Rana v. Islam et al

Filing 145

OPINION AND ORDER re: 144 MOTION to Vacate . filed by Monirul Islam, Fahima Tashina Prova. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants' consent motion is denied. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Sidney H. Stein on 5/23/2019) (kv)

USOCSDNY
·oocuMENT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ELBCTRONICALLY FILBD:
·\DOC#: _ ___,_ _,~-r::=::--DATE FILED:

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MASHUD PARVES RANA,
Plaintiff,

14-Cv-1993 (SHS)

-againstOPINION & ORDER

MONIRUL ISLAM and FAHIMA
TASHINA PROVA,
Defendants.
SIDNEY H. STEIN, U.S. District Judge.

The Court has received defendants' May 10, 2019, motion to vacate the
Court's May 4, 2018, Order and Judgment and to dismiss plaintiff's claims
with prejudice and without costs. [Doc. No. 144] Defendants bring this
motion with plaintiff's consent and pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 41(a)(2) and 60(b)(5) and (6). For the following reasons,
defendants' consent motion is denied.
Plaintiff filed this action in March 2014. In May 2016, after defendants'
extended, repeated, and multiple failures to cooperate in the litigation, the
Court issued an opinion and order striking defendants' answer and
directing the Clerk of Court to enter default judgment in plaintiff's favor
[Doc. No. 108]. Rana v. Islam, No. 14-Cv-1993, 2016 WL 2758290 (S.D.N.Y.
May 12, 2016). After holding a damages inquest, the Court awarded plaintiff
$922,597.31 and directed the Clerk of Court to enter judgment for plaintiff
in that amount [Doc. No. 120]. Rana v . Islam, 210 F. Supp. 3d 508 (S.D.N.Y.
2016).
Defendants then sought appellate review. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the
default judgment. Rana v. Islam, 887 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 2018). The Court
of Appeals also resolved a split in the district courts by concluding that
"courts may not award cumulative liquidated damages for the same course
of conduct under both" the New York Labor Law and the Fair Labor

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Standards Act. Id. at 119, 122-23. The Second Circuit vacated the damages
award in part and remanded the action in order for this Court to update its
damages calculation accordingly. Id. at 123. Following the issuance of the
Second Circuit's mandate, this Court awarded plaintiff the recalculated
total of $856,535.31 on May 4, 2018. [Doc. No. 139] That day, the Clerk of
Court entered final judgment against defendants in the same amount. [Doc.
No. 140] Now, a year later, the parties have entered into a confidential
settlement agreement and seek vacatur of the May 4, 2018, order and final
judgment. [Doc. No. 144]
Rule 41(a)(2) provides for dismissal of an action by court order "on
terms that the court considers proper." Rule 60(b )(5) allows the Court to
relieve parties from a judgment when, inter alia, the judgment has been
satisfied or its prospective application would be inequitable. This provision
may be invoked when there is a "significant change either in factual
conditions or in law" that "renders continued enforcement detrimental to
the public interest." Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 447 (2009) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). The Court can reopen a judgment under
Rule 60(b )( 6) for" any other reason that justifies relief" -a standard reserved
only for extraordinary circumstances. Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 777
(2017).
"[A]bsent 'exceptional circumstances,' parties are not entitled to
vacatur" merely because of a subsequent settlement agreement. Redeemer
Comm. of Highland Credit Strategies Funds v. Highland Capital Mgmt. , L.P., 253
F. Supp. 3d 722, 723-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). The Second Circuit and U.S.
Supreme Court have cautioned against vacating judgments following
settlements as a matter of course. E. Savings Bank, fsb v. Strez, 320 F.R.D. 9,
11 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (citing U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513
U.S. 18, 26 (1994); and Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 11 F.3d 381, 385
(2d Cir. 1993)). "In determining whether to vacate judgment, a court must
balance the benefits of honoring the parties' settlement agreement against
the public interest in the finality of judgments and the development of
decisional law." Austin v. Ford, 181 F.R.D. 283,285 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); accord E.
Savings Bank, 320 F.R.D. at 11; Jewelers Vigilance Comm., Inc. v. Vitale Inc., 177
F.R.D. 184, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).

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In terms of the parties' interests, the fact that plaintiff does not oppose
relief from the judgment weighs in favor of vacatur. See E. Savings Bank, 320

F.R. D. at 11. Yet, defendants have not explained how vacating the order and
judgment would benefit both parties (nor have they even indicated that the
settlement agreement is contingent on vacatur). See Austin, 181 F.R.D. at 286;
Jewelers Vigilance Comm., 177 F.R.D. at 187-88.
In terms of the public interest, vacatur would not impact the

development of decisional case law, because the parties only seek to vacate
the Court's order implementing the recalculation as directed by the Second
Circuit. See E. Savings Bank, 320 F.R.D. at 11; Jewelers Vigilance Comm., 177
F.R.D. at 188. They do not ask for vacatur of the Court's opinions in this
case.
Nevertheless, vacatur "would condone wasteful utilization of the
court's resources" and would perversely disincentivize settlement earlier in
litigation. Austin, 181 F.R.D. at 286; see also Young v. Cooper Cameron Corp.,
No. 04 Civ. 5968, 2008 WL 1748462, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2008) ("If
litigants know that the adverse effect of any precedent can be neutralized
through a settlement, a litigant may be encouraged to consume judicial
resources with abandon, secure in the knowledge that it may potentially
settle its way out of the consequences of having sought resolution of the
disputed question." (citing Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 28-29)). Here, as in other
cases, "the parties fail to make any argument that theirs is the rare,
exceptional case in which vacatur in light of settlement would be
appropriate." Redeemer Comm. of Highland Credit Strategies Fund, 253 F. Supp.
3d at 724; see also Clarke v. Castro, No. 10 Civ. 6330, 2013 WL 686680, at *3-*6
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2013).
Defendants merely make two assertions in conclusory fashion: first that
following the settlement, the order and judgment now inaccurately appear
unsatisfied; and second, that applying the order and judgment
prospectively would be inequitable. The parties have not represented that
the $856,533.31 judgment has been paid in full. That the parties may now
prefer the payment of a different amount does not render the Court's
judgment inaccurate or inequitable.

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants' consent motion is denied.

Dated: New York, New York
May 23, 2019
SO ORDERED:

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