Barnes v. New York State Division of Human Rights et al
Filing
79
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER re: 66 MOTION to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. filed by Beth Israel Medical Center, 60 SECOND MOTION to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. filed by New York State Division of Human Rights. For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motions to dismiss are granted. This Memorandum Opinion and Order resolves docket entries no. 60 and 66. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and close this case. (As further set forth in this Order.) (Signed by Judge Laura Taylor Swain on 9/29/2016) Copies Mailed By Chambers (cf)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------------x
BILLY BARNES,
Plaintiff,
-v-
No. 14 CV 2388-LTS
NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS and BETH ISRAEL MEDICAL
CENTER,
Defendants.
-------------------------------------------------------x
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff pro se Billy Barnes, a former cardiovascular technician at Beth Israel
Medical Center (“BIMC”), brought this action against the New York State Division of Human
Rights (“NYSDHR”) and BIMC, alleging unlawful discrimination and retaliation under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”) and the New York State
Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq. (“NYSHRL”). The Court has jurisdiction of
this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Both Defendants have filed motions to dismiss the complaint; Plaintiff has
responded to NYSDHR’s motion and his time to respond to BIMC’s motion has elapsed,
although Plaintiff’s opposition papers to NYSDHR’s motion address in part the arguments
BIMC has advanced. The Court has reviewed thoroughly all of the parties’ submissions, as well
as the administrative record and, for the reasons set forth below, both Defendants’ motions to
dismiss are granted.
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BACKGROUND
The following facts relevant to the disposition of the instant motion are drawn
from the Amended Complaint and are assumed to be true for the purposes of this motion
practice. In July 2006, Barnes was hired as a cardiovascular technician at Beth Israel Medical
Center. (Docket entry no. 4, Amended Complaint, at p. 14.) On January 24, 2011, Barnes
allegedly put his hands around the neck of Edith Aquino-Salem, a fellow co-worker, in the
course of a verbal argument. (Id. at p. 4.) The day after the incident, Barnes denied any physical
altercation, while admitting that he did threaten Aquino-Salem in a joking manner. (Id. at p. 23.)
Two days later, BIMC terminated Barnes for “gross misconduct” based on testimony from
Aquino-Salem and Heather Best-Pilgrim, a co-worker who allegedly witnessed the incident. (Id.
at p. 14.) Barnes filed an internal grievance with BIMC challenging his termination, but his
termination was sustained following a grievance hearing. (Id. at p. 11.)
On November 9, 2011, Barnes filed a complaint against BIMC with NYSDHR,
alleging that his supervisor at BIMC had failed to conduct a proper investigation of the incident
and that BIMC had discriminated against Barnes because of his race and gender. (Id. at p. 23.)
After a five month investigation, NYSDHR issued a Determination and Order After
Investigation that found that there was “no probable cause to believe that [BIMC] has engaged or
is engaging in the unlawful discriminatory practice complained of and there is a lack of evidence
in support of [Plaintiff’s] allegations of retaliation, and race/color and sex discrimination.” (Id.
at p. 10.)
On May 15, 2012, Barnes commenced an Article 78 proceeding against
NYSDHR and BIMC in New York Supreme Court, arguing that the NYSDHR decision should
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be overturned for lack of investigation. (See docket entry no. 40, Declaration of David R.
Marshall (“Marshall Decl.”), Ex. 11, at p. 50.) On November 5, 2012, New York Supreme Court
dismissed Barnes’ Article 78 petition, finding that NYSDHR’s investigation was adequate and
its decision was not arbitrary or capricious. Barnes v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights , No.
401119/12, slip op. at 10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 5, 2012). Barnes appealed to the Appellate
Division, which affirmed, holding that NYSDHR’s determination had a “rational basis” in the
record and was not arbitrary or capricious. Barnes v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr. , 113 A.D. 3d 431,
431 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2014). Furthermore, the Appellate Division held, the
investigation conducted by NYSDHR was “sufficient and not one-sided” and Barnes had a “full
and fair opportunity to present his own case.” Id.
Barnes commenced this action against NYSDHR and BIMC under Title VII and
NYSHRL on April 9, 2014. NYSDHR has moved to dismiss all of Barnes’ claims against it
with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). BIMC has moved under Rule
12(b)(6) to dismiss all of Barnes’ claims.
DISCUSSION
On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and (6), the Court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations set out in the
Plaintiff’s complaint, draw inferences from those allegations in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiff, and construe the complaint liberally.” Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 510 (2d Cir.
2007). The Court must give particular latitude to complaints prepared by pro se Plaintiffs, which
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are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Courts must “liberally construe pleadings and briefs
submitted by pro se litigants, reading such submissions to raise the strongest arguments they
suggest.” Bertin v. United States, 478 F.3d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). This approach applies with particular force when a Plaintiff’s civil rights
are at issue. McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004). However, pro se
complaints must still plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 546 (2007).
Plaintiff’s Claims Against NYSDHR
NYSDHR moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, arguing that the Eleventh Amendment precludes the exercise of federal subject
matter jurisdiction over claims asserted against NYSDHR, which is an agency of New York
State. As a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have
waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity or unless Congress has abrogated that immunity
pursuant to its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Woods v. Rondout
Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 466 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). Courts have consistently applied the doctrine of sovereign immunity to
preclude federal suits against state entities. See Employees of Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare,
Missouri v. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare, Missouri, 411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973); Jones v. N.Y.
State Metro D.D.S.O., 543 F. App’x 20, 21 (2d Cir. 2010). The same principle has been applied
to bar federal claims against NYSDHR. See Gonzalez v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, No.
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10 CV 98, 2011 WL 4582428, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2011) (holding that both Federal and
State claims against NYSDHR were barred by the Eleventh Amendment); McPherson v. Plaza
Athenee, NYC, No. 12 CV 0785, 2012 WL 3865154, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012) (holding
that Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985 claims against NYSDHR were barred by the
Eleventh Amendment). Here, Plaintiff’s claims against NYSDHR are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment, as NYSDHR is an agency of the state of New York and has not consented to
jurisdiction in this Court. See Gonzalez, 2011 WL 4582428, at *3 (“Agencies of the state, such
at the State Division, are entitled to assert Eleventh Amendment immunity.”). The Court
therefore grants NYSDHR’s motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint, as against it, for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiff’s Claims Against BIMC
BIMC moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII and NYSHRL claims for failure to
state a claim, arguing that they are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Collateral
estoppel protects the legal principles of consistency and finality in and between state and federal
courts, barring parties from re-litigating determinations already made in prior legal proceedings.
See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. , 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984) (“It is now settled that a
federal court must give to a state court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given
that judgment under the law of the state in which the judgment was rendered.”). A federal court
“must apply the collateral estoppel rules of the state that rendered a prior judgment on the same
issues currently before the court.” LaFleur v. Whitman , 300 F.3d 256, 271 (2d Cir. 2002).
Under New York law, collateral estoppel bars a subsequent action if (1) the issue raised in the
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second action is identical to an issue raised and decided in the first action and (2) the Plaintiff
had a “full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue” in the earlier proceeding. Id. (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). In Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corporation , the
Supreme Court held that a judicial determination of the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court affirming a NYSDHR finding of “no probable cause” of discrimination
precluded the Plaintiff from relitigating the same question in federal court under Title VII and
NYSHRL. 456 U.S. 461, 467 (1982). Courts in this Circuit have consistently followed the
Kremer holding and applied collateral estoppel to preclude federal litigation of a finding
affirmed by a New York State court. See Yan Yam Koo v. Dep’t of Bldgs. of City of N.Y. , 218
F. App’x 97, 99 (2d Cir. 2007); Pajooh v. Dep’t of Sanitation, City of N.Y. , No. 11 CV 3116,
2012 WL 4465370 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept 27, 2012) (Swain, J.).
Plaintiff contends that his claims are not precluded because, based on his own
investigative efforts, he has uncovered evidence that NYSDHR did not fully investigate his
complaint and that there were attempts to intimidate and silence witnesses who would have
testified on Plaintiff’s behalf. (See docket entry no. 73, Pl. Reply to Motion to Dismiss at p. 2.)
The petitioner in Kremer had similarly contended that the administrative proceedings and
judicial review were “so fundamentally flawed” as to deny petitioner a “full and fair
opportunity” to litigate his claim. 456 U.S. at 480. While acknowledging that argument, the
Kremer Court had no hesitation in concluding that the “panoply of procedures” within both
NYSDHR administrative and state court levels were sufficient under the Due Process Clause.
Id. at 484. Here, the due process already afforded Plaintiff means that the discovery of new facts
or legal claims does not undermine the applicable collateral estoppel analysis or the
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preclusiveness of state court determinations. See Yan Yam Koo, 218 F. App’x at 99 (New York
Supreme Court’s affirmance of NYSDHR’s “no probable cause” determination was preclusive,
even though the Supreme Court did not specifically address retaliation claims). Plaintiff’s new
evidence, alleging witness intimidation and coercion, is substantially identical to the facts and
arguments raised in his NYSDHR complaint, Article 78 Petition, and Pre-Argument Statement to
the Appellate Division. (See Marshall Decl., Ex. 3 (NYSDHR complaint) at pp. 17-22; Ex. 11
(Article 78 Petition) at pp. 46-53; Ex. 13 (Pre-Argument Statement to the Appellate Division) at
pp. 102-106). The record demonstrates that Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to present
his complaint to NYSDHR and twice in state court. Because Plaintiff did not prevail in the
earlier action, he may not relitigate those same claims here. The Court therefore grants BIMC’s
motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted. This
Memorandum Opinion and Order resolves docket entries no. 60 and 66. The Clerk of Court is
directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and close this case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: New York, New York
September 29, 2016
/s/ Laura Taylor Swain
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN
United States District Judge
Copy mailed to:
Billy Barnes, pro se
330 40th Street
Copiague, NY 11726
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