Henriquez-Ford v. Council of School Supervisors Administrators et al
Filing
89
OPINION AND ORDER re: 79 MOTION to Dismiss the Third Amended Complaint, filed by N.Y.C. Department of Education.For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint is GRANTED, and the case is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion at Docket Number 79 and close the case. (Signed by Judge J. Paul Oetken on 12/15/2016) (tro)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------------------- X
:
MAEGEN HENRIQUEZ-FORD,
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
-v:
:
N.Y.C. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
:
Defendant. :
:
-------------------------------------------------------------- X
14-CV-2496 (JPO)
OPINION AND ORDER
J. PAUL OETKEN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Maegen Henriquez-Ford initially brought this action alleging that her former
employer, the New York City Department of Education (“DOE”), and the two labor unions that
represented her during her employment, the Council of School Supervisors and Administrators
and the United Federation of Teachers, discriminated against her in violation of various federal
and state anti-discrimination statutes, as did a collection of individuals associated with those
organizations. (See Dkt. No. 2.) The Court granted a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint
on June 23, 2015, and a motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on January 7, 2016.
Henriquez-Ford v. Council of Sch. Supervisors & Adm’rs, No. 14 Civ. 2496, 2015 WL 3867565,
at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2015) (“Henriquez-Ford I”); Henriquez-Ford v. Council of Sch.
Supervisors & Adm’rs, No. 14 Civ. 2496, 2016 WL 93863, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2016)
(“Henriquez-Ford II”).
The Court granted Henriquez-Ford leave to amend on a single, narrow issue. HenriquezFord II, 2016 WL 93863, at *2. Henriquez-Ford filed a Third Amended Complaint on March
17, 2016, naming only Defendant DOE. (Dkt. No. 76.) The DOE then moved to dismiss the
Third Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 79; Dkt. No. 80.) For the reasons that follow, the motion
is granted.
I.
Discussion
Familiarity with the facts and history of this case is presumed; a complete description
appears in the Court’s first opinion in this action. See Henriquez-Ford I, 2015 WL 3867565, at
*1-*3. In the Third Amended Complaint, Henriquez-Ford—now represented by counsel 1—
raises three claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
(“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section
1981”). (Dkt. No. 76 at 10-13.) Defendant DOE moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Dkt. No. 80.)
The Court’s Order of January 7, 2016, which dismissed the Second Amended Complaint,
granted leave to amend on only one narrow ground:
A liberal reading of the complaint suggests that Henriquez-Ford may be able to
provide better evidence that she exhausted her Title VII claims before the EEOC,
but not that she can state a claim for retaliation or hostile work environment.
Accordingly, the Court grants Henriquez-Ford a final opportunity to amend the
complaint, limited solely to her Title VII claim . . . .
Henriquez-Ford II, 2016 WL 93863, at *2 (emphasis added). The Court, in no uncertain terms,
limited Henriquez-Ford’s right to amend to her Title VII claim. But in her Third Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff no longer raises a Title VII claim. For this reason alone, the law of the case
requires dismissal of the Third Amended Complaint. See Fermin v. United States, 859 F. Supp.
2d 590, 600 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[W]hen a court has ruled on an issue, that decision should
generally be adhered to by that court in subsequent stages in the same case unless cogent and
1
As she is now represented by counsel, she is no longer eligible for the special
solicitude given to pro se parties. See Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 47475 (2d Cir. 2006).
2
compelling reasons militate otherwise.” (quoting Johnson v. Holder, 564 F.3d 95, 99 (2d
Cir.2009))); see also, e.g., Rahman v. Fischer, No. 08 Civ. 4368, 2010 WL 1063835, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2010) (dismissing a claim as “beyond the scope of the permitted
amendment”); Pressley v. Green, No. 02 Civ. 5261, 2004 WL 97701, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16,
2004) (rejecting a plaintiff’s attempt to “continue[ ] to press the same negligence claim,
notwithstanding the fact that he was not granted leave to replead this dismissed cause of action”).
Even were the Third Amended Complaint not precluded by this Court’s prior opinion, it
would nonetheless be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 2 As regards Plaintiff’s ADA and
Rehabilitation Act claims, she fails to plead either that she required a reasonable accommodation
or that the DOE refused to make such accommodation available. (See Dkt. No. 85 at 23
(“[P]laintiff could perform the essential functions of the job at issue with or without reasonable
accommodation.”).) See Quadir v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 39 F. Supp. 3d 528, 538-39
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Rodal v. Anesthesia Grp. of Onondaga, P.C., 369 F.3d 113, 118 (2d
Cir.2004)) (explaining the requirement of reasonable accommodation under the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act and limiting the responsibility to “make reasonable accommodation” only to
those disabilities that are “known”). And to the extent that Plaintiff’s claim sounds in
retaliation—which was specifically barred by the Court’s prior opinion in this case, HenriquezFord II, 2016 WL 93863, at *2—she fails to state a claim, as merely inquiring or making
complaints about employment or salary without a “good faith, reasonable belief that the
underlying challenged actions of the employer violate the law” does not constitute a protected
2
The DOE also argues that Plaintiff’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims are
precluded by collateral estoppel as a result of an administrative hearing held pursuant to New
York State Education Law § 3020-a, (Dkt. No. 80 at 8-11), and that Plaintiff’s claims are time
barred in part (id. at 11-13). The Court need not address these arguments given its finding that
the Complaint should be dismissed on other grounds.
3
activity predicate for a retaliation claim. (See Dkt. No. 76 ¶¶ 45, 48.) Kelly v. Howard I.
Shapiro & Assocs. Consulting Eng’rs, P.C., 716 F.3d 10, 14 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Gregory v.
Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 701 (2d Cir. 2001)). As to Plaintiff’s Section 1981 claim, she fails to claim
that the allegedly retaliatory acts were “performed pursuant to a municipal custom,” as would be
required to state a claim against the DOE under Section 1981. Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375
F.3d 206, 226 (2d Cir. 2004).
II.
Leave to Amend
The Court declines to grant Henriquez-Ford further opportunity to amend. “In general,
‘where dismissal is based on a pro se plaintiff’s failure to comply with pleading conventions, a
district court should not dismiss without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal
reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.’” HenriquezFord II, 2016 WL 93863, at *2 (quoting Crisci-Balestra v. Civil Serv. Employees Ass’n, Inc., No.
07 Civ. 1684, 2008 WL 413812, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2008)). But Plaintiff is no longer pro
se and has already had three bites at the apple, twice proceeding pro se and once with counsel.
III.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint is
GRANTED, and the case is dismissed with prejudice.
The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion at Docket Number 79 and close the
case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 15, 2016
New York, New York
4
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?