Obal v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company et al

Filing 44

OPINION re: 37 MOTION for Reconsideration re; 36 Memorandum & Opinion, filed by David Obal. Based on the conclusion set forth above, Plaintiff's motion is denied and the case remains closed. (As further set forth in this Order.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 6/25/2015) (spo)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------------------------x
DAVID OBAL,
14 Civ. 2463

Plaintiff,

OPINION

-against-

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TROST COMPANY AS
TRUSTEE FOR MORGAN STANLEY MORTGAGE LOAN
TROST 2004-9, MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH
CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2004-9; MORGAN STANLEY
MORTGAGE LOAN TROST 2004-9, MORTGAGE
PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2004-9;
~
. \ ;; , i
I I 1-'',-.,c~ ~.._,;: ,'u.,,l"t" r~
.
.
THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS OF MORGAN STANLEY
~·\ l:7t r;: ·-.-(·\;(t),-.1 .. ;.•.Ll •'";'f" l-:'{) 1
,,,-~-~-.~f( ,\<I ~y l .. L-··
q ;,,.;1_,C.t.
MORTGAGE LOAN TROST 2004-9, MORTGAGE
I,
PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2004-9;
I\
·-·\ii
MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL 1, INC.; MORTGAGE
\~ n --·p FP ,:i l· .J) L,;l c. I
t
·
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.;
1~.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~
ROES 1-10 AND DOES 1-10, inclusive,
representing a class of unknown persons who
claim or have the right to claim an interest
in certain real property located in
Henderson, Nevada,

~~~:::-~ :/= :.· ~•.

'

·- ---=i-1'\

'II

ooc +-~:

.--·-·-r.t~1crc~-~ I
t

c:..~--~~~::~.,·...:.:::.--·- ·--:~---·--·-.JI

Defendants.
-----------------------------------------------x
A P P E A RA N C E S:
Pro Se
DAVID OBAL
405 Groft Way
Henderson, NV 89015
Attorneys for Defendants
HOGAN LOVELLS OS LLP
875 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022
By:
Lisa J. Fried, Esq.
Adam R. Feeney, Esq.

Sweet, D.J.

Plaintiff David Obal, appearing pro se,

("Obal" or

"Plaintiff") moves for reconsideration of this Court's dismissal
of his Verified Amended Complaint (the "AC") against Defendants
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as Trustee for the Morgan
Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-9, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-9 (the "Trust") and Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
the Trust, "Defendants").

("MERS" and, together with

Based on the conclusions set forth

below, Plaintiff's motion is denied.

Prior Proceedings

A detailed recitation of the facts of the underlying
case is provided in this Court's opinion dated February 13,
2015, which granted Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's
verified amended complaint.

See Obal v. Deutsche Bank Nat.

Trust Co., No. 14 CIV. 2463, 2015 WL 631404, at *1
Feb. 13, 2015)

(hereinafter "February Opinion").

with those facts is assumed.

1

(S.D.N.Y.
Familiarity

Following dismissal of his complaint, Plaintiff filed
the instant motion for reconsideration, which was marked fully
submitted on April 16, 2015.

Plaintiff Fails to Meet Reconsideration Standard

Under Local Rule 6.3, a court may grant
reconsideration where the moving party demonstrates an
"intervening change in controlling law, the availability of new
evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent
manifest injustice."

Henderson v. Metro. Bank & Trust Co., 502

F. Supp. 2d 372, 375-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)

(quotation marks and

citations omitted); see also Parrish v. Sollecito, 253 F. Supp.
2d 713, 715

(S.D.N.Y. 2003).

However, reconsideration of a

court's prior order is an "extraordinary remedy to be employed
sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of
scarce judicial resources."
Supp. 2d 598,

605

Sikhs for Justice v. Nath, 893 F.

(S.D.N.Y. 2012)

(citations omitted).

Accordingly, the standard of review applicable to such a motion
is "strict."

Shrader v. CSX Transp.,

Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257

Cir. 1995).

Plaintiff has provided no intervening change in
controlling law, new evidence, clear error, or manifest
2

(2d

injustice either in his moving papers or his memorandum of law.
"[W]hen [a] plaintiff proceeds prose,

. . . a court is obliged

to construe his pleadings liberally."

Sealed Plaintiff v.

Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008).

However,

those proceeding pro se "generally are required to inform
themselves regarding procedural rules and to comply with them."
Losacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92

(2d Cir. 1995)

(quoting Edwards v. INS, 59 F.3d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1995)); see also
Azkour v. Haouzi, No. 11 Civ. 5780(RJS) (KNF), 2012 WL 3561071
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2012)

("The Court's obligation to construe a

prose litigant's pleadings liberally has nothing to do with the
prose litigant's independent obligation to 'inform [himself]
regarding procedural rules and to comply with them.'").

Plaintiff's memorandum in support of the instant
motion largely restates the arguments made in opposition to the
motion to dismiss.

Compare Pl.'s Mem. in Supp't of Motion for

Reconsideration (hereinafter "Pl.'s Mem. in Supp't") 7-15 with
Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n to Motion to Dismiss 6-13.

Plaintiff

attempts to distinguish the Second Circuit's Rajamin opinion,
which he did not address in opposition to Defendants' motion to
dismiss.

Pl.'s Mem. in Supp't 2 (referencing Rajamin v.

Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 757 F.3d 79, 92
2014)) .

(2d Cir. June 30,

Plaintiff's basis for distinguishing Rajamin, i.e.,
3

that his claims are based on the relevant prospectus, and not
the PSA, is unpersuasive.

Plaintiff's amended complaint,

contrary to his contention, asserts several claims based upon
alleged violations of the PSA.
13.

See Amended Complaint Counts 11-

In fact, the only time the word "prospectus" is used in the

Amended Complaint is in reference to the PSA.

Plaintiff also takes issue with the February Opinion's
determination that his mortgage was transferred in 2004, not
2012.

See Pl.'s Mem. in Supp't 2.

However, the February

Opinion made clear that dismissal was warranted even if the
assignment occurred in 2012.

See February Opinion, 2015 WL

631404 at *5.

Accordingly, because no basis upon which
reconsideration may be granted has been asserted, Plaintiff's
motion must be denied.

Moreover, Plaintiff's motion for

reconsideration is also untimely because it was served more than
14 days after entry of the February Opinion.

Local Civil Rule

6.3 mandates that a motion for reconsideration be served within
14 days after the entry of the order sought to be reconsidered.
As the February Opinion was entered on February 13, 2015,
Plaintiff was required to serve his motion for reconsideration
by February 27, 2015.

Plaintiff did not serve his motion until
4

March 2015.

Conclusion

Based on the conclusion set forth above, Plaintiff's
motion is denied and the case remains closed.

It is so ordered.

New Yor~NY
June ')., '.) , 2015

ROBERT W. SWEET
U.S.D.J.

5