Calderon v. The City of New York et al

Filing 58

OPINION & ORDER: For the foregoing reasons, Calderon's motion for reconsideration is granted. The City of New York is reinstated as a defendant to the state-law claim of false arrest. The Clerk is directed to terminate the motion pending at Dkt. 53. The parties are directed to file a joint letter with the Court by November 2, 2015 proposing next steps in this litigation. (As further set forth in this Order) (Signed by Judge Paul A. Engelmayer on 10/19/2015) (kl)

October 13, 2015, defendants filed a brief in opposition. Dkt. 56 (“Def. Br.”). Later that day,
despite the Court’s instruction that it did not invite a reply brief, see Dkt. 55, Calderon filed a
short reply. Dkt. 57.
The Court grants the motion for reconsideration, and holds that Calderon adequately pled
her claim of false arrest under state law against the City. The Court therefore reinstates the City
as a defendant as to that claim.
I.

Background
The Court assumes familiarity with the October 5 Decision, including its summary of the

TAC. Relevant here, as to the state-law false arrest claim, the TAC first “repeats, reiterates, and
re-alleges each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs.” TAC ¶ 98. Among
these were the allegations that South and Sosa were employed by the City, specifically by the
New York City Police Department (“NYPD”), and were acting within the scope of employment
when they engaged in allegedly unlawful conduct. See id. ¶¶ 10–12, 14–16, 19. In that claim,
the TAC also speaks generally of “defendants,” without specifying South, Sosa, the City, or the
Doe defendants. See id. ¶¶ 99–100. Finally, in its prayer for relief on that claim, the TAC states:
“[P]laintiff is entitled to compensatory damages, in an amount of not less than $1,000,000.00, as
well as punitive damages against defendant, SOUTH, and the JOHN/JANE DOE defendants.”
Id. ¶ 102. Identical language appears in the section of the TAC setting out allegations underlying
the federal claim of false arrest, as to which vicarious municipal liability is not available. See id.
¶ 85.
II.

Legal Standards on a Motion for Reconsideration
The standard governing motions for reconsideration “is strict, and reconsideration will

generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the

court overlooked.” Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir.
2012) (citation omitted); see also S.D.N.Y Local Rule 6.3 (requiring the movant to “set[] forth
concisely the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked”).
Such a motion is “neither an occasion for repeating old arguments previously rejected nor an
opportunity for making new arguments that could have been previously advanced.” Associated
Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 395 F. Supp. 2d 17, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); see also Goonan v. Fed.
Reserve Bank of N.Y., No. 12 Civ. 3859 (JPO), 2013 WL 1386933, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2013)
(“Simply put, courts do not tolerate such efforts to obtain a second bite at the apple.”). Rather,
reconsideration is appropriate “only when the [moving party] identifies an intervening change of
controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent
manifest injustice.” Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable Tr., 729 F.3d
99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
III.

Discussion
The motion for reconsideration requires the Court to address two questions: Should the

state-law false arrest claim in the TAC be construed to name the City, as opposed to only the
individual defendants, as a defendant? And, if so, does that claim state a claim against the City?
As to the first question, defendants argue that the TAC allegations recounted above
“cannot possibly be read as being against the City.” Def. Br. 2. They argue that the TAC’s
“esoteric reference to a vicarious liability claim” does not sufficiently plead a cause of action
against the City. Id. at 3.
Defendants have a point: the TAC is hardly a model of clarity. In particular, the prayer
for relief—“plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages . . . as well as punitive damages against
defendant, SOUTH, and the JOHN/JANE DOE defendants,” see TAC ¶ 102—could be read as

praying for damages from South and the Doe defendants only. And, regrettably, Calderon’s
briefs in opposing defendants’ successive motions to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint
and now the TAC did not clarify that Calderon viewed the operative complaint as bringing statelaw, as well as § 1983, claims against the City.
Nevertheless, having now been alerted to that issue, the Court holds that the TAC does
bring a state-law claim of false arrest against the City. Although the TAC does not use the
phrase “vicarious liability,” it includes various allegations that are relevant only to such a claim,
for example, that South and Sosa were city employees whose actions were within the scope of
their employment. See, e.g., TAC ¶¶ 10–12, 14–16, 19. The TAC’s use of the overarching term
“defendants” in that cause of action, as opposed to specifying “the individual defendants” or
naming particular defendants, is also consistent with an intent to bring this claim against the
City. See id. ¶¶ 99–100. And the prayer for relief, fairly read, seeks “compensatory damages”
from all defendants, but punitive damages from only South and the Doe defendants. The
alternative reading, under which damages of any sort would be sought solely from South and the
Doe defendants, would exclude any claim for damages against Sosa, which is clearly
inconsistent with the balance of the TAC. Therefore, although the TAC should have been more
explicit on this point, it is ultimately apparent that the TAC pursues compensatory damages from
the City under a theory of respondeat superior on the state-law false arrest claim.
As to the second question, the state-law false arrest claim against the City states a claim,
and therefore should not be dismissed. Although vicarious liability is unavailable against
government defendants under § 1983, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009), under
New York law a municipality may be held vicariously liable for the torts of its employees. See
Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 95 n.21 (2d Cir. 2007); Collins v. City of New York,

923 F. Supp. 2d 462, 480 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Greenfield v. City of New York, No. 99 Civ. 2330
(AJP), 2000 WL 124992, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2000). And the City may be vicariously liable
for the torts of NYPD officers acting within the scope of their employment. See, e.g., Jenkins,
478 F.3d at 95 n.21; Corson v. City of New York, 736 N.Y.S.2d 71, 73 (2d Dep’t 2002).
Defendants argue that when a plaintiff “has alternate claims available both at common
law and under a federal statute such as Section 1983, her state constitutional tort claim is
precluded.” Def. Br. 2. But Calderon has not brought a constitutional tort claim. Rather, as a
case defendants cite makes clear, the false-arrest cause of action is a common-law one. See
Biswas v. City of New York, 973 F. Supp. 2d 504, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting that “plaintiff has
a remedy at common law for false arrest/false imprisonment”) (emphasis added); see also
Broughton v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 456 (1975) (“The action for false imprisonment is derived
from the ancient common-law action of trespass . . . .”). Although underlying legal concepts like
probable cause and reasonableness are relevant to both constitutional-tort claims and commonlaw claims like false arrest, and although such claims can arise from the same facts, these two
areas of law are distinct. See, e.g., Lyles v. State, 770 N.Y.S.2d 81, 82 (2d Dep’t 2003)
(dismissing constitutional-tort claims for unreasonable search and seizure under U.S. and New
York Constitutions “because the alleged wrongs could have been redressed by an alternative
remedy, namely, timely interposed common-law tort claims for [inter alia] . . . false
imprisonment”). Contrary to defendants’ argument, common-law claims like false arrest may be
brought against municipal as well as individual defendants (the former under a theory of
respondeat superior). See, e.g., Williams v. City of White Plains, 718 F. Supp. 2d 374, 382
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying summary judgment for individual officers and the city on a state law
claim of assault and battery).