Black v. Anheuser-Busch in Bev et al

Filing 55

OPINION. As set forth above, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to Plaintiff's harassment, discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, and wrongful termination claims. Plaintiff's claim(s) of breach of contract remain. This opinion resolves ECF No. 47. It is so ordered. re: 47 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Anheuser-Busch in Bev. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 7/11/2016) (rjm)

USDCSDNY
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED

UNITED STAT ES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

DOC#:~~--~..,...+-,-r­
--------

--------------------------------x

DATEFILED:

RANDALL BLACK ,
Plaintiff,
14 Civ. 2693
- against OP INION
ANHEUSER - BUSCH IN BEV, e t al.,
Defendants.
----------------------------------------x

A P P E A R A N C E S:

PLAINTIFF PRO SE
234 Bradhurst Ave.
Apt . 1 5
New York , NY 10 039

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT ANHEUSER-BUSCH
DISTRIBUTORS OF NEW YORK , INC.
JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
666 Third Ave .
29 th Floor
New York , NY 10 0 17
By:
John K. Bennett, Esq .
Jennifer B. Co urti an , Es q.
Katherine F. Cser , Es q .
Suzanne E. Peters, Esq .

1

(RWS)

Sweet, D.J.,

By lett e r dated March 16, 2008, Plaintiff pro se Randall M.
Black (" Plaintiff" or "Black") made requests for documents and
surveillance footage. Thereafter, Defendant Anheuser -B usch
Distributors of New York , Inc .

("Defendant" or "AB"),

incorrectly capt ioned as "Anheuser-Busch In Bev" moved for
summary judgment . Based on the conclusions set forth below,
Defendant ' s motion for summary judgment is granted and
Plaintiff's request is denied .

I.

Prior Proceedings

Plaintiff commenced this action on January 6, 2014 in the
Supreme Court of the State of New York.

Defenda nt removed the

action to th is court by Notice of Removal filed April 16, 2014 .
By Order dated June 9 , 2016, Defendant Angel Martinez was
dismissed , with reconsideration denied on January 30 , 20 15.
Plaintiff sought pro bono counsel on January 13 , 20 16. With no
motions then pending, the r equest was denied with leave granted
to renew at the time of any dispositive action . The request was
not renewed.

2

Plaintiff filed the instant l etter request following his
deposition, on March 18, 2016 . Defendant filed the instant
motion for summary judgment on April 14, 206 . Defendant's
summary judgment filings, Notice to a Pro Se Litigant pursuant
to Local Civil Rule 56 .2, and courtesy copies of all unpublished
decisions cited in Defendant's moving papers were served on
Defendant via overnight mail on the same date. By Order dated
April 18, 2016 , the motion was set returnable on May 12 , 2016 ,
directing papers to be served in accordance with Local Civil
Rule 6.1 . No further submiss i ons fr om either party having been
filed , the motion was deemed fully submitted on May 12, 20 1 6 .

II.

Relevant Facts

The summary set forth below is based on Defendant ' s Local
Civil Ru l e 56 .1 statement . No oppos it ion from Plainti ff having
been filed,

these facts are accepted as true for the purposes of

the instant motion . See Local Civi l Rule 56 . 2 ; Vermont Teddy
Bear Co . v . 1-800 Beargram Co ., 373 F.3d 241 , 246 (2d Ci r .
2004). They do not constitute findings of fact.

Black worked as a driver/helper for Anheuser - Busch
Distributors of New York , Inc. at a facility in the Bronx

3

between 2006 and 2012 . I n August 2010 , Bl ack alleges that
col l eague Migue l Mart i nez pu ll ed up his own shirt and began
licking his own chest . Bl ack reported the incident to then operations manager Tommy Shannon that month. A meeting was held
with Black , Martinez , Shannon , Delivery Manager Ray McLoughlin ,
and others regarding the event . A company- wide meeting was then
he l d to re - train emp l oyees regarding the Workp l ace Harassment
Policy .

In March 20 1 2 , Al Montes DeOca approached Black from behind
and pulled down Black ' s shorts , exposing Black ' s underwear.
Black reported the incident on May 7 , 2012 .

Bl ack further alleges that on May 4 , 2012 , Danny Cruz also
approached him from behind and pulled Bl ack ' s shorts and
underwear down , exposing Black. Black reported the event to
McLoughlin . McLoughlin directed Black to fi l e an incident
report , which Black did . It was forwarded to Shreyas
Balakrishnan , Director of Operations . The Report detailed all
three events.

Black did not want to meet with Cruz , and a meeting was
held between Cruz , Ba l akr i shnan , and Human Resources Manager

4

Carol Verdon. Cruz was required to take a computer course on
"Respect in the Workplace."

Later, Black met with Balakrishnan, Verdon, Shop Steward
Corey Petrella, and his Union Delegate John Urlich. Black was
advised that Cruz's behavior was not tolerated by AnheuserBusch, and provided Black with a copy of the Workplace
Harassment Policy. Black was offered counseling, which he
declined. Black requested several days of leave, which were
granted.

Plaintiff had a second meeting with Balakrishnan on May 31,
2012. They discussed posting anti-harassment signs in the
workplace and the frequency of harassment training. The
Workplace Harassment Policy was discussed at a company monthlymeeting.

Plaintiff injured himself on the job on June 12, 2012. He
took leave that day and filed a worker's compensation claim. By
letter on March 11, 2013, Plaintiff was offered a position in
the Restricted Duty Program, where the job demands would be
tailored to Plaintiff's restriction. The letter requested a
response no later than March 18, 2013. No response was received
and Plaintiff never returned to work.
5

Black alleges he informed Union Delegate Angel Martinez
about his out o f work status on May 17 , 2013. Defendant was
never informed of this communication.

Pursuant to a one-year limitation on leave in the
Collective Bargaining Agreement , Plaintiff's employment was
terminated on June 14, 2013. Black filed a grievance with the
union, alleging h e was terminated because of lack of
communication between AB and Martinez. The Union did not take
the grievance to arbitration .

In December 2012 , Plaintiff filed a complaint with the New
York City Commission on Human Rights

("NYCCHR") a lleging sexual

harassment and gender discrimination. The incidents with Mr.
DeOca and Cruz are the basis of the complaint . On November 22 ,
2013, a Determination and Order After Investigation was issued
finding no probable cause, and dismissing the complaint. On
February 24 , 2014 , the EEOC issued a determination adopting the
NYCCHR findings.

Plaintiff's complaint alleges "defendant A-B IN BEV has
breached there responsibil [sic]." Notice of Removal at 9-13
("Compl."). Specifically, the complaint recounts the three

6

incidents, the May 31 , 2012 conversation with Balakrishnan, and
alleges the following:
Defendant Anheuser Busch IN BEV Balakrishnan failed to
update or enforce it's [sic] [workplace harassment] policy .
1- Did not post harassment signs in designated areas
2- fail [sic] to enforce company policy for example A-B IN
BEV waits until an incident breaks out then start saying
what can we do to ensure this incident doesn't happen again
but by then it ' s to late [ sic].
Notice of Removal at 11. The Complaint also sets forth a claim
for wrongful termination :
1-0n June 14, 2013 plaintiff Black received call [sic] from
defendant A-B IN BEV Jesse Rivera that Black position [sic]
was terminated due to not calling company about status
before (1) year anniversary was past do [sic] per company
policy.
2- On May 17, 2013 plaint i ff Black talked to defendant
union delicate [sic] Ange l Martinez about Black's status of
being out of work in which Black explained that Black
remain on compensation and remain [sic] in doctor's and
physical therapist's care Martinez was suppost [sic] to
inform A-B Managme [sic] about Black's status but fail to
[sic] .
Id. at 12.
III. Applicable Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only where "there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and

the moving party

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. "

Fed. R. Civ. P.

56 (c).

"[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are

material." Anderson v . Liberty Lobby,
( 1986) .

7

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

A dispute is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party ."
Id.

The relevant inquiry on application for summary judgment is

"whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that
one party must prevail as a matter of law."

Id. at 251-52 .

A

court is not charged with weighing the evidence and determining
its truth, but with determining whether there is a genuine issue
for trial.

Westinghouse Elec. Corp . v. N.Y. City Transit Auth. ,

735 F . Supp. 1205, 1 2 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)

(quoting Anderson,

477

U.S . at 249) . "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual
dispute between the parties will not def eat an otherwise
prope~ly

supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement

is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson ,
477 U.S. at 247 - 48 (emphasis in original).

Plaintiff's prose status alters the interpretation of
Plaintiff ' s submissions, but not the burdens of law on either
party . Pro se submissions are held "to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafter by lawyers" and must be read to
"raise the strongest arguments they suggest." Olle v . Columbia
Univ. , 332 F. Supp. 2d 599 , 607
App ' x 383 (2d Cir. 2005)

(S.D . N.Y . 2004), aff ' d, 136 F.

(citations omitted). In addition, "even

when a nonmoving party chooses the perilous path of failing to
8

submit a response to a s ummary judgment motion ," the burden
remains on the defendant to demonstrate summary judgment is
appropriate as a matter of law . Amaker v . Fo l ey , 274 F . 3d 677 ,
681 (2d Cir . 2001) ; see a l so Vermont Teddy Bear , 373 F .3d at 244 ;
Holtz v . Rockefeller & Co. , Inc . , 258 F . 3d 62 , 74 n . 1 (2d Cir.
2001) ; Booker v . Fed . Reserve Bank of New York , Nos . 01 Civ.
2 2 9 0 (DC)

&

01 Ci v . 2 2 91 (DC) , 2 0 0 3 WL 121314 8 , at * 12

( S . D. N . Y .

Mar . 17 , 2003) ; Mattel , Inc. v. Pitt , 229 F.Supp . 2d 315, 320
(S . D. N. Y. 2002) .

However , proceeding pro se " does not otherwise relieve a
litigant from the usual requirements of summary judgment , and a
prose party ' s

'bald assertion ,' unsupported by evidence , is not

sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment ." Cole v .
Artuz , No.

93 Civ . 598 1 (WHP) (JCF) , 1999 WL 983876, at *3

(S . D. N.Y . Oct . 28 , 1999)
18 , 21

(quoting Carey v . Crescenzi,

(2d Cir . 1991) ) ; see also Lee v . Coughlin,

923 F . 2d

902 F . Supp .

424 , 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) .

IV.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted

The complaint may reasonably be read to raise claims of (1)
sexual harassment , discrimination, and hostile work environment

9

stemming from the incidents with Martinez, DeOca, and Cruz ,

(2)

wrongful termination, and (3) breach of the collective
bargaining agreement stemming from the three incidents and
Black's termination. Each will be addressed in turn.

A.

Sexual Harassment, Discrimination, and Hostile Work

Environment Claims Are Dismissed

Black filed a Verified Complaint with the NYCCHR on
December 17 , 2012 setting forth the events with DeOca and Cruz. 1
Bennet Deel. , Ex. G at 79-81,

~~

8-10 (" NYCCHR Compl ." ). The

NYCCHR Complaint set forth claims for gender discrimination and
sexual harassment on the basis of the incidents , in violation of
Titl e 8 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. Id.

~

12-

13 . After investigation, the NYCCHR determined there was "no
probable cause to believe that [Defendant] engaged in the
unlawful discriminatory practices alleg e d. " Bennet Deel ., Ex. H
at 83-86 ("NYCCHR Decision") . Though the decision determined
"these incidents did actually occur ," the incidents were not

The NYCCHR Complaint alleges the incident with Cruz occurred
"on or about May 4 , 2012 ." NYCCHR Compl. ~ 9. The Complaint
filed in the instant action states the incident occurred in
April 2012. Notice of Removal at 10. They are the same incident.
Be nn e t Deel ., Ex . Bat 63-64 ("Black Tr ." ).
1

10

sexual in natur e in the context of the workplace environment
where horseplay regularly occurred. Id . at 8 5 . Moreover ,
Defendant lacked the legally required notice required to impute
liability. Id .

Black fully litigated his harassment and discrimination
claims with respect to the DeOca and Cruz incidents before the
NYC CHR . New York City Human Rights Law provides:
any p e rson c laiming to be aggrieve d by an unlawful
discriminatory practice .
. sh a ll have a cause of action
in any court of competent jurisdiction .
. un l ess such
pers o n has filed a complaint with the city commission on
human rights or with the state di v ision o f human rights
with respect to such alleged unlawful discriminatory
practi c e o r act of discriminator y harassment o r violen c e .
New Yo rk City, N.Y . , Code§ 8 - 50 2 (emphasis added) . 2

In short, the election of remedies provision erects a
jurisdictional bar to relitigati o n of claims that have b e en
brought before the NYCCHR and f o und t o be without probable
cause. See MacEntee v . IBM (Int ' l Bus . Machines) , 783 F. Supp .
2d 434,

447

(S . D. N.Y . 2 011) aff'd sub n om. MacEntee v. IBM , 471

F. App ' x 4 9 (2d Cir. 2 012) cert. denied 133 S . Ct . 985, 184

New York Human Rights Law p r ovides simi lar l y :
Any p erson c l aimi ng to b e agg ri eved by an u nlawfu l di scr imi natory
practice shall h ave a ca u se of action in any court of app r opriate
jurisdiction . . . unless such person had fi l ed a compla in t hereunder
or with any local commi ssion o n human rights .
N. Y. Exec . Law§ 297(9) .
2

11

L.Ed.2d 774 , reh ' g denied 133 S . Ct . 1751 , 185 L . Ed.2d 805
(""Because the [New York State Division of Human Rights]
dismissed [Plaintiff ' s ] claims for a lack of probable cause ,
Plaintiff is barred from re -l itigat i ng the same c l aims in this
Court. " ). Removing any doubt, the Second Ci rcuit has made clear
that "the language of the [City Human Rights Law]

is nearly

identica l to that of§ 297(9), and discussion of the l atter
applies equally to the former . " York v . Ass ' n of Bar of City of
New York , 286 F.3d 122 , 127 (2d Cir. 2002)

(citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). "Thus, by the terms of the
statute and code , respectively , the [New York state and City
Human Rights Law ] claims , once brought before [a human rights
agency ], may not be brought again as a plenary action in another
court . " Id.

(citation omitted) .

Whether the claims for relief in Pla i nt i ff ' s instant
complaint can be read to arise under different statute than the
NYCCHR claim does not save the claim from the election of
remedies bar. A different pled form of re l ief arising out of the
same incident forming the basis of the claims before the Agency
is likewise barred by the election of remedies provision . Borum
v . Vill . of Hempstead , 590 F. Supp. 2d 376 , 383

(E . D. N.Y. 2008)

"Plaintiff cannot substantively litigate his claims before a
competent state agency , then circumvent the concomitant
12

jurisdictional bar by pleading the same events but checking a
different box on the next effort." Turner v. Concourse Vill .,
Inc . , No . 12 CIV. 8739 (RWS), 2016 WL 345575 , at *4

(S.D . N . Y.

Jan. 27 , 2016).

The incident with Martinez was not litigated before the
NYCCHR . However, the statute of limitations on any c l aim arising
from the Martinez incident has since lapsed . "A civil action
commenced under [New York City Human Rights Law] must be
commenced within three years after the alleged unlawful
discriminatory practice or act of discriminatory harassment or
violence as set forth in chapter six of this title occurred. "
New York City , N.Y ., Code§ 8-502(d) . 3 Under the law of New York
state , "[a]ny complaint filed pursuant to [New York Human Rights
Law] must be so filed within one year after the alleged unlawful
discriminatory practice . " N. Y. Exec. Law§ 297(5) . The Complaint
alleges the incident with Martinez occurred in "August of 2010. "

3

The statute of limitations on a claim is to l led upon the filing
of a petition with a human rights agency . New York City , N. Y. ,
Code§ 8-502(d) ; Pan Am . World Airways , Inc . v . New York State
Human Rights Appeal Bd . , 61 N. Y. 2d 542 , 549 , 463 N. E . 2d 597 , 600
( 1984) (addressing state human rights law claim) . However ,
" tolling applies only to the discriminatory practices alleged in
the administrative complaint."Kazimierski v. New York Univ . , 11
Misc . 3d 1087(A) , 819 N. Y. S . 2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 2006) . The Martinez
incident cannot be deemed to have been tolled by a NYCCHR
petition that did not allege it .
13

Compl. at 10. Any state claim that might be read from
Plaintiff's 2014 complaint arising from the incident with
Martinez is therefore barred by the statute of limitations.

With respect to any claim arising from the Martinez
incident under Title VII , "[a]n aggrieved employee wishing to
bring a Title VII claim in district court must file an
administrative complaint with the EEOC within 300 days of the
alleged discriminatory act." Petrosino v . Bell Atl ., 385 F.3d
210, 219 (2d Cir. 2004)

(citing Elmenayer v . ABF Freight Sys .,

Inc., 318 F . 3d 130, 133 (2d Cir.2003)

(citing 42 U. S.C .

§

2000e-

5(e))). Because Black did not allege any claim in his NYCCHR
complaint arising from the Martinez incident , the statute of
limitations was not tolled. Any federal claim Black may have had
therefore lapsed 300 days after the Martinez event occurred .

To the extent Plaintiff raises a claim of hostile work
environment stemming from the three events, the complaint fails
to plead the elements necessary to sustain such a claim .
"In order to prevail on a hostile environment sexual
harassment claim under Title VII , a plaintiff must
establish two elements . First, she must prove that the
harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
the conditions of the victim ' s employment and create an
abusive working environment . . . . Second , the plaintiff must
show that a specific basis exists for imputing the conduct
that created the hostile environment to the employer . "

14

Perry v . Ethan Allen , Inc . , 115 F . 3d 143 , 149 (2d Cir . 1997)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff has not made any allegations or pled any facts
tending to show severity or pervasiveness, and has not addressed
imputation of liability to Defendant . " Isolated , minor acts or
occas i onal episodes do not warrant relief . " Brennan v . Metro .
Opera Ass'n , Inc. , 192 F.3d 310 , 318

(2d Cir . 1999)

(citations

omitted) . "For [New York Human Rights Law ] liability . . . the
primary issue for a trier of fact in harassment cases, as in
other terms and conditions cases , is whether the plaintiff has
proven by a preponderance of the evidence that she has been
treated less well than other employees because of her gender ."
Williams v. New York City Hous . Auth . , 61 A.D . 3d 62 , 7 8 , 872
N. Y.S . 2d 27

(2009) . Plaintiff fails to meet this lower burden,

as he pleads no facts or even conclusions suggesting he was
treated differently than other employees on the basis of his
gender or any other protected class membership .

Because Black ' s claims arising from the DeOca and Cruz
incidents are jurisdictionally barred by the election of
remedies doctrine, because any claim of harassment or
discrimination arising from the Martinez i ncident is time barred, and because Plaintiff fails to plead th e e l emen ts of
15

hostile work environment , Defendant ' s motion for summary
judgment is granted with respect to these c l aims.

B.

Wrongful Termination Due to Retaliation or

Discrimination

As discussed above, "[b]efore commencing a Title VII
action, a plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies ....
Courts may only hear claims that were raised in the underlying
administrative charge. " Bailey v. Colgate - Palmolive Co ., No . 99
CIV . 3228

(CBM) , 2003 WL 21108325 , at *12

2003) , aff'd ,

93 F . App ' x 321

(S.D .N. Y. May 14,

(2d Cir. 2004). Plaintiff was

terminated after his adjudication before the NYCCHR . He did not
thereafter file a wrongful termination or retaliation claim with
the EEOC.

Failure to exhaust underlying administrative remedies may
be excused for claims "reasonably related " to those brought in
the underlying charge , including unasserted claims alleging
retaliation for filing of the underlying charge . Id . However,
where the plaintiff ' s underlying EEOC claim "mak[es] no
reference to retaliatory conduct on the part of defendant,

[and]

is bereft of any factual allegation from which one could infer
that plaintiff is asserting retaliation ," the "reasonably
16

related" safety valve does not apply. Id. at 12-13. This is
precisely the case where there is no mention of retaliatory
conduct exists in the NYCCHR petition, as Plaint iff' s
termination occurred afterward. Accordingly, any wrongful
termination claim on the basis of retaliation must be dismissed
for failure to exhaust remedies. See id.

With respect to any wrongful termination claim stemmin g
from discrimination that may be deemed reasonably related to
what Plaintiff did bring before the EEOC, Plaintiff has failed
to plead any facts giving rise to an inference of discrimination
sufficient to support a plausible claim of termination on this
basis. In New York and under Title VII , "[t]o establish a prima

facie case of intentional discrimination, a plaintiff must show:
(1) that he is a member of a protected class ;
qualified for the position he held;

(2) that he was

(3) that he suffered an

adverse employment action; and (4) t h at the adverse acti o n took
place under circumstances giving rise to an inference of
d is criminat i on. " Wright v. City of Syracuse , 611 F. App'x 8 , 11
(2d Cir. 2015) . Plaintiff pleads no adverse action or any facts
suggesting adverse action except his termination. However, even
if the incidents in question const itute harassment, Plaintiff
pursued a reporting and accountability process, subsequently
ha vi ng productive discussions with management about the events .
17

Even if he was dissatisf i ed wi t h the ultimate response , there
are no facts to ra i se an inference that the termination was on
the basis of his membership in a protected class .

Accordingly , summary judgment is granted and any wrongful
termination claim is dismissed .

C.

Plaintiff's Claims Regarding Breach of the Collective

Bargaining Agreement Remain

Plaintiff ' s complaint alleges " defendant A- B IN BEV has
breached there responsibi l

[sic] . " Comp l. at 13 . Defendants are

aware that Pl aint i ff has raised a c l aim that he " was wrongfully
terminated on June 1 4 , 2013 due to his absence from work for
more than one (1) year , u nder the re l evant prov i sions of the
applicab l e collect i ve bargaining agreement .. . and t h at
plaintiff ' s Union representative , de f endant Ange l Martinez ,
failed to represent his i nterests . " Notice of Remova l at 2 ,

~

3.

Defendants submit " Pl a i nt i ff ' s asserted c l aim of wrongful
discharge against defendant Anheuser - Busch is necessarily
dependent upon interpret i ng the terms of provisions of the
applicab l e co l lect i ve bargaining agreement ," Id. ,

~

6 , using the

agreement as grounds to invoke this court ' s jurisdict i on . Id. ,
~~

6- 10 .

In light of th i s fact and the l aw that Pl aintiff ' s
18

complaint must be read to raise the strongest claims it
suggests , Olle , 332 F. Supp . 2d at 607 , the Court interprets
Black ' s complaint to raise a claim that his termination was in
breach of the collective bargaining agreement.

Defendant has sought summary judgment for sexual harassment
and discrimination, host il e work environment , and retaliation .
See Def . 's Mem . of Law. Although Defendant ' s motion papers
allege that Black was terminated pursuant to the agreement,
summary judgment was not sought on breach of contract claims .
The burden of demonstrating summary judgment is appropriate is
on defendant . Amaker, 274 F . 3d 677 , 681 (2d Cir . 2001) ; see also
Vermont Teddy Bear , 373 F . 3d at 244; Holtz , 258 F . 3d at 74 n . 1
(2d Cir . 2001); Booker , 2003 W 1213148, at *12 ; Mattel , 229
L
F.Supp.2d at 320 . No argument having been made that summary
judgment is appropriate with respect to any contract related
claims , these claims survive.

V.

Plaintiff ' s Discovery Requests are Denied

Plaintiff has requested surveillance footage relating to
his interactions with Cruz , DeOca , Martinez, and related to a
"new informationu incident in June 2012 invo l ving an

19

"inappropriate toy." Pl. ' s letter filed March 18 , 2016 at 1- 2 .
Plaintiff also requests information as to "what action
constitutes workplace horseplay and what action constitutes
unlawful b e havior," id . at 2, and documents related to the Cruz ,
DeOca, and Martinez incidents . Each of these requests relates
solely to Plaintiff ' s discrimination, harassment , and wrongful
termination claims . Further , in so far as their occurrence
relates to any breach of contract claim, Defendant has admitt ed
th e m. Th e requ ests are therefore denied as moot as they r e l ate
to the now dismissed claims , and irrelevant as they relate to
any remaining c laims .

20

VI.

Conclusion

As set forth above, Defendant's motion for summary judgment
is granted with respe c t to Plaintiff's harassment,
discrimination , retaliation, hostile work environment, and
wrongful termination claims. Plaintiff ' s claim(s) of breach of
contract remain. This opinion resolves ECF No. 47.

It is so ordered .

New York, NY
July I!( , 2016
U.S.D.J.

21