Satterfield v. Maldonado et al

Filing 91

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 82 Motion in Limine. For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's motion in limine (Docket No. 82) is granted. (As further set forth in this Order.) (Signed by Magistrate Judge James C. Francis on 3/10/2016) Copies Sent By Chambers. (adc) Modified on 3/10/2016 (adc).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUT!lERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
14 Civ.

0627

(JCF)

14 Civ.

KENNETH SATTERFIELD,

3374

(,JCF)

Plaintiff,
against JESUS M. MALDONADO and LINDEN
YELLOW CAB INC.,
Defendants.
PAUL VANEDEN,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

- against LINDEN YELLOW CAB,
M. MALDONADO,

INC. and JESUS

Defendants.
JAMES C. FRANCIS IV
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
In

this

accjdent,
limine

plaintiff

seeking

following:
petit

personal

(1)

to

injury

Kenneth

action

Satterfield 1

preclude

evidence of Mr.

has

presentation

an

filed

during

automobile
a

motion

trial

of

in
the

Satterfield' s 2012 conviction for

larceny in violation of New York

evidence of Mr.

concerning

Penal Law §

155.25;

(2)

Satterfield's 1985 conviction for manslaughter in

violation of New York Penal Law§ 125.20; and (3) Mr. Satterfield's
driving abstract and record expansion.

The motion is granted.

A motion in limine allows the trial court "to rule in advance

On August 31, 2015, I granted summary judgment for the
defendants as to plaintiff Paul Vaneden's claims.
Satterfield v.
Maldanado,
F. Supp. 3d
, 2015 WL 5098103, at *16 (S.D.N.Y.
:2015).
1

of trial on the admissibility and relevance of certain forecasted
evidence.”
(E.D.N.Y.

Banushi v. Palmer, No. 08 CV 2937, 2011 WL 13894, at *1
Jan.

4,

2011).

Like

most

questions

about

the

admissibility of evidence, the decision whether to grant a motion
in limine is entrusted to the discretion of the trial court.

See,

e.g., Thomas v. O’Brien, 539 F. App’x 21, 21-22 (2d Cir. 2013).
However,

evidence

should

be

excluded

only

when

there

is

no

possibility that it will be admissible at trial, and even then, the
court’s ruling “is ‘subject to change when the case unfolds,
particularly
[expected.]’”

if

the

actual

[evidence]

differs

from

what

was

Banushi, 2011 WL 13894, at *1 (second alteration in

original) (quoting Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 (1984)).
Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence addresses the
admissibility of evidence of a criminal conviction for the purpose
of attacking a witness’ character for truthfulness.

The rule

requires admission of such evidence if “establishing the elements
of the crime required proving -- or the witness’s admitting -- a
dishonest act or false statement.”

Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2).

Mr.

Satterfield served as the get-away driver in a shoplifting incident
and was convicted of petit larceny, for which he was sentenced to
a term of less than one year in prison.

“With respect to

convictions for larceny, [the Second Circuit] ha[s] held that
‘[courts] will look beyond the elements of the offense to determine
whether the conviction rested upon facts establishing dishonesty or
false statement.’” United States v. Estrada, 430 F.3d 606, 614 (2d
Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Payton, 159 F.3d 49, 57 (2d
2

Cir.

1998)).

A

conviction

for

shoplifting,

even

where

the

convicted person “take[s] elusive action to avoid detection,” does
not generally “involve falsity or deceit such as to fall within the
ambit of Rule 609(a)(2).”

Id.

The defendants’ argument that a

shoplifting conviction necessarily “involves a dishonest act as it
involves an element of deceit or untruthfulness” (Memorandum of Law
in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine (“Def. Memo.”) at 2)
flies in the face of Second Circuit precedent and, indeed, would
likely require admission of evidence of almost any conviction. See
Estrada, 430 F.3d at 614 (“While much successful crime involves
some quantum of stealth, all such conduct does not, as a result,
constitute crime of dishonesty or false statement for the purpose
of Rule 609(a)(2).”).
Although Rule 609(a)(2) does not require admission of the
conviction, it still may be admitted under Rule 403 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 609, advisory committee’s note to
1990 amendments (“The amendment reflects the view that it is
desirable to protect all litigants from the unfair use of prior
convictions, and that the ordinary balancing test of Rule 403,
which provides that evidence shall not be excluded unless its
prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value, is
appropriate for assessing the admissibility of prior convictions
for impeachment of any witness other than a criminal defendant.”).
Determination of whether the probative value of such evidence “is
substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting
3

time, or needlessly presentating cumulative evidence,” Fed. R.
Evid. 403, is “left to the sound discretion of the district court.”
Estrada, 430 F.3d at 620-21.

Typically, courts look to such

factors as the impeachment value of the crime, its remoteness in
time, the similarity between the crime and the conduct at issue,
and the importance of the credibility of the witness.

Celestin v.

Premo, No. 9:12-CV-301, 2015 WL 5089687, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 27,
2015). Here, the impeachment value of the crime is minor and the
conviction is years old. Moreover, there is a danger that the jury
will interpret the conviction, which involves Mr. Satterfield
functioning as a get-away driver, as indicating a predilection for
unsafe or reckless driving.

Therefore, although Mr. Satterfield’s

credibility will likely be an important part of the case, I find
the danger of prejudice significantly outweighs the probative value
of evidence of the conviction, and the evidence is precluded.
As to the manslaughter conviction, Rule 609(b) “applies if
more than 10 years have passed since the witness’s conviction or
release from confinement for it, whichever is later.”
Evid. 609(b).

Fed. R.

Such evidence is excluded unless “its probative

value, supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially
outweighs its prejudicial effect.” Fed. R. Evid. 609(b)(1). Here,
Mr. Satterfield was released from his term of imprisonment for the
crime in March 1988.

Inmate Information for Kenneth Satterfield,

New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision,
http://nysdoccslookup.doccs.ny.gov/kinqw00 (last visited March 9,

4

2016).2

The defendants have presented no “specific facts and

circumstances”

to

show

that

the

conviction’s

substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.

probative

value

Instead, they

argue that they should be able to use evidence of the conviction to
undercut the “implication that his lack of employment since the
subject accident is solely related to the accident.”
at 4).

(Def. Memo.

However, as the defendants admit, Mr. Satterfield has not

claimed lost earnings in this action (Def. Memo. at 4), so I am at
a loss to understand how this supposed “implication” is at all
relevant.

Moreover, the defendants’ notion that Mr. Satterfield’s

felony conviction contributed to his failure to secure employment
is not supported by any evidence, but appears to be based merely on
the impression that “if one is a felon, employers may determine not
to hire a prospective employee solely on that basis.”
at 4).

(Def. Memo.

Evidence of Ms. Satterfield’s manslaughter conviction is

precluded.
Finally, the plaintiff asks that evidence of Mr. Satterfield’s
driving record be precluded. Evidence of a litigant’s past driving
record is “inadmissible . . . to prove character or propensity for
negligent driving.” Williams v. Boulevard Lines, Inc., No. 10 Civ.
2924, 2013 WL 5652589, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2013).

The

defendants seek to present the abstract of Mr. Satterfield’s
driving record and a notice of the suspension of his license for

2

The plaintiff indicates that Mr. Saterfield served four
years in prison and was released in approximately 1989. (Motion in
Limine at 7-8). That appears to be a misstatement, but, in any
case, it has no bearing on the analysis here.
5

impeachment purposes, noting that at his deposition, the plaintiff
testified,

apparently

falsely,

that

standing at the time of the accident.
the

defendants

would

like

to

his

license

was

(Def. Memo. at 5).

present

extrinsic

of

the

Federal

Rules

of

Evidence,

this

good

That is,

evidence

establish that Mr. Satterfield lied at his deposition.
608(b)

in

to

Under Rule

evidence

is

inadmissible to the extent that it is intended to show that Mr.
Satterfield has a penchant for untruthfulness.

Fed. R. Evid.

608(b) (“Except for a criminal conviction under Rule 609, extrinsic
evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a
witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s
character for truthfulness.”); United States v. James, 609 F.2d 36,
46 (2d Cir. 1979) (“[Rule 608(b) is] intended to regulate only the
use of specific instances of conduct to prove that the witness is
a ‘bad person’ or is a generally untruthful person who should not
be believed.”).

Moreover, the fact that Mr. Satterfield’s license

was suspended due to a failure to pay a traffic ticket is not
relevant to any substantive issue in this case.

See Jones v.

Poole, No. 05-CV-0886, 2010 WL 1949599, at *29 n.9 (W.D.N.Y. May
13, 2010) (“The trial court properly determined that evidence of
Petitioner’s license suspension was irrelevant to the issue of
whether he recklessly operated his motor vehicle on [the date of
the relevant incident].”); White v. Molinari, 160 A.D.2d 302, 303,
553 N.Y.S.2d 396, 397 (1st Dep’t 1990) (“[T]he license suspension
was clearly irrelevant to the issues of negligence and proximate
cause . . . .”); cf. People v. Caban, 14 N.Y.3d 369, 374-75, 901
6

N.Y.S.2d
license

566,

568-69

suspension

in

(2010)

(allowing

crimir1al

case

admission
where

of

evidence

suspension

conduct similar to that of which defendant accused).

based

of
on

Therefore,

extrinsic evidence offered for impeachment on this collateral issue
may also be excluded.
(2d Cir.

1998)

United States v. Purdy, 144 F.3d 241, 245-46

("Extrinsic evidence offered for impeachment on a

collateral issue is properly excluded.n); Calderon v. Keane, No. 97
Civ. 2116, 2002 V.11 1205745, at *12

state,

as well as federal law,

(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2002)

'extrinsic evidence cannot be used

to impeach a witness on a collateral issue.'"
Donnelly,

111 F.

Supp.

?d 239,

("Under

249

(W.D.N. Y.

(quoting Dawson v.
2000))),

report and

recorrmendation adopted, 2003 WL 22097504 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2003).
Evidence of Mr.

Satterfield's driving record,

that his license has been suspended,

including evidence

is precluded.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons,
(Docket No.

82)

the plaintiff's motion in limine

is granted.
SO ORDERED.

JAMES C. FRANCIS TV
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dated:

New York, New York
March 10, 201 6

7

Copies transmitted this date to:
Nicholas Warywoda, Esq.
Parker Waichman LLP
6 Harbor Park Dr.
Port Washington, NY 11050
Howard B. Schnitzer, Esq.
Kaf ko Schnitzer, LLP
7 Hugh J. Grant Circle
Bronx, NY 10462
Lindsay J. Kalick, Esq.
Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP
1133 Westchester Ave.
White Plains, NY 10604
Eugene T. Boule, Esq.
Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP
150 E. 42nd St.
New York, NY 10017

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