Kanayama v. Kesy LLC et al

Filing 42

OPINION & ORDER re: 23 FIRST MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction by Plaintiffs FIRST MOTION to Remand by Plaintiffs filed by Masahide Kanayama, 31 MOTION TO ENFORCE A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION file d by Masahide Kanayama: For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' motion to remand their first, second, third, fourth, and fifth claims back to New York County Supreme Court is granted. Therefore, the Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to remand those claims to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County. The motion for contempt remains pending and will have to be addressed by the state court upon remand. (Signed by Judge John F. Keenan on 3/30/2015) (tn)

USDC SDNY
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC #: _________________
DATE FILED: Mar. 30, 2015

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT YORK
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-----------------------------------X
-----------------------------------------------------------x
MASAHIDE KANAYAMA, and WEBER 1005, :
In
:
08 Civ. 7831 (PAC)
LLC, re FANNIE MAE 2008 SECURITIES
LITIGATION
09 MD 2013 (PAC)
::
:
Plaintiffs,
:
OPINION & 3405
::
No. 14 Civ.ORDER (JFK)
-----------------------------------------------------------x
-against:
:
OPINION & ORDER
KESY LLC, PROVENCE WELLNESS CENTER :
LLC, and BOARD OF MANAGERS OF THE :
HONORABLE PAUL A. CROTTY, United States District Judge:
WEBER HOUSE CONDOMINIUM,
:
:
Defendants.
:
BACKGROUND1
-----------------------------------X

The
APPEARANCES early years of this decade saw a boom in home financing which was fueled, among
For Plaintiffs Masahide Kanayama and Weber 1005, LLC:
other things, by low interest rates and lax credit conditions. New lending instruments, such as
HOROWITZ SIGMOND LLP
subprime By: Carol A. Sigmond and Alt-A mortgages (low-documentation loans)
mortgages (high credit risk loans)
For boom going. Provence Wellness Center on
kept the Defendant Borrowers played a role too; they tookLLCunmanageable risks on the
PILLINGER MILLER TARALLO, LLP
By: Laurence G. McDonnell
assumption that the market would continue to rise and that refinancing options would always be

available in the future. Lending discipline was lacking in the
JOHN F. KEENAN, United States District Judge:system. Mortgage originators did
not hold these high-risk mortgagePlaintiffs’ motions rising risk on their books, the
Before the Court are loans. Rather than carry the to remand this
originators sold their County Supreme mortgage market, often as securitized
action to New Yorkloans into the secondary Court and for a finding ofpackages
known against Defendant Provence MBS markets grew almost
contempt as mortgage-backed securities (“MBSs”).Wellness Center for exponentially.
But then the housing bubble April 2006, the preliminary
violating the state court’s burst. In 4, 2014demand for housing dropped abruptly
and home prices began to reasons of the follow, Plaintiffs’ motion to
injunction. For the fall. In lightthat changing housing market, banks modified their
lending denied in part and granted in part. Since the Court
remand ispractices and became unwilling to refinance home mortgages without refinancing.
remands the state law causes of action that underpin the
1

Unless otherwise indicated, all references motion for the “Complaint” are to have to be
preliminary injunction, the cited as “(¶ _)” or tocontempt will the Amended Complaint,
dated June 22, 2009. For purposes of this Motion, all allegations in the Amended Complaint are taken as true.

addressed by the state court upon remand.

1

I. Background
A. Facts
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are drawn from
the amended state court complaint.

Plaintiff Masahide Kanayama

is a licensed physician and citizen of New York.

He is also the

managing member of Plaintiff Weber 1005, LLC (“Weber 1005”),
which owns the fifth floor — where Kanayama conducts his medical
practice — in the Weber House Condominium at 150 East 55th
Street in Manhattan.

Weber 1005 is a New York limited liability

company with a principal place of business in New York.
Defendant Board of Managers of the Weber House Condominium
(“the Weber House Board”) formed and exists under New York’s
Real Property Law article 9-B.
Condominium.

It operates the Weber House

Defendants KESY LLC (“KESY”) and Provence Wellness

Center LLC (“Provence Wellness”) are New York limited liability
companies with their principal places of business in New York.
KESY and Provence Wellness allegedly share a common owner, and
KESY owns the sixth floor of the Weber House Condominium, where
Provence Wellness operates a spa providing high colonic
therapies directly above Kanayama’s medical office.
Plaintiffs allege that in 2007 they sought and were granted
permission by the Weber House Board to install three handwashing sinks in Kanayama’s office, but only after he agreed to

2

install waterproof floors and a leak alarm.

That same year, the

Weber House Board denied Plaintiffs’ request to install a waste
line to serve Kanayama’s office through the ceiling of the
fourth floor (i.e., the floor below his office).

Instead,

Plaintiffs installed an interior water pump and waste line fully
contained within the fifth floor.
In 2009, despite Kanayama’s objections, the floor above him
was rezoned as a “Physical Culture Establishment” so that
Provence Wellness could operate a spa.

Again over his

objections, the Weber House Board allowed Provence Wellness to
install wet facilities such as a shower, washing machine, and
toilets over his office.

Plaintiffs allege that although these

installations were supposedly conditioned on the installation
and use of waterproof floors and a leak alarm, the Weber House
Board never confirmed or inspected the installations, floors, or
alarms, which are all either nonexistent or deficient.
At some unspecified time, KESY and Provence Wellness
installed a waste line through Plaintiffs’ ceiling, over
Plaintiffs’ objections.

Plaintiffs allege that this was

accomplished by persons entering their floor without permission
to complete the installation.

Despite repeated demands to

remove the waste lines, they remain on Plaintiffs’ floor.

In

the three years prior to the filing of the complaint, Plaintiffs
allege that their office has been flooded from above thirteen
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times, causing water damage to the office, including the
presence of mold.

Plaintiffs allege that, despite repeated

requests, Defendants have not taken reasonable steps to prevent
these leaks.
B. Procedural History
On March 17, 2014, Kanayama filed his complaint in New York
County Supreme Court.

He asserted six causes of action:

(1) trespass of KESY and Provence Wellness’s waste line;
(2) trespass by the leaks emanating from KESY and Provence
Wellness’s floor; (3) nuisance by the repeated leaks emanating
from KESY and Provence Wellness’s floor; (4) damages for
destruction of property caused by the repeated leaks; (5) breach
of fiduciary duty by the Weber House Board for allowing the
leaks to continue unabated and causing a constructive eviction;
and (6) racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 because
Plaintiffs alleged that the Weber House Board has treated them
disparately from KESY and Province Wellness based on race.
Since the overlap of the state and federal claims
determines whether a court has supplemental jurisdiction, and
because the state claims are rather straightforward, the Court
will set out Plaintiffs’ lone federal claim in more detail.
Plaintiffs allege that they were the victim of racial bias
because the Weber House Board (a) required Plaintiffs to install
waterproof floors and alarms, but did not require KESY and
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Provence Wellness to prove it installed them; (b) violated its
own policies when it assisted KESY and Provence in planning the
trespass of the waste-line pipe; (c) exceeded its authority when
it consented to the rezoning of the sixth floor to allow
Provence Wellness to open a spa; and (d) has failed to take
steps to ameliorate the flooding from the sixth floor.
Plaintiffs believe this is because Kanayama is of Japanese
descent and the owner of KESY and Provence Wellness is white.
(Sigmond Aff. ¶ 6 n.1.)

Plaintiffs claim that the above

demonstrates that the Weber House Board does not enforce and
apply its Declaration and By-Laws in a nondiscriminatory manner.
Kanayama served Defendants on March 19, 2014.1

On April 4,

2014, the state court granted a preliminary injunction, ordering
Defendant “by any reasonable means at their disposal, to stop
liquid from leaking from their sixth floor premises into
plaintiff’s fifth floor office in the subject building.”
(McDonnell Aff. Ex. A.)

Kanayama then filed an amended

complaint on April 8, 2014, adding Weber 1005, LLC as a
plaintiff.

Weber 1005 joined Kanayama in asserting the same six

claims from the original complaint.

1

Defendants received the

Provence Wellness asserts that they were served on March 20, 2000
[sic]. (Notice of Removal ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs have submitted their
affidavits of service, which reflect that all three defendants were
served on March 19, 2014. (Sigmond Aff. Ex. A.) Provence Wellness
does not contest this date in its opposition.

5

amended complaint through the state court’s electronic filing
system.
Defendant Provence Wellness filed its notice of removal
with this Court on May 12, 2014.

Removal was based on federal

question jurisdiction because of Plaintiffs’ claim of racial
discrimination against the Weber House Board under 42 U.S.C. §
1981.
On May 21, 2014, Plaintiffs submitted a letter to the Court
that sought “leave to bring a motion to remand this action” or,
in the alternative, remand only the state claims back to state
court. (ECF No. 7)
2014.

Defendants responded by letter on May 29,

On June 2, 2014, the Court entered an order:

“There is

no need for a pre-motion conference for the contemplated motion.
Plaintiffs may make their motion to remand.” (ECF No. 8.)

After

two failed filing attempts on June 27, 2014 and July 2, 2014
(ECF Nos. 16–17.), Plaintiffs successfully filed their motion to
remand on July 7, 2014. (ECF No. 23.)
On January 30, 2015, Plaintiffs wrote to the Court,
requesting a pre-motion conference to discuss a new preliminary
injunction, again seeking to prevent further flooding of
Kanayama’s office.

Plaintiffs allege that the sixth floor

flooded Kanayama’s office again on January 20, 2015. (McDonnell
Aff. Ex. A.)

On February 5, 2015, the Court entered an order

allowing Plaintiffs to proceed with their motion without a
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conference and requesting that the parties address the status of
the state court preliminary injunction in their motion papers.
(ECF No. 28.)
II. Discussion
A. Remand for Untimely Removal
1. Legal Standard
On a motion for remand, the burden is on the defendant to
establish that removal was appropriate. See Cal. Pub. Emps.’
Ret. Sys. v. WorldCom, Inc., 368 F.3d 86, 100 (2d Cir. 2004).
The removal requirements are construed narrowly, and any doubts
are resolved against removal. See In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl
Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 488 F.3d 112, 124 (2d Cir.
2007).
A defendant may remove an action based on diversity or
federal question jurisdiction from a state court to a federal
district court by filing a notice of removal in the federal
court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).

Such a notice of removal “shall

be filed within 30 days after” receipt of the initial pleading
through formal service. Id. § 1446(b)(1); see also Murphy Bros.,
Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 348 (1999).
Courts “rigorously enforce” this mandatory 30-day statutory
requirement. Burr ex rel Burr v. Toyota Motor Credit Co., 478 F.
Supp. 2d 432, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

7

Subject to limitations not relevant here, if the initial
pleading is not removable on its face, then a defendant may
remove the action within 30 days of receiving a copy of the
amended pleading (or other paper) that reveals that the case is
removable. See id. § 1446(b)(3).

After filing of the notice of

removal, the defendant must also “promptly” inform adverse
parties and file a copy of the notice of removal with the state
court clerk. Id. § 1446(d).
A plaintiff seeking to remand a case back to state court
also has a deadline to keep in mind.

A motion to remand must be

made within 30 days of the filing of the notice of removal,
unless there is a defect in subject matter jurisdiction, in
which case the action must be remanded if the defect is
identified before final judgment. Id. § 1447(c).

While the 30-

day period in § 1446(b)(1) is strict, the 30-day deadline in
§ 1447(c) is stricter:

failure to move for remand within 30-

days of removal based on any nonjurisdictional defect results in
waiver of those defects. See Hamilton v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co.,
5 F.3d 642, 643 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[A]ll motions for remand —
except those based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction — must
be made within 30 days after removal or they are waived.”)
Failure to file the notice of removal within 30 days of
receipt of a removable pleading is a procedural defect rather
than a jurisdictional one. See Flood v. CSX Transp., Inc., No.
8

11 Civ. 162, 2012 WL 464189, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2012).
Thus, a motion premised on that defect is waived if not asserted
within the thirty-day window provided by § 1447(c).
2. Analysis
The initial complaint was removable because it contained a
federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See § 1441(c); see also
Williams-Velasquez v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., No. 99 Civ. 738,
2003 WL 22038567, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2003) (noting subject
matter jurisdiction over § 1981 claim).

That the amended

complaint added Weber 1005 is irrelevant, since the initial
complaint was already removable on its face. See In re Methyl
Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00 Civ.
1898, MDL 1358, 2006 WL 1004725, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2006)
(“Merely naming two new plaintiffs does not restart defendants’
removal clock because the essential nature of the case has not
changed.”).

Provence Wellness points to nothing else in the

amended complaint that would suggest it provided “a new basis
for removal” or changed “the character of the litigation so as
to make it substantially a new suit,” such that the right to
remove could be revived. MC Bldg. Materials, Ltd. v. Paychex,
Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 740, 744 (W.D.N.Y. 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also MTBE Prods Liab. Litig., 2006
WL 1004725, at *3 (“Where the pleading amendments do not change
the ‘target’ of a plaintiff’s attack, the basic legal theory of
9

the case, or the ‘nature of the relief sought’ there is no
revival.”)
Similarly, although Provence Wellness avers that Plaintiffs
received a copy of the notice of removal before the 30 days
expired, that is insufficient because the notice of removal must
be “filed” within the 30 days. See § 1446(b).

A paper is not

“filed” until it is delivered to the court — either to the clerk
or a judge. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d)(2).

Mailing a copy to

plaintiff therefore does not satisfy the filing requirement.
There is thus no doubt that Defendant Provence Wellness’s
notice of removal was untimely.

Provence Wellness does not

dispute that Kanayama served it with the initial complaint on
March 19, 2014.

Since the 30-day window to remove opened on

that date, Provence Wellness had until April 18, 2014, a Friday,
to remove the action.

Defendant did not file its notice of

removal until twenty-four days later on May 12, 2014.

The

notice of removal itself purports to be timely “exclusive of
legal holidays and days when the court was closed” (Notice of
Removal ¶ 3.), but Rule 6(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure prevents such a reading. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
6(a)(1)(B) (“[C]ount every day, including intermediate
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays . . . .”)

Indeed, legal

holidays and weekends only come into effect if the thirtieth day

10

falls on one, which was not the case here. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
6(a)(1)(C).
The filing of a late notice of removal, however, does not
automatically mean that remand is appropriate.

As discussed

above, a late filing is not a jurisdictional defect and may
therefore be waived. See Phx. Global Ventures, LLC v. Phx. Hotel
Assocs., Ltd., 422 F.3d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 2005); Bedminster Fin.
Grp., Ltd. v. Umami Sustainable Seafood, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 5557,
2013 WL 1234958, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2013); Flood, 2012 WL
464189, at *2.

Plaintiffs are wrong when they state that

failure to timely remove an action to federal court is
jurisdictional.

The case they cite for that proposition does

not so hold, and, unlike here, there was no dispute that the
motion to remand was filed within the 30-day window so there was
no question of waiver. See Hallenback v. Transgas, Inc., 53 F.
Supp. 2d 543, 544 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).
Plaintiffs waived their ability to seek remand on the basis
of untimely removal by ignoring their own 30-day deadline to
remand for such a defect. See § 1447(c).

Since Defendant

removed this action on May 12, 2014, Plaintiffs had until June
11, 2014 to move for remand on the basis of a procedural defect.
Plaintiffs did not successfully file their motion until July 7,
2014, twenty-five days late.

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Plaintiffs make two arguments that they hope will excuse
their lateness.

Neither is persuasive.

First, they claim that

their lateness should be excused because they made two previous
attempts to file their motion via the Court’s electronic case
filing system on June 27, 2014 and July 2, 2014.

To be sure,

the Court has the power to excuse technical filing defects when
considering a motion to remand. See Phx. Global Ventures, 422
F.3d at 76 (“Our decision today simply recognizes the district
court’s authority to excuse [Plaintiff’s] failure to comply with
the ECF system requirements and thus deem the motion made at the
time when, but for this noncompliance, the motion would have
been made.”)

But this is not such a case since both of

Plaintiffs’ previous attempts were also untimely.
Second, Plaintiffs contend that the time to remand should
be tolled because they requested leave to file their motion on
May 21, 2014.

The one case that Plaintiffs cite for support

does not help them.

In Federal Insurance Co. v. Tyco

International Ltd., the motion to remand was filed within the
30-day window but “was denied without prejudice merely for
failure to comply with the Court’s individual practices, which
require a moving party to submit a pre-motion letter outlining
the basis for the motion and requesting a pre-motion
conference.” 422 F. Supp. 2d 357, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

12

Thus, it

was more analogous to a technical filing defect.

Plaintiffs are

not entitled to tolling.
Moreover, the Court sees no reason to extend the reasoning
in Federal Insurance to this case.

Neither Section 1447 nor the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure definitively answer when a
motion is “made” beyond tying it to the filing of the motion
with the court. See Phx. Global Ventures, 422 F.3d at 75–76.
But it is clear from the text of Plaintiffs’ letter, the Court’s
order, and Plaintiffs’ filing of a separate notice of motion
that the letter itself was not the making of a motion.
Plaintiff’s letter sought “leave” to file a remand motion and
gave no indication that it was meant as a motion.

The Court’s

order gave permission to “make” the “contemplated motion,”
indicating that a motion had not yet been made.

Finally,

Plaintiffs betrayed no misapprehension when they later filed
their notice of motion and supporting documentation without
seeking further clarification from the Court.
After the Court granted leave to move without a pre-motion
conference, Plaintiffs had nine days to make their motion.

Even

if the Court were to give Plaintiffs the benefit of their first
rejected filing, Plaintiffs were still over two weeks late.

The

Court sees no reason to exercise whatever discretion it may have
to excuse the late filing. See also Scantek Med., Inc. v.
Sabella, No. 08 Civ. 453, 2008 WL 2518619, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y.
13

June 24, 2008).

Therefore, because of Plaintiffs’ clear

tardiness under § 1447(c), the Court cannot grant remand on the
basis of Provence Wellness’s obvious failure to timely comply
with § 1446(b)(1).
B. Remand of the State Law Claims
1. Legal Standard
Federal courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
state law claims where the state law claims are “so related to
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they
form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of
the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Put

another way, the state and federal claims should arise from a
“common nucleus of operative fact.” LaChapelle v. Torres, 37 F.
Supp. 3d 672, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

Supplemental jurisdiction is

thus appropriate where there is a substantial overlap of the
federal and state claims or “where presentation of the federal
claim necessarily brings the facts underlying the state claim
before the court.” Patel v. Baluchi’s Indian Rest., No. 08 Civ.
9985, 2009 WL 2358620, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2009).
However, that a court may entertain state claims that it
has supplemental jurisdiction over does not mean that it must
entertain them.

A district court may decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim where, inter

14

alia, the state law claim “substantially predominates” over
federal claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2).

“Once it appears that a

state claim constitutes the real body of a case, to which the
federal claim is only an appendage, the state claim may fairly
be dismissed” or, in this case, remanded. United Mine Workers of
Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 727 (1966); see also Carnegie-Mellon
Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988); Sherman v. Town of
Chester, No. 01 Civ. 8884, 2001 WL 1448613, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 15, 2001).

A court should not exercise this discretion,

however, “unless it also determines that [exercising
supplemental jurisdiction] would not promote the values . . .
[of] economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Oneida Indian
Nation of N.Y. v. Madison Cnty., 665 F.3d 408, 439 (2d Cir.
2011) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
2. Analysis
Although the Court has supplemental jurisdiction, it will
decline to retain it over the state law claims.

This is an

instance of state law issues dominating an overlapping federal
claim.
The Court has supplemental jurisdiction because the federal
discrimination claim will bring forth some of the facts that
would support the state law claims.

The federal claim is

premised on the Weber House Board’s alleged racial bias in
15

enforcing its Declaration and By-Laws.

To support their

disparate treatment, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that the
Weber House Board assisted KESY and Provence in planning the
trespass of the waste-line pipe and failed to take steps to
ameliorate the flooding from the sixth floor.

There is thus a

sufficient overlap with the state court claims because they
concern the trespass of the waste line and leaks, nuisance as a
result of the leaks, damages as a result of the leaks, and the
Weber House Board’s breach of its fiduciary duties in allowing
the trespass and nuisance to continue.
Although the Court finds an adequate overlap to justify its
supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims, this case is
plainly dominated by broken pipes and flooded floors, not
discrimination.

The federal claim is but a bit player in this

action starring Plaintiffs’ state claims, and the state claims
are suitable candidates for remand.
Provence Wellness argues, citing Kirschner v. Klemons, 225
F.3d 227 (2d Cir. 2000), that the state claims are “inexorably
intertwined” with “an anchoring federal question.” (Def. Mem.
8.)

But Kirschner only addressed whether the court had

supplemental jurisdiction, not whether it was appropriate to
decline to exercise it.

Provence Wellness is also wrong in

characterizing the state claims as factual predicates for the
discrimination claim.

Although Plaintiffs claim that the
16

continued trespass and nuisance demonstrate discrimination, they
also point to the Weber House Board exceeding its authority in
consenting to rezoning and not requiring KESY and Provence
Wellness to prove they installed waterproof floors or alarms,
neither of which need to be established for nuisance or
trespass.

Thus, trespass and nuisance are not essential to

Plaintiffs’ discrimination claim and there is no danger of
inconsistent verdicts.
Having concluded that the state claims may be remanded, the
Court next considers whether it should remand them.

Economy,

convenience, fairness, and comity suggest that remand of the
state claims is appropriate.

Chief among the Court’s

considerations is the fact that this case is still in the
initial stages of litigation.

Additionally, as discussed above,

there is no need for the state claims to be tried together with
the federal claim.

Although the state claims are rather

straightforward, Plaintiffs are also seeking to enforce a state
court preliminary injunction.

This Court finds principles of

comity suggest that the state court is in the better position to
interpret and enforce its own injunction.

Defendants point to

no other considerations that counsel against remand.

Therefore,

the Court will remand the state court claims.
Finally, the Court also notes that even if it were to
continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state
17

claims, as a practical matter it would just be waiting for the
other shoe to drop.

Plaintiffs have already indicated that in

the event their motion to remand was denied they were “prepared
to dismiss Count 6” in order to remove the federal claim from
this case. (Reply Aff. ¶ 8.)

Remand of the state claims would

almost certainly be appropriate then. See Valencia ex rel.
Franco v. Lee, 316 F.3d 299, 305 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[I]n the usual
case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before
trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent
jurisdiction doctrine — judicial economy, convenience, fairness,
and comity — will point toward declining to exercise
jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Maguire v. A.C. & S., Inc., --- F.
Supp. 3d ----, 2014 WL 6611748, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
Therefore, Plaintiffs’ motion to remand their state law
claims (i.e., their first through fifth claims) back to New York
County Supreme Court is granted.

Since Plaintiffs’ motion

concerning the state court preliminary injunction only concerns
their state court claims, the Court will not address it. See
Bloomfield v. MacShane, 522 F. Supp. 2d 616, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(“These motions remain pending for resolution by the state court
following remand.”)

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III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons,
their first,

Plaintiffs' motion to remand

second, third, fourth, and fifth claims back to New

York County Supreme Court is granted.

Therefore, the Clerk of

Court is respectfully directed to remand those claims to the
Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County.
The motion for contempt remains pending and will have to be
addressed by the state court upon remand.
SO ORDERED.

Dated:

New York, New York
March 30, 2015

John F. Keenan
United States District Judge

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