Wilson v. Corelogic Saferent, LLC

Filing 72

OPINION AND ORDER: re: 48 MOTION for Leave to File Amended Complaint filed by Abdullah James George Wilson. For the foregoing reasons, Judge Ellis' well-reasoned Report and Recommendation (Dkt No. 62) is ADOPTED in full and Wil son's motion for leave to amend is DENIED. Wilson's request that, in the alternative, "he be permitted to move for certification of the NY-FCRA section 380-j(e) class set forth in the proposed Amended Complaint following the completion of discovery" is also DENIED. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion at docket number 48. (Signed by Judge J. Paul Oetken on 2/08/2016) (ama)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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ABDULLAH JAMES GEORGE WILSON,
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Plaintiff,
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-v:
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CORELOGIC SAFERENT, LCC,
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Respondent. :
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14-CV-2477 (JPO)
OPINION AND ORDER

J. PAUL OETKEN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Abdullah James George Wilson (“Wilson”) commenced this action on April 9,
2014, by filing the Complaint against Defendant CoreLogic SafeRent, LLC (“CoreLogic”).
(Dkt. No. 2.) On September 29, 2014, the Court referred this matter to United States Magistrate
Judge Ronald L. Ellis for general pretrial supervision. (Dkt. No. 33.) On June 15, 2015, Wilson
moved for leave to file an amended complaint. (Dkt. No. 48.) On August 12, 2015, Judge Ellis
filed a Report and Recommendation (the “Report”) concluding that Wilson’s motion for leave to
amend should be denied. (Dkt. No. 62.) Thereafter, Wilson filed objections to the Report and
the parties submitted supportive briefing. 1 (Dkt. Nos. 63, 65, 68.) The Court has reviewed the
record in this case, the Report, Wilson’s Objections, and the parties’ other memoranda of law.
For the reasons that follow, the Report is adopted in full and Wilson’s motion for leave to amend
is denied.
I.

Discussion
When reviewing the report and recommendation of a magistrate judge, a district court

“may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the

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Familiarity with the facts and procedural history of this case is presumed. (See Dkt. No. 62.)
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magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “The Court reviews the Report strictly for clear error
where no objection has been made and will make a de novo determination regarding those parts
of the Report to which objections have been made.” McDonaugh v. Astrue, 672 F. Supp. 2d 542,
547 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). However, where objections are “merely perfunctory responses . . .
rehashing [] the same arguments set forth in the original petition” and not “specific and clearly
aimed at particular findings in the magistrate judge’s proposal,” de novo review is inappropriate.
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
A.

Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), courts “should freely give leave [to amend
a pleading] when justice so requires.” Generally, “a district court has discretion to deny leave for
good reason, including futility, undue delay, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.”
McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 200 (2d Cir. 2007). But once a court has
issued a scheduling order to govern the course of litigation pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 16, such an order “may be modified only for good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b).
Thus, “despite the lenient standard of Rule 15(a), a district court does not abuse its discretion in
denying leave to amend the pleadings after the deadline set in the scheduling order where the
moving party has failed to establish good cause.” Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d
326, 340 (2d Cir. 2000) (Sotomayor, J.). It must be so, for “if we considered only Rule 15(a)
without regard to Rule 16(b), we would render scheduling orders meaningless and effectively
would read Rule 16(b) and its good cause requirement out of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.” Id. (quoting Sosa v. Airprint Sys., Inc., 133 F.3d 1417, 1419 (11th Cir. 1998) (per
curiam)).

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Under the scheduling order, Wilson’s deadline to amend his Complaint was December
15, 2014. (Dkt. No. 37.) Wilson filed his motion to amend six months after that deadline and
shortly before the close of all discovery. (Dkt. Nos. 48, 52) As a result, Wilson’s motion
squarely implicates Rule 16. Judge Ellis recommended denial of Wilson’s motion under the
more liberal standard of Rule 15(a). (See Dkt. No. 62 at 2.) The Court agrees in full with Judge
Ellis’ analysis that Wilson is not entitled to leave to amend under Rule 15(a), and the Court also
concludes that Wilson has failed to demonstrate the “good cause” necessary to modify a
scheduling order under Rule 16.
B.

Good Cause

“A finding of good cause” under Rule 16 “depends upon the diligence of the moving
party.” Grochowski v. Phoenix Constr., 318 F.3d 80, 86 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). In
other words, to demonstrate good cause, a movant must show that “despite its having exercised
diligence, the applicable deadline could not have been reasonably met.” Oscar v. BMW of N.
Am., 09-CV-11, 2011 WL 6399505, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2011) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff seeking leave to amend a pleading fails to show good
cause when all the information necessary to support the proposed amendment was in the
plaintiff’s possession when the action was commenced, and “nothing . . . learned in discovery or
otherwise altered that fact.” Parker, 204 F.3d at 341; see Oscar, 2011 WL 6399505, at *2. In
addition to party diligence, “[t]he district court, in the exercise of its discretion under Rule 16(b),
also may consider other relevant factors including . . . whether allowing the amendment of the
pleading . . . will prejudice defendants.” Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229,
244 (2d Cir. 2007).

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As relevant here, Wilson seeks leave to amend the complaint to “add[] additional detail in
support of Plaintiff’s class claim under section 1681e(b) of the [Fair Credit Reporting Act
(“FCRA”)], expand[] on the class definitions . . . and amend[] the existing individual claim of the
Plaintiff under section 380-j(e) of the [New York Fair Credit Reporting Act (“NY-FCRA”)] to
make it a class claim.” (Dkt. No. 63 at 4.) Wilson asserted an individual claim in his initial
Complaint based on the fact that CoreLogic relied on records from the New York Department of
Corrections (“DOC”) “as its primary source of criminal court records from the State of New
York.” (Id. at 6.) Wilson contends that “what was originally pled as an individual claim in
Count III of the Complaint is now appropriate to pursue as a claim on behalf of two classes of
consumers, one nationwide under the FCRA, and one New York state class under the NYFCRA.” (Id. at 13.)
In explaining the delay in seeking amendment, Wilson chiefly argues that “it was not
until Defendant responded to discovery that Plaintiff learned that the same [individual] claim and
theory of liability applied to” a class of consumers. (Id. at 6.) Wilson contends that, at the time
of the filing of the Complaint, he would not have had a good-faith basis in conformity with Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for asserting a class-based claim. (Dkt. No. 63 at 15.)
But it is difficult to square Wilson’s argument that discovery revealed the ground for amendment
with the good-faith basis that must have existed for Plaintiff to have pleaded any nationwide
class at the outset of this case. As Wilson alleged in his Complaint, his individual claim could be
resolved alongside “numerous [other] individual claims based upon a single set of proof in a
unified proceeding.” (Dkt. No. 2 ¶ 30.) In other words, the Complaint was “predicated upon the
uniformity of Plaintiff’s circumstances to the other consumers he also alleged were in the class.”
(Dkt. No. 65 at 14.) In any event, Rule 11 provides that a pleading may contain “factual

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contentions . . . if specifically so identified” that do not yet but “will likely have evidentiary
support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
11(b)(3). The flexible requirements of Rule 11 were no barrier to Wilson’s pleading these other
class-based claims at the outset. Because the information necessary to support the proposed
class claim was in Wilson’s possession when the action was commenced, Judge Ellis determined
that Wilson acted with undue delay in filing his motion to amend. (Dkt. No. 62 at 4.) For the
same reason, Wilson has failed to show the requisite diligence necessary to constitute good cause
under Rule 16. Parker, 204 F.3d at 341.
Judge Ellis also determined that amendment would prejudice CoreLogic because
amendment would necessitate the reopening of discovery and thus “would result in a substantial
delay in the resolution of this case” and “additional expense.” (Dkt. No. 62 at 5.) The Court
adopts in full Judge Ellis’ analysis. Wilson objects that the addition of a new class-based claim
“will not require the parties to engage in significant new preparation, or result in a complicated
or lengthy trial.” (Dkt. No. 63 at 16.) He further states that he “will not be issuing any new
written discovery or deposing any additional witnesses” as a result of the new claim. (Id.) Even
if the Court were inclined to credit the promise that no new discovery requests from Wilson will
be forthcoming, Wilson has not accounted for, among other things, the burden and expense of
discovery that CoreLogic would be motivated to serve in the event that leave to amend is
granted. The prejudice that CoreLogic would face in the event of amendment is an additional,
although not a determinative, factor in the Court’s conclusion that Wilson has failed to show
good cause.

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II.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Judge Ellis’ well-reasoned Report and Recommendation (Dkt

No. 62) is ADOPTED in full and Wilson’s motion for leave to amend is DENIED. Wilson’s
request that, in the alternative, “he be permitted to move for certification of the NY-FCRA
section 380-j(e) class set forth in the proposed Amended Complaint following the completion of
discovery” is also DENIED.
The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion at docket number 48.
Dated: February 8, 2016
New York, New York
J. PAUL OETKEN
United States District Judge

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