Cruz et al v. Zucker

Filing 52

OPINION: Accordingly, the Court granted defendant's motion to dismiss Count IV of the Amended Complaint. For the foregoing reasons, the Court, by Order dated June 26, 2015, dismissed Claims III and IV, and also dismissed Claim V with respect to the Youth Exclusion, but otherwise denied defendant's motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint. (Signed by Judge Jed S. Rakoff on 7/29/2015) (ama)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------------- x

ANGIE CRUZ, I.H., AR'ES KPAKA, and
.K.L :CP...

C:UKIO:STIB'

UH

L>ehc.>.1 L

v.L

themselves and all others similarly
situated,
Plaintiffs,
14-cv-4456 (JSR)
-v-

OPINION
HOWARD ZUCKER, as Commissioner of the
Department of Health [of the State of
New York],
Defendant.
------------------------------------- x
JED S. RAKOFF, U.S.D.J.
The intersection of our cognition with our emotions is both the
essence of our humanity and the source of our anxiety. According to
the plaintiffs in this class action, someone who is born with the
physical equipment of one sex but emotionally identifies as someone of
the opposite sex suffers severe anxiety and emotional distress that
may, however, be materially alleviated by available medical
procedures. Plaintiffs further contend that New York wrongly denies
Medicaid coverage for many such procedures, regarding them as merely
"cosmetic" or the like. The immediate question before the Court is
whether the plaintiffs here can sue for redress of this alleged wrong.
The Court concludes that they can.
Plaintiff Angie Cruz, now fifty years old, alleges that she was
assigned male at birth but has identified as female since she was ten
years old. See Amended Class Action Complaint dated March 27, 2015,
ECF No. 27

("Am. Compl.")

~~

91, 93. She began taking hormones as a

teenager in an effort to bring her physical appearance into alignment

with her gender identity and has undergone hormone therapy for much of
her adult life, purchasing her hormones sometimes from doctors and
pharmacies

ana some t:..Lmes

on

cne

scrt=t=L.

Iu.

~~

34 - ::is.

.A.1 thou'::::lh

Lhl;:;

therapy has given her body a more feminine appearance, she still
experiences intense distress and interference with her capacity for
normal activity as a result of the mismatch between her body and her
identity. Id.

~~

96, 99, 104-05. Cruz is a "categorically needy"

Medicaid recipient, meaning that she meets one of nine eligibility
categories set forth in the federal Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a) (10) (A) (i). Id.

~~

29,

91.

Plaintiff Ar' es Kpaka, also a categorically needy Medicaid
recipient, alleges that, although born with a male body, she has
identified as female since she was three years old. Id.

~

136. As an

adolescent, she hid her gender identity from her mother and brothers
until, at age twenty-one, she was forced to move out of her mother's
home and became homeless for several months. Id.

~

137. Now twenty-

three, she is undergoing hormone therapy but still struggles with
depression relating to her gender identity. Id.

~~

136, 138, 140.

Plaintiff Riya Christie alleges that, growing up in Jamaica, she
faced violence because of her gender expression and suffered from
severe depression and suicidal thoughts. Id.

~~

149-50. At the age of

twenty-one, she moved to the United States and was granted asylum on
the ground that her gender identity made it unsafe for her to return
home. Id.

~

152. Now twenty-three, she continues to experience pain

and anxiety as a result of the incongruence between her body and her

2

gender identity. Id. ~ 159. She, like Cruz and Kpaka,

is a

categorically needy Medicaid recipient. Id. ~ 136.
Each of the three named plaintiffs in this
diagnosed with Gender Dysphoria ("GD")
Identity Disorder) . 1 Id.

~~

class actlon has been

(formerly known as Gender

95, 138, 155. They allege that GD is

recognized by the medical community as "'an identifiable, severe and
incapacitating disease.'" Id.

~

(quoting D. Barish & B. Sharma,

80

Medical Advances in Transsexualism and the Legal Implications, 24 Am.
J. Forensic Med. & Pathology 100, 101 (2003)). It is defined in the

latest edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ("DSM-V") as a "marked
incongruence between one's experienced/expressed gender and assigned
gender," as manifested by at least two of the following:

(i) a "marked

incongruence between one's experienced/expressed gender and primary
and/or secondary sex characteristics ... ";

(ii) a "strong desire to be

rid of one's primary and/ or secondary sex characteristics ... ";

(iii)

"a

strong desire for the primary and/or secondary sex characteristics of
the other gender";

(iv) a "strong desire to be of the other gender ... ";

(v) a "strong desire to be treated as the other gender... "; and (vi) a
"strong conviction that one has the typical feelings and reactions of
the other gender ... " Id.

~

82 (quoting DSM-V

§§

302. 06, 302. 85). The

DSM-V further specifies that GD is "associated with clinically
significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other
important areas of functioning." Id.

1

One of the original named plaintiffs, I.H., subsequently withdrew as
3

Plaintiffs allege that,

in order to alleviate the profound

psychological suffering and social and occupational impairment that
they experience as a result

OL

their

GD,

they need certain treatments

to facilitate their transitions to the gender with which they
identify. The treatments they seek include breast augmentation, facial
feminizing surgery, chondrolarngoplasty (commonly referred to as
"tracheal shave"), body sculpting procedures, and electrolysis. Id. ~~
101, 141, 157. Plaintiffs allege that these treatments are safe,
effective, and medically necessary. Id.

~~

83-88. However, plaintiffs

allege, they have been denied access to the needed treatments because
such treatments are excluded from coverage under New York State's
Medicaid program. Id.

~~

103, 143, 158.

Prior to 1998, medical coverage was available under New York's
Medicaid program for the treatment of GD, including hormone treatment
and sex reassignment surgery. Id.

~

2. However, in 1998, the New York

State Department of Health ("DOH"), which is responsible for
administering the state's Medicaid program, promulgated 18 N.Y.C.R.R.
§

505.2(1), which barred payment for all "care, services, drugs or

supplies rendered for the purposes of gender reassignment" treatment
or for "promoting" such treatment ("Section 505.2(1)"). Id.
On June 19, 2014, plaintiffs filed a class action complaint on
behalf of themselves and all similarly situated individuals against
Dr. Howard Zucker, acting in his official capacity as Commissioner of
DOH, alleging that Section 505.2(1) violates various provisions of

class representative. ECF No. 28.
4

state and federal law. ECF No. 1. On August 21, 2014, the parties
agreed to a Provisional Stipulation and Order of Class Certification,
pursuant to which the Court

cert~f~ed

a

class

cons~st~ng

0£,

All New York State Medicaid recipients who have been
diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder or Gender Dysphoria,
and whose expenses associated with medically necessary
Gender
Identity Disorderor
Gender
Dysphoria-related
treatment are not reimbursable by Medicaid pursuant to 18
N.Y.C.R.R. § 505.2(1).
ECF No. 23. Subsequently, on December 17, 2014, DOH published a Notice
of Proposed Rule Making that proposed amendments to Section 505.2(1)
("Amended Section 505. 2 ( 1) ") .
The proposed Amended Section 505.2(1) lifted the blanket ban on
coverage for treatment of GD, making hormone therapy and gender
reassignment surgery available to certain Medicaid recipients. Am.
Compl.
31

~

5; Declaration of John Gasior dated April 17,

2015,

ECF No.

("Gasior Deel.") Ex. 1. However, it preserved two important

coverage exclusions. First, it excluded coverage for "cosmetic
surgery, services, and procedures," which it defined as "anything
solely directed at improving an individual's appearance," including
but not limited to certain enumerated procedures such as breast
augmentation, electrolysis, thyroid chondroplasty, and facial bone
reconstruction, reduction, or sculpturing (the "Cosmetic Procedures
Exclusion"). Gasior Deel. Ex. 1. Second, it did not provide coverage
for hormone therapy or gender reassignment surgery for individuals
under the age of eighteen, or for gender reassignment surgery for
individuals under the age of twenty-one where such surgery would

5

result in sterilization (the "Youth Exclusion"). Id.
The Amended Section 505.2(1) came into effect on March 11, 2015.
On March 27, 2015, plaintiffs filed their

Amended complalnt.

lt,

In

plaintiffs allege that the Amended Section 505.2(1) violates various
provisions of Title XIX of the Social Security Act

(the "Medicaid

Act"), the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA"), and the
New York State Constitution. Specifically, plaintiffs assert six
causes of action:

(I) violation of 42 U.S.C.
440.210

§

1396a(a) (10) (A) and its

implementing regulation, 42 C.F.R.

§

(the "Availability

Requirement" of the Medicaid Act);

(II) violation of 42 U.S.C.

1396a(a) (10) (B) and its implementing regulation, 42 C.F.R.
440. 240 (b)

§

§

(the "Comparability Requirement" of the Medicaid Act);

(III) violation of 42 U.S.C.

§§

1396a(a) (17), 1396a(a) (10) (B) (i) and

their implementing regulation, 42 C.F.R.

§

440.230(c)

Standards Requirement" of the Medicaid Act);

(the "Reasonable

(IV) violation of Article

I, Section 11 of the New York State Constitution, which guarantees
equal protection of the laws;

(V) Section 1557 of the ACA, 42 U.S.C. §

18116, which prohibits sex discrimination in the provision of
healthcare; and (VI) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (43), which
requires states to provide "early and periodic screening, diagnostic,
and treatment services" for eligible persons under the age of twentyone (the "EPSDT Requirement" of the Medicaid Act) . 2

Plaintiffs' sixth cause of action cites the Availability and
Comparability Requirements, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (10). See Am. Compl.
177. However, plaintiffs represented in their opposition to
defendant's motion that they intended to cite the EPSDT Requirement,
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (43), which is referenced in other paragraphs of
2

6

~

Defendant moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint. By "bottom
line" Order dated June 26, 2015, the Court granted in part and denied
in part defendant's

mot~on.

ECF NO.

46.

Th~s

Op~n~on

e=p1al=s

the

reasons for those rulings.
As discussed above, in their Amended Complaint, plaintiffs allege
violations of various provisions of the federal Medicaid Act. Medicaid
is a cooperative state and federal benefit program designed to provide
necessary medical services to "needy persons of modest income." Cmty.
Health Ctr. v. Wilson-Coker, 311 F.3d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 2002).
"'States need not participate in the program, but if they choose to do
so, they must implement and operate Medicaid programs that comply with
detailed federally mandated standards.'" Cmty. Health Care Ass'n of
N.Y. v. Shah, 770 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir. 2014)

(quoting Three Lower

Cnties. Cmty. Health Servs., Inc. v. Maryland, 498 F.3d 294, 297
Cir. 2007)

(4th

(internal quotation marks omitted)). States that elect to

receive federal Medicaid funds must submit a plan detailing how they
will spend such funds to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, a federal agency within the Department of Health and Human
Services. Wilson-Coker, 311 F.3d at 134 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396,
1396a). State Medicaid plans are subject to extensive requirements,
four of which are relevant here.

the Amended Complaint. Reading the Amended Complaint as a whole and
drawing all inferences in plaintiffs' favor, it is clear that the
citation to Section 1396a(a) (10) was merely a scrivener's error, and
the Court will treat it as such. Because of this error, defendant does
not make any argument with respect to the EPSDT Requirement. Defendant
has not been prejudiced by plaintiffs' error, however, as the Court
finds that the EPSDT Requirement gives rise to a private right of
7

Availability. The Availability Requirement provides that a state
plan for medical assistance "must provide ... for making medical
ass~stance

ava1lable

[to a l l categorlcally needy lr1dlvlduals] ,

including at least" certain enumerated types of care and services,
including inpatient and outpatient hospital services, laboratory and
x-ray services, nursing facility services, and physicians' services.
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (10) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a). Categorically needy
individuals are those meeting one of nine eligibility criteria, which
include, for example, receipt of supplemental security income benefits
and having an income that does not exceed 133 percent of the poverty
line. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (10) (A) (i) (I)- (IX).
The implementing regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 440.210, requires the
State plan to provide categorically needy individuals with the
"services defined in§ 440.10 through 440.50
provisions, in turn,

[and]

440.70." Those

further define the types of services that must be

provided. For example,

"inpatient hospital services" are defined as

services that "(1) are ordinarily furnished in a hospital for the care
and treatment of inpatients;

(2) are furnished under the direction of

a physician or dentist; and (3) are furnished in an [appropriate and
approved]

institution... " 42 C.F.R. § 440.10 (a). Similarly,

"physicians'

services" are defined as "services furnished by a physician-· [w]ithin
the scope of practice of medicine or osteopathy as defined by State
law; and ... [b] y or under the personal supervision of an individual

action. See infra.
8

licensed under State law to practice medicine or osteopathy." 42
C.F.R.

§

440.50(a).

The implementing regulations

~urther

provide,

ln re1evant part:

(b) Each service must be sufficient in amount, duration, and
scope to reasonably achieve its purpose.
(c) The Medicaid agency may not arbitrarily deny or reduce
the amount, duration, or scope of a required service under
§§ 440.210 and 440.220 to an otherwise eligible beneficiary
solely because of the diagnosis,
type of illness,
or
condition.
(d) The agency may place appropriate limits on a
necessity
based
on
such
criteria
as
medical
utilization control procedures.
42 C.F.R.

§

service
or
on

440.230.

Comparability. The Medicaid Act's Comparability Requirement
provides that "the medical assistance made available to any
[categorically needy individual] ... shall not be less in amount,
duration, or scope than the medical assistance made available to any
other such individual." 42 U.S.C.

§

1396a(a) (1) (B) (i). Its

implementing regulation provides that the state's "plan must provide
that the services available to any [categorically needy]

individual ...

are equal in amount, duration, and scope for all beneficiaries within
the [categorically needy] group." 42 C.F.R.

§

440.240(b). The purpose

of the Comparability Requirement is to make clear that "states may not
provide benefits to some categorically needy individuals but not to
others." Rodriguez v. City of New York, 197 F.3d 611, 615 (2d Cir.
1999) .

9

EPSDT. The Medicaid Act further requires a state plan for medical
assistance to provide "early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and
treatment services," including regular

screening for phyBlcal and

mental illnesses and conditions, to eligible individuals under the age
of twenty-one. 42 U.S.C.

§§

1396a(a) (43), 1396d(r). In addition, the

state plan must provide "[s]uch other necessary health care,
diagnostic services, treatment, and other measures ... to correct or
ameliorate defects and physical and mental illnesses and conditions
discovered by the screening services, whether or not such services are
covered under the State plan." 42 U.S.C.

§

1396d(r) (5).

Reasonable Standards. Finally, the Medicaid Act requires that the
state plan must "include reasonable standards ... for determining
eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance under the plan
which [] are consistent with the objectives of [the Medicaid Act]." 42
U.S.C.

§

1396a(a) (17). This subsection further sets forth certain

requirements for the "reasonable standards" that the state must adopt,
such as the types of income and resources that the state may take into
account in determining eligibility. Id.
Plaintiffs' claims alleging violations of the Availability
Requirement (Count I), the Comparability Requirement (Count II), and
the EPSDT Requirement (Count VI) of the federal Medicaid Act are
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§

1983

("Section 1983"), which provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia,
subjects,
or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights,
privileges,
or
immunities
secured
by
the
10

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress ...
42 U.S.C.

§

1983.

In

his motion to dismiss,

defendant

argued that

Section 1983 does not create a private right of action to enforce
these provisions, and therefore that plaintiffs' Counts I, II, and VI
must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
In Maine v. Thiboutot, the Supreme Court held that the Section
1983 remedy encompasses rights conferred by federal statutes. 448 U.S.
1, 4 (1980). Nonetheless,

"[i]n order to seek redress through§ 1983,

a plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely
a violation of federal law." Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340
(1997). In determining whether a particular statutory provision gives
rise to a federal right, courts apply a three-pronged test:

(1)

"Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit
the plaintiff";

(2)

"the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right

assertedly protected by the statute is not so 'vague and amorphous'
that its enforcement would strain judicial competence"; and (3)

"the

statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States,"
meaning it "must be couched in mandatory, rather than precatory,
terms." Id. at 340-41. If the plaintiff demonstrates that the federal
statute creates an individual right, the defendant many nonetheless
rebut the presumption that such right is enforceable via a Section
1983 action by showing that Congress "specifically foreclosed a remedy
under § 1983," either expressly or "impliedly, by creating a
comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual

11

enforcement under

§

1983." Id. at 341 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). This test is known as the "Blessing" test.
In Gonzaga University v.

Doe,

the Supreme Court

clarlfle~

~ha~.

with respect to the first prong of the Blessing test, it "reject[ed]
the notion that our cases permit anything short of an unambiguously
conferred right to support a cause of action brought under § 1983."
536 U.S. 273, 283

(2002). It was insufficient, the Court held, that

the "plaintiff falls within the general zone of interest that the
statute is intended to protect." Id. at 283. The Court reaffirmed that
"unless Congress 'speak[s] with a clear voice,' and manifests an
'unambiguous' intent to confer individual rights, federal funding
provisions provide no basis for private enforcement by
280

§

1983." Id. at

(quoting Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451

U.S. 1, 17, 28 and n.21 (1981)).
In arguing that provisions of the Medicaid Act cited by
plaintiffs do not create private rights of action under Section 1983,
defendant relies heavily on Casillas v. Daines, 580 F. Supp. 2d 235,
242

(S.D.N.Y. 2008). The plaintiff in that case, Terri Casillas, was a

New York State Medicaid recipient who had been diagnosed with GD, and
whose physicians had recommended that she undergo hormone therapy,
orchiectomy (removal of the testes) , and vaginoplasty (removal of the
penis and creation of a vagina). Id. at 237-38. She brought an action
under Section 1983 challenging the original Section 505.2(1) under the
Availability and Comparability Requirements of the Medicaid Act.3 Id.

3

Casillas also brought a Section 1983 claim alleging that Section
12

------~-------------

at 241-44. The court granted defendant's motion for judgment on the
pleadings, holding that neither provision created a right enforceable
under Section 1983.
With respect to the Availability Requirement, Casillas held that
neither the first nor the second prong of the Blessing test was met.
As to the first prong,

it held that, although the Availability

Requirement may confer certain rights on certain classes of persons,
it did not unambiguously confer the right that plaintiff asserted,
namely the right to receive the specific treatments for GD that had
been deemed medically necessary by her physicians. Id. at 241-43. The
court reasoned that the Availability Requirement requires states to
provide coverage for certain broad categories of medical services, but
does not "mandate that a particular level or type of care must be
provided." Id. at 242. In so finding,

it relied on Supreme Court's

decision in Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438

(1977),

for the proposition that

"nothing in the statute suggests that participating states are
required to fund every medical procedure that falls within the
delineated categories of medical care." Id.
444)

(quoting Beal, 4 3 2 U.S. at

(alteration omitted).
The Casillas court further reasoned that the right that plaintiff

asserted was inconsistent with the Availability Requirement's
implementing regulation, which allows states to "'place appropriate

505.2(1) violated the Reasonable Standards Requirement. Casillas, 580
F. Supp. 2d at 245-46. Because plaintiffs in this case bring their
claim relating to the Reasonable Standards Requirement under the
Supremacy Clause rather than Section 1983, this portion of the
Casillas decision is not directly relevant.
13

limits on a service based on such criteria as medical necessity or on
utilization control procedures.'" Id.
440.230(d)). These criteria, the court

(quoting 42 C.F.R.
held,

part~cularly

§
the

reference to "utilization control procedures," "capture[] concepts
that do not relate to the care of any one particular patient but looks
to actual or expected utilization over a broader population," and thus
indicate that the Availability Requirement is intended to prescribe
standards with which the state plan must comply rather than to create
individual rights. Id.
As to the second prong of the Blessing test, Casillas further
held that the phrase "utilization control procedures" was "so 'vague
and amorphous' that its enforcement would strain judicial competence."
Id. at 243

(quoting Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41). This term, the

court noted, is "susceptible to multiple plausible interpretations and
lacks a fixed meaning." Id. Moreover, it noted, the regulation permits
a state to rely on other unspecified criteria in crafting "appropriate
limits" on medical services, thereby compounding the vagueness
problem. Id.
Although in no way binding on this Court, Casillas is entitled to
this Court's respectful attention. But in the end,

the Court finds

itself in disagreement with that decision's reasoning and conclusions.
In particular, the Court concludes that the Availability Requirement
unambiguously confers on categorically needy individuals an individual

14

right to the medical services described in the statute and its
implementing regulations. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280.
As an initial matter,

Casillas's

reliance on Beal

is mlsp1aced.

That case concerned a Pennsylvania regulation that limited Medicaid
coverage for abortions to those that had been certified by the
recipient's physicians as medically necessary. Beal, 432 U.S. at 44142. In holding that the challenged regulation did not violate the
Medicaid Act, the Supreme Court focused on the fact that the excluded
procedures were not medically necessary. Id. at 440

(describing the

question presented as whether the Medicaid Act requires states to
"fund the cost of nontherapeutic abortions"

(emphasis added)) . It

expressly noted that denial of medically necessary treatment would
pose a very different question:

"Although serious statutory questions

might be presented if a state Medicaid plan excluded necessary medical
treatment from its coverage, it is hardly inconsistent with the
objectives of the Act for a State to refuse to fund unnecessary though
perhaps desirable medical services." Id. at 444-45 (emphasis added) . 4
Here, by contrast, plaintiffs allege that the treatments they seek are
medically necessary, and on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept
that allegation as true.

4

Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun in
dissent, interpreted the Medicaid Act to require coverage even for
elective abortions. Id. at 449 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As relevant
here, Justice Brennan interpreted the Medicaid Act to leave decisions
regarding medical treatment to the doctor and patient, not the state:
"the very heart of the congressional scheme is that the physician and
patient should have complete freedom to choose those medical
procedures for a given condition which are best suited to the needs of
the patient." Id. at 450 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
15

Regarding the first prong of the Blessing test, the language of
the Availability Requirement is expressly addressed to the needs of
indJ.Vl.dUa.L

Med.1.cal.d. bene.I:l.ciaries:

"[ci]

.SL.ace

plan ... mu::sL

pLuvlcte:

tor

making medical assistance available ... to all indi victuals" who meet
certain eligibility requirements. 42 U.S. C.

§

13 96a (a) ( 10) (A) . This is

precisely the "unmistakable focus on the benefited class" that the
Supreme Court, in Gonzaga, held would evince Congress's intent to
create an individual right. 536 U.S. at 284

(citation and internal

quotation marks omitted) . Indeed, the Third Circuit has found that
"the 'individual focus' of

[the Availability Requirement]

is

unmistakable." Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 190 (3d
Cir. 2004).
Although the Second Circuit has not had occasion to consider this
question, it has held that a similarly worded provision of the
Medicaid Act created a privately enforceable right. See Rabin v.
Wilson-Coker, 362 F.3d 190 (2004). The provision at issue in Rabin
granted a six-month extension of eligibility for medical assistance,
provided the recipient complied with certain reporting requirements:
"[E]ach State plan approved under this subchapter must
provide that each family which was receiving aid pursuant to
a plan of the State
in at least 3 of the 6 months
immediately preceding the month in which such family becomes
ineligible for such aid
shall
remain eligible for
assistance
under
the
plan
during
the
immediately
succeeding 6-month period."
Id. at 194

(quoting 42 U.S.C.

§

1396r-6(b)). The Second Circuit found

that, by focusing on individual (or family) entitlements rather than
high-level programmatic requirements, Congress intended to create an

16

enforceable right. Id. at 201-02. Given the grammatical similarity
between this provision and the Availability Requirement, it follows
that the Availability

Requirement also evinces

congressiona1

lntent

to

create an enforceable right.
Contrary to Casillas, nothing about the existence of this right
is inconsistent with the "appropriate limitsn clause of the
implementing regulations. 42 C.F.R.

440.230(d). That clause simply

§

provides that, like most rights, the right to the medical services
described in the Availability Requirement is not absolute. Rather, it
is subject to limits that the state may enact, consistent with the
discretion vested in the state by the statute. That discretion is not
boundless. The state may enact only "appropriaten limits, must provide
services that are "sufficient in amount, duration, and scope to
reasonably achieve [their] purpose,n and "may not arbitrarily deny or
reduce the amount, duration, or scope of a required service ... to an
otherwise eligible beneficiary solely because of the diagnosis, type
of illness, or condition.n 42 C.F.R.

§

440.230(b)-(d). These

provisions define the contours of the right; they do not negate its
existence.
Nor is this right so "vague and amorphousn as to be judicially
unmanageable under the second prong of the Blessing test. The
Availability Requirement and its implementing regulations set forth in
detail the services that states must provide to their needy residents,
and states' compliance with these requirements is objectively
measureable. See Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152, 1161 (9th Cir. 2006)

17

("[Sections 1396a(a) (10) and 1396d(a) supply concrete and objective
standards for enforcement; they are hardly vague and amorphous.").
CaS1llaS

rOUDd

that

the

term

-utlllzatlon

control

proce~ures,"

dB

used in the implementing regulations, was not judicially manageable.
Casillas, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 243. But courts have had no trouble
adjudicating whether a particular regulation is a valid utilization
control procedure. For example, in DeLuca v. Hammons,

927 F. Supp. 132

(S.D.N.Y. 1996), plaintiffs challenged a regulation, which the state
defended as a utilization control procedure, that limited home-care
services for new Medicaid recipients to twenty-eight hours per week.
Id. at 134. The court found that this arbitrary cap was "not
appropriate in that it discriminates among applicants and
intentionally fails to take into account the amount of services that
have been determined

to be necessary for the health and safety of

the patient." Id. at 136. See also, e.g., Davis v. Shah, No. 12-CV6134 CJS, 2013 WL 6451176, at *12

(W.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2013)

(holding

that regulation limiting access to medically necessary orthopedic
shoes and compression stockings based on diagnosis was not valid
utilization control procedure); Ladd v. Thomas, 962 F. Supp. 284, 294
(D. Conn. 1997)

(holding that requirement that Medicaid recipients

submit requests for prior authorization of durable medical equipment
to vendor was a valid utilization control procedure) .
Casillas further expressed concern that the implementing
regulation permits a state agency to place "appropriate limits" on
services based on unspecified other criteria. To be sure, this

18

provision grants the state a considerable measure of discretion. It
does not, however, render the asserted right entirely standardless.
For example, a limitation based on genuine health and safety concerns
would most likely be an "appropriate limit," whereas one based solely
on animus towards a disfavored class most certainly would not. Nothing
about this determination stretches the bounds of judicial competence.
Finally, regarding the third prong of the Blessing test, the
Availability Requirement is framed in mandatory terms. It provides
that state plans "must" make available the services described.
Provision of these services is not optional. Accordingly, the Court
finds that all three Blessing factors are met and the Availability
Requirement creates an individual right enforceable under Section
1983. 5

In so holding, the Court joins the overwhelming majority of courts,
both before and after Gonzaga, that have considered this question. See
Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 2006) ("No circui_t_
court has held that section 1396a(a) (10) does not create a section
1983 right."); Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180 (3d Cir.
2004); S.D. ex rel. Dickson v. Hood, 391 F.3d 581, 603 (5th Cir.
2004); Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Arkansas Dep't of Human
Servs., 293 F.3d 472, 478-79 (8th Cir. 2002); Westside Mothers v.
Haveman, 289 F.3d 852, 862-63 (6th Cir. 2002); Miller by Miller v.
Whitburn, 10 F.3d 1315, 1319 (7th Cir. 1993); Crawley v. Ahmed, No.
08-14040, 2009 WL 1384147, at *19 (E.D. Mich. May 14, 2009); Michelle
P. ex rel. Deisenroth v. Holsinger, 356 F. Supp. 2d 763, 767 (E.D. Ky.
2005); Health Care For All, Inc. v. Romney, No. CIV.A.00-10833-RWZ,
2004 WL 3088654, at *2 (D. Mass. Oct. 1, 2004); Memisovski ex rel.
Memisovski v. Maram, No. 92 C 1982, 2004 WL 1878332, at *11 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 23, 2004); Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 218 F.R.D. 277, 294
(N.D. Ga. 2003); Dajour B. v. City of New York, No. 00 CIV. 2044, 2001
WL 830674, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2001); cf. Bryson v. Shumway, 308
F.3d 79, 88-89 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that similarly worded
provision of Medicaid Act creates privately enforceable right); Doe 113 By & Through Doe, Sr. 1-13 v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 719 (11th Cir.
19 9 8) (same) .
5

19

With respect to the Comparability Requirement, the Court also
finds that all three Blessing factors are met. First, the statutory
language is squarely directed toward individual rights: "the

med~cal

assistance made available to any [categorically needy individual]
shall not be less in amount, duration, or scope than the medical
assistance made available to any other such individual." 42 U.S. C.

§

1396a(a) (1) (B) (i). The implementing regulations further provide that a
state Medicaid "plan must provide that the services available to any
individual in the following groups are equal in amount, duration, and
scope for all beneficiaries within the group:
needy.

(1) The categorically

(2) A covered medically needy group." 42 C.F.R.

§

440.240(b).

These provisions, like those of the Availability Requirement, focus on
the particular services that individual beneficiaries are entitled to
receive, not on the broader structure of the Medicaid program as a
whole, and thus evince congressional intent to create individual
rights.
In holding otherwise, the Casillas court relied on Rodriguez v.
City of New York, 197 F.3d 611 (2d Cir. 1999). In Rodriguez, New York
had elected to provide certain types of personal care services to
individuals with disabilities, which were not among the services it
was required to provide under the Availability Requirement. Id. at
613. Plaintiffs contended that, under the Comparability Requirement,
the state was required to provide "safety monitoring," a different
service that plaintiffs alleged was comparable to the personal care
services that the state had chosen to cover. Id. at 616. The Second

20

Circuit rejected plaintiffs' argument, noting that "[a] holding to the
contrary would

create a disincentive for states to provide services

opt1onal under reaeral law lest a

courL

deem o t h e r ~ervlceB

'comparable' to those provided ... thereby increasing the costs of the
optional services." Id.
The right asserted in Rodriguez is very different from the right
asserted here. The Rodriguez plaintiffs sought access to a specific
service that the state was not required to provide and that it had not
chosen to provide to anyone. Here, by contrast, plaintiffs allege that
the specific treatments they seek are already provided to other
Medicaid recipients but have been denied to them on the basis of their
GD diagnoses alone. This, they allege, demonstrates that the services
they receive under New York's Medicaid program are not "equal in
amount, duration, and scope" to those received by other categorically
needy individuals. 42 C.F.R.

§

440.240(b).

In Casillas, the court found that the right asserted by plaintiff
would, as in Rodriguez, create a disincentive for states to provide
specific treatments: "the state would have to consider other possible
diagnoses for which the treatment might be prescribed before deciding
whether to make it available for any single condition." Id. at 244.
While that may be the case, requiring the state to undertake such
considerations is entirely consistent with the purpose of an antidiscrimination provision. In enacting the Comparability Requirement,
Congress made clear that the states may not blithely provide services
to some of their needy residents while denying the same services to

21

others who are equally needy. Thus, this is not a reason to find that
the Comparability Requirement does not give rise to an individual
right.
The Comparability Requirement also satisfies the second and third
prongs of the Blessing test. The standard set forth in the statute
that services provided to some categorically needy individuals may not
be "less in amount, duration, or scope" than those provided to others
is neither vague nor amorphous. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (1) (B) (i). And
by directing that services "shall" be comparable, Congress made clear
that this requirement was mandatory and binding on the states.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the Comparability Requirement
creates an enforceable individual right.

6

Finally, although defendant makes no argument regarding the EPSDT
Requirement, see supra note 2,

the Court finds that the EPSDT

Requirement is also privately enforceable under Section 1983. As
numerous courts have held, the EPSDT Requirement (1)

is unmistakably

focused on the rights of Medicaid-eligible youth to receive the
enumerated services,

(2) provides detailed, objective, and manageable

standards, including specific services that must be provided, and (3)
is binding on states. See, e.g., Dajour B. v. City of New York, No. 00
Civ. 2044, 2001 WL 830674, at *8-*10

(S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2001); see

Numerous other courts have so held. See, e.g., Davis v. Shah, No.
12-CV-6134 CJS, 2013 WL 6451176, at *12 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2013);
Michelle P. ex rel. Deisenroth v. Holsinger, 356 F. Supp. 2d 763, 767
(E.D. Ky. 2005); Health Care For All, Inc. v. Romney, No. CIV.A.0010833-RWZ, 2004 WL 3088654, at *2 (D. Mass. Oct. 1, 2004); Antrican v.
Buell, 158 F. Supp. 2d 663, 672 (E.D.N.C. 2001) aff'd sub nom.
Antrican v. Odom, 290 F.3d 178 (4th Cir. 2002).
6

22

also Salazar v. District of Columbia, 729 F. Supp. 2d 257, 269 (D.D.C.
2010) .
Because the court round

that

the Availab:LLLLy,

Comparab:Ll:Lty,

and

EPSDT Requirements create private rights enforceable via Section 1983,
the Court denied the portion of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss
Counts I, II, and VI.
With respect to certain of plaintiffs' other claims, however, the
Court found that defendant's motion had merit, at least in part.
Regarding plaintiffs' claim that Amended Section 505.2(1) violates the
Reasonable Standards Requirement (Count III), this claim is brought
pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
See U.S. Const. art. VI.

7

In his motion, defendant argued that the

Supreme Court's recent opinion in Armstrong v. Exceptional Child
Center, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015), establishes that plaintiffs have
no cause of action under the Supremacy Clause to enforce the
Reasonable Standards Requirement.
In Armstrong, the Court held that the Supremacy Clause does not
confer a private right of action. Id. at 1384. Furthermore, although
federal courts have inherent authority to enjoin unconstitutional
actions by state and federal officials, that authority "is subject to
express and implied statutory limitations." Id. at 1385. Specifically,

Plaintiffs also allege that the Availability and Comparability
Requirements (Counts I and II) are preempted by the Supremacy Clause.
Because the Court finds that plaintiffs have a private right of action
to enforce these provisions under Section 1983, it does not address
whether they may also bring their claims pursuant to the Supremacy
Clause.
7

23

where a statute "implicitly precludes private enforcement," a
plaintiff "cannot, by invoking our equitable powers, circumvent

At issue in that case was Section 30(A) of the Medicaid Act,
which requires state plans to:
provide
such methods
and procedures
relating
to
the
utilization of, and the payment for, care and services
available under the plan ... as may be necessary to safeguard
against unnecessary utilization of such care and services
and to assure that payments are consistent with efficiency,
economy, and quality of care and are sufficient to enlist
enough providers so that care and services are available
under the plan at least to the extent that such care and
services are available to the general population in the
geographic area ...
42 U.S. C.

§

13 96a (a) ( 3 O) (A) . The Court held that Section 3 O (A) is not

privately enforceable because, first,

the statute provides an express

method of enforcement, namely withholding of Medicaid funds by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services. Id. at 1385 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§

1396c). The creation of an administrative remedy, the Court held,

evinced Congress's intent to preclude private enforcement. Second, the
Court found that Section 30(A) was not amenable to private enforcement
because its mandate was so "judgment-laden," "broad[]," and
"complex[]" as to be "judicially unadministrable." Id.
Like Section 30(A), the Reasonable Standards Requirement is
subject to an express administrative enforcement mechanism, viz.,
defunding by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 42 U.S.C.
1396c. Furthermore, this provision consists of a broad grant of
discretion to the states to implement "reasonable standards ... for

24

§

determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance under
the plan" that are "consistent with the objectives of [the Medicaid
Act]."

42

U.S.C.

§

l396a(a) (l7).

("Section 1396a(a) (17)

er.

Watson,

436

Y.3d

at

1162

is a general discretion-granting requirement

that a state adopt reasonable standards."). Like Section 30(A), it
focuses on programmatic aspects of the state plan as a whole, rather
than on the specific benefits that must be accorded to individuals.
Therefore, the Court concluded that the Reasonable Standards
Requirement is not privately enforceable under Armstrong. Accordingly,
the Court granted defendant's motion to dismiss Count III.
Turning to Count V, defendant argued in his motion that
plaintiffs failed to state a claim for violation of Section 1557 of
the ACA with respect to the Youth Exclusion. Section 1557 provides
that "an individual shall not ... be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under, any
health program or activity" that receives federal funding on the basis
of certain criteria, including sex. 42 U.S.C.

§

18116. On a motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6), a court must assess whether the complaint
"contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678
544, 570

(2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

(2007)). Defendant argues that the Youth Exclusion draws

distinctions on the basis of age, not sex, and therefore does not
violate this provision.

25

Plaintiffs respond that the Youth Exclusion discriminates on the
basis of sex in two ways:

"(1) that certain services are available to

non-i::;ransgenaer peop1-e Due denied

medically necessary; or (2)

cu

t.ra_ns9ender peuple where

that regardless of the availability of

these treatments to people generally, these coverage exclusions have a
disparate impact on transgender people for whom these services are
medically necessary." Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss dated May 8, 2015, ECF No. 34, at 19. 8
However, plaintiffs fail to allege any facts in support of either
theory.

9

Most notably, plaintiffs fail to allege that the treatments

barred by the Youth Exclusion are available to non-transgender youth.
In the absence of such an allegation, defendant's failure to make such
services available to transgender youth cannot constitute sex
discrimination. Thus, although the Court is cognizant of the principle
that "[c]omplaints alleging civil rights violations must be construed
especially liberally," United States v. City of New York, 359 F.3d 83,
91 (2d Cir. 2004), here there is nothing to construe. Accordingly, the
Court granted defendant's motion to dismiss Claim V of the Amended

It is not settled whether a disparate impact claim is cognizable
under Section 1557 of the ACA. See Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs.,
No. 14-CV-2037 SRN/FLN, 2015 WL~97415, at *12 (D. Minn. Mar. 16,
2015)
8

The only factual allegation in the Amended Complaint relating to
treatment of transgender youth is that "numerous respected clinics
around the United States provide medical services for people diagnosed
with GD/GID who are under the age of eighteen." Am. Compl. ~ 89. This
allegation cannot support plaintiffs' claim of discrimination.
9

26

complaint with respect to the Youth Exclusion for failure to state a
claim.
Defendant also argued

in his motion that p l a i n t i f f s

falled

to

state a claim for violation of the Comparability Requirement because
they failed to plead sufficient factual support for their contention
that they have not received comparable services. However, plaintiffs
clearly allege that defendant provides medical coverage to similarly
situated Medicaid recipients suffering from conditions other than GD
for the surgical procedures and other treatments that are denied to
them under Amended Section 505.2(1), and cite a provision of the DOH
regulations supporting that contention. Am. Compl.
(citing 18 N.Y.C.R.R.

§

~~

107, 146, 160

533.5). These paragraphs adequately plead

violations of the Comparability Requirement, as they allege that
defendant has provided medically necessary procedures to some
individuals but not to others. See Providence Pediatric Med. Daycare,
Inc. v. Alaigh, 799 F. Supp. 2d 364, 374

(D.N.J. 2011)

(denying motion

to dismiss where plaintiffs alleged that certain "children are not
receiving those services that their physicians have designated as
medically necessary").
Defendant further argued that plaintiffs' claims with respect to
the Cosmetic Procedures Exclusion are not yet ripe for adjudication
because plaintiffs failed to plead that they have requested and been
denied any of the procedures barred by Amended Section 505.2(1). "A
claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future
events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at

27

all." Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300

(1998)

(internal

quotation marks omitted). However, courts within this circuit do not
require "a futile gesture as a prerequisite

for adjudicatlon ln

federal court." Desiderio v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 191
F.3d 198, 202

(2d Cir. 1999)

(quoting Williams v. Lambert, 46 F.3d

1275, 1280 (2d Cir. 1995)). Amended Section 505.2(1), by its plain
terms, excludes coverage for the procedures deemed "cosmetic." See
Amended Section 505.2(1) (4)

(stating that "[p]ayment will not be made"

for "cosmetic surgery, services, and procedures including but not
limited to" the enumerated procedures) . Furthermore, the Department of
Health's Medicaid Update makes clear that "payment will not be made
for" the services deemed "cosmetic." Declaration of Arthur Biller
dated May 8, 2015, Ex. 2, at 16. Therefore, the Court finds that any
attempt to seek coverage for the so-called "cosmetic" services would
have been a "futile gesture" and was not required to render
plaintiffs' claims ripe for adjudication.
Accordingly, the Court denied defendant's motion to dismiss
plaintiffs' claims regarding the Cosmetic Procedures Exclusion as
unripe.
Finally, defendant argued in his motion that plaintiffs' Claim
IV, for violation of the equal protection provisions of the New York
State Constitution, is barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the United
States Constitution because it asserts a purely state law claim
against a state official. See Concourse Rehab. & Nursing Ctr., Inc. v.
DeBuono, 179 F.3d 38, 44

(2d Cir. 1999); Morningside Supermarket Corp.

28

v. New York State Dep't of Health, 432 F. Supp. 2d 334, 339 (S.D.N.Y.
2006)

(dismissing state law claims against DOH official as barred by

argument. See Transcript dated May 22, 2015, ECF No. 41, at 6:18.
Accordingly, the Court granted defendant's motion to dismiss Count IV
of the Amended Complaint. 10
For the foregoing reasons, the Court, by Order dated June 26,
2015, dismissed Claims III and IV, and also dismissed Claim V with
respect to the Youth Exclusion, but otherwise denied defendant's
motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint.

~-"

Dated: New York, New York
July :tj_, 2015

10

U.S.D.J.

Defendant raised several other arguments for the first time in his
reply papers. Because these arguments were not raised in his opening
brief, they were waived, and the Court does not address them. See
Knipe v. Skinner, 999 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Arguments may not
be made for the first time in a reply brief.").
29