considered a
“reasonable time” at one year. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).
Although Penn and the Entity Defendants filed separate Rule 60(b) motions, Dkts. 381,
384, both motions rely on Rule 60(b)(6).7 Penn Rule 60(b) Mem. of Law, Dkt. 385 at 11; Entity
Defs. Rule 60(b) Mem. of Law, Dkt. 382 at 5–6. Rule 60(b)(6) is a catchall provision that
applies when there is “any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Motions
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) may only be brought if no other subsection is applicable. See PRC
Harris, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 700 F.2d 894, 898 (2d Cir. 1983) (“Rule 60(b)(6) is a broadly drafted
‘umbrella provision,’ which must be read in conjunction with the other sections of that Rule, and
is applicable only where the more specific provisions do not apply.”) (collecting cases); accord
Nemaizer, 793 F.2d at 63 (same); Jackson v. Stanford, No. 16-CV-9702, 2020 WL 6822984 at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2020) (same); cf. Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd.
P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393 (1993) (holding that Rule 60(b)(1) and Rule 60(b)(6) are mutually
Because both motions rely on Rule 60(b)(6), the Court must first determine whether this
is the only provision of Rule 60(b) that could apply. Defendants argue that the Court should
reconsider its final judgments because they allegedly conflict with a recent Supreme Court
decision, Liu v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 140 S. Ct. 1936 (2020). As discussed
below, courts apply Rule 60(b)(1) when parties contend that a judgment is no longer valid
because of an intervening change of law. Because Rule 60(b)(6) is a provision of last resort,
Penn briefly reviews the purported Rule 60(b)(5) standard in his opening brief. See Penn Rule 60(b) Mem.
of Law, Dkt. 385 at 10–11. To the extent that Penn intends to rely on Rule 60(b)(5), the motion is denied. Rule
60(b)(5) allows a court to grant relief in three scenarios: the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it
is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying the judgment prospectively is no
longer equitable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). Penn owes over $20 million dollars pursuant to a valid judgment against
him, see Dkt. 300, and no one has asserted that the judgment has been paid. Accordingly, the judgment has not been
satisfied, released, or discharged. The judgment against Penn is not based on an earlier judgment that has been
reversed or vacated, and Penn’s appeal of the judgment was unsuccessful, see Dkt. 334, so the second scenario does
not apply. The final possibility, that applying the judgment prospectively is no longer equitable, is inapplicable to
money judgments such as this one. See DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266, 1275 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that
judgments involving injunctions may have prospective applications while money judgments do not).
were Rule 60(b)(1) to apply, the motions would have to be evaluated pursuant to that provision
and not under Rule 60(b)(6). Accordingly, the Court must first make a threshold determination
whether Rule 60(b)(1) applies, and, if it does not, then the Court can consider the motions under
B. Rule 60(b)(1) Is Not Available to Penn; The Entity Defendants’ Rule 60(b)(1)
Motion Is Denied
Rule 60(b)(1) permits a court to grant relief from a final judgment in the case of
“mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). The Second
Circuit has construed this provision to apply to judicial mistakes, including when courts
incorrectly apply the law. See Chiulli v. Internal Revenue Serv., No. 03-CV-6670, 2006 WL
3008084, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2006) (collecting Second Circuit cases). The Second Circuit
has also interpreted this subsection in a manner that facilitates the correction of judgments that,
although correct at the time of decision, subsequently became incorrect due to a change in law.
Schildhaus v. Moe, 335 F.2d 529, 530–31 (2d Cir. 1964); Tarkington v. United States Lines Co.,
222 F.2d 358, 359–60 (2d Cir. 1955). In Schildhaus, Judge Friendly explained that interpreting
“mistakes” in this manner promotes judicial efficiency by allowing district courts to correct
errors without requiring the aggrieved party to appeal. Schildaus, 335 F.2d at 351; see also In re
310 Assocs., 346 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 2003) (reiterating the judicial efficiency rationale).
Rule 60(b)(1) motions must be made within a reasonable time and no more than one year
after the date of judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). One year is the outer limit; what is
reasonable depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Chiulli, 2006 WL
3008084, at *3 (internal citation omitted). When parties move pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) to
address an alleged intervening change of law, motions are only made within a reasonable time
when they are filed before the time to appeal has expired. In re 310 Assocs., 346 F.3d at 35; In
re Texlon Corp., 596 F.2d 1092, 1100 (2d Cir. 1979); Int’l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d
665, 670 (2d Cir. 1977). Accordingly, for a Rule 60(b)(1) motion based on an intervening
change of law to be timely, two things must happen before the time to appeal has expired: the
pertinent change of law must occur, and the corresponding Rule 60(b)(1) motion must be filed.
Given Judge Friendly’s reasoning — that it is more efficient for district courts to alter their
judgments and save the parties from an appeal on the same grounds — it makes sense that a Rule
60(b)(1) motion based on a post-judgment change in law would be temporally limited in this
With respect to Penn, the outer limit on a Rule 60(b)(1) motion is one year from entry of
judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). The Court entered judgment against Penn on October 1,
2018. Judgment, Dkt. 300. The alleged intervening change of law occurred in June 2020, well
over a year after the judgment was entered. Accordingly, Rule 60(b)(1) is unavailable to Penn,
leaving Rule 60(b)(6) as his only mechanism for seeking relief.
The Entity Defendants are in a different situation because the alleged intervening change
of law occurred within the time to appeal the judgments against them. Specifically, the Court
entered judgments against the Entity Defendants on April 30, 2020, Judgments, Dkts. 339, 340,
meaning that the entities had until June 29, 2020 to appeal.8 Fed. R. App. R. 4(a)(1)(B)(ii). The
Liu decision was announced on June 22, 2020, a week before their appeal deadline.9
Neither entity filed an appeal.
Although a week may seem like a relatively short period, the Entity Defendants were, or at least they
should have been, on notice that the Supreme Court was likely to issue its decision around that time; the Supreme
Court granted the writ of certiorari on November 1, 2019, and heard oral argument on March 3, 2020. See Liu v.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 140 S. Ct. 451 (2019); Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1936. Moreover, if the Entity Defendants were
worried about time, they could have requested an extension of time to file a notice of appeal, which would have
given them an additional 30 days to file their motion. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A).
Accordingly, Rule 60(b)(1) was available to the Entity Defendants, precluding them from
pursuing relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6).
Because the Entity Defendants’ Rule 60(b) motion could have been filed pursuant to Rule
60(b)(1), the Court must apply that provision to their motion. Upon careful consideration, the
Court denies the Entity Defendants’ 60(b)(1) motion as untimely. The entities informed the
Court of their intention to file their Rule 60(b) motion on August 18, 2020, see Letter, Dkt. 363,
several weeks after the deadline to appeal had passed. The Entity Defendants attempt to excuse
their failure to file earlier,10 Entity Defs. Rule 60(b) Reply, Dkt. 392 at 10, but excusing such
delay would undermine the fundamental purpose of allowing a Rule 60(b)(1) motion following a
change in law — to avoid an unnecessary appeal. With no other arguments why Rule 60(b)(1)
should not apply,11 the Entity Defendants’ Rule 60(b) motion must be denied.
Although this finding warrants denial of the Entity Defendants’ Rule 60(b) motion in its
entirety, the Court further considers their motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), which only confirms
that the motion should be denied.
C. Penn and the Entity Defendants’ Motions Must Be Denied Pursuant to Rule
When considered pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), the Court finds that Penn and the Entity
Defendants’ motions are procedurally improper and substantively baseless. The Court considers
each deficiency in turn.
As will be discussed below, the Entity Defendants’ excuse, that they were unrepresented, is manifestly
inadequate. See Section I(C)(1)(b) of this Opinion, infra.
Oddly, the Entity Defendants do not discuss Rule 60(b)(1) at all. This is all the more surprising inasmuch
as they acknowledge that Rule 60(b)(6) relief is only available when “the asserted grounds for relief are not
recognized in clauses (1)-(5) of the Rule.” Entity Defs. Rule 60(b) Mem. of Law at 5–6 (citing Nemaizer v. Baker,
793 F.2d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 1986)).
1. The Motions Are Procedurally Improper
To be procedurally proper, a Rule 60(b)(6) motion must be filed within a reasonable time,
and it is not a substitute for a properly filed appeal. With respect to timing, the Supreme Court
has found that to “justify relief under subsection (6) [of Rule 60(b)], a party must show
extraordinary circumstances suggesting that the party is faultless in the delay.” Pioneer Inv.
Servs. Co., 507 U.S. at 393 (collecting cases) (emphasis added); see also PRC Harris, Inc., 700
F.2d at 897 (requiring courts to “scrutinize the particular circumstances of the case, and balance
the interest in finality with the reasons for delay.”). As discussed below, Penn’s motion must be
denied because he has done nothing within a reasonable time in this case. The Entity
Defendants’ motion must be denied because their purported reason for their delay — that they
were unrepresented — is meritless.
Additionally, Rule 60(b) motions “may not be used as a substitute for a timely appeal,”
Nemaizer, 793 F.2d at 61, and, in the event that a party has failed to appeal, the party must
“allege circumstances showing that [the] failure to appeal was justifiable,” Ackermann v.
United States, 340 U.S. 193, 197 (1950). While Penn timely appealed the judgment against him,
he did not appeal the amount of disgorgement; the Entity Defendants did not appeal at all. Here
too the Entity Defendants attempt to excuse their failure by asserting their lack of representation.
For the reasons discussed below, the fact that the Entity Defendants were not represented is not
an adequate excuse for their failure to appeal.
a. Penn Is at Fault for the Delay, Making his Rule 60(b)(6) Motion
Penn filed this Rule 60(b) motion — his second one — more than two years after the
Court entered judgment against him in 2018 and more than two months after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Liu, the purported basis of his motion. Penn offers no explanation or
justification for his delay in filing this motion, and the Court finds that this is just one more
attempt by Penn to prolong the inevitable, the turning over of assets to partially satisfy the
judgment that was entered against him. Accordingly, the Court finds that Penn’s motion for
relief from the judgment was not made within a reasonable time and must be denied.
Penn has engaged in a series of strategic moves to delay the Court’s issuance of
judgments against him and against the entities he controls. While there are many examples of
such behavior, Penn’s actions surrounding an evidentiary hearing on remedies is an excellent
illustration of his larger pattern of dilatory conduct that wastes judicial time and that has delayed
this case for no legitimate reason.
After finding Penn liable for violations of the securities laws, the Court directed the
parties to brief the issue of remedies. Penn Liability, 225 F. Supp. 3d at 238. The Court then
granted the SEC’s motion to enjoin Penn from further violations of the securities laws, but
denied its motion with respect to disgorgement and penalties because a dispute of fact required
an evidentiary hearing. Penn Remedies I, 2017 WL 5515855, at *1. The Court gave the parties
two weeks to propose a schedule for the hearing. Id. at *5. After over a year of discovery
delays, including many precipitated by Penn’s disregard for court deadlines, the Court finally set
the hearing for August 20, 2018. Penn Remedies II, 2018 WL 4378444, at *2, *2 n.1. Penn
represented to the Court that he would call three witnesses; he also repeatedly requested
adjournments of the hearing without a valid basis, which the Court denied. Id. at *2. Penn
called Chambers minutes before the hearing was scheduled to begin to inform the Court that he
was ill and would not be attending. He then hung up despite requests by Court staff that he
remain on the line so that the undersigned could be consulted. Id. Follow-up calls from the
Court to Penn went unanswered. Id. Penn’s three witnesses also did not appear at the hearing
suggesting either that the witnesses never planned to appear or that they had advance notice from
Penn that he would not proceed with the hearing on that date. Id. at *2 n.4.
In response to a subsequent order to show cause why default should not be entered
against him in light of his failure to appear at the hearing, Penn filed a two-sentence letter stating
that he had been ill. Id. at 2 (citing Letter, Dkt. 288). The Court scheduled a conference for a
few days later to give Penn an opportunity to provide medical documentation of his sudden
illness and warned him that failure to appear would be grounds for the Court to enter judgment
against him. Id. (citing Endorsement, Dkt. 290). Penn did not appear at the conference
scheduled to address his non-appearance; instead, he filed a letter twenty-five minutes before the
start time stating that he had treated his illness with over-the-counter medication and that he
could not travel to the Court on such short notice. Id. He offered no explanation why the trip
from his apartment in midtown Manhattan to the courthouse in lower Manhattan would require
more than three days to plan. Id.
In light of these shenanigans, the Court concluded that “Penn’s late-in-the-game requests
for an adjournment appear calculated to delay these proceedings as long as possible.” Id. at *2
n.4. While the events surrounding the evidentiary hearing represent an egregious form of his
dilatory actions, such tactics have been ever-present in this litigation. Had Penn adhered to
court-ordered deadlines, this matter would have been resolved years earlier. When “balance[ing]
the interest in finality with the reasons for delay,” PRC Harris, Inc., 700 F.2d at 897, the Court
resoundingly concludes that the interest in finality is paramount. Not only was the judgment
entered almost two years before the alleged intervening change in law, but had Penn respected
court procedure and decorum,12 the time between the judgment and the intervening change in
The fact that Penn is pro se is of no moment. See Penn Remedies II, 2018 WL 4378444, at *3 n.5 (“While
pro se litigants are entitled to substantial latitude, pro se litigants, no more than counselled litigants, are not
law would have been much longer. “Although courts have permitted untimely motions for
reconsideration when there was a compelling reason to ignore the time limit, nothing in this
motion presents such a compelling reason, or any circumstance that may excuse the delay.”
Millennium Partners, L.P. v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, No. 12-CV-7581, 2015 WL 6454844 at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2015) (cleaned up). Accordingly, the Court denies Penn’s Rule 60(b)(6)
motion as untimely.
b. The Entity Defendants Have No Excuse for Their Delay and Their
Rule 60(b)(6) Motion Is an Improper Substitute for an Appeal
The Entity Defendants’ Rule 60(b)(6) motion is also procedurally improper. With
respect to timing, the judgments against the entities were entered on April 30, 2020. Dkts. 339,
340. Liu was announced almost two months later, one week before their time to appeal would
expire. Approximately six weeks later, on August 18, 2020, the Entity Defendants informed this
Court of their intention to file a Rule 60(b) motion. See Letter, Dkt. 363. The Entity Defendants
did not appeal the judgments against them, nor did their apparently recently-retained attorneys
seek an extension of time for them to file a notice of appeal. While the majority of the Entity
Defendants’ memorandum of law in support of their Rule 60(b) motion focuses on the effect of
the Liu decision on the Court’s disgorgement orders, the Entity Defendants also contest the
Court’s decisions finding Penn and the entities liable for the underlying conduct. See Entity
Defs. Rule 60(b) Mem. of Law at 2 n.1, 8–9 (arguing that Penn never admitted his guilt and that
the Court was wrong to impute its findings about Penn to the Entity Defendants); Entity Defs.
permitted to disregard flagrantly Court orders and rules.”) (citing McDonald v. Head Crim. Ct. Supervisor, 850 F.2d
121, 124 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[A]ll litigants, including pro ses, have an obligation to comply with court orders. When
they flout that obligation they, like all litigants, must suffer the consequences of their actions.”)).
Rule 60(b) Reply at 3–4 (same).13 Opposing the SEC’s motion for summary judgment or
appealing the final judgments would have been the proper avenues for raising such arguments.
But the Entity Defendants chose neither option, and a Rule 60(b) motion is not a proper
The Entity Defendants offer the same excuse for both the delay and the failure to appeal:
they were unrepresented. See, e.g., Entity Defs. Rule 60(b) Reply (“Crucially, the Camelot
Entities were unrepresented when the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Liu (November 1,
2019), they were unrepresented when the Court entered summary judgment against them (March
17, 2020), they were unrepresented when the final judgments were entered (April 30, 2020), and
they were unrepresented when the U.S. Supreme Court decided Liu (June 22, 2020)”); see also
id. at 7–9 (repeating that any deficiency should be excused by the entities’ lack of
representation); Entity Defs. Rule 60(b) Mem. of Law at 5, 13–14 (same).
In citing their lack of representation, the Entity Defendants are the corporate equivalent
of the child who, having killed his parents, is begging for mercy because he is an orphan. As
discussed in further detail below, the Entity Defendants were not always unrepresented; Penn
fired their counsel on the day after their opposition to the SEC’s motion for summary judgment
For more than three of the seven years of this protracted litigation, the Entity Defendants
were represented. On June 28, 2016, Edward Rodriguez filed a notice of appearance as counsel
These arguments ignore the Court’s reasoned determinations about Penn’s admissions, see Penn Liability,
225 F. Supp. 3d at 230–38, and the Court’s detailed analysis supporting the imputation of Penn’s liability to the
Entity Defendants, see Entity Defs. Liability & Remedies, 2020 WL 1272285, at *4–5.
Given the heavy reliance the Entity Defendants place on the fact that they were unrepresented when they
should have filed a notice of appeal or made a Rule 60(b)(1) motion, the Court was anticipating some explanation
for why, all of a sudden, they decided to retain counsel. No such explanation appears in the Defendants’ papers,
leading to the inevitable conclusion that this is just one more delaying tactic by Penn.
for the Entity Defendants. Dkt. 143. Four months later, Rodriguez filed a stipulation of
substitution of counsel on behalf of the Entity Defendants (calling themselves the “Penn
Entities”), under which Ian Orr replaced Rodriguez as counsel, “pursuant to the wishes of the
Penn Entities and on consent.” Stip., Dkt. 166 at 1. Although Orr never filed a motion to
withdraw as counsel, the Court later learned that Penn, acting on behalf of his entities, had fired
Orr the day after the Entity Defendants’ response to the SEC’s motion for summary judgment
was due. See Orr Letter, Dkt. 324 at 1 (“[M]y firm’s representation of the Camelot Entities in
this matter was terminated by Mr. Lawrence Penn, the sole member of said entities, on June 5,
2019.”); see also Penn Letter to Orr, Dkt. 326-1 (“As the matter currently evokes strategic,
material and irreconcilable differences, your representation of [the Entity Defendants] is hereby
terminated on June 5, 2019.”).
Penn proceeded to represent his entities on his own, an action which the Court twice
warned Penn was unlawful. In lieu of responding to the pending motion for summary judgment,
on June 6, 2019, Penn filed a motion to disqualify the undersigned on his own behalf and on
behalf of the Entity Defendants. First Motion to Disqualify, Dkt. 318. The Court initially gave
Penn the benefit of the doubt as a pro se party who may not understand that unlicensed
laypersons are prohibited from representing anyone but themselves.15 See Order on Motion to
Disqualify at 4 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1654 and relevant case law). Accordingly, the Court sua
sponte extended the deadline for the Entity Defendants to oppose SEC’s motion for summary
judgment to give Penn more time to arrange for counsel to represent his entities.16 Id. at 5. Even
To the extent that Penn filed the motion to disqualify on his own behalf, the Court denied the motion as
moot or in the alternative, as untimely. See Order on Motion to Disqualify at 3–4.
The Court also ordered Orr, who had not filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the Entity Defendants,
to explain (i) whether he was continuing to represent the entities or whether he was seeking to withdraw; (ii) why he
failed to respond to the SEC’s motion for summary judgment; and (iii) why he allowed Penn, a layperson, to file
papers on behalf of his clients. See Order on Motion to Disqualify at 5.
though Penn had been warned that he could not represent anyone but himself, Penn filed a
response to the SEC’s motion on the entities’ behalf, which the Court struck for violating 28
U.S.C. § 1654 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a). Order, Dkt. 323 at 2–3. The Court
again sua sponte extended the deadline for the Entity Defendants to respond to the motion for
summary judgment, this time to July 22, 2019. Id. Penn continued not to retain counsel for the
entities, and no valid opposition brief was ever filed. See Entity Defs. Liability & Remedies,
2020 WL 1272285, at *1 n.1. In fact, it appears that Penn only retained counsel for his entities
in August 2020, a year after the opposition brief was due and more than three months after the
Court had entered final judgments against the entities. See Notices of Appearance, Dkts. 353,
354. In short, the Entity Defendants’ lack of representation is far from an innocent excuse;
instead, it was a calculated decision by Penn, their sole owner.
Just as the Court did relative to liability, the Court imputes Penn’s lack of diligence vis-àvis this motion to the Entity Defendants. “Where an entity is completely dominated and
controlled by an individual, such that the entity has no autonomous and separate existence, the
entity becomes independently liable for violations . . . committed by the controlling individual.”
Entity Defs. Liability & Remedies, 2020 WL 1272285, at *4 (cleaned up) (collecting cases);
accord id. *4 n.4. As the Court has previously found, Penn completely dominates the Entity
Defendants, a fact which he has conceded on numerous occasions. Id. at *4. Accordingly,
because Penn has proffered no excuse for leaving his entities unrepresented (and the Court is
aware of none), the Court will not credit the Entity Defendants’ contention that their lack of
representation is good cause for them to be relieved of the timing requirements for a Rule 60(b)
motion. In short, the Entity Defendants’ Rule 60(b)(6) motion is denied as untimely and as an
improper attempt to use a Rule 60(b) motion as a substitute for an appeal.
2. The Motions Fail on the Merits
Even if Defendants’ Rule 60(b)(6) motions were procedurally proper, they would fail on
the merits. As the Supreme Court noted, “[i]ntervening developments in the law by themselves
rarely constitute the extraordinary circumstances required for relief under Rule 60(b)(6).”
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 239 (1997). The Second Circuit has not directly considered
what standard applies when a Rule 60(b)(6) motion is filed as a result of an intervening change
of law. But the Second Circuit has said that its power to recall a mandate when faced with an
intervening change of law is analogous to the power conferred on district courts by Rule 60(b).
See Sargent v. Columbia Forest Prod., Inc., 75 F.3d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 1996). Accordingly, the
Court looks for guidance to the Second Circuit’s reasoning in such cases when considering an
analogous Rule 60(b)(6) motion. See also Devino v. Duncan, 215 F. Supp. 2d 414, 417–18
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (applying the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Sargent to a Rule 60(b)(6) motion
made following an intervening change of law). Alongside other factors,17 the Second Circuit
evaluates whether the new law “is beyond any question inconsistent with [its] earlier decision.”
Sargent, 75 F.3d at 90. Because the Court finds that its disgorgement orders are not “beyond any
question” inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Liu, Defendants’ Rule 60(b)(6)
motions would be denied on the merits, if they were timely and otherwise appropriate.
Defendants argue that the Court’s disgorgement orders conflict with Liu in three ways: (i)
Liu requires the Court to deduct legitimate expenses from disgorgement awards; (ii) Liu forbids
The other factors are: “whether the moving party notified the court of a pending case or motion that may
alter the decisional law; whether substantial time had elapsed between the earlier decision and the pending motion;
and whether the equities strongly favor the moving party.” See Devino v. Duncan, 215 F. Supp. 2d 414, 417–18
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (listing the factors identified by the Second Circuit in Sargent). These factors clearly weigh in
favor of denying Defendants’ motions. Neither Penn nor the Entity Defendants informed the Court that Liu was
pending and that it may implicate the Court’s disgorgement orders; Defendants only informed the Court about Liu
after the decision was issued. And for the reasons discussed in Section I(C)(1) of this Opinion, the Court finds that
the time elapsed and the equities weigh against Defendants.
joint and several liability; and (iii) Liu does not allow disgorged funds to be sent to the U.S.
Treasury. Entity Defs. Rule 60(b) Mem. of Law at 5.18 The Court evaluates each contention in
a. The Court’s Disgorgement Orders Do Not Conflict with the
Requirement in Liu to Deduct Legitimate Expenses
In Liu, the Supreme Court grappled with the SEC’s power to seek, and a federal court’s
power to order, disgorgement pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5), a statute which limits the
court’s power to equitable relief. Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1940. The Supreme Court looked to what
has historically constituted equitable relief and held that “a disgorgement award that does not
exceed a wrongdoer’s net profits and is awarded for victims is equitable relief permissible under
§ 78u(d)(5).” Id. With respect to net profits, the Supreme Court further held that to avoid
becoming a punitive sanction, which is not permitted when granting equitable relief, “courts
must deduct legitimate expenses before ordering disgorgement.” Id. at 1950.
Liu involved an offering fraud. The Lius, a married couple, solicited $27 million from
investors purportedly to establish a treatment center for cancer patients. Id. at 1941. The SEC
investigated and found that “only a fraction of the funds were put towards a lease, property
improvements, and a proton-therapy machine for cancer treatment” and that $20 million of the
investors’ money was spent on marketing expenses and salaries, which was far more than what
was permitted by the offering memorandum. Id. The district court “ordered disgorgement equal
to the full amount petitioners had raised from investors, less the $234,899 that remained in the
corporate accounts for the project.” Id. at 1942. But because the Lius had spent some of the
money on expenses that “arguably have value independent of fueling a fraudulent scheme,” id. at
1950, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred by not considering whether the
Penn makes the first two arguments but not the third. See Penn Rule 60(b) Mem. of Law at 2.
disgorgement award should be limited to net profits. The Supreme Court remanded the case for
the district court to reevaluate its disgorgement award in line with the Court’s decision. Id.
From the Supreme Court’s summary of the facts, it appears that the district court was obligated
to determine how much of the $7 million was spent on legitimate expenses, like the lease
payments and medical equipment, and how much of the $20 million was spent on permissible
marketing expenses and salaries. The ultimate outcome will constitute profit less legitimate
expenses, which is the post-Liu formula for determining the amount to be disgorged.
This case does not involve an offering fraud. In this matter, Penn misappropriated
approximately $9.3 million of a total “$123 million of committed capital” in the Fund. See Penn
Turnover Resp., Dkt. 378 at 10; accord SEC Rule 60(b) Resp., Dkt. 390 at 2. Between 2010 and
2013, Penn misappropriated “$9,286,916.65 from the Fund through a series of fictitious invoices
for ‘due diligence.’” Penn Remedies I, 2017 WL 5515855, at *1 (internal citation omitted). The
Court found that the “invoices were from Ssecurion, LLC (“Ssecurion”), a [shell] company set
up by Penn and an accomplice” and that “Ssecurion transferred the lion’s share of the funds to
other entities controlled by Penn,” namely the Entity Defendants. Id. Because “[t]here is no
evidence that Ssecurion provided any legitimate services to the Fund,” the full $9,286,916.65
constitutes ill-gotten gains, which the Court ordered Penn to disgorge, see Penn Remedies II,
2018 WL 4378444, at *7. “To avoid duplicative recovery, the Court [found] CASO
Management and CGI jointly and severally liable with Penn for disgorgement up to their
respective share of the ill-gotten gains,” which was $440,000 for CASO Management and
$8,627,004 for CGI, Entity Defs. Liability & Remedies, 2020 WL 1272285, at *7. See also
Judgments, Dkts. 300, 339, 340.
Penn and the Entity Defendants make different arguments to support their contention that
this Court’s disgorgement awards contradict the Supreme Court’s holding in Liu. Penn argues
that his New York larceny conviction is “illegitimate on its face,” that he “is not an individual
defendant who actually profited,” that “without profits there can be no wrongdoing,” and,
therefore, “[b]ased on the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Liu, disgorgement is not
permissible.” Penn Rule 60(b) Mem. of Law at 15; Penn Rule 60(b) Reply at 1–2. To support
his contention, Penn returns to the arguments he has made throughout this litigation: his larceny
conviction in New York state court is invalid pursuant to People v. Zinke, 556 N.Y.S.2d 11
(1990); that he has been denied a hearing on the merits before New York courts in violation of
his due process rights; that it was unlawful for this Court to rely on his invalid criminal
conviction; that a 2018 affidavit from a member of the Fund’s advisory board shows that it was
impossible for him to have committed larceny; and that the $9.3 million was not misappropriated
because it was part of committed capital designated for investments and expenses in line with the
Fund’s agreements and associated documents. See generally Penn Rule 60(b) Mem. of Law;
Penn Rule 60(b) Reply.
None of these arguments has anything to do with Liu; instead, Penn is attempting to relitigate liability. The Court has already considered Penn’s arguments and properly concluded
that he violated federal securities laws. Liu’s requirement that legitimate expenses be deducted
from disgorgement awards is not relevant to the underlying liability determination, and the Court
refuses to reopen this case to determine yet again that Penn is liable for fraud. “The law of the
case doctrine commands that when a court has ruled on an issue, that decision should generally
be adhered to by that court in subsequent stages in the same case unless cogent and compelling
reasons militate otherwise.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 731 F. App’x 51, 55 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting
Johnson v. Holder, 564 F.3d 95, 99 (2d Cir. 2009)). While an intervening change of law can be
one such compelling reason, see Johnson, 564 F.3d at 99–100, nothing in Liu concerns liability
for fraud, and Penn has provided no cogent or compelling reason to depart from the law of the
The Entity Defendants make a different argument. They claim that the SEC “made no
effort to deduct legitimate expenses from the gross proceeds that were allegedly ill-gotten, as Liu
requires” and that “the SEC has conceded from the very beginning that certain funds were used
for business and overhead expenses.” Entity Defs. Rule 60(b) Mem. of Law at 10–11. The
Entity Defendants are correct that the SEC alleged in the Complaint that Penn and his entities
“engaged in a fraudulent scheme to misappropriate approximately $9.3 million” in order “to
provide additional assets to Penn to spend on his business and personal expenditures.” Compl. ¶
2. The SEC also alleged that, after money was diverted from the Fund, “it was commingled with
management fees” that had been paid to CASO Management and forwarded to CGI, which, in
turn, “used the commingled funds to pay overhead expenses, such as rent and salary.” Id. ¶ 4.
But the Entity Defendants have not shown that the Court’s disgorgement awards were
“beyond any question inconsistent” with Liu’s holding that disgorgement may not exceed a
wrongdoer’s net profits. Sargent, 75 F.3d at 90. First, this Court limited its disgorgement
awards to the amount that was misappropriated; the Court found that the entire $9.3 million was
the result of fraud because there was “no evidence that Ssecurion provided any legitimate
services to the Fund.” Penn Remedies I, 2017 WL 5515855, at *3. This contrasts with the
district court in Liu, whose disgorgement award included amounts that were apparently not
misappropriated but were instead spent on apparently legitimate expenses, such as a lease,
property improvements, and medical equipment. Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1941. Second, Liu
recognizes an exception to the requirement that legitimate expenses be deducted, namely where
the “entire profit of a business or undertaking” results from wrongful activity. Id. at 1945
(internal citation omitted). Although the Supreme Court does not define what constitutes an
“undertaking” in this context, the due diligence scheme must fit into that category. Money is
fungible, so any portion of the misappropriated funds that were subsequently spent on allegedly
legitimate expenses are “merely wrongful gains under another name.” Id. at 1950 (internal
citation omitted). And third, the SEC has far from conceded that such expenses were
legitimate.19 As alleged in the Complaint and admitted by Penn in his Answer, “CGI used the
commingled funds to pay overhead expenses, such as rent and salary, which were not
permissible fund expenses under the [F]und’s governing document.” Compl. ¶ 4; accord Am.
Ans., Dkt. 134 ¶ 4; SEC Rule 60(b) Resp. at 24–25 n.8.20 At best for the Entity Defendants, such
expenses are somewhat analogous to the payments in Liu for marketing expenses and salaries
that went beyond what the offering memorandum permitted; an illegitimate expense that should
not be deducted when calculating the amount of disgorgement.21 SEC Rule 60(b) Resp. at 24–25
The Entity Defendants also point to the Court’s acknowledgement of a discrepancy between the amount
misappropriated by Penn ($9,286,916.65) and the amount of the state court’s restitution order ($8,362,973.89),
which the Court noted is based on the “[state] court’s finding that $1 million of the diverted funds were used for the
benefit of the Fund.” Entity Defs. Rule 60(b) Mem. of Law at 2–3 (citing Penn Remedies I, 2017 WL 5515855, at
*1 n.1). Not only is the state court’s finding not binding on this Court, but the orders at issue are fundamentally
different: the state court ordered restitution pursuant to New York criminal law while this Court ordered
disgorgement pursuant to federal securities laws.
Paragraph 6.7(a) of the Amended and Restated Limited Partnership Agreement of Camelot Acquisition:
Secondary Opportunities, L.P. states that “expenses of the Partnership shall not include the normal operating
expenses of the General Partner and its equity holders (including salaries and benefits provided to employees of the
General Partner or its Affiliates, rent, facilities and supplies expenses, and similar expenses).” See Agreement, Dkt.
391-1, ¶ 6.7(a).
The analogy between this case and Liu does not fit neatly: in Liu, investors were providing funds pursuant
to an offering memorandum that permitted the Lius to make use of the funds for the intended purpose. The Lius
were charged with fraud because they did not use the vast majority of the funds raised for the intended purpose. In
contrast, here, using false invoices, Penn told the Fund that its money was being used to pay a third party that had
provided services to the Fund, even though Penn knew that no such services had ever been provided. Because the
entire relationship between Ssecurion and the Fund was fraudulent, there are no legitimate expenses at issue, even if
the stolen funds were commingled with funds that were then used to pay legitimate expenses.
n.8 (citing Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1941). Given these findings, the Entity Defendants have not met
their burden to demonstrate that the disgorgement awards were beyond question inconsistent
The Entity Defendants further argue that the disgorgement orders violate Liu because the
state court’s restitution order covers most of the same funds as the Court’s disgorgement orders.
Entity Defs. Mem. of Law at 11. But the Court explicitly accounted for this, finding that “Penn
is not required to disgorge amounts that he has already repaid” as part of restitution. Penn
Remedies I, 2017 WL 5515855, at *3; accord id. at *3 n.2 (“It is unclear whether Penn has paid
any restitution to the Fund. To the extent he does so in the future, it is appropriate to offset these
payments against his disgorgement obligation.”). The Entity Defendants claim that this is
insufficient because “nothing in the judgments provides for such an offset.” Entity Defs. Rule
60(b) Reply at 5–6. But the Entity Defendants provide no reason why a Court must explicitly
include such language in the judgment itself when it has already so directed in a binding court
order.22 Moreover, the judgments explicitly provide the Court with enforcement jurisdiction, see
Dkts. 300, 339, 340, providing Defendants with an avenue for recourse in the unlikely event this
were ever to become a real issue.
In Securities & Exchange Commission v. Palmisano, the Second Circuit modified a judgment to “provide
that to the extent that Palmisano pays or has paid restitution as ordered in the criminal judgment, such payments will
offset his disgorgement obligation under the present judgment.” 135 F.3d 860, 864 (2d Cir. 1998). But in that case,
there was no previous court decision stating that any restitution payments would offset the disgorgement award. In
fact, in cases where courts acknowledge that restitution payments will offset disgorgement awards, this language is
often not included in the final judgment. Compare Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 738 F. Supp. 2d
376, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting in a summary judgment opinion that “[t]o the extent that Rittweger has paid or
pays the amount owed in restitution, the amount of his disgorgement obligation may be offset accordingly.”) with
Judgment, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., No. 99-CV-11395, Dkt. 1219 (lacking any reference to
such offsets in the final judgment).
In short, neither Penn nor the Entity Defendants have demonstrated that the disgorgement
awards are inconsistent with Liu’s holding that a disgorgement award may not exceed a
wrongdoer’s net profits.
b. Liu Does Not Prohibit Joint and Several Liability
The Court held CASO Management and CGI jointly and severally liable with Penn for
disgorgement up to their respective share of the ill-gotten gains. Entity Defs. Liability &
Remedies, 2020 WL 1272285, at *7; see also Judgments, Dkts. 339, 340. Defendants argue that
this aspect of the disgorgement awards contradicts Liu, which requires holding defendants liable
for “profits only as have accrued to themselves” and that imposing disgorgement liability “on a
wrongdoer for benefits that accrue to his affiliates” could transform the equitable remedy into a
penalty. Entity Defs. Rule 60(b) Mem. of Law at 7 (citing Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1945). Defendants
further contend that Liu prohibits joint and several liability for that reason. See Entity Defs. Rule
60(b) Mem. of Law at 1, 4–5, 7; Penn Rule 60(b) Mem. of Law at 1, 12.
Defendants’ argument misinterprets Liu. The Supreme Court found that disgorgement
cannot be applied jointly and severally when such a remedy was not available at common law
but that the “common law did . . . permit liability for partners engaged in concerted
wrongdoing.” Liu, 140 S Ct. at 1949. To this Court’s knowledge, no court has agreed with
Defendants’ argument that Liu proscribes joint and several liability in all instances. See, e.g.,
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Curative Biosciences, Inc., No. 18-CV-925, 2020 WL 7345681, at *6
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2020) (holding that Liu permits joint and several liability when defendants
were “partners engaged in concerted wrongdoing”) (quoting Liu 140 S. Ct. at 1949); Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n v. Laura, No. 18-CV-5075, 2020 WL 8772252, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2020)
(same); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Elec. Payment Sols. of Am. Inc., 482 F. Supp. 3d 921, 930 (D.
Ariz. 2020) (same). Accordingly, the mere fact that the Court imposed joint and several liability
does not, standing alone, run afoul of the holding in Liu.
The Entity Defendants further argue that by holding the entities jointly and severally
liable with Penn, the Court has made the “error of not ordering disgorgement only to the extent
that profits accrued to the [Entity] Defendants.” Entity Defs. Rule 60(b) Mem. of Law at 8. To
support this contention, they contest the Court’s underlying liability findings and recycle old
arguments that Penn’s guilty plea and the admissions in his answer have been misconstrued. Id.;
Entity Defs. Rule 60(b) Reply at 3–4. But, as discussed above, the holding in Liu is confined to
the proper scope of disgorgement; it does not concern underlying determinations of wrongdoing.
Penn and the Entity Defendants’ liability is the law of the case, and, like Penn, the Entity
Defendants have provided the Court with no cogent or compelling reason to depart from the law
of the case, particularly given their failure to respond to the motion for summary judgment or to
Additionally, the Entity Defendants claim that the Court never determined the entities’
individual liability and instead simply imputed Penn’s conduct and scienter to the entities. Entity
Defs. Rule 60(b) Mem. of Law at 7. But this argument ignores that Penn and the Defendant
Entities were partners engaged in concerted wrongdoing, the exact scenario in which Liu permits
joint and several liability. Liu, 140 S Ct. at 1949. As this Court found, “Penn completely
dominated the Camelot Entities and that, at least for purposes of the transactions at issue, there is
no distinction between them.” Entity Defs. Liability & Remedies, 2020 WL 1272285 at *4. Penn
and his entities carried out the fraud together, making joint and several liability for disgorgement
Moreover, the entities were not “mere passive recipient[s] of profits,” as the Entity
Defendants contend. Entity Defs. Rule 60(b) Mem. of Law at 8 (quoting Liu, 1940 S. Ct. 1949).
CASO Management “maintained a ledger containing due diligence payments, which the Fund’s
administrator relied on to prepare financial statements.” Entity Defs. Liability & Remedies, 2020
WL 1272285, at *2. Additionally, “CGI helped Penn implement the fraud by allowing Penn to
use CGI newsletters and emails to procure the fraudulent due diligence payments from the
Fund.” Id. at *5. And, more generally, “Penn and his entities all acted egregiously and with a
high degree of scienter — the scheme took substantial planning and involved the coordination of
multiple entities . . . .” Id. at *6. In short, CASO Management and CGI played active roles in
the fraud under the direction and control of their owner Penn.
The Court previously found that the Entity Defendants “benefitted from the scheme, with
CGI and CASO Management receiving, respectively, $8,627,004 and $440,000 of the fraudulent
due diligence payments.” Id. at *4. The Court held each entity jointly and severally liable with
Penn for disgorgement only up to its respective share of the ill-gotten gains. Accordingly, the
Court’s imposition of joint and several disgorgement is not in any way inconsistent with Liu.
c. The SEC Distribution Plan Is Not Inconsistent with Liu
Pursuant to Liu, for disgorgement to constitute permissible equitable relief, the SEC is
generally required “to return a defendant’s gains to wronged investors for their benefit” and that
disgorgement awards “must do more than simply benefit the public at large by virtue of
depriving a wrongdoer of ill-gotten gains.” Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1948. But the Supreme Court also
noted that an open question remains as to whether the SEC is permitted to deposit disgorgement
funds with the Treasury when it is infeasible to distribute such funds to investors. Id. In this
case, the judgments all contain the same language with respect to distribution of disgorgement.
The judgments state:
The Commission shall hold the funds (collectively, the “Fund”) and may
propose a plan to distribute the Fund subject to the Court’s approval. The
Court shall retain jurisdiction over the administration of any distribution of
the Fund. If the Commission staff determines that the Fund will not be
distributed, the Commission shall send the funds paid pursuant to this Final
Judgment to the United States Treasury.
Judgments, Dkt. 300 at 5; Dkt. 339 at 4; Dkt. 440 at 5. The Court agrees with the Entity
Defendants that, read in isolation, this text permits “the SEC, in its discretion, to send any
disgorged funds to the U.S. Treasury if the SEC does not distribute them to investors . . . .”
Entity Defs. Rule 60(b) Mem. of Law at 12. But the SEC has clarified that the money it collects
— if the Court grants its turnover motion — will be distributed to investors. SEC Rule 60(b)
Resp. at 28; see also SEC Turnover Mem. of Law, Dkt. 351 at 11–12. The SEC further
committed to conducting a feasibility analysis were it to collect additional money; if it
determines that distribution to investors is infeasible, it will update the Court so that the
undersigned can decide whether directing such proceeds to the Treasury is permissible. SEC
Rule 60(b) Resp. at 28–29. The Court agrees with the SEC’s sensible approach and finds it
consistent with Liu.
The Entity Defendants argue that this is insufficient, noting that nothing in the judgments
requires the SEC to inform the Court if distribution to investors is ever infeasible. Entity Defs.
Rule 60(b) Reply at 6. But the Entity Defendants cite no caselaw that would require such
language to be in the judgments themselves. The Court agrees with other district courts which,
post-Liu, have relied on SEC commitments without requiring that such plans be detailed in the
respective judgments. Compare Curative Biosciences, Inc., 2020 WL 7345681, at *6
(highlighting with approval the SEC’s assertion in a supplemental brief that it plans to distribute
the funds to investors) with Judgment, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Curative Biosciences, Inc., No.
18-CV-925, Dkt. 178 at 5 (stating only that the “SEC may propose a plan to distribute the Fund
subject to the Court’s approval”); compare Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Mizrahi, No. 19-CV-2284,
2020 WL 6114913, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2020) (analyzing the SEC plan, as stated in its
memorandum of law, to return disgorged funds to the defendant’s investors) with Final
Judgment, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Mizrahi, No. 19-CV-2284, Dkt. 77 at 3–4 (stating that the
SEC “may propose a plan to distribute the Fund subject to the Court’s approval” and that “[i]f
the Commission staff determines that the Fund will not be distributed, the Commission shall
send the funds paid pursuant to this Final Judgment to the United States Treasury.”). The SEC
has already committed to distributing collected funds to investors and to informing the Court if
that becomes infeasible. The SEC’s plan does not conflict with anything in the judgments, and
the Court retains enforcement jurisdiction for exactly these types of issues. Accordingly, this
portion of the judgment is also not inconsistent with Liu.23
To summarize, the Entity Defendants’ motion was improperly filed pursuant to Rule
60(b)(6). When properly considered as a Rule 60(b)(1) motion, it must be denied as untimely.
Considering the Entity Defendants and Penns’ motions pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), they are
procedurally improper, because Penn’s behavior in this litigation demonstrates that he and his
entities are at fault for the many delays and for the Entity Defendants’ failure to appeal. In all
events, even if considered on the merits, the motions are without merit.
The Entity Defendants also argue that “it would be inequitable to permit the SEC to collect disgorgement
from the [Entity Defendants] when a civil penalty already has been imposed against both Penn and the [Entity
Defendants], because the SEC may use any civil penalties collected to benefit investors through a Fair Fund.”
Entity Defs. Rule 60(b) Mem. of Law at 12. Liu is limited to interpreting the scope of disgorgement permissible
under 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5); it does not have any impact on civil penalties ordered pursuant to other statutory
provisions. Because nothing in Liu disturbs the Court’s power to order civil penalties, or the SEC’s authority to set
up a Fair Fund. This is just another attempt by the Entity Defendants to use a Rule 60(b) motion to substitute for an
appeal. For that reason, the Court declines to consider this argument.
SEC’s Turnover Motion
The SEC has separately moved for orders directing certain financial institutions to turn
over funds held in accounts that were frozen to satisfy in part the three judgments. Dkt. 350 at 1.
Pursuant to the final judgments against them, Defendants owe the following amounts:
Interest on the
*CASO Management and CGI’s disgorgement is owed jointly and severally with Penn
To satisfy partially these judgments, the SEC has moved the Court to order four financial
institutions to turn over a combined total of $177,615.15, which is the sum that was frozen
pursuant to preliminary injunctions and subsequent orders. See Willenken Decl., Dkt. 352, ¶¶ 6,
7, 9, 16, 20, 25; Prelim. Injunctions, Dkts. 56, 58; Judgment, Dkt. 300 at 6 (extending the
freeze); Entity Defs. Liability & Remedies, 2020 WL 1272285, at *8 (same). These funds are
held in bank accounts belonging to the three Defendants and to three non-parties: CASO GP,
CASO Co-Invest, and CASO Offshore. The breakdown of the frozen funds by account holder is
In its memorandum of law, the SEC clarified that the amount of pre-judgment interest in Penn’s judgment
(Dkt. 300) is approximately $1,000 too high because, when calculating interest, the SEC failed to account for the
fact that pre-judgment interest does not accrue on funds from the time they are frozen. SEC Turnover Mem. of Law,
Dkt. 351 at 3 n.1. The SEC must re-calculate the amount of pre-judgment interest and file a proposed corrected
judgment with the Court.
Amount Held in
Defendants and two of the non-party entities, CASO GP and CASO Co-Invest (collectively, the
“Non-Party Entities”), object to the SEC’s motion. See Penn Turnover Resp., Dkt. 375; Entities
Turnover Resp., Dkt. 375.
A. Legal Standard
District courts have “broad equitable power to fashion ancillary relief” when their
jurisdiction has been invoked pursuant to the “sweeping mandate manifest in the securities
laws.” Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Smith, 653 F.3d 121, 129 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028, 1041 (2d Cir. 1990) and Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v.
Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 1984)). The Court has “the authority to grant the full
panoply of equitable remedies so that the [SEC] can obtain complete relief.” Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n v. Martino, 255 F. Supp. 2d 268, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (internal citations omitted).
Such equitable power includes the authority to order the turnover of assets to be used to satisfy
judgments in such cases. Id. at 289.
The Willenken Declaration appears to have a typographical error. Ms. Willenken reports that CASO
Offshore has $3,375 remaining in the account. Willenken Decl., Dkt. 352 ¶ 25. But the email from a bank
representative that she references to support that claim states that there is $3,327.27 in the account, as does the
SEC’s memorandum of law. See First Republic Bank Email, Dkt. 352-3 (listing $3,327.27 in the account ending
with 9380); SEC Turnover Mem. of Law at 4 (listing $3,327).
B. The Court Grants the SEC’s Turnover Motion with Respect to Defendants
Penn objects to the SEC’s motion to turn over the funds in his bank accounts. See Penn
Turnover Resp., Dkt. 375. But Penn’s objections simply rehash his claims of innocence. Penn
Turnover Resp. at 4, 6–8, 11–12. He also argues that the Court’s disgorgement award violates
the Supreme Court’s Liu decision. Id. at 2–4, 6–10.26 Because Penn’s underlying liability is law
of the case and because the Court’s disgorgement award does not contravene Liu, the Court
overrules Penn’s objections. See Section I(C)(2)(a) of this Opinion, supra.
The Entity Defendants do not object to the turnover orders; their only request was that the
Court decide the turnover motion after briefing on the Rule 60(b) motion was complete. Entities
Turnover Resp., Dkt. 375. at 9–10.27 Briefing on the Rule 60(b) motion has long been complete
and, accordingly, this request is moot.
The time has come for Defendants to start paying the valid judgments that have been
entered against them. Accordingly, the SEC’s turnover motion with respect to the Defendants is
C. The Court Grants the SEC’s Turnover Motion with Respect to the Non-Party
“Federal courts may order equitable relief against a person who is not accused of
wrongdoing in a securities enforcement action where that person: (1) has received ill-gotten
funds; and (2) does not have a legitimate claim to those funds.” Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v.
Cavanagh, 155 F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Rosenthal, 426 F.
Penn also argues that he is not the alter ego of the Entity Defendants or of the Non-Party Entities. Penn
Turnover Resp., Dkt. 375 at 13–14. With respect to the Entity Defendants, this argument is irrelevant as the Entity
Defendants’ liability is the law of the case, and that finding will not be re-opened. With respect to the Non-Party
Entities, the Court need not consider this argument because the Court does not rely on a finding of alter ego to
determine that those entities must turn over the funds at issue to the SEC.
The Entity Defendants and the Non-Party Entities filed a joint brief in opposition to the SEC’s turnover
motion. Dkt. 375. The Court refers to this joint brief as the “Entities Turnover Response.”
App’x 1, 3 (2d Cir. 2011) (applying the Cavanagh test); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Boock, No. 09CV-8261, 2013 WL 4828571, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2013) (same).
1. CASO Offshore
Bank records show that the $3,327.27 in the CASO Offshore28 account is ill-gotten funds
because it is the remainder of a $10,000 wire transfer from Defendant CGI. SEC Turnover
Mem. of Law at 7. CASO Offshore transferred $5,000 back to CGI and $1,250 to an unnamed
individual. Id. Beyond bank fees, there were no other transactions in the account. Id. Because
the money came directly from CGI while the Ssecurion fraud was on-going, and CGI was a
recipient of ill-gotten funds from Ssecurion, the Court finds that the sums in the account are illgotten funds. Moreover, CASO Offshore is aware that it has the right to oppose the SEC’s
motion, and it decided that it would not oppose. Healy Decl., Dkt. 359 ¶¶ 5–6. CASO
Offshore’s lack of opposition can be construed as an admission that it does not have a legitimate
claim to those funds. Accordingly, the Court grants the SEC’s turnover motion with respect to
2. CASO GP
Bank records show that the $3,255 in the CASO GP account is ill-gotten funds because it
is also the remainder of a $10,000 wire transfer from Defendant CGI. SEC Turnover Mem. of
Law at 5–6. CASO GP argues that the SEC made no effort to trace the assets to funds that were
allegedly misappropriated. Entities Turnover Resp. at 9. But “[t]he SEC is not required to trace
specific funds to their ultimate recipients in such a situation.” Rosenthal, 426 F. App’x at 3. The
Second Circuit explained that “[i]mposing such a tracing requirement would allow [a] defendant
The SEC explains, without contradiction from the Defendants, that according to documents provided by
Defendant CASO Management, CASO Offshore was used as a vehicle to pool capital so it could then be invested in
the master Fund. SEC Turnover Mem. of Law at 6.
to escape disgorgement by spending down illicit gains while protecting legitimately obtained
assets or, as was the case here, by commingling and transferring such profits.” Id. Accordingly,
the Court finds that the money remaining in CASO GP’s account was ill-gotten because it was
transferred from CGI while the Ssercurion scheme was on-going.
The Second Circuit has “not developed explicit guidelines for what qualifies as a
‘legitimate claim.’” Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Walsh, 618 F.3d 218, 226 (2d Cir.
2010).29 But even without such guidance, the Court finds, based on the evidence in the record,
that CASO GP does not have a legitimate claim to those funds. Penn admitted that CASO GP
“made all the decisions and had the right to pay consultants, finders, and those who added value
like Mr. Ewers.” Am. Ans. at 22. (Mr. Ewers was the managing partner of Ssecurion, the shell
corporation that generated fraudulent invoices for the phony due diligence services that are at the
core of this case. Compl. ¶ 31.) CASO GP is part of the Camelot Group, which also includes
the two Entity Defendants. As Penn explained, he “was the [f]ounder and approximately 99%
owner” of CGI, CASO Management, and CASO GP. Am. Ans. at 24. Penn used a Camelot
group signature and email address to perpetrate the fraud. Entity Defs. Liability & Remedies,
2020 WL 1272285, at *2.
There is no evidence that CGI received any consideration for the funds it transferred to
CASO GP. The Second Circuit has found that “the receipt of property as a gift, without the
payment of consideration, does not create a ‘legitimate claim’ sufficient to immunize the
property from disgorgement.” Walsh, 618 F.3d at 226 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Cavanagh, 155 F.3d
at 137). The only activity in the CASO GP account was the initial wire transfer of $10,000 from
The Entity Defendants argue that the SEC failed to establish that CASO GP is the alter ego of CGI or Penn.
Entities Turnover Resp. Dkt. 375, at 4–8. But the Court does not rely on a finding of alter ego to determine that the
entities must turn over the funds at issue to the SEC, and neither party argues that such a finding is required.
CGI, the transfer of $5,000 back to CGI, the transfer of $1,250 to an unnamed individual, and
bank fees. SEC Turnover Mem. of Law at 5–6 (citing bank records). The lack of business
activity suggests that CGI received no consideration for the amount remaining in the account.
CASO GP argues that the lack of business activity should carry little weight, because the account
has been frozen since January 2014. Entities Turnover Resp. at 6. But the bank records reveal
that there was no activity in the account (other than bank fees) between November 2012 and the
freeze in January 2014. SEC Turnover Reply, Dkt. 380 at 7. Accordingly, the Court finds that
CGI received no consideration for the money transferred to CASO GP, demonstrating that
CASO GP does not have a legitimate claim to the funds.
Because CASO GP has received ill-gotten funds to which it lacks a legitimate claim, the
Court grants the SEC’s turnover motion with respect to CASO GP.
3. CASO Co-Invest
The remaining $3,200 in the CASO Co-Invest account is also ill-gotten funds. As with
the other entities, these funds constitute the remaining portion of an initial wire transfer of
$10,000 from CGI made during the fraud scheme. SEC Turnover Mem. of Law at 6. As with
the other accounts, $5,000 was transferred back to CGI, $1,250 was transferred to an unnamed
individual, and the remaining deductions were for various bank fees. Id. In addition to these
transfers, the account also received $1.79 million from investors, which was transferred out of
the account to purchase shares of Fisker Automotive in what appears to be a legitimate
transaction prior to the freeze order. Id.; SEC Turnover Reply at 4–5. Because the SEC is under
no obligation to trace the money and given the apparent commingling of legitimate and
illegitimate funds, the Court concludes that the remaining $3,200 constitutes ill-gotten gains.
The Court also finds that CASO Co-Invest has no legitimate claim to the funds. CASO
Co-Invest is a private fund that “co-invested” with the Fund in one issuer, Fisker Automotive.
SEC Turnover Mem. of Law at 6; Annex C, CASO Co-Invest Subscription Agreement, Dkt.
352-13 at 9 (“[CASO Co-Invest] will invest all of its available assets in one company, Fisker
Holdings, Inc. . . .”); see also Am. Ans. at 4 (describing CASO Co-Invest’s role amongst the
various entities). CASO Co-Invest does not dispute that Fisker Automotive has filed for
bankruptcy. See SEC Turnover Reply at 3 n.2. All of the evidence presented demonstrates,
without refutation from Defendants, that the funds were a gift from CGI, given without
consideration. As recipients of such gifts do not have legitimate claims to ill-gotten funds,
Walsh, 618 F.3d at 226 (2d Cir. 2010), CASO Co-Invest is ordered to turn over the funds to the
In short, because CASO Co-Invest received ill-gotten funds from CGI and because it
lacks any legitimate claim to those funds, the Court grants the SEC’s turnover motion with
respect to CASO Co-Invest.
D. The Court Grants the SEC’s Request to Lift the Freeze on Accounts with Zero
or Negative Balances and to Lift the Freeze on a Safe Deposit Box
The SEC also moves the Court to lift the freeze with respect to bank accounts that were
included in the Court’s temporary restraining order and preliminary injunctions, Dkts. 2, 56, 58,
but that turned out to have zero or negative balances. SEC Turnover Mem. of Law at 7, 12.
Additionally, the SEC seeks to lift the freeze on the contents of a CGI safe deposit box that, after
inspection, appear to have no monetary value. Id. at 7; Willenken Decl. ¶ 7. Entity Defendants
do not oppose this request, see Entities Turnover Resp. at 3 n.3, and Penn does not provide his
view on the matter. Without any reason to maintain a freeze on accounts or items with no value,
the Court grants the SEC’s motion.
Dismissal of Count VI of the Complaint
The SEC also moves to dismiss Count VI of the Complaint, which alleges that Penn and
CASO Management violated Section 207 of the Advisers Act by “willfully [making] untrue
statements of material facts in registration applications filed with the Commission, and willfully
[omitting] to report material facts, which are required to be stated therein.” Compl. ¶ 77; accord
id. ¶¶ 76, 78. This is the only claim for relief in the Complaint that was not resolved through
settlement or summary judgment. Defendants do not oppose SEC’s motion. Accordingly,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), the Court deems the Complaint amended to
exclude Count VI, and dismisses that claim with prejudice.
For the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ Rule 60(b) motions are DENIED, the
SEC’s turnover motion is GRANTED, the SEC’s request to lift the freeze on certain accounts
and on the contents of a safe deposit box is GRANTED, and the SEC’s request to amend the
Complaint to exclude Count VI is GRANTED. The Court will direct the financial institutions to
turn over the funds and will direct the relevant non-parties to release the asset freeze on certain
accounts by separate orders.
By no later than Friday, April 9, 2021, the SEC must file a proposed amended judgment
as to Penn that includes the correct amount of pre-judgment interest owed.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the open motions at docket entries
350, 381, and 384.
Date: March 31, 2021
New York, NY
United States District Judge
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